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Data has become a social and political issue because of its capacity to reconfigure 
relationships between states, subjects, and citizens. This book explores how data 
has acquired such an important capacity and examines how critical interventions in 
its uses in both theory and practice are possible.
Data and politics are now inseparable: data is not only shaping our social 
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national contributors consider political questions about data and the ways it 
provokes subjects to govern themselves by making rights claims. Concerned with 
the things (infrastructures of servers, devices, and cables) and language (code, 
programming, and algorithms) that make up cyberspace, this book demonstrates 
that without understanding these conditions of possibility it is impossible to 
intervene in or to shape data politics.
Aimed at academics and postgraduate students interested in political aspects of 
data, this volume will also be of interest to experts in the fields of internet studies, 
international studies, Big Data, digital social sciences, and humanities.
Didier Bigo is Professor of War Studies at King’s College London and Research 
Professor at Sciences-Po, CERI Paris.
Engin Isin is Professor in International Politics at Queen Mary University of 
London, UK and University of London Institute in Paris (ULIP).
Evelyn Ruppert is Professor of Sociology at Goldsmiths, University of London.
Routledge Studies in International Political Sociology
Series Editors:
Tugba Basaran, University of Kent, UK, Didier Bigo, King’s College 
London, UK, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet, University of Manchester, UK,  
Jef Huysmans, Queen Mary, University of London, UK
Routledge Studies in International Political Sociology aims to provide a forum for out-
standing empirical and theoretical research engaging with the interplays between 
the international, the political and the social. This timely book series draws 
upon significant theoretical and empirical challenges within the growing critical 
approach of international political sociology. It seeks to address, to encourage and 
to conceptualise the knowledge and understanding of transversal issues at stake 
when exploring the different components of the heterogeneous worlds hidden 
behind International Relations.
For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge.com/
Routledge-Studies-in-International-Political-Sociology/book-series/IPS
Perspectives From International Political Sociology
Transversal Lines in International Relations
Edited by Tugba Basaran, Didier Bigo, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet & RBJ Walker
Data Politics
Worlds, Subjects, Rights
Edited by Didier Bigo, Engin Isin and Evelyn Ruppert
DATA POLITICS
Worlds, Subjects, Rights
Edited by Didier Bigo, Engin Isin, and  
Evelyn Ruppert
First published 2019
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
 2019 selection and editorial matter, Didier Bigo, Engin Isin, and Evelyn 
Ruppert; individual chapters, the contributors.
The right of Didier Bigo, Engin Isin, and Evelyn Ruppert to be identified 
as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their 
individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 
of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
The Open Access version of this book, available at www.taylorfrancis.com, 
has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non 
Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or 
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation 
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Bigo, Didier, editor. | Isin, Engin F. (Engin Fahri), 1959- editor. | 
Ruppert, Evelyn Sharon, 1959- editor.
Title: Data politics : worlds, subjects, rights / edited by Didier Bigo, Engin 
Isin and Evelyn Ruppert.
Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2019. | 
Series: Routledge studies in international political sociology |  
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018054225| ISBN 9781138053250 (hardback) | 
ISBN 9781138053267 (pbk.) | ISBN 9781315167305 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Big data—Political aspects. | Big data—Social aspects.
Classification: LCC QA76.9.B45 D385 2019 | DDC 005.7—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018054225
ISBN: 9781138053250 (hbk)
ISBN: 9781138053267 (pbk)
ISBN: 9781315167305 (ebk)
Typeset in Bembo
by Swales & Willis Ltd, Exeter, Devon, UK
CONTENTS
List of illustrations vii
List of contributors viii
Acknowledgements x
 1 Data politics 1
Didier Bigo, Engin Isin, and Evelyn Ruppert
PART I
Conditions of possibility of data politics 19
 2 Knowledge infrastructures under siege: climate data as  
memory, truce, and target 21
Paul N. Edwards
 3 Against infrasomatization: towards a critical theory  
of algorithms 43
David M. Berry
 4 Surveillance capitalism, surveillance culture and data politics 64
David Lyon
PART II
Worlds 79
 5 Mutual entanglement and complex sovereignty in cyberspace 81
Ronald J. Deibert and Louis W. Pauly
vi Contents
 6 Digital data and the transnational intelligence space 100
Didier Bigo and Laurent Bonelli
 7 From fake to junk news: the data politics of online virality 123
Tommaso Venturini
 8 Seeing like Big Tech: security assemblages, technology,  
and the future of state bureaucracy 145
Félix Tréguer
PART III
Subjects 165
 9 Towards data justice: bridging anti-surveillance and  
social justice activism 167
Lina Dencik, Arne Hintz and Jonathan Cable
10 Theses on automation and labour 187
Brett Neilson and Ned Rossiter
11 Data’s empire: postcolonial data politics 207
Engin Isin and Evelyn Ruppert
PART IV
Rights 229
12 The right to data oblivion 231
Giovanni Ziccardi
13 Data citizens: how to reinvent rights 248
Jennifer Gabrys
14 Data rights: claiming privacy rights through international  
institutions 267
Elspeth Guild
Index 285
ILLUSTRATIONS
Figures
2.1 Northern Hemisphere Average Temperatures 29
2.2 BEST Annual Land-Surface Temperature Analysis 33
3.1 Soylent: a word processor with a crowd inside  
(Bernstein et al 2015) 53
3.2 “Find-Fix-Verify” (Bernstein et al 2010, 58) 55
3.3 Shortn algorithm: even though it claims use of a “wizard”  
it nonetheless informs the user of the current cost  
and number of workers currently working 56
6.1 Most Contributing Variables on Axes 1 and 2 of the MCA 113
6.2 The Space of Institutional Positions 114
Table
9.1 List of Interviews 174
Textbox
6.1 Methodological Details 111
CONTRIBUTORS
The editors
Didier Bigo is Professor of War Studies at King’s College London and Research 
Professor at Sciences-Po, CERI Paris. He is editor of the quarterly journal, Cultures 
& Conflicts, and was the founder and co-editor of the journal, International Political 
Sociology, published by the International Studies Association. His work concerns 
sociology of surveillance, policing, and borders. He co-edited Transversal Lines 
(with Tugba Basaran, Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet and R. B. J. Walker, 2016) as part 
of the Routledge Studies in International Political Sociology.
Engin Isin is Professor in International Politics at Queen Mary University of 
London and University of London Institute in Paris (ULIP). Isin’s work concerns 
politics of the changing figure of the citizen as a political subject. He has authored 
Cities Without Citizens (1992), Citizenship and Identity (with Patricia Wood, 1999), 
Being Political (2002), Citizens Without Frontiers (2012), and Being Digital Citizens 
(with Evelyn Ruppert, 2015). He has edited Acts of Citizenship (2008) with Greg 
Nielsen, Enacting European Citizenship (2013) with Michael Saward and Routledge 
Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies (2014) with Peter Nyers. His latest book is 
Citizenship after Orientalism: Transforming Political Theory (2015).
Evelyn Ruppert is Professor of Sociology at Goldsmiths, University of London. 
She studies how digital technologies and the data they generate can powerfully 
shape and have consequences for how people are known and governed and how 
they understand themselves as political subjects, that is, citizens with rights to data. 
Evelyn is PI of an ERC funded project, Peopling Europe: How data make a people 
(ARITHMUS; 2014–19). She is Founding and Editor-in-Chief of the SAGE open 
access journal, Big Data & Society. Recent books are Being Digital Citizens (with 
Engin Isin, 2015) and Modes of Knowing (with John Law, 2016).
Contributors ix
The contributors
David M. Berry, Professor of Digital Humanities, University of Sussex; Visiting 
Fellow, School of Advanced Studies, University of London; and Associate Member, 
Faculty of History, University of Oxford.
Laurent Bonelli, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Paris- 
Nanterre.
Jonathan Cable, Lecturer, School of Media, University of Gloucestershire.
Ronald J. Deibert, Professor, Political Science and Director, Citizen Lab, Munk 
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, University of Toronto.
Lina Dencik, Reader, School of Journalism, Media and Culture, Cardiff 
University.
Paul N. Edwards, William J. Perry Fellow in International Security, Center for 
International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, and Professor of 
Information and History (Emeritus), University of Michigan.
Jennifer Gabrys, Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge.
Elspeth Guild, Jean Monnet Professor ad personam Queen Mary University of 
London and Radboud University Nijmegen.
Arne Hintz, Senior Lecturer, School of Journalism, Media and Culture, Cardiff 
University.
David Lyon, Director, Surveillance Studies Centre, Professor of Sociology and 
Professor of Law, Queen’s University.
Brett Neilson, Professor, Institute for Culture and Society, Western Sydney 
University.
Louis W. Pauly, J. Stefan Dupré Distinguished Professor of Political Economy, 
Department of Political Science and Munk School of Global Affairs and Public 
Policy, University of Toronto.
Ned Rossiter, Professor of Communication, Institute for Culture and Society and 
the School of Humanities and Communication Arts, Western Sydney University.
Félix Tréguer, Postdoctoral Researcher, Centre National de la Recherche 
Scientifique (CNRS).
Tommaso Venturini, Advanced Research Fellow, French Institute for Research 
in Computer Science and Automation (INRIA).
Giovanni Ziccardi, Legal Informatics Chair and Director of the Information 
Society Law Centre (ISLC), Faculty of Law, University of Milan.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We would like to thank the editors of the series, Routledge Studies in International 
Political Sociology for their support and encouragement. Many thanks also go to 
Claire Maloney and Robert Sorsby at Routledge who helped guide this book 
through the production process. We would also like to thank Margaret Gillespie 
Cheesman, a PhD candidate at the Oxford Internet Institute, for the editorial 
assistance she provided. Her attentiveness and professionalism made invaluable 
contributions to the production of this collection. We are grateful for the contri-
butions the authors made by responding to our initial framing and provocation 
and delivering inspiring chapters that enrich our understanding of data politics. 
We acknowledge that the research leading to this book was supported by fund-
ing from a European Research Council (ERC) Consolidator Grant 615588 
(ARITHMUS; PI Evelyn Ruppert) and a French National Research Agency 
(ANR) Grant (2014-UTIC: PI Didier Bigo).
1
DATA POLITICS1
Didier Bigo, Engin Isin, and Evelyn Ruppert
Introduction
In 1983, Ian Hacking (2015) described the period between 1820 and 1840 
as the “avalanche of printed numbers” in Europe and America. Hacking was 
reflecting on Michel Foucault’s concept of biopolitics that targeted “popula-
tion” with its own characteristics as an object of government in the nineteenth 
century. This invention was related to developments not least the birth of a 
science – statistics, Hacking’s primary concern – but also associated sciences 
such as demography and probability, and data production practices such as the 
census and administrative registers. Hacking emphatically characterised that as 
the period when the “statistical study of populations comes to amass gigantic 
quantities of data” (2015, 280).
As Hacking was identifying “gigantic quantities of data” a new term was rapidly 
becoming popular in Euro-American languages: “personal computer”. The inven-
tion of large-scale data processing machines following the Second World War 
was giving way to the miniaturisation of both processors and components of a 
computer – storage, graphics, controllers, and cooling. By the late 1980s a personal 
computer could already store and process all the “gigantic data” collected about 
populations between 1820 and 1840. This would have been truly wondrous to 
William Farr (1807–1883), a compiler of abstracts for the newly-founded (1836) 
Office of the Registrar-General of England and Wales who remained in office for 
40 years (2015, 284). Hacking recounts that it was Farr who pirated a Swedish 
computing machine with more than 5,000 moving parts for use in the Office 
of the Registrar-General (Hacking 2015, 291). Two centuries later, a hand-held 
device could store and process such gigantic data.
Although the contemporary period has been described as the era of data revo-
lution (Kitchin 2014, Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013), we insist that it be 
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placed in a longer history. The personal computer of the 1980s morphed into 
a ubiquitous device of the twenty-first century, became connected with other 
devices through the Internet (a word born in 1980), converged storing and pro-
cessing of data with sharing, led to the invention of protocols for collecting, 
representing, and sharing of data, and generated not only an Internet of people but 
also of things. Now, the amount of data generated and collected from these devices 
and the interests, authorities, and expertise required to render them useful make 
the data revolution of the 1820s appear rather miniscule but we need to understand 
the present as part of a broader historical transformation.
When Edward Snowden, a security operative working for the CIA, walked 
out of his office for the last time in 2013 (thereafter he became an exile), to reveal 
that national security organisations had been “harvesting” and “mining” gigantic 
masses of data generated by devices, he was carrying a small storage device capable 
of holding thousands times more data than was amassed between 1820 and 1840 
(Bauman et al. 2014, Lyon 2014, Toxen 2014). His act revealed not only the truly 
enormous quantities of data that have been amassed from devices about those 
who use them and their interconnections and communications but also the varie-
ties of analytical and algorithmic technologies invented to analyse and interpret 
them. The question now is how to place the 1980–2020 period within a broader 
historical transformation?
This book attempts to step back from these developments to position them 
within a broad historical-sociological perspective to articulate an international 
political sociology of data politics. We offer it not to express awe in contemporary 
technological developments but draw attention to social and political practices and 
arrangements that made them possible. Unlike many interpreters, Hacking under-
stood Foucault’s work as involving different histories of life, labour, and language 
and argued that Foucault provides both short and long histories of life (Hacking 
2015, 279). He saw Foucault’s distinction between body politics (discipline) and 
biopolitics (regulation) as different perspectives on the same series:
There is a longer and a shorter story of biopolitics. The longer story gradually 
assumes a definite form in the mid-eighteenth century, and it continues today. 
Whereas Foucault’s early books talked of sharp transformations, his research 
on sexuality directs itself not to mutation and revolution but to evolution 
in the longer term. There is no inconsistency in this: the world knows both 
revolution and evolution.
(Hacking 2015, 281)
The sharp change that Hacking detects in 1820–1840, he argued, belongs 
to the longer story of biopolitics. Moreover, he also admitted that 1820 and 
1840 are arbitrary dates and more precisely these should be 1839 and 1848. 
Why? The gigantic accumulation of numbers actually bracketed two European 
political revolutions:
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It represented an overt political response by the state. Find out more about 
your citizens, cried the conservative enthusiasts, and you will ameliorate 
their conditions, diminish their restlessness, and strengthen their character. 
Statistics, in that period, was called moral science: its aim was information 
about and control of the moral tenor of the population.
(2015, 281)
Hacking then goes on to illustrate how calculating machines originated from 
the need to collect, store, and analyse these numbers and how the longer history of 
biopolitics made the conditions of possibility of the invention of statistics as a moral 
science of the state and how this science has driven calculating machine tech-
nologies in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. Although there have 
been various studies since Hacking’s article that explored the rise of census, survey, 
and statistical technologies as developments of biopolitics (Desrosières 1998, Porter 
1986), we want to see recent developments within a similar series.
The purpose of this book is to think about recent transformations in data politics. 
In our introduction we position these in historical-sociological terms, especially of 
the kind that Foucault and Bourdieu initiated and Hacking and others expanded 
and modified. For there are fundamental differences between empire-states amass-
ing gigantic amounts of data for governing metropole and colonial populations in 
the nineteenth century and the complex assemblage of public and private authori-
ties and interests invested in the production of data in the twenty-first century. 
This book is certainly about these differences. But it is also about situating these 
differences in relation to social, economic, and political conditions when such a 
modern regime of government emerged and of which we are still subjects. As a 
contribution to international political sociology we want to consider the condi-
tions of possibility of data politics as a field of power and knowledge (Bigo 2011, 
Bigo and Walker 2007, Bonditti, Bigo, and Gros 2017).
What is data politics?
If not for the rapid development of the Internet and its connected devices “data” 
would have probably remained a relatively obscure concept or term confined to 
these sciences. Yet, data has become a social and political issue not only because it 
concerns anyone who is connected to the Internet but also because it reconfigures 
relationships between states, subjects, and citizens. Just about every device is now 
connected to the Internet and generating vast quantities of digital traces about inter-
actions, transactions, and movements whether users are aware or not. What started 
as an ostensibly liberated space rapidly became the space over and through which 
governments and corporations began collecting, storing, retrieving, analysing, and 
presenting data that records what people do and say on the Internet. This ranges 
from who communicates with whom, who goes where, and who says what – and 
much more besides. This is now being augmented with data that people collect 
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about themselves, especially their relations, body movements, and measurements; 
the amount and range of data that has become available is, as everyone now knows, 
staggering. There has never been a state, monarchy, kingdom, empire, government, 
or corporation in history that has had command over such granular, immediate, var-
ied, and detailed data about subjects and objects that concern them. What exactly 
governments, corporations, and a whole series of agencies and authorities collect, 
analyse, and deploy is complex but it is now generally understood that data has 
become a major object of economic, political, and social investment for govern-
ing subjects. This development has been captured by the term “big data” to mark 
a departure from conventional forms of data and statistical knowledge. While first 
coined by industry, big data has come to have different meanings and uses but sig-
nificantly, and along with the increasing ubiquity of data in everyday life, the term 
has become less prominent. Notably, attention has started shift to a focus on com-
putation and analytics such as algorithms, machine learning, artificial intelligence, 
and the Internet of things. Yet, data remains a key matter of concern as both the 
product and condition of computation and analytics.
Scholarship on these developments has understandably focused on issues con-
cerning surveillance, privacy, anonymity, and types of conduct that the Internet 
cultivates about always-connected, always-measured selves. Perhaps equal to the 
measure of the influence of the Internet there has been scholarship on data ranging 
from warnings about its consequences (surveillance, privacy, isolation) to types of 
conduct (racism, misogyny, bullyism). Along with this, numerous studies, reports, 
guidelines, regulations, and legislation concerning data protection and the rights of 
data subjects have proliferated.
Data Politics builds on this scholarship but it aims to make three distinct yet 
interrelated contributions to an international political sociology of data politics.
The first concerns a shift in focus from the politics of or in data to data as a force that 
is generative of politics. In this view, rather than settled in databases or archives, data 
is a force realised through its production, uptake and deployments. We want to draw 
the implications of thinking about data not as an inert representation but a language 
with performative force as Bourdieu (1993, 1973) and Butler (1997) have shown. 
That is, data politics is concerned with not only political struggles over data produc-
tion and its deployments, but how data is generative of new forms of power relations 
and politics at different and interconnected scales. If indeed data enacts that which it 
represents, this signifies two things. To collect, store, retrieve, analyse, and present data 
through various methods means to bring those objects and subjects that data speaks of 
into being. Data sciences such as statistics, probability, and analytics have emerged not 
because they have merely quenched our curiosities but because these sciences have 
been useful for the objects and subjects they have brought into being for the purposes 
of governing and/or profit. And, to speak constantly about data as though it either 
represents or records subjects and objects and their movements, independent from the 
social and political struggles that govern them, is to mask such struggles.
That data is generative of new power relations and politics is evident in the 
recent struggles over how big data was allegedly used in the US election and UK 
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referendum to create personalised political advertising to influence how people 
voted. Referring to these electoral uses, George Monbiot writing in The Guardian 
noted that we must act now to own these new political technologies before they 
own us. He was of course referring to the work of a company called Cambridge 
Analytica, which was partly owned by US billionaire Robert Mercer, who also 
happens to be a friend of former UKIP leader Nigel Farage. It was widely reported 
that the company allegedly influenced both the US election and the UK refer-
endum by mining data from Facebook and using it to create profiles predicting 
people’s personalities and then tailoring advertising to their psychological pro-
files. While some of the claims that this happened were brought into question, 
including denials from Cambridge Analytica, the UK’s privacy watchdog – the 
Information Commissioner’s Office – deemed there was sufficient cause to launch 
an inquiry. These claims and denials were soon followed by the disclosure that 
the personal information of up to 87 million users was harvested without their 
permission by an app designed by a Cambridge academic. The seriousness of this 
breach intensified when Cambridge Analytica claimed that hundreds of companies 
harvest such data and that it is legal to do so. Or when the Cambridge academic at 
the centre of the controversy claimed that it was both legal and ethically accept-
able to sell data to a third party. Or when CEO Mark Zuckerberg admitted that 
Facebook took no action to ensure that the tens of thousands of apps it approved 
adhered to their terms of service.
So, in the wake of already uneven power and influence over electoral 
processes – such as campaign financing and media alliances – we now have mis-
information, disinformation, and techniques such as bot-swarming whereby fake 
online accounts are created to give the impression that large numbers of people 
support a political position. For these reasons, Oscar Gandy recently argued that 
this calls for a shift of attention away from a focus on privacy or surveillance and 
the collection and processing of information to how information is being used 
and misused (Gandy and Tsui 2018).
What these examples illustrate is that data and politics are inseparable. Data is 
not only shaping our social relations, preferences, and life chances but our very 
democracies. And that is how we want to speak of data politics. However, a 
problem with these views on data politics is that the subjects who are constituted 
as the addressee are presumably the affected Internet subjects. This is the second 
intervention that has led us to articulate what we call data politics. It concerns 
atomism: often such pronouncements address atomised individuals who need 
to protect themselves from the dangers of the Internet and its manipulations. It 
is based on the ontological premise of “hyper-individualism” whereby persons, 
events and phenomena are treated as independent and “atomistic” entities (Lake 
2017). Data politics that emerges from this reaction is one of urging people to 
protect themselves as individuals. It is almost as if the narrative says “yes, there is 
collective work that needs to be done but ultimately it is up to you to change your 
behaviour to protect yourself from the dark forces of the Internet”. The addressee 
in other words is the atomised subject whose data is individualised rather than 
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understood as a product of collective relations with other subjects and technologies 
(Socialising Big Data Project 2015).
A third intervention concerns the immediacy that pervades these reactions or 
responses. They are predominantly exercised by the immediacy of a threat, danger, 
menace, risk, or peril or insecurity or unease that the Internet ostensibly engenders. 
Even those who have fought battles with governments and corporations to expose 
their data practices fall prey to a Messianic creep in articulating political problems 
by decrying their immediacy.
The obverse response to these reactions has been to extol the virtues of the 
Internet and illustrate that if it is not liberating it is at least making our lives better 
organised, measured, improved, whatever. Yes, there may be dangers and inse-
curities but this is a small price to pay for the benefits it brings. This response is 
still riddled with immediacy and atomism. Its calculative logic is from the point of 
view of the atomised subject weighing the pros and cons of the Internet against the 
threats of immediacy.
All this has led us to the conclusion that data politics is yet to find its subjects. 
This book attempts to step back from the inertness, atomism, and immediacy 
of the dominant points of view of the Internet and the data it generates and 
ask questions about data politics and position these within a broad historical-
sociological perspective. What do we then mean by an international political 
sociology of data politics?
We start with the assumption that the will to knowledge and the will to power 
are two aspects of how we conduct ourselves and the conduct of others, and thus 
we approach data not as a representation (i.e., information collected, stored, and 
presented without interest) but as an object whose production interests those who 
exercise power. This was at least one of the lessons we have learned from Michel 
Foucault’s studies of the ways in which modern societies come to depend on gov-
erning subjects with data collected over not only their physical and social attributes 
(life, language, labour) but also about the conduct of their behaviour (Foucault 
2007). Our second assumption is that the production of data is a social and often 
political practice that mobilises agents who are not only objects of data (about whom 
data is produced) but that they are also subjects of data (those whose engagement 
drives how data is produced). Our question thus shifts to social practices and agents. 
Just as the avalanche of numbers was an aspect of the birth of a modern regime of 
government, in our age data does not happen through unstructured social practices 
but through structured and structuring fields in and through which various agents 
and their interests generate forms of expertise, interpretation, concepts, and methods 
that collectively function as fields of power and knowledge. This was at least one of 
the lessons we learned from Pierre Bourdieu’s studies on the ways in which fields 
of knowledge constitute fields of power (Bourdieu 1988) that involve struggle and 
change, fragile moments, and the emergence of new kinds of practices (Bigo 2011).
Foucault and Bourdieu influenced a generation of scholars who have taken up 
the relations between power, knowledge, and fields and investigated the ways in 
which states, agencies, organisations, corporations, and institutions – often assembled 
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in different combinations as governments – constituted their authority, legitimacy, 
and legality by producing knowledge about objects and subjects through establish-
ing method and data regimes such as censuses, indexes, indicators, registers, rolls, 
catalogues, logs, and archives. We now understand much better the relationships 
between state formation and statistics, probability, and data regimes (Desrosières 1998, 
Hacking 1990, Porter 1986). Statistics, from their very beginning, combined “the 
norms of the scientific world with those of the modern, rational state” (Desrosières 
1998). These data regimes have now been extensively studied as historical develop-
ments. The birth of objects of knowledge such as the economy, population, society 
and their sciences – originally called political arithmetic and now statistics — have 
also been studied extensively. Although it would be impossible to summarise what 
we now know about these data regimes and the state, the overall insight we have 
gained can be stated as follows. While Max Weber’s argument that the sovereignty 
of the state consists in its monopoly of the means of violence is often cited, following 
the studies of Foucault and Bourdieu and the literature inspired by them, we have 
come to recognise that this sovereignty depends on numerous practices beyond the 
organisation of violence. Historically, the state performs sovereignty with control 
over and dependence on especially education, fiscal, and cultural data regimes. This 
does not mean that citizens in each state did not influence, interfere, or intervene in 
the ways that data regimes constituted them as data subjects. On the contrary, schol-
ars have also investigated and documented how citizens have developed democratic 
practices to challenge social categories of data regimes and their effects (Anderson 
and Fienberg 2000, Kertzer and Arel 2002, Nobles 2000). There are many cases that 
illustrate how, for example, census categories such as race, ethnicity, gender, and 
other indexes have been called into question, subverted, and transformed.
Nonetheless, the state, or rather organisations, institutions, agencies, agents, and 
authorities that make up the complex field of government, maintained an effective 
monopoly on data regimes concerning whole populations. This is not to say that 
corporations did not also generate data about their customers especially over the last 
century or so but this was largely limited to specific population groups and in rela-
tion to narrow concerns. Beginning in the early-twentieth century, opinion polling 
and marketing research were considerable developments in corporate forms of pop-
ulation data generation (Osborne and Rose 1999). And although there have been 
various international organisations that have entered into fields of data generation and 
accumulation such as the United Nations, the European Union, Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation Development, and the International Labour Organisation, 
the primary site and scene of the collection of population data and its various regimes 
have remained the monopoly of the state for nearly four centuries.
This monopoly of the state over data production, collection, and even inter-
ception is increasingly challenged. Or, at least, state sovereignty over data regimes 
is now shared by the birth of entirely new assemblages of the production of data 
(Kitchin 2014). Not least has been the increasing accumulation and mobilisation 
of data by corporations (Thrift 2005). It is tempting to immediately single out 
the Internet and its connected devices as the source of this challenge. But it is 
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much more complicated than that as our argument above anticipates. It would 
be folly to assume that Internet technologies develop independently from the 
interests that constitute the fields through which various data regimes have been 
invented. However, beyond technological developments, the sovereignty of the 
state in accumulating and producing data about its population, territory, health, 
wealth, and security is being challenged by corporations, agencies, authorities, and 
organisations that are producing myriad data about subjects whose interactions, 
transactions, and movements traverse borders of states in new and complicated 
patterns. Not least, these traversals challenge the methodological nationalism that 
has dominated statistical thought and practice and their corresponding bounda-
ries of population data, knowledge and power for centuries (Scheel et al. 2016). 
While Bourdieu’s studies focused on the nation and in particular France, others 
have taken up his conception to understand fields as international and transnational 
(Dezalay and Garth 1996, Madsen 2011, 2014). For Bigo, the transnational exists 
in the form of transnational networks and practices of professionals who “play 
simultaneously in domestic and transnational fields” (Bigo 2011). In this view, a 
transnational field is constituted by networks and practices between and amongst 
professionals who act at various non-hierarchically ordered scales of the transna-
tional, national, and local (Scheel et al. 2016).
We have divided the book into what we consider as three domains of data 
politics: worlds, subjects, rights. In the first part, we discuss some key conditions 
of possibility of these domains of data politics and then in the next three parts the 
importance of each domain. We pose key questions that are not exhaustive of 
possible inquiries and then summarise the contributions of each chapter. Taken 
together, the chapters of this book set out political questions about the ways in 
which data has been constituted as an object vested with certain powers, influence, 
and rationalities.
Part I: conditions of possibility of data politics
Part I addresses some of the conditions of possibility of data politics and through 
which new worlds are produced, new subjects come into being, and new rights 
emerge from struggles over the ownership, collection, analysis, and storage of data. 
The chapters in this part reveal some of the complexities of these conditions. In 
Chapter 2 Paul N. Edwards examines the role of infrastructures as one condition 
of possibility and specifically those of environmental data systems that have been 
built over a long period of time and are now being undermined by the Trump 
administration’s attack on climate science in the USA. He demonstrates how data 
analysis models (or algorithms) that mine, collate, organise, and present data and 
their interoperability and compatibility have become infrastructures of knowledge 
about the earth’s climate. These data models he argues have now become primary 
worlds of struggle over knowledge about climate change. He deftly illustrates the 
tension between critiques of algorithms that critical data scientists advance and the 
consequences of eliminating such data models as infrastructures of knowledge.
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In Chapter 3 David M. Berry thinks “beyond data” to critically consider their 
algorithmic underpinnings and connections to a wider political economy and across 
multiple levels of computational systems. He examines the complexity of understand-
ing the code that underlies data models or algorithms. Berry points out a paradox of 
the Internet where billions of people communicate on the basis of a language that is 
hardly visible or comprehensible to them: the code. So, while the Internet may depend 
on a massive infrastructure of servers, devices, and cables what brings them together 
or more precisely what holds them together and enables them to communicate with 
each other is this special kind of language. But to understand code is anything but 
straightforward because code itself embodies various programming and communi-
cation languages such as binary machine code to algorithms (Galloway 2006). The 
Internet has a language but it is hardly visible or even comprehensible to those who do 
not write such code. How does the language of the Internet traverse both actual and 
virtual worlds of data? Berry argues that the struggles over the language of the Internet 
and its code takes place simultaneously with the struggles over “natural” languages 
and their use and abuse. The question then becomes to what extent those who write 
code enable and shape the former. In regards to this question he argues for a critical 
theory of algorithms (CTA) to examine “the particular historical conditions that give 
the present its shape in relation to the specific material and ideological formations that 
algorithms introduce into the social and economic conditions of society.”
In Chapter 4 David Lyon focuses on how everyday life in the twenty-first 
century is unavoidably surveillant, especially in the increasingly data-dependent 
Global North and South. This condition is led by giant Internet corporations such 
as Google who promote data capture and analysis as the new fuel for prosperity 
and progress, which raises profound questions for the politics of data and everyday 
life. Lyon frames his discussion of this condition in terms of two wide-ranging con-
cepts, surveillance capitalism and surveillance culture, which both depend on data 
but often in different ways and with different consequences. He argues that surveil-
lance capitalism is the source of systems that enable many aspects of surveillance 
culture, and that at present much that counts as surveillance culture is supportive 
of surveillance capitalism. But, he contends, this is not inevitable, as evident in the 
case of the Facebook scandal of 2018. The conditions of possibility – surveillance 
data in this case – do not produce predetermined outcomes. Instead, Lyon argues 
that a meaningful data politics can emerge through the reassertion of human dig-
nity and especially agency in responses to surveillance capitalism.
Each of the following parts of the book provide more detailed investigations of 
the worlds, subjects, and rights that emerge under these conditions of possibility 
of data politics.
Part II: worlds
The Internet is an elaborate infrastructure composed of objects, equipment, cables, 
routers, servers, switches and devices that constitute a unique technological materi-
ality. Unlike other massive material transformations of industrial and post-industrial 
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cities and their transportation and communication infrastructures, the materiality 
of the Internet is mostly out of sight and located elsewhere. The data servers and 
data farms are often in faraway and remote locations or nestled within cities that are 
inaccessible and unknown to most people. Its connectors are often buried under 
the earth or sea. Its wireless communications are invisible but routers, switches, and 
masts create strange yet recognisable objects within and outside cities. Without this 
massive infrastructure and its maintenance and production the Internet of things, 
communications, and exchanges would be impossible. The material infrastructure 
of the Internet not only generates new logics of borders and capacities of control 
that remain often invisible but also protocols and platforms that make people think 
the Internet is made up of a seamless and invisible flow of information. How are 
these worlds created and governed? What are the material conditions of possibility, 
configurations, and stratifications of these worlds? How do these worlds straddle 
or cross between offline and online worlds? To think of worlds is to trace how 
material conditions of the Internet are critical infrastructures that are generative of 
politics and struggles.
Through the Internet a new space is being made – a cyberspace perhaps – but 
understanding this space is fraught with difficulties. The Internet has not only blurred 
the boundaries between online and offline worlds but it has also rendered the dis-
tinction between the two spurious and perhaps untenable. With always-connected 
devices it is impossible to say when people or things are offline or online or indeed 
to separate embodied subjects from their operation. What kind of space does the 
Internet generate? What is the role of data in such a space and how does data make it 
possible? In turn, how does the Internet and the space it generates make data politics 
possible and with what effects? In Chapter 5 Ronald J. Deibert and Louis W. Pauly 
take up some of these questions by illustrating how states have been attempting to 
impose their borders on cyberspace. The expansion and intensification of controls 
over cyberspace by states within conventionally conceived territorial boundaries are 
well known. But they argue that states simultaneously project power in and through 
global cyberspace outside of their territorial jurisdictions. They remind us that strug-
gles over cyberspace do not stop at borders and that extraterritorial projections of 
state power through cyberspace are expanding, deepening, and becoming more 
elaborate. They create a sophisticated image of cyberspace as a site of international 
politics and struggles between various national and international authorities.
The emergence of big data with its focus on production, accumulation, min-
ing, circulation, aggregation, analysis, and interpretation has also engendered the 
formation of various professions from data scientists to data journalists. Each of these 
professions is engaged in competitive struggles between each other and with other 
professions and yet at the same time also reinforce the broader practice of investing 
data with powers. These emergent professions and their practices have not only 
begun reorganising existing fields of data production such as the official statistics of 
states (state and statistics share common etymologies) but also have given birth to 
new forms of data accumulation and valuation whose source of authority and legiti-
macy traverse the boundaries of state sovereignties and produce international effects.
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In this light, data is not an already given artefact that exists (which then needs to 
be mined, analysed, brokered) but an object of investment (in the broadest sense) 
that is produced by the competitive struggles of professionals who claim stakes in its 
meaning and functioning. They engage in struggles over the valuation of different 
forms of capital conceived by Bourdieu including cultural, economic, social, and 
symbolic capital (Bigo 2013). It is through the accumulation of these various forms 
of capital that their relative positions are established within the field (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992). The emergence of data as a field and data professionals as its cus-
todians and gatekeepers shapes competitive struggles not only in defining an object 
but also the principles of how to understand and intervene in data politics. At the 
same time, algorithms increasingly call into question the very expertise that data 
accumulation has spawned through the automating practices of judgement. Who 
decides whether to invest, what to listen to, where to eat, where to stay, and where 
to go? How do algorithms embed expert judgements and normative assumptions 
without appearing to do so? In Chapter 6 Didier Bigo and Laurent Bonelli examine 
these issues through their analysis of the emergence of data production as a field 
and intelligence professionals as its producers. They argue that competitive struggles 
not only shape the defining of data as an object but also the principles of how to 
understand and intervene in what we call data politics. Through a Bourdieusian, 
international political sociology-inspired analysis, they illustrate the emergence of a 
transnational space where the production of security data occurs to argue against the 
illusionary idea of the intelligence community as a single world united by common 
surveillance techniques which are changing the understanding of security. Rather, 
they highlight how logics of action cut across and transgress distinctions between 
the internal and the external, the national and the foreigner.
The accumulation of data procures not only cultural capital but also economic 
capital. An economy of data is founded on the “voluntary” input of personal data in 
exchange for Internet services. This creates the conditions for the making of a stock 
market of data involving data brokers and profit shares generated by deep data min-
ing and data discoveries. How do individuals contribute to this production and what 
is the political economy of desire that generates a material economy of services? 
What are the consequences of subjects giving up data in return for so-called free 
services? What are the legal conditions that enable and disable the circulation of data 
within and across states? From questions of data commons to data ownership, how 
are legal regimes being challenged and remade by struggles over data as property?
In Chapter 7 Tommaso Venturini takes up some of these questions through 
a focus on what is at stake with “fake news” as a key object of data politics. He 
illustrates that this misleading term conceals that the production of news and pro-
duction of truth in general always involve interpretive struggles and a competition 
between interests to establish authority and expertise. Rather than considering it an 
object of algorithmic intelligence, computational analytics or political intentions, 
he proposes an understanding of fake news based on its circulation rather than its 
contents. He proposes that it is more appropriate to consider circulating stories as 
“junk news” and describes its economic, communicational, technological, cultural, 
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and political dimensions. In this way, Venturini shifts attention to our ability to 
discern between news and junk as an important object of debate and discussion and 
form of data politics.
Félix Tréguer in Chapter 8 considers how data politics is embodied in security 
assemblages – combinations of technology companies and security professionals – 
and how their practices are increasingly shaping how the state governs its citizens. 
He illustrates how these assemblages are leading to a new technological bureaucra-
tisation of the state that transforms citizens’ understanding of themselves as subjects 
of government. His chapter identifies the need to resist the technological bureau-
cratisation of the state as a significant element of data politics today – a theme that 
is picked up by chapters in Parts III and IV.
Part III: subjects
The emergence of data as an object of government engenders the emergence of 
subjects who take positions in and through the various resignifications and chal-
lenges that it spawns. Rather than occupying already existing positions, subjects 
are produced through various digital interactions and at the same time their digital 
traces shape and organise their subjectivities and how they are known and gov-
erned. How are subjects part of the work and making of data through which they 
then come to be known? Through procedures of channelling, filtering and sorting 
data, various devices and platforms configure not only transactions and interactions 
but the data they generate recursively shapes and forms subjects in never fixed but 
modulating ways. With the increasing circulation, mining and combining of data 
how are subjects and their affiliations, connections and relations multiplied and 
governed via ever more dispersed micro data politics?
People govern their health by making themselves data subjects of health. 
Measuring their own performances with Internet-enabled devices and benchmark-
ing their performance against other performers, data subjects of health increasingly 
calibrate a model body not through images circulated by the advertising industry 
but by literally working themselves out through their data performances and for 
others. How is data part of the making and shaping of bodies and the body a 
site of data politics? Being a data subject entails the radically shifting meaning of 
being a consumer from a subject making choices to a choice-making and sorted 
subject. Being constantly a reviewer, modern consuming data subjects are caught 
in a spiral of evaluations: they are evaluated and evaluator all at once and all the 
time. Recommender platforms and evaluation data generated by transacting ever 
more sort subjects into categories of cultural preferences that narrow and channel 
choices. How is consuming through the Internet generative of data politics?
In Chapter 9 Lina Dencik, Arne Hintz and Jonathan Cable consider some of 
these questions of the data subject in relation to the uneven effects of data-driven 
surveillance practices which simultaneously advance particular social, economic and 
political agendas that enfranchise some whilst disenfranchising others, and prioritise 
certain ways of organising society at the expense of others. It is in relation to such 
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concerns that they consider the possibility of data justice. They note that much 
resistance to surveillance has predominantly centred on techno-legal responses 
relating to the development and use of encryption and policy advocacy around 
privacy and data protection. They argue that data surveillance should be considered 
in relation to broader social justice politics. If there is an emergent surveillance 
capitalism in which the collection, use and analysis of our data increasingly comes 
to shape the opportunities and possibilities available to us then we must ask broader 
questions of data justice.
The practices that produce data subjects also involve changing relations of 
production in the generation of data including the production of its labourers. Are 
we moving from the logic of having a job to a logic of contributing something to 
the fulfilment of a task? The data-generated market of global tasks has now created 
a vast meeting place for those who need and will pay for accomplishing specific and 
often micro tasks and those who can and need to fulfil these tasks to make a living. 
To consider the data subject also calls upon consideration of the uncanny conver-
gence between robots and humans not in the way in which the cyborg manifesto 
(Haraway 1991) envisaged it but perhaps more in the manner in which Star Trek 
anticipated. How does the automated generation and analysis of data based on 
artificial intelligence and machine learning appear autonomous and yet inseparable 
from struggles and relations between programmers, subjects and technologies? In 
Chapter 10 Brett Neilson and Ned Rossiter approach these questions through the 
examination of data centres as sites of data politics. They show how data centres are 
increasingly moving toward automated economies with the integration of artificial 
intelligence, machine learning, and robotics into processes of capital accumulation. 
These data infrastructures should be considered sites of struggle not only because 
of where they are located but also how they have become hubs of command and 
control over production, consumption, and exchange circuits. Understanding how 
these centres regulate logistics by which various forms of capital is accumulated 
and how labour transitions to a society of automation for them is a key political 
question and field of struggle. For them, “data politics are not exclusive to the 
claiming of rights so much as the production of subjectivity within environments 
whose data architectures register conflicts between the politics of decentralisation-
centralisation and the impossibility of pure distribution”.
Data not only captures but also colonises minds, souls, bodies, and spaces. It 
subjectifies through practices of production, accumulation, aggregation, circula-
tion, valuation, and interpretation. These practices call upon subjects who are not 
separate from but submit to and are active in the various ways that data is made and 
colonises lifeworlds to constitute “data’s empire”. In Chapter 11, Engin Isin and 
Evelyn Ruppert examine the various ways that data captures and colonises minds, 
souls, bodies and spaces and makes data subjects through practices of production, 
accumulation, aggregation, circulation, valuation, and interpretation. They draw 
our attention to the fact that these practices operate together yet differently in the 
metropole and postcolony and produce different data subjects. They remind us 
how European empires in the nineteenth century invented various data collection 
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and analysis methods for producing colonial populations and how contemporary 
practices build on these imperial infrastructures and logics. They invite readers to 
understand developments such as UN Global Pulse as instances of postcolonial data 
politics, which call for decolonising data politics.
Part IV: rights
If the accumulation of data traverses subjects it also constitutes them with claims to 
certain rights that concern its accumulation: who owns, distributes, sells, accesses, 
uses, appropriates, modifies, and signifies data become objects of struggles for 
claiming rights to such modalities. The rights claiming subject is the figure of the 
citizen that we have inherited as a political subject who is now making rights claims 
about being a subject of data. How do subjects exercise and claim such rights 
through what they say and do through the Internet? How do they perform rights 
and claims about being subjects of data through how they communicate, share, 
express, and engage with digital devices and platforms? How do they invent data 
practices that challenge and subvert state and corporate forms of data and struggle 
for rights through legal and regulatory mechanisms?
This third condition of data politics considers rights claiming subjects such as 
citizen data scientists as part of material-political arrangements and struggles over 
who generates, legitimises and has authority over data and how data is mobilised to 
make claims for environmental and other rights. It concerns how citizens make data 
an object of transnational politics and engage in struggles around free expression, 
privacy and ethics and the forums, practices, and networks through which these 
struggles are being fought. In Chapter 12 Giovanni Ziccardi shifts our attention 
from the collection and collation of data to consider rights over its life and death. He 
discusses the whole “life cycle” of data, especially from a legal-informatics point of 
view and with particular attention to the right to oblivion after the death of a person 
and how this constitutes a different kind of right. He discusses the complexities of 
the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the impos-
sibility of data oblivion. Rather, he argues that the right to data oblivion requires 
simultaneously addressing three forms of oblivion that make it up: social, which 
concerns the persistence and circulation of personal data; technical, which relates to 
the resistance of technology to the removal of data; and legal, which refers to forget-
ting, deleting, and de-indexing elaborated by legal means through case law or norms.
How are rights not only claimed through regulations, laws, and protocols but by 
citizens who make claims and in turn perform what is data politics through their eve-
ryday digital acts? In Chapter 13 Jennifer Gabrys takes up this question by shifting our 
attention from data as something collected about citizens to many instances where cit-
izens generate their own data. Whether to document lived experiences through social 
media platforms, sensing air pollution to challenge governmental measurements, or 
documenting conflict in overlooked zones, citizens are collecting, analysing and com-
municating data to articulate alternative narratives. These practices of data citizens not 
only challenge official practices for making evidence, they also potentially reinvent 
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how rights are formed, expressed, and transformed through ongoing data practices. 
Gabrys show how citizen practices of using low-cost and digital sensor technologies to 
monitor air quality and changing urban environments generate distinct forms of data 
politics through the operationalisation of new data and data relations.
The relationship between the right to privacy and that of data protection is 
illustrative of the transversal relations and legal and political tensions that make up 
data politics. On the one hand, international human rights laws and obligations seek 
to secure and universalise the former and various national regimes have emerged 
to address the latter. However, transversal relations call for a figure of a citizen 
that is different from the subject we have inherited and instead one who can make 
rights claims that traverse national borders (Isin and Ruppert 2015). In Chapter 14 
Elspeth Guild illustrates an emerging field of international law where data citizens 
are able to command and have control over their privacy. Guild notes that citizens 
have discovered to their shock how little control their own state authorities have 
over the protection of their privacy and shows that the global movement of com-
munications, Internet, and social media platforms makes a citizen’s right to privacy 
impossible to regulate and protect at the national level. Guild documents how since 
2013 a number of authorities, interests, and forces have come together to create an 
international framework for privacy in a digital age. It is a framework that is emerg-
ing as a consequence of data citizens contesting and seeking to establish their rights 
to privacy by using the intersection of international and national law as a nexus 
through which to achieve their claims.
Conclusion
This book invites readers to regard contemporary transformations as a field of 
power and knowledge and an emerging regime of government that is comparable 
yet irreducible to the modern regime of government that emerged in the nine-
teenth century and of which we are still subject. It provides an analytical framing 
with a focus on worlds, subjects, and rights as conditions of possibility of such a 
field. Our hope is that the book contributes to our understanding of this field and 
the possibilities of data subjects becoming data citizens.
Note
1 An earlier version of this chapter appeared as a commentary and invitation to contributors 
to this book: (Ruppert, Isin, and Bigo 2017).
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PART I
Conditions of possibility  
of data politics

2
KNOWLEDGE INFRASTRUCTURES 
UNDER SIEGE
Climate data as memory, truce, and target
Paul N. Edwards
Introduction
Data politics are not really about data per se. Instead, the ultimate stakes of how 
data are collected, stored, shared, altered, and destroyed lie in the quality of the 
knowledge they help to produce. The value of knowledge depends on trust 
in the infrastructures that create it, which themselves depend on trusted data. 
“Trust” and “truth” are closely related English words, and both are strongly 
connected to the “truce” of my title. Indeed, etymologically “true” and “truce” 
are in fact the same word.1
This chapter argues that both trust in climate knowledge infrastructures and 
the truth they deliver descend from the truces necessary to share and maintain 
climate data—all of them heavily contested in the contemporary United States. 
The partial success of climate change denialism stems, in large part, from the 
recent arrival of what I call “hypertransparency”: open data, open code, com-
modity software tools, and alternative publication venues have quite suddenly 
upended truces painstakingly built over multiple centuries. Not only climate 
knowledge, but virtually all scientific knowledge of public concern is affected by 
this transformation.
My title derives from Nelson and Winter’s theory of organizational routines in 
An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982). In large organizations, Nelson and 
Winter posited, routines serve three critical purposes. First, they hold the organiza-
tion’s knowledge, storing organizational memory even as individual employees come 
and go. Argote (1999) later argued that automating routines transfers organizational 
knowledge to machines, a line of reasoning readily extended to many kinds of 
algorithms. Second, routines and technologies constitute a de facto truce among 
individuals and organizational elements whose goals and interests conflict. Routines, 
machines, and algorithms may incorporate workarounds and exception-handling 
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procedures, and organizational culture can evolve to tolerate failures, delays, and 
protests (up to a point). Finally, routines, machines, and algorithms function as tar-
gets, in two senses. First, they embody the organization’s aims and goals. Second, 
they serve as patterns or templates for managing new systems.
Nelson and Winter’s paradigm cases were factories and corporations, but their 
theory fits most organizational contexts. It can be extended to encompass routines 
that cross organizational boundaries, as is typical in the case of infrastructures (Edwards 
et al. 2007). In the first part of this chapter, I show how the routines, machines, and 
algorithms of climate data systems fit Nelson and Winter’s paradigm of memory, 
truce, and target. Against this background, I then engage a much less benign sense 
of the word “target”—namely, “an object aimed at in shooting”—in the context of 
aggressive assaults on environmental knowledge infrastructures in the contemporary 
United States. These attacks seek to dismantle the very sources of climate knowledge 
by defunding crucial instruments, satellites, and data analysis programs.
“Long data” and environmental knowledge
Some kinds of environmental knowledge, such as the monitoring of weather, water 
quality, air pollution, or seismic activity, concern what is happening in the present, 
often with a view to short-term prediction (hours to days). Many such systems col-
lect “big data,” e.g. from satellites or large sensor networks. As environmental data 
make their way into archives, they become “long data” (Arbesman 2013). Long data 
enable scientists to track and understand environmental change.
Memory: environmental data and data models
Enduring, carefully curated collections of long data—scientific memory—are 
therefore among the most valuable resources of modern environmental science. 
Such collections require continual maintenance. Over time, all kinds of things 
change about how data are collected. Instruments and sensors get out of calibra-
tion, or are replaced with newer models with different characteristics. New human 
observers, new standards, new organizations, and new methods replace predeces-
sors. National boundaries and political systems also change, sometimes with effects 
on data-collecting practices (Edwards 2010; Gitelman 2013).
Such changes nearly always affect the relationship of today’s data to those recorded 
in the past. If a new digital thermometer (say) systematically reads 0.2°C higher than 
a previous model, this is because the instruments differ, not because the air tempera-
ture has actually changed. To keep the long-term record consistent, scientists must 
adjust data to take account of these shifts. In the simple case just mentioned, when 
graphing temperature change over time, they might add 0.2°C to all readings taken 
by the older instrument. Far from falsifying data, this practice actually “truthifies” the 
long-term record. Adjusting data was once a manual routine; today it is usually han-
dled by computerized algorithms. I often call such algorithms “data models,” because 
they encode models of how different instruments or data sources relate to each other.
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In addition, many environmental sensing instruments, such as those flown on 
satellites, produce data that require interpretation by algorithms before they can 
be used for most purposes. Since data analysis algorithms change—often but not 
always for the better—data interpreted with older algorithms must be continu-
ally re-interpreted using newer ones. For example, many major satellite data sets 
are “versioned,” or re-issued after reprocessing with revised algorithms. At this 
writing, the 35-year record of tropospheric temperatures from satellite-mounted 
microwave sounding units is on version 6, with multiple minor releases between 
major ones (Spencer, Christy, and Braswell 2017).
Routines for homogenizing data—whether enacted by people, machines, or 
algorithms—embody scientific organizations’ memory of how their data were 
previously created, just as Nelson and Winter argued. Perhaps counterintuitively, 
this ongoing adjustment—and revisions of the techniques used to make those 
adjustments—proves critical to maintaining and even improving the integrity of 
the long-term record. Different versions of data sets often, though not always, 
converge on similar results as analysis techniques improve. Further improvement—
i.e., further revision, potentially reversing previous convergence—is almost always 
possible, and no data set is ever entirely definitive. In A Vast Machine (2010), I 
called this phenomenon “shimmering data.”
Truce: keeping things running
Nelson and Winter’s idea of routines as truces among conflicting groups and 
goals appears very clearly in the record of many environmental data systems. An 
extreme example of one such truce: even during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 
1962, the weather services of Cuba, the USSR, and the United States continued 
to exchange weather data (Schatz 1978). With only a few exceptions, from the 
late 19th century to the present only actual war interrupted the routine flow of 
meteorological data among national weather services—even those of pariah states 
such as North Korea.
When a scientific field depends on data from many sources, such as the weather 
services of the world’s 190-plus nations, conflicts among the various contributors 
are almost inevitable. In meteorology, such conflicts have occurred over observing 
hours, temperature and pressure scales, instrument placement, instrument housings, 
methods of calculating averages, reporting deadlines, and many other details of 
exactly when, where, and how observational data are taken and recorded. To share 
data in any meaningful way, these differences must be reconciled (Bowker 2000; 
2005). Before computers, this was done primarily by standard-setting and laborious 
post hoc calculation; after computers, algorithms took over the calculations.
The dramatic advance of the environmental and geosciences resulted in large 
part from routines-as-truces surrounding data. In meteorology, merchant ships 
from many nations began keeping standardized weather logs in the 1850s; these 
logs represented a truce among nations that used different temperature scales and 
other norms. The International Meteorological Organization, formed in the 1870s, 
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promoted common standards and data sharing (Daniel 1973). The World Data 
Centers established during the 1957–58 International Geophysical Year, at the 
height of the Cold War, today remain critical institutions supporting virtually all 
of the geosciences: soil, solid Earth, climate, oceanography, and others (Aronova 
2017; International Council of Scientific Unions 2016).
Examples are easily multiplied.
Target: routines and technologies as patterns for new systems
By representing the new and unfamiliar in terms of something old and well 
understood, the page, file folder, and wastebasket icons of modern comput-
ers helped enable the transition from paper-based office information systems. 
Similarly, Nelson and Winter argued that when organizations confront new 
needs, they use their existing routines as “targets” for the design of new ones. 
In just this way, existing data handling routines serve as targets when new data 
sources become available.
For example, satellite radiometers can measure atmospheric temperature, but 
they do so in a very different way from instruments that work by direct con-
tact with the atmosphere, such as the thermometers carried on weather balloons. 
Essentially, they measure huge volumes of air, rather than taking readings at points 
along an ascending line. When satellite radiometry first became available in the 
1970s, meteorologists developed algorithms to make satellite data look like weather 
balloon data in order to incorporate them into existing weather forecast models. 
Only much later were techniques developed to ingest satellite data in a form more 
appropriate to what they actually measure.
By now the overall point should be clear. Scientific memory requires truces: 
acceptance of common standards, suspending conflicts and disagreements to get 
on with routine data sharing, putting aside political and ideological differences to 
work together. Such truces—and the mature technological systems that embody 
them—endow knowledge infrastructures with considerable stability and inertia 
(Edwards et al. 2007). Usually (but not always) this inertia prevents sudden, dra-
matic changes in how knowledge is created, disseminated, and understood. Like 
other organizational routines, they bear history and memory within them, main-
taining coherence and providing templates for new data systems as they arise. Only 
with such truces can a knowledge commons emerge, beyond both organizational 
and national borders (Edwards 2013).
The glass laboratory
My argument in this section is that in the early 21st century, certain truces became 
targets—not in Nelson and Winter’s benign sense, but in the more destructive 
sense of “things to shoot at.”
To understand the siege I will discuss in Part III, this section first offers some 
general background on the evolving character of transparency in science. Next, I 
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briefly discuss three climate controversies of the early 21st century. These include 
the “hockey stick” graph of global temperature since AD 1000, the citizen-science 
project surfacestations.org, and the Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature (BEST) 
project. Together, these examples illustrate the emergence of hypertransparency in 
climate science: a “glass laboratory” in which virtually every aspect of scientific 
work—data, algorithms, software, email—takes place in a vastly expanded public 
arena. In this condition, the truces that made modern climate science possible 
come under severe, sometimes disabling scrutiny, with both negative and poten-
tially positive consequences for public knowledge.
Transparency as norm: from open methods to open data
Merton (1973) famously argued that norms of disinterestedness and communalism 
guide science: scientific findings belong to the entire community, rather than to 
individual investigators. This principle manifests in publication, a word that means, 
quite literally, “making public.” In the tradition of “virtual witnessing” established 
by the Royal Society of London in the 17th century—eloquently elaborated by 
Shapin and Schaffer in Leviathan and the Airpump (1985)—modern science “makes 
public” not only its results, but also the methods by which they were obtained. 
Scientific articles enrol the reader as a “virtual witness” to an openly and fully 
described process.
As Shapin and Schaffer also showed, however, the “public” in question was 
originally a very limited, elite group. In the case of the Royal Society, only “gen-
tlemen” could participate, whether as experimenters or as trusted witnesses. By the 
second half of the 20th century, the practice of virtual witnessing had evolved to 
include what we call peer review, the gateway to publication. In this system, other 
scientists doing closely related work serve as initial referees (virtual witnesses), 
while the assumed Mertonian norms of disinterestedness and scepticism replace 
those of the gentlemanly “modest witness.” Once approved and published, any 
member of “the public” could (in principle) conduct a new trial of the results, 
using the methods section as a recipe.
These were never, of course, more than ideals. One need no longer be a 
gentleman to participate, but not just anyone can do so; one must still be a prac-
ticing scientist. Most people—even most scientists outside the focal discipline 
of any given publication—lack the extensive training, specialized vocabularies, 
and access to laboratories and other resources required even to understand, much 
less to reproduce, any given result. On top of that, the descriptions in meth-
ods sections almost never contain enough information to permit exact replication 
(Collins 1985; Collins and Pinch 1993). Peering through the tiny window of a 
scientific article, one can’t see everything.
With respect to data, until recently most scientific publications fell far short of 
full transparency. In most fields, so-called “raw” data were never revealed at all. 
Instead, scientists published graphs, tables, or charts that synthesized large bodies of 
data. Practicalities partly explain this: raw data could be voluminous and expensive 
26 Paul N. Edwards
to publish on paper, yet even expert readers were unlikely even to look at them. 
Peer reviewers had the right to review data, but in practice they rarely did so. 
Together, these cultural practices made raw data effectively the intellectual and 
physical property of their creator (Bowker 2000, 646).
The environmental and geosciences exhibited a different pattern, with many 
data published and freely shared. Yet even in those fields, a sense of personal own-
ership is not uncommon. When I first started researching the history of climate 
science in the mid-1990s, I was regularly directed to “data guys” who specialized in 
one kind of instrument, region, or record. The moniker “data guys” reflected these 
individuals’ deep knowledge of quirks and limitations, down to specific events in 
the life of particular surface stations or instruments. The phrase also implied a sense 
of ownership: only these “data guys” really “knew” the data in question.
In summary, limited transparency for limited publics has always played a major 
role in modern science. These limits on visibility and participation were critical, widely 
accepted truces. They were key to remarkable successes in producing reliable knowl-
edge. Yet at different times and in different contexts, those same limits have led to 
both trust and distrust, broad benefits and broad harms, social uplift and damaging 
elitism (Jasanoff 2005; Lövbrand, Pielke, and Beck 2010; Miller 2007). The tacit 
social agreements making up those truces have been thoroughly explored by sci-
ence and technology studies.
Less widely remarked have been the equally critical limits on participation 
imposed by access to technologies and skills—limits that have diminished dramati-
cally in recent years. Breathtaking Moore’s-law declines in the cost of storing digital 
data and the rise of high-speed computer networks have removed most practical 
obstacles to publishing or sharing even large data sets and scientific software. By the 
early 2010s, these factors combined with a perceived “replication crisis” in science 
to create pressures for scientists to “publish everything”: data, software, spread-
sheets, experimental protocols, etc. (Baker 2015). Some journals and many science 
funders began to require would-be authors to deposit both data sets and computer 
models or scripts along with articles describing their findings (Stodden, Seiler, and 
Ma 2018). Across the same period, scientific tools for data analysis became cheaper, 
simpler, and much more widely available. Examples include statistical analysis soft-
ware, spreadsheets, visualization tools, and scripting languages. Millions of people 
acquired skills in statistics and in coding, both once arcane arts.
Most of these phenomena extended, of course, far beyond science. Open source 
code and open access to data, software, and publications were part of a general-
ized clamour for greater transparency in government and even in corporate life 
(Goldstein, Dyson, and Nemani 2013; Weinberger 2012). Instead of mere win-
dows, it suddenly seemed possible to replace every laboratory (or government) wall 
with glass, and to move this glass laboratory (metaphorically) from a quiet campus 
to the centre of a great city. Now “the public” could include anyone with access 
to a computer and the Internet. Credentialed visitors, informed spectators, random 
passers-by, and snarling vandals could all play the role of virtual witness. Promoters 
of transparency typically invoked the values of democracy, participatory process, and 
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institutionalized scepticism (“trust but verify”)—but vastly increased transparency 
has proven an equal if not greater boon to conspiracy theorists, muckraking journal-
ists, and populist politicians.
Truces as targets: three climate data controversies  
of the early 21st century
As ever more virtual witnesses crowded around to watch climate science in action, 
some chose to join in, to test and sometimes to challenge methods and data. In this 
section, I show how the glass laboratory revealed some of the many truces involved 
in “making data global,” as I put it in A Vast Machine (2010, chapter 10)—and how 
the rhetoric of transparency led to outcomes that presage today’s concerted assault 
on the climate knowledge infrastructure. Here I have space to offer only sketches of 
each controversy, pointing the reader to other sources for more complete discussions.
Climate Audit
If you are a corporation, you need to get your books audited regularly. Internal 
audits are fine for some purposes, but they create an opening for corruption, 
because an auditor whose salary you pay has a strong incentive to tell you what you 
want to hear. That auditor might be tempted to alter, conceal, or delete data that 
doesn’t look good for your bottom line, or you. Therefore, to show shareholders 
and regulators that you’re telling the truth, you need an independent audit. Further, 
it’s the job of auditors to check that results are correctly derived from data.
This was the idea behind “Climate Audit,” a blog started in 2004 by retired 
Canadian mining engineer Steve McIntyre. Peer review is fine, he might say, 
but since this week’s peer reviewer is next week’s peer reviewee, scientists have 
a certain incentive to approve each other’s work: peer review can become “pal 
review.” Even if scientists aren’t doing each other personal favours, there remains 
the potential for “groupthink” (Janis 1982): what Kuhn (1962) might have char-
acterized as collective commitment to a paradigm, causing an entire field to ignore 
anomalous data or results. Peer reviewers influenced by groupthink might resist 
publication of results that violate the paradigm. Funding agencies might also be 
victims of groupthink, in a positive feedback loop that starves out research aimed 
at disconfirming a widely accepted theory. Since climate change is a major public 
policy issue, McIntyre might argue, important results need review by some neutral 
party without financial or personal stakes in the outcome.
The first of McIntyre’s “audits” involved the “hockey stick” graph of north-
ern hemisphere average temperatures (see Multiproxy line in Figure 2.1, called 
a hockey stick because the long “handle” of relatively little variation ends in a 
“blade” of steeply rising average temperatures in the 20th century). This graph, 
first published in Mann, Bradley, and Hughes (1998) for the period 1400–1980 
AD, was subsequently extended to encompass the period since 1000 AD (Mann, 
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Bradley, and Hughes 1999, hereafter MBH99). MBH99 used statistical techniques 
to combine some 112 proxy data sets, such as corals, tree rings, and ice cores, 
and historical thermometer records. (Proxies are things that vary consistently with 
temperature, so that they can be used as surrogate thermometers.) Their results 
showed recent temperatures as more than 0.5°C higher than at any time in the last 
1,000 years (Houghton 2001; Mann and Jones 2003).
Working with economist Ross McKitrick and an eventual army of interested 
blog readers, McIntyre requested and received Mann’s raw data, along with the 
“weights” applied to different proxies in his analysis. Without claiming expertise in 
paleoclimate studies, McIntyre and McKitrick argued that they were still compe-
tent to evaluate the MBH studies since “the same algebraic and statistical methods 
[used by MBH] are commonly used in economics, business and elsewhere in the 
social sciences.” Interrogating the MBH data and analysis, they claimed to find 
significant problems in both, including “collation errors, unjustifiable truncation or 
extrapolation of source data, obsolete data, geographical location errors, incorrect 
calculation of principal components and other quality control defects.” McIntyre 
and McKitrick concluded that the sharp upward curve seen in the MBH98 north-
ern hemisphere temperature graph was “primarily an artefact of poor data handling, 
obsolete data, and incorrect calculation of principal components” (McIntyre and 
McKitrick 2003). Their own analysis seemed to show that average northern hemi-
sphere temperatures were higher in the 1400s than at any other time before 1980, 
when the analysis ended.
Thus began a complicated and acrimonious dispute that continues, in some 
quarters, to this day. Mann admitted to certain errors, but disputed most others 
and held that correcting those errors made little difference to the final outcome 
(Mann, Bradley, and Hughes 2004). McIntyre and McKitrick amped up their cri-
tique of the MBH methods, gradually shifting from a polite, participatory mode 
into a much more adversarial discourse that stopped just short of accusing MBH of 
outright fraud (McIntyre and McKitrick 2005).
These disputes eventually led to hearings before the US House of Representatives 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, as well as reviews by the US National 
Science Foundation, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 
the National Academy of Sciences, and the US National Research Council, as 
well as others. In 2006, a lengthy NRC report concluded that “uncertainties of 
the published reconstructions have been underestimated,” expressing only luke-
warm confidence in proxy-based reconstructions of the period 1000–1600 AD. 
However, it also noted that multiple lines of evidence did support the conclusion 
that the warmth of the late 20th century “in many cases appear[s] to be unprec-
edented during at least the last 2,000 years.” Despite large uncertainties, multiple 
independent proxy reconstructions also tended to support the MBH conclusions, 
according to the report (Committee on Surface Temperature Reconstructions for 
the Last 2000 Years, Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, and National 
Research Council 2006). As a direct result of this “audit,” the unfortunate Michael 
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Mann became a bête noire of climate change deniers, subjected to multiple lawsuits, 
investigations, harassment, and death threats (Mann 2012).
Meanwhile, McIntyre’s blog gained tens of thousands of followers, becoming 
a kind of clearinghouse for both genuinely sceptical but open-minded readers and 
ideologically-driven climate change deniers. In November 2009, Climate Audit 
was among the first websites to publish the hacked “Climategate” emails. Not 
coincidentally, earlier that year McIntyre and various Climate Audit readers had 
filed 58 Freedom of Information requests to the Climatic Research Unit at the 
University of East Anglia, from which the emails were stolen (Pearce 2010).
Climate Audit made an explicit goal of disrupting key truces in the climate knowl-
edge infrastructure as it then existed. Early on, McIntyre and McKitrick excoriated 
the existing peer review system and proposed the audit as a new, higher standard:
We are . . . struck by the extremely limited extent of due diligence involved in peer 
review as carried out by paleoclimate journals, as compared with the level of 
due diligence involved in auditing financial statements or carrying out a fea-
sibility study in mineral development. For example, “peer review” in even the 
most eminent paleoclimate publications, as presently practiced, does not typically involve 
any examination of data, replication of calculations or ensuring that data and compu-
tational procedures are archived. We are not suggesting peer reviewers should be 
auditors. Referees are not compensated for their efforts and journals would 
not be able to get unpaid peer reviewers to carry out thorough audits.
(McIntyre and McKitrick 2005, 94, emphasis added)
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If peer reviewers need not be auditors, then who? McIntyre and McKitrick’s forays 
into publishing in climate science suggested one approach, i.e. publishing their 
critique in a traditional venue, itself subject to peer review. But the example of 
McIntyre’s blog—from its title to its contents and hard-hitting tone—suggested 
another: that a random crowd of deeply sceptical, variably skilled, often anonymous 
interpreters might do the trick. The fact that the thorny problem of groupthink, 
mentioned earlier, might prove even harder to avoid in the case of a public blog 
did not dissuade him from pursuing that course.
Surfacestations.org
Without necessarily using the “audit” vocabulary, numerous similar projects have 
ensued since about 2005. One is surfacestations.org, initiated in 2007 by televi-
sion meteorologist Anthony Watts, who runs the extremely popular sceptic blog 
WattsUpWithThat (WUWT). From 2007–2017, according to Watts, WUWT 
racked up more than 316 million page views and 2 million comments on some 
16,500 posted “stories.”3 Watts believed, and apparently still believes, that at least 
part of the warming trend since the 1970s is due to an upward bias in the surface 
temperature record due to poorly sited weather stations. To test this hypothesis, 
Watts used his blog to enlist volunteers in an audit of all stations in the US Historical 
Climatology Network (USHCN), a specialized subset of weather stations selected 
for “their spatial coverage, record length, data completeness, and historical stability.”4
The ideal site (location) for weather instruments is a flat area surrounded only by 
grass or low vegetation, far from large bodies of water, buildings, and anything else 
that might render readings unrepresentative of the surrounding area. An imperfect 
site can subject thermometers to various forms of bias, such as artificial heating 
from asphalt parking lots. The National Climatic Data Center’s Climate Reference 
Network (CRN) Site Information Handbook defines five classes of sites: classes 1 and 
2 are least susceptible to bias, whereas classes 3, 4, and 5 exhibit biases above 1°C, 
2°C, and 5°C respectively. A class 5 site might, for example, have a thermometer 
located near a building’s heating vent or air conditioner exhaust.
Over 650 volunteers signed on. Watts instructed them to visit stations with 
cameras and the Site Information Handbook in hand. They wrote up their results 
according to the Handbook’s rating scheme and provide detailed photographic and 
written evidence. They eventually surveyed nearly every station in the USHCN.
The surfacestations.org survey seemed to validate Watts’s suspicions. He released 
a “midterm report” entitled “Is the U.S. Temperature Record Reliable? How do 
we know global warming is a problem if we can’t trust the U.S. temperature 
record?” published by the denialist thinktank Heartland Institute (2009). It touted 
the “inescapable” conclusion that “the US temperature record is unreliable” and 
claimed that it “reports a false warming trend.”
Data from the citizen-science survey, including photographs, were posted on the 
surfacestations.org website. Quantified, the results portrayed a network with serious 
problems. A mere 11 percent of stations fell into the minimally-biased classes 1 and 2, 
while a whopping 69 percent fell into classes 4 and 5—heavily biased warm.
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The story then took an unusual turn. Researchers at the US National 
Climatic Data Center (NCDC), led by Matthew Menne, downloaded and ana-
lysed the surfacestations.org data. For a key subset of stations, they compared 
the surfacestations.org ratings with independent ratings of the same stations by 
the National Weather Service. For the most part, these ratings agreed: Watts’s 
volunteers had done an excellent job. Of the 525 stations they evaluated, only 
71 fell into the “good” classifications (ratings 1 or 2).
Oddly, however, when Menne’s group compared the temperature trends calcu-
lated from the “good” and “poor” stations, they found that unadjusted temperatures 
for the “poor” stations actually exhibited a slightly cool bias relative to the “good” 
stations. This counterintuitive result turned out to be due to specific characteristics 
of the temperature sensors. Most of the “poor” stations used Maximum/Minimum 
Temperature System (MMTS) sensors, a relatively new type installed since the 
mid-1980s. These electronic sensors are attached by cables to an indoor readout 
device. Limits on the maximum cable length required that many be installed much 
closer to buildings and parking lots than the optimal siting guidelines allowed. 
At most of the “good” stations, by contrast, thermometers were an older liquid-
in-glass type installed in Cotton Region Shelters located further from distorting 
influences. However, the MMTS sensors register lower maximum temperatures than 
the CRS type, accounting for the cool bias at the apparently “poor” station sites. 
The NCDC researchers then showed that the algorithms used to adjust data across 
the entire network already produced very close agreement between “good” and 
“poor” stations—though even after adjustment, a slight cool bias in the “poor” 
stations remained (Menne, Williams, and Palecki 2010).
In this example, two kinds of truce became targets. First, the raw data themselves 
came under scrutiny by citizen scientists who challenged Weather Service data 
collection systems, demonstrating justifiable concerns about data quality. Given 
WUWT’s relentlessly denialist posture, most of these volunteers probably hoped to 
discredit Weather Service data. Second, Weather Service data modelling—designed 
to correct for missing data and inevitable biases such as those introduced by replac-
ing CRS sensors with MMTS—came under fire. Watts’s “midterm report” noted 
that data adjustment routines included replacing missing station data with data 
from other, nearby stations (an old practice in weather data analysis), and claimed 
that “adjustments applied to ‘homogenize’ the data . . . impart an even larger false 
warming trend to the data” (Watts 2009, 13).
This episode ended with acceptance and integration of the citizen-science data 
into normal scientific routines. Watts later co-authored a paper with John Christy, 
Roger Pielke Sr., and other sceptical scientists. After peer review, Watts’s original 
claims of enormous bias in the USHCN were drastically tempered:
Temperature trend estimates vary according to site classification, with 
poor siting leading to an overestimate of minimum temperature trends 
and an underestimate of maximum temperature trends. . . . The oppo-
site-signed differences of maximum and minimum temperature trends are 
similar in magnitude, so that the overall mean temperature trends are nearly 
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identical across site classifications. Homogeneity adjustments tend to reduce 
trend differences, but statistically significant differences remain for all but 
average temperature trends.
(Fall et al. 2011, D14120, emphasis added)
Within the scientific community, then, this audit ended by essentially corrobo-
rating the NCDC’s data, its data collection routines, and its data models, while 
pointing to room for small improvements in both.
The mother of all audits: Berkeley Earth
Among the most intriguing and thorough “audits” of climate data is the Berkeley 
Earth Surface Temperature project (BEST, also known simply as Berkeley Earth), 
initiated in 2010 by UC Berkeley physics professor Richard Muller. A self- 
proclaimed “agnostic” on global warming, Muller had been an early critic of the 
MBH “hockey stick” graph, finding merit in the arguments of McIntyre, McKitrick, 
and Watts. Following Watts’s surfacestations.org study and the “Climategate” email 
controversy, Muller decided to revisit the global land surface temperature record. 
He sought and received funding for this effort from several sources, including the 
US Dept. of Energy, Bill Gates, and the Bowes, Folger, and Getty foundations. 
The largest single contribution ($150,000) came from the ultraconservative Charles 
Koch Foundation, which doubtless hoped that Muller would put the lie to global 
warming science. Convinced of Muller’s neutrality, Anthony Watts contributed 
data from surfacestations.org to the project. On his blog, Watts wrote:
I’m prepared to accept whatever result they produce, even if it proves my premise 
wrong . . . My gut feeling? The possibility that we may get the elusive “grand 
unified temperature” for the planet is higher than ever before. Let’s give it 
a chance.5
BEST collected data from some 39,000 weather stations—over five times as many 
as any previous study. These data included many records previously considered 
too brief, too intermittent, too biased, or too poorly standardized for use in cli-
mate studies. BEST developed its own quality control algorithms to eliminate 
impossible readings, duplicate records, and other problems. It also developed new 
algorithms for adjusting and homogenizing data. The project made a special point 
of maximum transparency, publishing all of its data, algorithms, and code online 
at berkeleyearth.org.
Like Watts, Muller released his preliminary findings before peer review—
at a March 2011 session of the US House Committee on Science, Space and 
Technology. The trend seen in the BEST analysis, he told the representatives, 
“is very similar to that previously reported by the other [climate data] groups” 
(Roosevelt 2011). In fact, the BEST analysis differs hardly at all from those of the 
three major climate data stewards: NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, 
Knowledge infrastructures under siege 33
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
−1
−0.8
−0.6
−0.4
−0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Te
m
p
er
at
ur
e 
A
n
o
m
al
y 
(C
)
Year
GISS HadCRU NOAA Berkeley (2%)
[Preliminary]
FIGURE 2.2 BEST Annual Land-Surface Temperature Analysis6
NOAA, and the UK’s Hadley Centre and Climatic Research Unit (Figure 2.2). 
BEST noted that the urban heat island effect (related to Watt’s critique of surface 
station bias) is “large and real,” but concluded that it “has not had a significant 
impact on global temperatures since 1950,” primarily because urban areas take up 
only a tiny fraction of Earth’s total land area (Wickham et al. 2013: 6).
Far from accepting Muller’s results, as he had promised the previous month, 
Watts now criticized Muller for presenting them prior to peer review—even 
though he had done the same thing with his own “midterm report.” Yet when 
it appeared in late 2012, the final peer-reviewed study differed only in minor 
details from what Muller showed to Congress (Muller et al. 2013). Watts now cites 
Muller’s pre-review release to justify doing the same.
New fronts in the siege
Taken together, these three episodes demonstrated how digital technologies, 
combined with open data policies, have empowered serious challenges to 
knowledge infrastructures controlled by government and academic institutions. 
“Climate audits” were only part of an older, much larger industry-led attack on 
environmental science with regulatory implications. Deliberate efforts to under-
mine scientific conclusions about climate change date to the early 1990s and even 
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before; in other areas, similar efforts can be traced to the dawn of environmental 
regulation in the 1970s (Jasanoff 1990). This picture includes major lobbying efforts 
and public relations campaigns funded by fossil fuel interests and wealthy donors, 
often via conservative think tanks such as the Heartland Institute and the George 
C. Marshall Institute (Hoggan and Littlemore 2009; Oreskes and Conway 2010).
The so-called “Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change”—
sponsored by the Heartland Institute—makes the stakes quite clear: the NIPCC is
an international panel of nongovernment scientists and scholars who have come 
together to understand the causes and consequences of climate change. 
Because we are not predisposed to believe climate change is caused by 
human greenhouse gas emissions, we are able to look at evidence the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) ignores. Because we do 
not work for any governments, we are not biased toward the assumption that greater 
government activity is necessary.
(emphasis added)7
The obvious, but false implication is that IPCC members are “government 
scientists” whose hidden goal is to promote a restrictive regulatory agenda, which 
could be damaging to the fossil fuel industry, as well as others. In reality the 2,500-
plus scientists who work on each IPCC report participate as unpaid volunteers. 
Their salaries and research support come from their home institutions, which may 
be academic, industrial, or government laboratories. Government funding mecha-
nisms and IPCC authorship protocols are designed to prevent political (including 
government) interference with the scientific process. Representatives of national 
governments do participate directly in final editing and approval of IPCC summa-
ries but this review comes only after the scientific conclusions have been finalized. 
Government influence is widely believed to have pushed the reports toward more 
conservative conclusions (Edwards and Schneider 2001).
Politically motivated attacks on the conclusions of climate science take many 
other forms as well. The most common strategies include repeating false claims 
long after they have been disproven, maligning and harassing individual scientists, 
altering official reports (as was done on multiple occasions during the George W. 
Bush administration), and attempting to muzzle scientists employed by govern-
ment agencies (Bowen 2008; Mann 2012; Office of Inspector General, National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration 2008). Lacking space to discuss all of this, 
my final section focuses specifically on current attempts to undermine the climate 
knowledge infrastructure.
In 2017, following the inauguration of President Donald Trump, the siege 
progressed to a new stage, with a new series of targets. This new approach 
goes far beyond the questioning of knowledge outputs (conclusions, estimates 
of uncertainty, data analyses, etc.). Instead, it seeks to delete important inputs 
to the knowledge-making process, such as key instruments required to moni-
tor environmental change, and to remove climate change from the missions of 
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agencies charged with environmental monitoring. In some cases, it has forcibly 
restructured review processes, altering who has standing to act as a peer in review-
ing environmental policies based on science. If successful, this siege will certify 
poorly qualified people as expert peers while decertifying highly qualified scien-
tists; introduce significant discontinuities and/or distortions in the long-term data 
record; and diminish the quality and quantity of public knowledge about the state 
of the environment.
Instruments: eliminating satellites and their data
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) currently holds 
responsibility for designing and launching satellites carrying environmental sens-
ing instruments. In April 2017, in its first budget proposal, the incoming Trump 
administration proposed cuts of about US$167 million to NASA’s budget for earth 
science. Virtually all of that would come from eliminating five specific satellite 
missions directly related to climate science:
 • RBI (Radiation Budget Instrument), providing data to establish the amount of 
incoming and outgoing radiation, crucial to both long-range weather forecasts 
and climate sensitivity studies
 • PACE (Plankton, Aerosol, Clouds and Ocean Ecosystem), providing data 
relevant to ocean health, cloud formation, and the carbon cycle
 • OCO-3 (Orbiting Carbon Observatory), monitoring the location of carbon 
sources and sinks
 • CLARREO (Climate Absolute Radiance and Refractivity Observatory) 
Pathfinder, a solar spectrometer
 • DSCOVR (Deep Space Climate Observatory) provides radiation monitoring 
as well as high-resolution images of the Earth and its moon.
The last of these, nicknamed “Goresat,” was funded and built under President 
Clinton, but mothballed before launch by President G.W. Bush. Revived under 
President Obama, it was finally launched in 2015. The same satellite also carries 
two NOAA space weather instruments. The Trump budget would have elimi-
nated funding for data analysis of only the two DSCOVR instruments run by 
NASA, i.e., those proposed by Gore (a pariah for the far right). Savings from the 
DSCOVR cut: a mere $3.2 million. As one policy analyst dryly put it, “budget 
savings do not appear to be the driving force for proposing these terminations. 
Instead, it apparently is based on Trump Administration scepticism about climate 
change” (Smith 2017, 5).
Under the complex US budget process, the proposed cuts were approved by the 
House of Representatives, but specifically and entirely restored by the Senate before 
the FY2018 budget was signed into law. NASA terminated the RBI program on its 
own initiative in January 2018, citing cost overruns and the existence of other, similar 
instrument. The administration’s FY2019 budget once again proposed cutting the four 
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remaining satellite programs. At this writing, in late 2018, the House Appropriations 
Committee has approved a budget for Earth science that is $116 million higher than 
NASA’s request. This time, it did not specifically address the proposed cuts, thus open-
ing a window for executive cancellation later on. If approved, these cuts will result in 
significant gaps in data about major climate-related processes, including data needed to 
verify emissions cuts programmed by the 2015 Paris Agreement.
Privatizing weather satellites and weather data
President Trump’s NASA administrator is Jim Bridenstine, a former Republican 
Congressman from Oklahoma. The first elected official and non-scientist ever 
to hold that post, until very recently Bridenstine proclaimed denialist views. 
However, after his confirmation as NASA administrator Bridenstine told senators 
that his opinion had evolved. He now agrees with the scientific consensus that 
global warming is happening and that humans are its primary cause. Asked the 
reason for his changed views, Bridenstine said he “listened to a lot of testimony. I 
heard a lot of experts, and I read a lot” (Davenport 2018). He now plans to fully 
support NASA’s climate science missions.
Bridenstine also supports the acquisition of weather and Earth science data 
from commercial satellites. The American Space Renaissance Act (ASRA), a 
bill he introduced in 2016, would direct the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration to revise its data provision rules to “ensure that [the agency] does 
not release more than the minimum amount of data required” under World 
Meteorological Organization Resolution 40. If passed, the ASRA would direct 
NASA to evaluate whether “industry can provide new or alternative architec-
tures for Federal Earth science missions” and propose “new Federal programs 
that leverage such commercial capabilities, products, and services.” This vision of 
hybridized government/commercial sourcing of Earth science data raises numer-
ous questions. How will data quality standards be set and audited? How much data 
will be publicly released? What entity would preserve these data for the long term? 
Would scientists who need more than basic data now have to pay large, potentially 
prohibitive sums to acquire it?
Without careful work to ensure continuity and transparency, privatization 
could create significant discontinuities in weather data collection, preservation, 
analysis, and access, potentially reducing the quality and/or availability of climate 
data. As Gemma Cirac Claveras has observed, privatizing weather satellites chal-
lenges another long-standing scientific truce:
a steady shift taking place in the perception of weather data, from part of 
a global commons to a global commodity to be bought and sold. What 
is at stake is the whole notion of ‘the commons’, the idea of recogniz-
ing and preserving a shared human and natural heritage through public 
institutions.
(Cirac-Claveras 2018)
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Peer review
As soon as he was appointed, the Trump administration’s Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) director, Scott Pruitt, set to work deleting the phrase “climate 
change” from EPA web pages. By October 2017, this task had been largely accom-
plished. Yet this output-side attack received more attention than two other moves 
with potentially even more severe consequences for climate knowledge.
First, Pruitt decreed that scientists who receive EPA grants could no longer 
participate in EPA science advisory panels. Citing the Biblical prophet Joshua—
“choose this day whom you’re going to serve”—Pruitt declared that scientists 
could either receive EPA grants, or advise the agency on policy, but not both. 
(No similar injunction applied to industry-funded scientists, whom Pruitt has pro-
ceeded to appoint to EPA boards.)
Pruitt’s policy reflects a longstanding theme of climate change deniers: that 
government research grants are a corrupting influence. The concept seems to be 
that scientists might seek to amplify the importance of problems they study, even 
to the point of conspiring to fabricate a global issue such as climate change, in 
order to keep bringing in grant money. Those who espouse this view rarely discuss 
the corrupting influence of private-sector money; indeed, many scientists cited by 
sceptics, and the think tanks that support them, have received substantial funding 
(including salary) from fossil fuel companies (Hoggan and Littlemore 2009). Pruitt’s 
injunction appears paradoxical on its face, since those scientists most knowledge-
able about any given regulatory issue are also most likely to seek research support 
from the EPA to study that issue. Pruitt’s policy was immediately condemned 
by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (Leber 2017) and 
numerous other scientific societies.
Second, Pruitt repeatedly called for a “red team-blue team review” of climate sci-
ence (Redfearn 2017). He characterized this exercise as an “honest, open, transparent 
discussion about this supposed threat to this country.” The red team-blue team 
technique, taken from military and cyber-defense exercises, is designed to expose 
vulnerabilities that might be exploited by an attacker—not to calmly assess the qual-
ity of arguments and evidence using the best available expertise. A leaked email from 
Heartland Institute CEO Joseph Bast indicates that “folks at EPA” asked him for 
“recommendations” for “Red Team” scientists and economists, which Bast duly 
provided (Demelle 2017). Pruitt hoped to hold such an exercise on national televi-
sion, a forum that strongly rewards personal charisma, hyperbole, and the reduction 
of complex issues to sound bites. As one climate scientist, a NASA veteran, put it:
From my experience in both types of review, I can say confidently that red 
team-blue team exercises are not a mechanism for scientific debate. They are 
not designed to take a testable hypothesis and then look at whether obser-
vations and theory support or refute it. They are more like Heath Ledger’s 
Joker in The Dark Knight, causing disruption, distortion and chaos.
(Rood 2017)
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Committed denialists of Pruitt’s ilk ignore the decades of review and re-review 
of all major climate science conclusions. Indeed, the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change peer review process is probably the deepest and most thorough 
ever designed (Edwards and Schneider 2001; Farber 2007).
While the red team-blue team exercise remains on hold at this writing, the 
larger issue is Pruitt’s redefinitions of conflict of interest and peer review. They 
target longstanding scientific truces, replacing them with a corrupt process under 
the guise of an audit culture. Should they take root throughout American science 
agencies, the nation’s climate knowledge infrastructures will be severely damaged.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined specific challenges to routines and truces surrounding 
climate data. Starting in the 1990s, but accelerating dramatically after the turn of the 
millennium, routines and truces in the climate knowledge infrastructure became 
the targets of concerted attack. Mirroring trends in the larger society around it, an 
“audit culture” arose that sought to open the black boxes of scientific processes, 
seeking to expose illegitimately manipulated data and analysis. Under the banner 
of “transparency,” it promoted the value of scrutiny from positions outside the 
established boundaries of disciplinary expertise, effectively cashing the chip of the 
“modest witness” whose virtue consists in having no direct stakes in the outcome. 
This position challenged prevailing norms of peer review, even to the point of 
disqualifying disciplinary experts as “government scientists.”
The “audits” I discussed began as a check on scientific output, but moved on 
to scrutinize inputs to the knowledge-making process, including weather stations 
and raw data. All drew large contingents of vitriolic supporters hoping to witness 
a debunking of “AGW” (anthropogenic global warming). Yet instead of proving 
correct their suspicions of bias or illegitimate data adjustment, both surfacestations.
org and BEST ended up confirming existing climate knowledge. BEST director 
Richard Muller changed his view on anthropogenic global warming as a result. 
The same cannot be said for the other two groups, which continue to contest data, 
methods, and the validity of peer review.
The most direct threat to climate knowledge infrastructures now comes from 
an American administration hostile to the very concept of anthropogenic climate 
change. It plans to eliminate key instruments, de-fund climate data analysis and 
other research, and rewrite the rules of peer review. It appears poised to privat-
ize key satellites for collecting Earth science data, a move with complex, poorly 
understood ramifications for the future. These shifts target the chain of evidence 
regarding climate change, the stability of the peer review system, and the climate 
research funding paradigm in place since the 1950s.
The entire international climate infrastructure will suffer as a result. Nations 
with extensive scientific resources—especially the European Union, Japan, and 
China—may take up some of the slack. In 2018 the state of California announced 
plans to orbit its own carbon monitoring satellite, partially replacing a similar 
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NASA program deleted by the Trump administration. Scientists I know have 
discussed whether private-sector entities such as Google, Microsoft, Amazon, 
or Tesla—with access to privately-owned satellites, rockets, massive computing 
power, and “big data” methods—might join the climate knowledge enterprise, 
perhaps replacing lost government capacity. The only sure thing is that climate 
change will continue, whether or not our knowledge of it keeps pace.
Notes
1 Middle English “trewe” (sing.) and “trewes” (pl.), according to the OED.
2 Original caption: Smoothed reconstructions of large-scale (Northern Hemisphere mean 
or global mean) surface temperature variations from six different research teams are shown 
along with the instrumental record of global mean surface temperature. Each curve por-
trays a somewhat different history of temperature variations and is subject to a somewhat 
different set of uncertainties that generally increase going backward in time (as indicated 
by the grey shading). This set of reconstructions conveys a qualitatively consistent pic-
ture of temperature changes over the last 1,100 years and especially over the last 400 
(Committee on Surface Temperature Reconstructions for the Last 2000 Years, Board on 
Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, and National Research Council 2006).
3 https://web.archive.org/web/20170713182820/https://wattsupwiththat.com/2017/06/14/
wuwt-at-10-years-i-need-some-help-please/, accessed 15 December 2017.
4 National Centers for Environmental Information, www.ncdc.noaa.gov/data-access/
land-based-station-data/land-based-datasets/us-historical-climatology-network-ushcn, 
accessed 15 December 2017.
5 “Briggs on Berkeley’s forthcoming BEST surface temperature record,” WUWT blog 
entry, 6 March 2011, https://wattsupwiththat.com/2011/03/06/briggs-on-berkeleys-
best-plus-my-thoughts-from-my-visit-there/, accessed 15 December 2017.
6 BEST land-surface temperature analysis, as shown to the US House Science, Space, and 
Technology Committee on 31 March, 2011, prior to peer review. Source: Richard A. 
Muller, “Statement to the Committee on Science, Space and Technology of the United 
States House of Representatives,” available at science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.
house.gov/files/documents/hearings/Muller%20Testimony%20rev2.pdf.
7 http://climatechangereconsidered.org/, accessed 15 December 2017.
References
Arbesman, S. 2013. “Stop Hyping Big Data and Start Paying Attention to ‘Long Data’.” 
Wired. www.wired.com/2013/01/forget-big-data-think-long-data/
Argote, Linda. 1999. Organizational Learning. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
Aronova, Elena. 2017. “Geophysical Datascapes of the Cold War: Politics and Practices of 
the World Data Centers in the 1950s and 1960s.” Osiris 32: 307–27.
Baker, Monya. 2015. “Over Half of Psychology Studies Fail Reproducibility Test.” Nature 27. 
www.nature.com/news/over-half-of-psychology-studies-fail-reproducibility-test-1.18248
Bowen, Mark. 2008. Censoring Science. New York: Penguin.
Bowker, Geoffrey C. 2000. “Biodiversity Datadiversity.” Social Studies of Science 30 (5): 
643–83.
Bowker, Geoffrey C. 2005. Memory Practices in the Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Cirac-Claveras, Gemma. 2018. “The Weather Privateers: Meteorology and Commercial 
Satellite Data.” Information & Culture 53 (3/4): 271–302.
Collins, Harry M. 1985. Changing Order. London: Sage.
40 Paul N. Edwards
Collins, Harry, and Trevor Pinch. 1993. The Golem: What Everyone Should Know About 
Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Committee on Surface Temperature Reconstructions for the Last 2000 Years, Board on 
Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, and National Research Council. 2006. Surface Temperature 
Reconstructions for the Last 2000 Years. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press.
Daniel, Howard. 1973. “One Hundred Years of International Co-Operation in Meteorology 
(1873–1973).” WMO Bulletin 22: 156–203.
Davenport, Christian. 2018. “NASA’s New Administrator Says He’s Talking to 
Companies About Taking Over Operations of the International Space Station.” The 
Washington Post. www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/06/05/nasas- 
new-administrator-says-hes-talking-to-companies-to-take-over-the-international-
space-station/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f4392946a0d5
Demelle, Brendan. 2017. “Heartland Institute ‘Red Team’ Climate Lists Revealed, And 
Science Deniers Are Upset with Pruitt.” www.desmogblog.com/2017/10/25/heartland-
institute-red-team-lists-revealed
Edwards, Paul N. 2010. A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of 
Global Warming. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Edwards, Paul N. 2013. “Predicting the Weather: A Knowledge Commons for Europe and 
the World.” In Cosmopolitan Commons: Sharing Resources and Risks across Borders, edited 
by Nil Disco, and Eda Kranakis, 155–84. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Edwards, Paul N., Steven J. Jackson, Geoffrey C. Bowker, and Cory P. Knobel. 2007. 
Understanding Infrastructure: Dynamics, Tensions, and Design. Ann Arbor: Deep Blue.
Edwards, Paul N., and Stephen H. Schneider. 2001. “Self-Governance and Peer Review 
in Science-for-Policy: The Case of the IPCC Second Assessment Report.” In Changing 
the Atmosphere, edited by Clark A. Miller, and Paul N. Edwards, 219–46. Cambridge: 
MIT Press.
Fall, Souleymane, Anthony Watts, John Nielsen-Gammon, Evan Jones, Dev Niyogi, John 
R. Christy, and Roger A. Pielke Sr. 2011. “Analysis of the Impacts of Station Exposure 
on the Us Historical Climatology Network Temperatures and Temperature Trends.” 
Journal of Geophysical Research 116 D14120.
Farber, Daniel. 2007. “Modelling Climate Change and Its Impacts: Law, Policy, and 
Science.” Texas Law Review 86: 1655.
Gitelman, Lisa. 2013. Raw Data is an Oxymoron. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Goldstein, Brett, Lauren Dyson, and Abhi Nemani. 2013. Beyond Transparency: Open Data 
and the Future of Civic Innovation. San Francisco: Code for America Press.
Hoggan, James, and Richard D. Littlemore. 2009. Climate Cover-Up. Vancouver: Greystone 
Books.
Houghton, John Theodore. 2001. Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis. Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press.
International Council of Scientific Unions. 2016. “ICSU World Data System.” www.icsu-
wds.org
Janis, Irving L. 1982. Groupthink. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Jasanoff, Sheila. 1990. The Fifth Branch. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Jasanoff, Sheila. 2005. Designs on Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kuhn, Thomas S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press.
Leber, Rebecca. 2017. “Scott Pruitt is Using the Bible as His Guide for Reorganizing 
EPA’s Science Boards.” Mother Jones. www.motherjones.com/environment/2017/10/
scott-pruitt-is-using-the-bible-as-his-guide-for-reorganizing-epas-science-boards/
Knowledge infrastructures under siege 41
Lövbrand, Eva, Roger Pielke, and Silke Beck. 2010. “A Democracy Paradox in Studies of 
Science and Technology.” Science, Technology & Human Values 36 (4): 474–96.
McIntyre, S, and R McKitrick. 2003. “Corrections to the Mann et al. (1998) Proxy Data 
Base and Northern Hemispheric Average Temperature Series.” Energy & Environment 
14 (6): 751–71.
McIntyre, S, and R McKitrick. 2005. “The M&M Critique of the MBH98 Northern 
Hemisphere Climate Index: Update and Implications.” Energy & Environment 16 (1): 69–100.
Mann, Michael E. 2012. The Hockey Stick and the Climate Wars: Dispatches from the Front 
Lines. New York: Columbia University Press.
Mann, Michael E., Roger S. Bradley, and Malcom K. Hughes. 1998. “Global-Scale 
Temperature Patterns and Climate Forcing Over the Past Six Centuries.” Nature 392 
(6678): 779–87.
Mann, Michael E., Raymond S. Bradley, and Malcom K. Hughes. 1999. “Northern 
Hemisphere Temperatures During the Past Millennium: Inferences, Uncertainties, and 
Limitations.” Geophysical Research Letters 29 (6): 759.
Mann, Michael E., Roger S. Bradley, and Malcom K. Hughes. 2004. “False claims by 
McIntyre and McKitrick regarding the Mann et  al. (1998) reconstruction.” www.
realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2004/12/false-claims-by-mcintyre-and-mckitrick-
regarding-the-mann-et-al-1998reconstruction/
Mann, Michael E., and Philip D. Jones. 2003. “Global Surface Temperatures Over the Past 
Two Millennia.” Geophysical Research Letters 30 (15): 1820.
Menne, Matthew J., Claude N. Williams, and Michael A. Palecki. 2010. “On the Reliability 
of the US Surface Temperature Record.” Journal of Geophysical Research 115 (D11).
Merton, Robert King. 1973. The Sociology of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Miller, Clark A. 2007. “Democratization, International Knowledge Institutions, and Global 
Governance.” Governance 20 (2): 325–57.
Muller, Richard A., Robert Rohde, Robert Jacobsen, Elizabeth Muller, and Charlotte 
Wickham. 2013. “A New Estimate of the Average Earth Surface Land Temperature 
Spanning 1753 to 2011.” Geoinformatics & Geostatistics: An Overview 1 (1). www.
scitechnol.com/new-estimate-of-the-average-earth-surface-land-temperature-spanning-
to-1eCc.php?article_id=450
Nelson, Richard R, and Sidney G Winter. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Office of Inspector General, National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 2008. 
“Investigative Summary Regarding Allegations That NASA Suppressed Climate 
Change Science and Denied Media Access to Dr. James E. Hansen, a NASA Scientist.” 
Washington, D.C.: Office of Inspector General, National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration.
Oreskes, Naomi, and Erik M. Conway. 2010. Merchants of Doubt. New York: Bloomsbury 
Press.
Pearce, Fred. 2010. “Climate Wars: The story of the hacked emails.” London: The Guardian. 
www.guardian.co.uk/environment/series/climate-wars-hacked-emails.
Redfearn, Graham. 2017. “EPA Chief Pruitt’s ‘Red Team’ on Climate Science Is an Eight-
Year-Old Talking Point Pushed by Heartland Institute.” https://www.desmogblog.
com/2017/06/13/epa-chief-scott-pruitt-red-team-climate-science-eight-year-old-talking-
point-heartland-institute.
Rood, Richard B. 2017. “Red team-blue team? Debating climate science should not be a cage 
match.” https://theconversation.com/red-team-blue-team-debating-climate-science- 
should-not-be-a-cage-match-80663
42 Paul N. Edwards
Roosevelt, Margot. 2011. “Critics’ Review Unexpectedly Supports Scientific Consensus 
on Global Warming.” Los Angeles Times. www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-climate-
berkeley-20110404,0,772697.story
Schatz, Gerald S. 1978. The Global Weather Experiment: An Informal History. Washington, 
D.C.: National Academy of Sciences.
Shapin, Steven, and Simon Schaffer. 1985. Leviathan and the Air-Pump. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Smith, Marcia. 2017. “NASA’S FY2018 Budget Request Fact Sheet (updated September 24, 
2017).” Arlington, VA: Space and Technology Policy Group. https://spacepolicyonline.
com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/NASA-FY2018-budget-request-Sep-24-2017.pdf
Spencer, Roy W., John R. Christy, and William D. Braswell. 2017. “UAH Version 6 
Global Satellite Temperature Products: Methodology and Results.” Asia-Pacific Journal of 
Atmospheric Sciences 53 (1): 121–30.
Stodden, Victoria, Jennifer Seiler, and Zhaokun Ma. 2018. “An Empirical Analysis of 
Journal Policy Effectiveness for Computational Reproducibility.” Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 115 (11): 2584–89.
Watts, Anthony. 2009. “Is the US Surface Temperature Record Reliable?” Chicago: The 
Heartland Institute.
Weinberger, David. 2012. Too Big to Know. New York: Basic Books.
Wickham, Charlotte, Robert Rohde, Richard A. Muller, Jonathan Wurtele, Judith Curry, 
Don Groom, Robert Jacobsen, Saul Perlmutter, and Arthur Rosenfeld. 2013. “Influence 
of Urban Heating on the Global Temperature Land Average Using Rural Sites Identified 
from MODIS Classifications.” Geoinformatics & Geostatistics: An Overview 1 (2). www.
scitechnol.com/influence-urban-heating-global-temperature-land-average-using-rural-
sites-identified-from-modis-classifications-vwBQ.php?article_id=588
3
AGAINST INFRASOMATIZATION
Towards a critical theory of algorithms
David M. Berry
We now live within a horizon of interpretability determined in large part by the 
capture of data and its articulation in and through algorithms. This novel space of 
experience and meaning creates a new envelope for economic valorization and 
leads to new forms of control and exploitation – and subsequently to new sites for 
social conflict. I want to argue that we can use critical theory for deepening our 
thinking about algorithms and data and understand how they manifest themselves 
in everyday life. Whilst it is not a perfect metaphor, it is clear that an understanding 
of a system of publishing requires more than studying just “books” in and of them-
selves (in as much as books might be understood as non-networked “websites” or 
data repositories). We also need to understand the systems and processes around 
the “bookish” objects and in particular their political economy. Similarly, with 
computational “data” objects, it is crucial that the algorithmic underpinnings are 
given critical attention – above and beyond what we might call its data logics, such 
as in “capta”, databases, interfaces and streams – and connected to a wider political 
economy. Indeed, to think about data, and especially a “data politics” requires one 
to think across multiple levels of computational systems. To think about data, we 
have to think beyond data.
An algorithm is often defined as a series of rules followed to reach a computable 
end. The algorithm is a computational process followed, in a somewhat deterministic 
workflow, towards a conclusion. Algorithms tend to be defined through means-end, 
or instrumental rationality to perform specific functions and calculate specific results. 
Today we predominantly think of algorithms as the rules governing the operation 
of a computer program, but we need to remain alert to the conceptual utility of the 
concept of “algorithm”. It seems to me that whilst we might deploy the concept 
of algorithm critically, it also has a tendency to obfuscate materiality due to its con-
ceptual abstraction. So, we must be sure that the notion of the algorithm does not 
dis-embed computation, in effect reifying it.
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I think this further raises the question of whether the term algorithm is itself 
ideological, in as much it conceals and distorts the legibility of computation (see 
Berry 2014). After all, the concept of “algorithm” often stands in for a variety of 
forms of computation: technical processes, software, code, source-code, etc. As 
an abstraction, it can obscure the specificity of computational instances, and may 
conflate all computational processes as “algorithmic”. So, we need to unpack 
the concept of algorithm into specific material instances if we are to critically 
engage with computation (see for example Eubanks 2017, Noble 2018). But we 
must also be careful not to reduce algorithms to instrumentalism by implying 
that all agency rests only with human actors or social groups – algorithms are 
not merely tools.
It is the material specificity that is crucial to capture about computation above 
and beyond its sociological or cultural logics and hence its ability to structure 
a specific condition of possibility. This also applies when undertaking a criti-
cal analysis of data, which is similarly made up of a constellation of algorithms, 
protocols, systems and archives. Algorithms now shape and mediate our direct 
experience of a system of capitalist exploitation. In doing so algorithms utilize, in 
their material substructure, a number of what we might call fundamental material 
(or operational) concepts that frame software’s operation. These material concepts 
are both operationalized and ideological. I want to argue that these concepts can 
be radicalized to perform a critique of the presently existing structure of society 
by an immanent critique. But we need to go further than focus on the issues 
raised by algorithms in and of themselves and think critically about the underly-
ing system of domination that is immanent to computation and calculative reason 
in and of itself. We must interrogate and critique the will to power of algorithms 
and the political economy it makes possible (see, for example, Monahan 2018, 
Pasquale 2016, Srnicek 2017).
Today, in work, action and intellectual inquiry we see a growing use of compu-
tational systems to abstract, simplify and visualize complex “Big Data” phenomena 
and a tendency towards simplistic causal and statistical models to understand com-
plex social and cultural phenomena, such as the notion of “social physics” (Pentland 
2015). Chris Anderson has proclaimed the “End of Theory” as the data deluge has 
made the scientific method obsolete. Indeed, he claims that
we can stop looking for models. We can analyze the data without hypoth-
eses about what it might show. We can throw the numbers into the biggest 
computing clusters the world has ever seen and let statistical algorithms find 
patterns where science cannot.
(2008)
and that “with enough data, the numbers speak for themselves” (Anderson 2008). 
These claims reflect what we might call a “cult of data-ism” and a renunciation 
of the extended and important role of critical reason and theoretical thinking in 
modern society.
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In contrast, I argue that a critical theory of algorithms is needed that prevents 
“algorithm studies” becoming merely an “academy of projectors”. Rather, theory 
and its development are crucial to understand the contemporary situation through 
the confrontation of the object with its own concept. It is an approach that refuses 
to ignore and smooth over contradictions and contradictory claims and attempts 
to grasp the dynamic moment of the subject. By leaving open the possibility of a 
critical reflexive understanding of algorithmic history and tradition, it accepts the 
importance of the meaning structure of tradition but also seeks not idealize it. That 
is, that in computational societies, traditions might continue to embody interaction 
based on deception and distortion (in other words, ideology), and which can often 
be translated unreflexively into algorithmic forms. The cult of data-ism is a turn 
away from the project of seeking to understand society and culture through the 
application of critical reason in human affairs towards a data-deterministic world. 
It is problematic to erect an abstract and metaphysical standard by which human 
action and society can be judged – yet the cult of data-ism makes such a claim 
and works hard to produce and reproduce this new data-centric milieu. Whether 
history will be written by algorithms and data, even in its first draft through com-
putational journalism, is subject to citizens’ power to contest and challenge this 
new form of authority. One way to do this is by critiquing concrete examples of 
computationalism by drawing on a critical theory of algorithms. This enables us 
to challenge the cult of data-ism and an administrative approach to thinking about 
algorithms and instead to suggest different ways of being in a digital age.
In this chapter, I use these ideas to explore two sites for thinking about how one 
can begin to uncover a new politics appropriate to a contemporary computational 
milieu. The technical cannot be the locus of all politics, of course, as it could not 
cover all the varieties of political struggle expressed in society. But it is crucial that 
a politics of the computational is developed to examine the kinds of issues that are 
structured in and through data. To my mind there is little doubt that such a con-
sideration requires a multidisciplinary approach to understand how algorithms are 
radically transforming politics, society, the economy and everyday contemporary 
life (Berry 2014; Berry and Fagerjord 2017).
I argue that a critical theory of algorithms (CTA) must be concerned with exam-
ining the particular historical conditions that give the present its shape in relation 
to the specific material and ideological formations that algorithms introduce into 
the social and economic conditions of society. A CTA seeks to explore human 
reality as a self-structured, self-unfolding and contradictory whole. Through this 
explication, reality becomes open to radical change, but nonetheless, a CTA does 
not claim to represent a complete picture of reality. In the context of computation 
this requires that we need to consider the specific historical ideas and practices 
within which we experience algorithms and in which they are made and remade. 
This means that we need to critique an ahistorical notion of the “algorithm” and 
critically interrogate metaphors and analogies that are necessary to explain but are 
not sufficient for understanding the instantiation of algorithmic forms in the new 
world of computation.
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Here, I want to use the term algorithm, rather than software or code, not 
because algorithms capture more accurately the way in which the technical under-
pinnings of how digital technology are manifested through digital processes and 
systems, but because “algorithm” has become an increasingly important lens. We 
see it deployed as a concept in journalism and in academic work as a shorthand 
for a wide range of different computational systems. But equally, for this reason 
its use as a concept requires interrogation and historicizing. The digital world is 
not a static object; it is a highly dynamic and relational system that is in constant 
movement and undergoing continual change. For example, it is quite remarkable 
to note that the internet has never been taken off-line in order to be upgraded 
or changed, rather it is built through accretions and replacements that are slotted 
into or onto the existing system structure whilst it is still “running”. This makes 
understanding the material specificity of algorithmic systems, like the internet, 
extremely important, and helps to show why an analysis that focused only on the 
“data” or “content” of the internet would be insufficient.
To deepen this analysis, I have previously introduced the notion of a laminated 
system for thinking about how one might undertake an analysis of computational 
systems, even the gigantic infrastructures of computation. Depending upon the level 
of analysis, different aspects of a computational system and its deployment of algo-
rithms is made manifest. The layers I draw attention to include the physical, logical, 
codal, interactional, logistical and individuational layers (for a more detailed explana-
tion of the notion of a laminated system see Berry 2014, 58). For example, we might 
look at the interface, the element in which reading largely takes place, through an 
analysis of the surface of computation a reading, which is deepened through a focus 
on what I call the “interactional” level. Algorithms are usually fixed into a specific 
layer – algorithms are implemented at specific levels to actuate particular functional 
requirements – and thus offer potential for comparative analysis between algorith-
mic levels. They can also transverse these layers and this helps to understand the 
systemic interaction that underwrites a computational system as a whole.
In this chapter I am particularly focused on the surface (“interactional”) layer 
and how it functions in combination with the “logistics” layer responsible for 
organizing and distributing resources to create specific forms of work-processes 
and practices. The patterning of these layers of computation into vast laminated 
systems creates what I call infrasomatization (see Berry 2016). This notion draws on 
the work of Bernard Stiegler who has pointed to Alfred Lotka’s and also Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen’s notion of exosomatization as a crucial means of under-
standing computational capitalism (see Bobulescu 2015; Stiegler 2016, 95–96). 
Infrasomatizations are vast infrastructural configurations that create networks of 
cognitive agents to commodify human capacity for reason and thought – what 
Stiegler calls the becoming-mnemotechnical of every material, substance and prod-
uct. I want to cast light upon these complex interactions through an immanent 
critique. By immanent critique, I refer to an approach drawn from the Frankfurt 
school, whereby the internal terms and concepts within a system are examined 
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in relation to the reality of the claims they make about and the actuality of the 
world. How computational systems are justified both discursively and in terms 
of their internal logics and the contradictions revealed in their organization. I 
want to interpret these algorithms by reflecting on how they structure subject 
positions within computational capitalism, and how humans are thereby affected 
by computation. I argue that this helps to demonstrate how algorithms are used 
as a technique to exercise power, and to produce strategic behaviour by shaping 
the labour, both physical and mental, of workers in specific digital environments. 
Indeed, the management of information and communication as an aspect of our 
everyday lives is one that is increasingly prevalent and the dynamics of these 
new hyper-individualized capillaries of power are seldom appreciated outside of 
academic and technical circles.1
We might note that in advanced capitalist societies, economic anarchy is inter-
woven with rationalization and technology to create fewer chances for mental and 
reflective labour. Under such conditions, the values of instrumental reason are 
accorded a privileged status since they are embodied in the concept of rationality 
itself. The confounding of calculation with rational thinking implies that whatever 
cannot be reduced to number is illusion or metaphysics. As a result, the condi-
tions are created for a greater susceptibility of society to demagogic discourses and 
charismatic forms of power and a weakening of the potential for individuation. 
This forms part of the wider significance of a critical theory of algorithms and its 
contribution to social critique and critical thinking under contemporary condi-
tions. Indeed, behind the ideological claims of data science and related approaches, 
particularly in Silicon Valley, this fetishism of calculation and computation is dom-
inant. In spite of its efforts to reflect the object of analysis in terms of the manifest 
forms of development, such as here with algorithms, critical theory depends in its 
analysis on particular historical conditions. Therefore, it is crucial to maintain a 
dynamic distinction between social processes and resultant social forms by using 
commodity fetishism rather than the base/superstructure as its explanatory frame-
work. Thus, institutional and ideological formations are not simple reflections of 
an economic base; instead, work has to be done to understand both culture and 
economy in relation to the growing use of computation.
The drive to use rationalisation and the insertion of algorithmic ways of doing 
and thinking permeates our everyday lives in contemporary computational socie-
ties. The introduction of measurable indicators of performance as standards of 
output and the monitoring and surveillance that computation makes possible are 
examples of such permeation. We also see the expansion of mediated experi-
ences and systems of control in contrast to (dialogical) interaction in capitalist 
society. But equally seriously there is a lack of legitimacy for algorithmic systems 
that remain opaque and yet contribute to the structural problems associated with 
authority and legitimacy. As they continue to enmediate existing communications 
and media systems, algorithms’ accelerating influence may generate systemic crisis 
and dangerous system failures. By enmediate I mean
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when a media form is no longer dominant, becoming marginal, and later 
absorbed/reconstructed in a new medium which en-mediates it. By using the 
term enmediate, I want to draw attention to the securing of the boundaries 
related to a format, that is, a representation or mimesis of a previous medium – 
but it is not the “same”, nor is it “contained” in the new media. This distinction 
is important because at the moment of enmediation, computational categories 
and techniques transform the newly enmediated form.
(Berry 2013, 33)
On this point, we might only reflect on the 2008–2013 financial crisis to see 
how rationalization and computation can create a heady mix in relation to profit-
oriented corporations and individuals when the medium of communication is 
transformed. We might also note that increases in rationalization and computation 
can result in higher emotional intensity and promote irrational behavior (e.g. anger 
and outrage but also empathy and warmth). Similarly, the warnings from the 2016 
US presidential election and the UK Brexit referendum show how computation 
and affect can be combined for political effect. This is a situation in which poli-
tics through the mediation of computationalism is rendered algorithmic. Critical 
theory responds by politicizing algorithms.
A critical theory of algorithms can offer an analytical framework for thinking 
about how society can escape the related fetishisation of newness and upgrade cul-
ture and contribute to a project of data politics (see Berry 2014; Berry and Dieter 
2015). To do this I will look briefly at two case studies, one examining mental 
labour and the other physical labour. In the first, I look at the way in which social 
conflict is embedded within the machinery of algorithms and labour is transformed 
into a commodity through an interface. Here justificatory claims are linked to 
notions of “freedom” in a freelance “gig” economy mediated and performed by 
algorithms that are actually systems of control and exploitation. In the second, I 
look at how the interface-machinery dichotomy informs many attempts to disci-
pline labour and enables radical attempts to objectify computation in the physical 
world. Here, the “digital market” of the Amazon Marketplace website is produced 
through a centralised computational system by making possible anti-human spaces 
through the use of “chaos algorithms” to proletarianise labour through a new form 
of radical objectification of the physical world through automation, rationaliza-
tion and algorithmic systems. In this case a new algorithmic version of capitalist 
exploitation intensified by software and computation takes over from the succes-
sive forms of valorisation that dominated consciousness and society in the era of 
capitalist industrial production (Berry 2014).
“Freedom”
I want to suggest that one of the crucial approaches for thinking about algorithms 
and data is to attend to the way in which social conflict is submerged within the 
algorithmic form. A way to do this is to explore in more detail the new micro-labour 
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or micro-task practices, that is the new forms of labour that computational technolo-
gies make possible. This is where micro-task algorithms are claimed to be “literally 
mediating the future of work” (Bernstein et al 2015). The idea is to “draw on 
demand” labour as needed into a project from a “digital market place” – the highly 
visible examples being Uber, TaskRabbit and Upwork. This notion of micro-work 
is also connected to the notion of what has been called “flash teams” (Retelny et 
al 2014), which “leverage the scale of paid crowdsourcing for expert work”. These 
systems allow one to “hire more people elastically in reaction to task needs, and 
pipeline intermediate output to accelerate completion times” (Retelny et al 2014).2 
In a sense this is the cooperation between brains that Stiegler (2010, 47) argues is 
“produced through grammatization systems which make possible the proletarianiza-
tion of all those tasks conducted at the highest levels of nervous system activity”. 
Crucially it is the real-time abstraction of labour-power as a potentiality, which we 
might think of as an unending stream of labour-power on demand in a similar fash-
ion to an electricity or water supply that software and data make possible.
In the Fordist phase of capitalism, producing a stream of labour required the 
construction of massive factories to monitor and control labour through technolo-
gies such as the assembly-line. This was the era of industrial gigantism through the 
construction of huge, capital intensive factories with large work-forces gathered in 
a single location. Under conditions of computational capitalism, algorithms turn 
the factory inside out requiring the building of a distributed system of production 
reminiscent of the “putting-out” system as a means of subcontracting work. Also 
known as the “workshop” or “domestic” system, this method of production was 
considered a precursor to capitalism proper as industrialism. In this system work-
ers used their homes or workshops to produce goods, allowing them flexibility in 
organizing their time and blending the notion of work and home. Similarly, under 
the micro-task systems, we see a return to this early capitalist form, but radicalized 
and intensified by the use of algorithms that simplify the difficulty of managing 
labour and production in such a decentralized system. These more recent experi-
ments with micro-task production are nothing less than attempts to reinvent the 
world as a post-factory society. It requires the building of a new infrastructure of 
production by enframing labour-power within algorithmic “wrappers” that present 
a surface effect of a seemingly unending stream of abstract labour. This is akin to 
being within a videogame, with its own game mechanics, points awarded, badges, 
and stars, to create a sphere of production tailored to each individual worker who 
is encapsulated within the interface and thereby insulated from other workers and 
overseen and managed by the rule of algorithms.
This labour-power is made available via websites and apps creating a highly 
alienated form of labour-power that is disciplined and managed algorithmically 
through various forms of “signal” mechanisms, which are generated by the system, 
such as pay, ratings, reviews and metrics. In some sense, they are the realization 
of cybernetic systems that attempt to closely integrate machines and humans into 
tightly linked feedback loops and valorize labour through computation. This 
process requires management of bodies and minds and hence the creation of an 
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ideology of “freedom” through a creative economy but is really based on casu-
alization, precarity and piece-work. The “boss” of the old factory is abolished 
by computation and replaced by the algorithm that guides, chides and informs 
through a personal device, such as a smartphone, whose very intimacy makes it 
compelling and trustworthy.
The paradigmatic example is Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), which Jeff 
Bezos, Amazon’s CEO, calls “humans-as-a-service.” As Bezos explains,
normally, a human makes a request of a computer, and the computer does 
the computation of the task, but artificial intelligences like Mechanical Turk 
invert all that. The computer has a task that is easy for a human but extraor-
dinarily hard for the computer. So instead of calling a computer service to 
perform the function, it calls a human.
(Bezos, quoted in Pontin 2007)
AMT is named after the Mechanical Turk, an 18th-century chess-playing 
automaton actually driven by a small chess master hidden inside its case. The 
Mechanical Turk amazed contemporary observers with the seeming mechaniza-
tion of the chess-playing skill. Meanwhile, in actuality the labour of playing chess 
was actually hidden behind the “interface” of the device. Thus, the skill of chess 
playing whilst contained within the system as a whole, was utilizing the embodied 
chess playing skills of a human. Similarly, today, computer scientists working on 
large-scale systems bracket off complexity by studiously ignoring how the func-
tions they depend on are implemented – that is, they “black box” the components 
of the system design and worry about how they will be implemented at a later date. 
Programmers are taught to construct and respect “walls of abstraction” – functional 
modules that can be invoked in standard and consistent ways, hiding complexities 
within. The Amazon Mechanical Turk refers to itself as an “Artificial Artificial 
Intelligence”, which aptly captures the way in which it conceptualizes its Human 
Intelligence Tasks (HITs) that “enable[s] technology builders to farm out massive 
volumes of small data processing tasks”. The people requesting work (“requesters”) 
“interact with the system primarily by posting tasks and receiving results produced 
by the pool of workers in the marketplace” who are paid a set piece-work fee 
(Irani 2015, 3). The tasks are usually small processing activities, such as labelling a 
photo, transcribing a fragment of text or performing a small calculation.
This notion of not only aggregating human beings through software, but also 
treating them as components or objects of a computational system is indicative of 
the kind of cybernetic thinking that is prevalent in computational society. In many 
ways this is a discretization of human activity, but it is also the dehumanization 
of humans through a computation layer used to mediate the use of social labour 
more generally. It also serves to show how the interface acts to reify social labour 
undertaken behind the surface, such that the machinery may be literally millions of 
humans “computing” the needs to the software, all without the user being aware 
of this. It also opens up the possibility of new forms of social labour, disconnected, 
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managed, controlled, monitored and disaggregated and re-aggregated on demand. 
In effect, people are selling “their idle brains to the companies and people who 
need the special processing power that they alone possess through marketplaces” 
(Pontin 2007). When operationalized into infrasomatizations by capitalist corpora-
tions, computation is in danger of creating a social shock, in as much as the new 
labour practices are often under the radar of labour laws and protections, but also 
hugely profitable and therefore have distorting effects upon the wider economy 
unless they are subject to regulatory control by governments and oversight by 
labour organisations, such as unions.3
Within computing the approach of using humans to stand in for algorithms is 
modeled as “Wizard of Oz prototyping”. It allows a system to be broken down 
into constituent modules, which may involve processing of some kind but that 
might actually be fulfilled, usually temporarily by a human actor. However, if 
labour is cheap enough – or can be structured in such a way as to effectively mas-
sively reduce the cost, such as with the use of micro-piece work practices – then 
there may not need be a need to replace the human labour, which becomes a cog 
in larger computational systems. In effect, this allows corporations to tap virtu-
ally unlimited amounts of labour through aggressive task reduction to its smallest 
possible component – the creation of computational pin factories. These are the 
elements of an intensification of the division of labour made possible by algo-
rithms, which are created and organized according to a logic of rationalization that 
does not address the social questions generated by this large-scale computerization. 
Unlike the manual labour usually associated with the division of labour, in this case 
it is the standardization, fragmentation and automation of cognitive mental work, 
usually understood as undertaken by white-collar workers who were previously 
largely immune from the labour management and proletarianization of blue-collar 
workers. Taken as a whole,this is a new infrastructure for mediating labour, inter-
connected across multiple, previously discrete computational systems, which link 
data, models and work into new aggregates.
Examining this “Wizard of Oz prototyping” approach, allows us to understand 
the process of constructing algorithms in a similar way to observing a process engineer 
working according to the principles of Taylorism, for example, using a watch to reify 
the relationship between worker and machine through standardisation and division of 
labour of work processes. These software products use “Wizard of Oz prototyping, a 
tried-and-true technique in HCI and AI . . . to put a human behind the curtain . . . 
until we understand how to engineer it”. Indeed, these researchers claim that it is
now possible to wire a wizard permanently into an interactive system . . . 
[which is] fully deployable from day one” (Bernstein et al 2010). Wizard of Oz 
prototyping involves a user “interacting with a computer system which is actu-
ally operated by a hidden developer – referred to as the “wizard.” The wizard 
processes input from a user and simulates system output. During this process 
the user is led to believe that they are interacting directly with the system.
(Maudsley, Greenberg and Mander 1993)
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In reality, I argue that the interface acts as an ideological veil for the deployment 
of human labour. This form of prototyping is considered beneficial at early stages of 
the design cycle as it provides a means of studying and understanding user expecta-
tions and requirements. Maudsley et al argue that this approach is particularly suited 
to exploring design possibilities in systems that are demanding to implement, but 
here I am interested in how this practice becomes an end in itself as a means of utiliz-
ing what is conceptualized as abstract labour power, and which is indistinguishable to 
the user from an algorithm in and of itself. This is interesting to think about in rela-
tion to commodity fetishism as this is not the use of dead labour mediated through 
exchange, but rather the mediated use of living labour as a kind of algorithmic fetish-
ism. Indeed, it appears as if the computer “magically” has the human intelligence, 
empathy, agency and skill to perform the tasks that are required – magnified if the 
laptop one is working on, or the phone in one’s pocket is able to undertake skills that 
were previously thought of as only the domain of humans.
These approaches have fed into and made possible the new micro-labour prac-
tices that new computational technologies facilitate. As Bernstein explains,
imagine a world in which the computing systems and applications that you 
use are not only far smarter than they are today but as smart as you and 
I are. And this is not a world that we have to wait 100 years for artificial 
intelligence to create but something that you could use tomorrow.
(Bernstein 2015)
But of course, these systems are only partially computational with the “difficult” 
work undertaken by a hidden workforce of humans.
One example of this kind of design process is a plug-in for the Microsoft Word 
word-processor, christened Soylent, created by Bernstein et al and described as 
a “Word Processor with a Crowd Inside”.4 Soylent is a set of architectural and 
interaction patterns for “integrating crowdsourced human contributions directly 
into user interfaces” (Bernstein et al 2015, 85). In this case a prototype system 
for copyediting functions built on the Mechanical Turk system and obfuscated 
through a user interface incorporated into Microsoft Word.5 It is a research pro-
ject undertaken by Michael Bernstein and others in the MIT Human-Computer 
Interaction lab and therefore connects academic research and the growing phe-
nomena of micro-labour practices. Here, workers’ labour power is literally 
incorporated and mediated through the software. Soylent is part of a larger set 
of research projects around micro-task workflow management, but which also 
openly publish their results, including the source code of the system that can be 
compiled and run, allowing detailed analysis of the algorithm code, processes and 
interfaces. Soylent is, in the hyper-distributed nature of an “open access” soci-
ety, also available open-source under the MIT license, and is hosted on Google 
Code.6 However, these kinds of projects are also exemplary in showing the poten-
tial direction of these types of micro-task system and how easy they are becoming 
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to implement without any need to consider the normative questions raised by this 
form of anonymous crowdsourced labour. Indeed, these techniques are used to 
harvest human cognition processes for machine-learning data. For example, the 
use of image recognition training data through Google captcha and related inter-
faces (see Chew and Tygar 2004).
In the case of the Soylent software, the code is comprised of three main algo-
rithms: (1) Shortn, a text shortening service that cuts selected text down to 85% 
of its original length on average without changing the meaning of the text or 
introducing new writing errors; (2) Crowdproof, a human-powered spelling and 
grammar checker that finds problems Microsoft Word is unable to identify, 
explains the error, and suggests corrections; and (3) The Human Macro, an inter-
face for offloading arbitrary word processing tasks such as formatting citations 
or finding appropriate images. Each of these utilizes the Amazon Mechanical 
Turk system to distribute tasks to real-time human labour to undertake the text 
processing functions and check and anonymously return the results to the user 
(Bernstein et al 2010).
Let us take a closer look at this system as, even though it is a research project, 
it still allows us to understand and critique the ways of thinking engendered in the 
development of algorithmic systems. Perhaps the most noticeable is the assumed 
neutrality of the system but also the lack of a sociological understanding of the 
problem being investigated. This can often be manifested in a process of dehuman-
ization of the subjects of the algorithmic system, but is also blind to race, gender, 
class and other social identities. This is done through a process of abstraction that 
strips particularity of the subject into data types, data streams and other structures 
that are then treated as disembodied “pure” labour-power.
FIGURE 3.1 Soylent: a word processor with a crowd inside (Bernstein et al 2015)
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So, for example, Soylent enables the user to automatically gather, employ, 
organize and discipline “crowds” of labour sourced via the Amazon Mechanical 
Turk system to undertake these word-processing functions through the human 
intelligence marketplace. This creation of an interface that abstracts away the 
underlying complexities of interacting with and using the Mechanical Turk work-
ers changes the user experience of working with or interacting with human beings. 
As Irani notes in relation to the underlying Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) 
system, “AMT’s interfaces render workers invisible, crowdsourcing entrepre-
neurs can imagine workers are in a better place. [There are a] proliferation of 
contradictory justifications for low wages on AMT – Turkers want fun, or live 
in ‘developing’ countries”. Indeed, “with these stories, and by keeping low-status 
work at a distance, these professionals maintain the ideology of the non-hierarchical 
organization within their walls, keeping other kinds of new media work hidden 
behind the API or the interface” (Irani 2015, 16). The only relation users of the 
word-processor have with the workers whose labour they are using, is mediated 
algorithmically into a price-mechanism.
As mentioned earlier, even in the case of Soylent, which was nominally a 
research project, certain ideological constructions of workers and labour prob-
lems are apparent and have been implemented into the code, such as to discipline 
or control the workforce. For example, the designers developed what they call 
the “Find-Fix-Verify” paradigm in order to manage the labour and “quality” of 
the work of the “Turkers”. As the researchers explain, the Find-Fix algorithm 
“forces Lazy Turkers to work on a problem of our choice. Allows us to merge 
work completed in parallel” and with the Verify algorithm “quality rises when 
we place Turkers in productive tension. Allows us to trade off lag time with qual-
ity” (Bernstein et al 2010, 58). The project introduces the Find-Fix-Verify design 
pattern as a general algorithm for programming/controlling crowds to complete 
open-ended tasks.
This is a crucial move and is why a critical theory of algorithms is urgently 
needed. Computation enables the creation of what may appear to be relatively 
benign algorithms (often abstractly called patterns), which not only can become 
property rights in and of themselves (as intellectual property rights) but also accen-
tuate and encourage further development and abstraction of the exploitation of 
labour within algorithms. Indeed, the researchers make analogies with the popu-
lar UI technology Model-View-Controller, which has standardised programming 
user interfaces. In the case of Find-Fix-Verify, the algorithm functions to closely 
integrate labour to the needs of the user of the interface, in effect making the 
workers mere appendages of the machine. It is striking the way in which labour 
is inscribed into the system, but also de-humanized and reified into pure labour 
power, which is abstracted from its human form. But more than this, it is the 
purity of the algorithmic “pattern” that, stripped of normative content and decon-
textualized, appears to justify and encourage potentially exploitative and unjust 
labour practices. Here we need only note that these techniques are already used to 
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Identify at least one area that can be shortened 
without changing the meaning of the paragraph.
1. Find
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, apeirian consetetur ut sit, eu mea liber 
concludaturque, vim no evertitur percipitur. Et everti scaevola 
rationibus usu, alterum e
quidam, ne eos detraxit disputationi. Ut ius elit rebum erroribus. Ne 
has quodsi delectus urbanitas, ne eos sonet tantas.
Edit the highlighted section to shorten its length 
without changing the meaning of paragraph.
2. Fix
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, apeirian consetetur ut sit, eu mea liber 
concludaturque, vim no evertitur percipitur. Et everti scaevola 
style errors. Choose at least one rewrite that 
3. Verify
Soylent is
Soylent is a
Soylent, a prototype
Microsoft Word 
C# Visual Studio Tools for O ce
Mechanical Turk 
Javascript, Java and Turkit
Soylent is a prototype 
crowdsourced word 
processing interface. It 
focuses on three main tasks: 
Soylent, a prototype 
crowdsourced word 
processing interface. It 
focuses on three main tasks: 
shorten(text)
return(patches)
Find overlapping areas (patches)
Randomize order of suggestions
FIGURE 3.2 “Find-Fix-Verify” (Bernstein et al 2010, 58)
build platforms, such as ride-sharing apps (e.g. Uber, Lyft), delivery services (a.g. 
Deliveroo, UberEATs), domestic workers (e.g. Taskrabbit, Postmates) and many 
other new platforms.
This new paradigm to “stream” labour-power, points towards the possibility of 
a new class of crowd-powered interfaces through a proof-of-concept prototype. 
Here the machinery is obfuscated by the interface that may be human labour, an 
artificial intelligence (AI), or a standard algorithm. From the perspective of the user 
of the interface there is no difference. This procedure reifies the relationship and 
creates a Command-Execute relationship between user and underlying process. 
It foregrounds the ends of the process and obfuscates the means, regardless of the 
exploitative relationship it may be encoding or making possible. It goes without 
saying that the social and political consequences of the rationalization and abstrac-
tion of real human beings within computational systems is thereby minimized and 
social conflict is submerged into software.
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FIGURE 3.3 Shortn algorithm: even though it claims use of a “wizard” it 
nonetheless informs the user of the current cost and number of 
workers currently working
Perhaps this software class should therefore be better thought of as reifying labour 
into algorithmic units – actually called “blocks” in Retelny et al (2014) – but what 
we might describe as “human-labour blocks”. This type of software pattern allows 
the user to become a “manager” of teams of people in a project even if they may not 
actually be aware that they are managing people due to the distantiation created by 
the mediation of the algorithms. Retelny et al (2014) describes the software pack-
age Foundry, for example, as a flash team authoring environment with “strongly 
typed handoffs” and “support for diverse expertise, and a runtime management 
platform”.7 That is, the software simplifies the process of managing diverse teams 
that are constituted from micro-task systems. These systems, rather than try to recre-
ate the strengths of “in-person expert teams”, create the conditions for a “beyond 
being-there” vision of expert crowd work, that enables remote-working micro-task 
type short-term precarious work. In other words, hiring and firing workers is now 
possible seamlessly and invisibly within the space of an interface.
This is an example of where computation serves to hide social labour such 
that workers are hidden “behind web forms and APIs [which] helps employ-
ers see themselves as builders of innovative technologies, rather than employers 
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unconcerned with working conditions” (Irani and Silberman 2013). As Marcus 
Courtney of WashTech, a technology workers union says, “what Amazon is try-
ing to do is create the virtual day laborer hiring hall on the global scale to bid down 
wage rates to the advantage of the employer” (Mieszkowski 2006).
Attempts have been made to contest these systems and the algorithmic logics they 
instantiate. For example, as a response to the difficulty of collective action, unionisation 
or political mobilisation against various forms of human intelligence technology systems, 
which are built to deliberately obfuscate and limit the formation of a social group or 
identity. Salehi et al (2015) built “Dynamo”. Dynamo was designed as a platform to 
support the Mechanical Turk community in forming publics around issues and then 
mobilizing them (see Harris 2014). Whilst laudable, it is interesting to see how the 
problem of the reification of human labour through mediating technologies is posed as a 
problem to be solved through a new set of technologies to remediate these relationships – 
technology is offered as a response to the problems of technology. However, these new 
forms of organizing are still nascent, and the Dynamo system has been largely dormant 
since its inception – perhaps pointing to the limitations of this kind of somewhat anti-
political solution to worker organization and community building.
Some Turkers have formed collectives such as TurkerNation, MTurkGrind, and 
Reddit’s/r/HITsWorthTurkingFor (Human Intelligence Tasks) using social media, 
etc. Amazon Mechanical Turk’s legal terms create strong and often unfair power 
relationships between works and employers (“requesters”) “enabling requesters to 
pay for data and nothing more. Requesters have full discretion to deny payment 
without justification to workers or to Amazon . . . requesters do not pay to train 
and maintain employees and infrastructure” (Irani 2015). Indeed, each worker 
is rated using metrics based on “how many of their tasks have been approved or 
rejected. The most productive are invited to become ‘Masters’ and gain exclusive 
access to better-paying tasks” but Amazon can also “deactivate Turkers’ accounts 
at any time, without giving a reason.” The workers themselves are often cognizant 
of their new subject position inside computation systems, for example, one Turker 
wrote on the Dynamo site, “I am a human being, not an algorithm, and [employ-
ers] seem to think I am there just to serve their bidding.” (Harris 2014). The future 
of these platforms and the labour relations they create is symptomatic of the wider 
proletarianisation and automation that society faces under this technical imaginary. 
However, conversely we might also see the political potential for a powerful inver-
sion of the usual idea of computation. Algorithms are increasingly associated with 
agency, value and freedom whereas worker’s agency is to be automated away. By 
counter-intuitively self-identifying as an algorithm, a worker might assign this new 
agency and value to herself, within a computational milieu but not completely 
controlled by it. By negating a particularly capitalist notion of labour made possible 
in the new data capture and the algorithmic processing capacities of streams, new 
forms of political subjectivity are made possible. If the worker were to understand 
her own labour as algorithmic before the enframing logic of capitalism alienates 
it, that algorithm, that labour, is seen as a product of the worker rather than the 
system itself (see Berry 2011, 142–171).
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“Chaos”
Next, let us look at the use of algorithms within Amazon’s most advanced 
warehouses. In Amazon’s physical stores, multiple objects are packed tightly 
into a warehouse space, which is computationally managed through a complex 
technology stack. What is interesting here is that, in contrast to the previous 
example, Amazon sees a commercial advantage in removing human labour and 
human cognition out of the system and replacing it with full-scale automation 
as much as practically possible. Of course, in this extreme case of warehouse 
automation it is its systemic implementation that is of interest. In other words, 
external to the algorithmic warehouse there still needs to be the technical a 
priori of human technicians, programmers, engineers and so forth to keep the 
warehouse running, but internally the system is a completely automated process 
that is organized computationally.8 This use of computation to “bracket” space 
and create autonomous zones is highly suggestive of the manner of computa-
tional implementation more generally, and of the need to demarcate boundary 
zones, gatekeepers and boundary objects that enforce this dichotomy between 
what we might call real-space and algorithmic-space.9
Here computation is used to rethink the question of space, volume and organization 
in an extremely radical way in order to reduce the reliance on physical labour-power. 
Thus, the optimization of space internal to this system is done computationally: 
Amazon knows the exact dimensions of every product in its warehouses and the 
exact dimensions of vacant shelf space as well as the entire warehouse capacity and 
uses a set of algorithms to match object-space to the algorithmic-space of the ware-
house. Amazon has even created a gestural model of the human body for situations 
where labour is still unavoidable for so-called human “pickers”. Objects are retrieved 
using computer-controlled robots (formerly Kiva-branded orange robots) gliding 
swiftly and quietly around the warehouse bringing forth the stacks to the front of the 
building. These robots then glide the storage stacks back to the most efficient places, 
depending on frequency of access and contents of the stacks, rather like the way in 
which computers hold frequently accessed memory contents physically closer inside 
the processor. From the outside to humans, this system looks extremely disorganised 
and illogical. In fact, it represents the objectification of what Amazon calls a chaotic 
storage algorithm. The warehouse is in effect a reification of the code into the materials 
of stone, metal, plastic and human labour. The result is that the system functions at the 
highest rates of efficiency in the retail industry, with (some) humans removed from 
dealing with thinking about specific aspects of storing, retrieving (stowing/picking) 
objects to the greatest possible extent. Indeed, algorithms are deployed to manage the 
movement, organisation and cognitive-processing of the remaining workers too. As 
the system works, full-scale data collection enables new models to be created, workers 
to be tracked and new optimizations to be discovered and implemented.
It is striking that Amazon uses this so-called “chaotic storage” algorithm that 
optimizes storage through mediating databases and which writes onto the physicality 
of the warehouse building, stacks and remaining human labour by prescribing the 
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organization, movement, practices and gestures. For example, if Amazon receives 
a shipment of 500 copies of a specific book, they do not necessarily store the 500 
copies in one location together. Instead, they can distribute the books to different 
areas of empty shelf space and their location is recorded in the database because the 
capacity for thinking about organising and storage is delegated to algorithms. The 
mediation of archival strategies, storage, and its materiality through the operation of 
robots and specialised storage units enables further optimizations, complexities and 
computational logics.
It is this process of objectification that once again demonstrates the need for a criti-
cal theory of algorithms. The recasting of the material world into the shapes dictated 
by computational analysis or computational processes (e.g. transduction) creates an 
absolute alienation of labour.10 Using these augmented algorithms a human picker 
who has been working for years in the warehouse is no more productive than one 
who has worked for a week, since her familiarity with the layout of the warehouse 
is irrelevant. The only thing that matters is how quickly she can move her hands and 
eyes from point A to B, as directed by the algorithm using the data scanned in when 
products reach the warehouse. The amount of training required by new employees 
is therefore remarkably lower when using chaotic storage algorithms. It is not nec-
essary for workers to memorize the entire warehouse layout or even single storage 
locations. This allows Amazon to potentially replace staff more easily or hire sea-
sonal workers during peak times as humans do not even have to think about where 
to move their hands, as an algorithm-controlled laser points to the correct shelf and 
the order of picking items. All of this recasts the material world and labour-power 
into the shapes dictated by computational analysis or computational processes. This 
also highlights that algorithms are deployed not just to aid organizational efficiency, 
but also to deskill, proletarianize and pacify the human components of these algo-
rithmic systems. Further integrating workers into the streams of algorithms as partial 
objects rather than sensual human beings, through new infrasomatizations.
However, it is precisely here in the notion of chaos as a model for the organization 
of labour and production that another world is visible. The suggestive idea of a “cha-
otic” system that operates at a higher level of efficiency than a traditional bureaucratic 
hierarchical warehouse might be deployed to negate the existing standards of dehu-
manized workplace organization. Of course, the Amazon model of implementation 
of deskilling is not to be applauded in and of itself, rather the idea of an “organized 
anarchy” has suggestive political implications. It prompts the asking of questions 
around the subordination of the worker to the job, the creation of mere appendages 
to the machine and the fetish of the assembly-line as a model of disciplining workers. 
Instead, an organized anarchy of algorithms, as democratic self-organization, might 
link the resources available and their distribution to a new system of needs.
Conclusions
I have sought to show how the study of actually existing algorithmic systems 
can contribute to developing and deepening a critical theory of algorithms. 
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By linking the strategies of thinking about questions of data power and politics 
to the project of a critical theory of algorithms a more sophisticated approach 
to offering a critique of computational capital is made possible. By situating its 
analysis at the mediation point between algorithm and labour, the relations of 
power and reification through data, the algorithmic form as a site of power is 
brought forward more starkly. One of the idiosyncrasies of computational or 
algorithmic capitalism is its widespread adoption of software development pro-
cesses like “open source” (see Berry 2008). This means that there is a tendency 
to use widely available non-proprietary technologies in innovative combinations 
to create new technology stacks. But this also allows that these technologies can 
be “read” as their underlying logics are often available as source code offering 
a potential for immanent critique. This presents critical approaches with a tre-
mendous opportunity to study, explore and understand these systems and their 
algorithmic structures to enable theorizing and to challenge their normative and 
often exploitative forms. It also points to the importance of seeking to read pro-
prietary algorithms in situations where the social implication of softwarization 
have pernicious outcomes.
With the rise of Big Data, data itself becomes another important resource for 
input into these systems. Clive Humby has described a kind of process where
data is the new oil . . . Data is just like crude. It’s valuable, but if unrefined it 
cannot really be used. It has to be changed into gas, plastic, chemicals, etc. to 
create a valuable entity that drives profitable activity; so must data be broken 
down, analyzed for it to have value.
(Palmer 2006)
Or as Wired put it,
like oil, for those who see data’s fundamental value and learn to extract and 
use it there will be huge rewards. We’re in a digital economy where data is 
more valuable than ever. It’s the key to the smooth functionality of everything 
from the government to local companies. Without it, progress would halt.
(Toonders 2014)
This extractive metaphor, which is rich in illustrative description, is limited for 
understanding the processes of creating, maintaining and using data, and thus needs 
to be unpacked and critiqued. Indeed, seeking to open the databanks seems to me to 
still be an important tactic in a data politics, also the opacity of algorithms need 
to be questioned and linked to a wider political struggle.
These new systems create imbalances of power. Amazon does not “set minimum 
rates for work, which can pay less than $2 an hour, and takes a 10% commission 
from every transaction. Employers can even refuse to pay for work altogether, 
with no legal consequences” (Harris 2014). The way in which the organization of 
society is crystallized in algorithms and the institutions and networks they make 
Against infrasomatization 61
possible need urgent and better methods for understanding and exploring their 
constitution, capacities and implications. Equally, we need to undertake more work 
to understand the mechanisms that determine the infrastructures of algorithms, 
which themselves may be computationally mediated and have an ideological effect. 
The processes of algorithm production, reproduction, distribution, exchange and 
consumption are complex and multi-layered, as a result a set of critical methods 
for understanding these new tools, mechanisms and procedures need to be further 
refined to capture this complexity. This chapter has sought to be a contribution to 
the project of data politics by contesting the invisibility of algorithmic infrastruc-
tures, critiquing infrasomatizations as new cultural forms whether as algorithms, 
apps, Big Data or machine-learning. As algorithms disappear from view into these 
vast new infrastructures, the need for social critique becomes pressing. Identifying 
the pacifying effects of algorithms and their exploitation of labour-power offers a 
critical lever to crack open the black-box of computational capitalism.
Notes
 1 These issues are explored in depth in the work of Irani (2015), who focuses on how social 
conflict is mediated through particular assemblages of algorithmic systems.
 2 We should be clear that this form of crowd-sourcing of human labour-power, often 
low-paid or even unpaid, is not limited to the Web 2.0 economy of Silicon Valley. Indeed, 
academic research projects have in some instances tried to utilize the “wisdom of crowds” 
to make up for the low amounts of funding available in academia, a perceived “demo-
cratic” or “participatory” advantage of these approaches for impact in the humanities, 
or a lack of local expertise. In whatever form these systems are deployed, there remain 
significant questions to be addressed in relation to issues of exploitation, reification and a 
duty of care towards one’s crowd-sourced “workers.”
 3 It is likely that we will see future social conflicts generated through greater use of auto-
mation systems that function in this way. In effect they create a sense of algorithmic 
fetishism in that provided the labour is hidden behind algorithms, then the program-
mer/user who interacts via dashboard interfaces and computer programming code need 
not acknowledge its social character. For the worker on the other side of the interface, 
the demands on agency, physical labour and emotional control and self-disciplining are 
likely to create severe psychic tensions in terms of pendulum swings between anomie 
and fatalism. A single bad review or rating from a customer or client can instantly cause 
termination of the employment – the reasons for which are seldom given. Whether this 
will create the conditions for a politics of necessity and a sociological reflexivity remains 
to be seen, but will be a potent future source of labour disenchantment beyond that of 
the traditional working class.
 4 See http://projects.csail.mit.edu/soylent/
 5 Other examples include the software Foundry an “end-user authoring platform and 
runtime manager. Foundry allows users to author modular tasks, then manages teams 
through handoffs of inter-mediate work.” (Retelny et al 2014). This allows the user to 
coordinate isolated contractors, and micro-task crowdsourcing techniques from online 
marketplaces such as Upwork. Also, Dynamo a platform to support the Mechanical 
Turk community in forming publics around issues and then mobilizing. It structures 
“labor to maintain efforts forward motion” and prevent the “twin perils of stalling and 
friction” (Salehi 2015).
 6 https://code.google.com/p/soylent/
 7 See https://hci.stanford.edu/publications/paper.php?id=284
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 8 These algorithmic-spaces also require the condition of possibility created by environ-
mental technologies, buildings, corporate structures, and so on.
 9 Elsewhere I have used the distinction of compute-computing and compute-computed 
to think through this method of producing algorithmic zones through machine-learning 
(see Berry 2017).
10 This is not just taking place in the market economy, for example, the logic of the 
British Library’s National Newspaper Building, Boston Spa, United Kingdom, which 
opened January 23, 2015. This is a facility that stores 33 linear kilometres of newspapers, 
290,000 bound volumes. Here, the temperature is a constant 14 degrees centigrade, 
and 55% humidity to lengthen the life of fragile newspaper, oxygen levels in the void 
will be reduced to 14.6% to eliminate the risk of fire (air is 20.95% oxygen). In the BL 
Newspaper store newspapers are stored in high-density racking 20 metres high and 
collection items are retrieved by robotic cranes, which transfer stacks of newspapers 
via an airlock to a retrieval area. Indeed, other examples include: North Carolina State 
University James B. Hunt Jr. Library automated book retrieval system (“BookBot”), 
University of Missouri, Miller Nichols Library automated book retrieval system 
(“RooBot”), the five-story underground robo-library at the Joe and Rika Mansueto 
Library at the University of Chicago, and Macquarie University Library (Australia) – 
automated storage and retrieval system.
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4
SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM, 
SURVEILLANCE CULTURE AND  
DATA POLITICS1
David Lyon
Introduction
A surveillance scandal involving Facebook exploded in 2018. In 2015 a political 
consulting company, Cambridge Analytica (CA), specializing in influencing vot-
ers, obtained access to personal data mined from 87 million Facebook users (Davies 
2015). A Cambridge University social psychologist named Aleksandr Kogan built 
an app to harvest data from unwitting Facebook users. They were asked to take a 
survey from which psychological profiles were constructed and intended to predict 
their behaviour. The users were unaware that the data would gain access to their 
friends, or that another company, CA, was involved.
It was revealed that 270,000 Americans took the survey, enabling Kogan and 
his colleague, Alexander Nix, to develop a model predicting the personalities of 
all adult US citizens, that was then passed to CA. It is unclear which data were 
used, but CA worked for Ted Cruz and then for Donald Trump in the 2016 presi-
dential election campaign. Steve Bannon, who was to be Trump’s White House 
Chief Strategist for the first seven months of his presidency, was on CA’s board 
and Robert and Rebekah Mercer, Republican Party supporters, backed CA finan-
cially. As for Facebook users, they were unaware that data from them and their 
friends were being used for these purposes.
The news about these activities did not fully break until 2018, when a Canadian, 
Chris Wylie, who used to direct research at CA, turned whistleblower and informed 
The Guardian, which on March 21 published details of what had happened, based 
on documents from CA. This prompted government hearings in the UK, USA – 
featuring Facebook’s founder, Mark Zuckerberg among others – and in Canada 
in April 2018. And it also generated a storm of outrage and interest in Facebook’s 
activities, particularly over privacy of users’ data, that had repeatedly been the sub-
ject of controversy almost since Facebook was founded. A #deletefacebook hashtag 
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appeared, attracting much attention, and inquiries about how to remove oneself 
from Facebook grew rapidly, especially in the UK and Canada.
All this represents a new departure for studies of surveillance, an important 
marker of something that has been simmering under the surface for a number of 
years but finds concrete expression in the 2018 Facebook scandal. The key to this 
is that the internet is a surveillance space that is inherently fluid, liquid (Bauman 
and Lyon 2013). Such liquidity tends to blur boundaries, flowing across previ-
ously assumed activities and categories. For some time, for instance, the categories 
“online and offline” have seemed less and less salient to how people actually spend 
their daily lives. While these refer to distinct experiences – touch and smell, for 
example, are not yet available online – much of life is in fact lived “on the inter-
net,” in almost constant contact with, or finding out about, others who are not 
physically present. The latter category is especially interesting, because not only 
do people encounter and experience online surveillance, they also engage with it. 
This is “social surveillance” (Marwick 2012).
This happens because the internet has become a surveillant space that also 
smudges the distinctions between monitoring and tracking activities of security 
agencies, police and corporate marketers and advertisers on the one hand, and the 
surveillance initiatives of everyday life, on the other. What security agencies, police 
and corporate marketers do is hard to discern, for a number of reasons, including 
agency and commercial secrecy. But everyday surveillance is not well researched 
yet, either. Finding out about others, or “social surveillance,” has many faces, from 
the relatively benign searches for classmates or potential romantic partners, to sur-
veillance of groups and individuals that some wish to “name and shame” through 
forms of “digital vigilantism” (Trottier 2017).
Surveillance data are thus key to the functioning of the internet; they are part 
of what constitutes the internet at every level. They make possible many activities, 
both those that become visible in public scandals such as that affecting Facebook as 
well as those that are as yet relatively unknown. The internet, including surveillance 
data, also facilitates debates over surveillance activities, and over data themselves, 
thus also becoming an intrinsic dimension of the politics of surveillance, and of 
the internet itself. It is some of these complex inter-relations between the surveil-
lance that characterizes large global organizations and surveillance involving the 
mundane activities of everyday life that now have to be explored if contemporary 
kinds of surveillance are to be understood. An important question is this: under 
what circumstances are the politics of data normalized or radicalized? And how do 
ordinary users’ practices make a difference?
To paint with a broad brush, I shall frame this discussion in terms of two wide-
ranging concepts, surveillance capitalism and surveillance culture. The first is 
associated with scholars such as Shoshana Zuboff and Mark Andrejevic and the latter 
with figures such as Alice Marwick and Anders Albrechtslund. I have also contri-
buted to this research enterprise (Albrechtslund 2008, Lyon 2017, 2018, Marwick 
2012, Zuboff 2015). Both surveillance capitalism and surveillance culture depend 
on data but often in different ways and with different consequences. I shall show 
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that surveillance capitalism is the source of the systems that enable many aspects of 
surveillance culture, and that at present much that counts as surveillance culture is 
supportive of surveillance capitalism. But this is not inevitable, as evident in the case 
of the Facebook scandal of 2018. The conditions of possibility – surveillance data in 
this case – do not produce predetermined outcomes. Or so I shall argue.
Surveillance capitalism
Let me turn to the first topic of the duo, surveillance capitalism. To focus on sur-
veillance capitalism is to note the ways that surveillance is moving more rapidly 
towards centre stage in the political economy of the early twenty-first century. 
It is to grasp the immense power and profitability of personal data and to see 
why not only corporations but government departments, health-care systems, 
educational establishments and of course policing and security initiatives are so 
eager to follow the Big Data bandwagon into new realms of user-transparency, 
efficiency, productivity and power.
Facebook is a prime example of a surveillance capitalism corporation. What 
came to be called social media was in its infancy at the century’s turn. Friendster, 
founded in Kuala Lumpur in 2002, was a social gaming site and MySpace, started 
in 2004 and the largest platform anywhere until 2010, were the best-known play-
ers. Facebook began, as Zuckerberg relishes relating, in his Harvard dorm room 
and quickly grew to be the mega-corporation that it is today. Critical to its success 
were the invention of Facebook “friends” from whose data assumptions can be 
made about whole groups and population segments with similar characteristics. 
Similarly, the “like” button innovation that enabled users to approve and rate oth-
ers’ contributions, to engage in impression management and identity construction, 
and, crucially, also permitted Facebook to track users as they move from site to site, 
thus accruing more and more data.
Thus Facebook “connects” users with other acquaintances, family members, 
groups and so on, as heavily advertised from the beginning. But it also connects 
users with unseen others – the data brokers, developers, advertisers, political cam-
paigners and snake-oil vendors that pay Facebook for data about these valuable 
connections. This is Facebook’s business model, which falls squarely into the sur-
veillance capitalism category. People are attracted to the site and encouraged to 
spend more and more time there so that their attention, their interests, the details 
of their daily lives, may be sold to the highest bidders. As data are donated, unwit-
tingly, or at least only vaguely perceived, by users, so the data are used to profile 
those users and their friends and acquaintances, including those with no Facebook 
account. As with all social media, these interactions with the site are the source of 
value. And their aim is not merely to predict but also to shape lives and lifestyles.
The idea of connecting people sounds innocuous and attractive. Two billion 
users and more rely on Facebook for a host of connections and it clearly meets 
needs, including those needs engineered by Facebook’s psychologists. However, 
there have been strong indications, from the outset, that Facebook’s aims were 
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not limited to their lofty social aspirations to connect users “with those whom we 
love.” As one player in the current scandal, Sandy Parakilas, a former data manager 
for Facebook, put it when asked about the privacy concerns of users: Facebook 
“prioritizes the growth of users, the growth of the data they can collect and their 
ability to monetize that through advertising . . . [;] . . . those . . . are the metrics 
that the stock market cares about” (Stahl 2018). To understand surveillance capital-
ism better, however, we must turn to Shoshana Zuboff.
Zuboff holds an important place in Surveillance Studies, for her 1988 analysis, 
In the Age of the Smart Machine. Her brilliant finding was not just that automa-
tion allows machines to lighten the load on labour and to capture and develop 
within software skills previously perfected by human beings but that the deep 
difference lies in the ways that automation also informates. The application of 
information technology makes the tasks more transparent to managers who can use 
their enhanced knowledge to control more precisely the way work is done. The 
workplace thus becomes more intensively surveillant.
Zuboff’s new book, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (2019) describes in more 
detail the emergence of “surveillance capitalism” that builds on but goes far beyond 
the argument of “Smart Machine.” Here is doggedly persistent social research at 
its best. Animated by Google’s business model, as found in the work of Hal Varian 
(Google chief economist), it is the source of Google’s massive value of over $600B 
(Apple is $750B+; Microsoft: $521B; Amazon $433B; Facebook: $420B). Zuboff’s 
work depends on extensive interviews with all the key leaders of the big five 
internet corporations – Google, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft and Apple – and 
produces a very largescale analysis of the phenomenon that is breathtaking in its 
scope and boldness. Surveillance capitalism evidences several key features.
Google’s secret of profitability is what Zuboff describes as “unilateral surveil-
lance and behaviour modification” (Zuboff 2016). It sells real-time access to 
everyday life, aiming to change behaviours at scale, through data capture, analysis, 
and reward/punishment. The logic of accumulation determines what is measured 
or ignored and how resources are allocated. Computer mediation “now means that 
the world is visible, knowable and shareable in a new way” (Zuboff 2015, 76) It is 
corporations that gain access to everyday life and today this exempts almost no one 
in societies dependent on digital infrastructures. There is no transaction with users 
or consumers, however. Straight extraction is all that occurs at that level. The trade 
in data is entirely between large corporations.
Going beyond some other authors (e.g. Boltanski and Chiapello 2018), Zuboff 
concludes that this adds up to a new logic of capital accumulation, far beyond old 
supply and demand approaches that, she argues, up until the recent past tied capital-
ism more or less to population needs. It is characterized, she avers, by a combination 
of digital dependence, indifference and neoliberalism. It uses prediction to eliminate 
uncertainty, that may produce anxiety if not other emotions. But it also undermines 
social trust, cohesion, familial bonding, and binding contracts and promises. As she 
warns, it finally severs those already frail and frayed relationships between capitalist 
corporations and their employees, their consumers and their users.
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The key dimensions of surveillance capitalism are as follows: (i) multiple data 
sources are exploited, pervasively recording everything. StreetView, is a key 
example, which has, of course led to protest and legal action in several countries. 
Another is Sidewalk Labs, currently making a bid to revitalize a whole area of der-
elict wharves on the Toronto waterfront, reviving the district “from the internet 
up” as Alphabet, for Google, puts it (Economist 2018); (ii) data extraction occurs, a 
one-way process, lacking relationship or structural responsibilities yet dependent on 
“signals of subjectivity” (Zuboff 2015, 79). Extraction sums it up. Ordinary inter-
net users have no say. Data are expropriated without permission (unless one counts 
“terms of use”) or apology. The “formal indifference” to users and consumers is 
visible right here, and to employees, in physical plants such as Amazon’s in Seattle 
where making impossible demands on workers is how managers themselves define 
their task (Kantor and Streitfeld 2015); and, (iii) analytics means authority (spiritual) 
is supplanted by technique (material), producing “anticipatory conformity.”
Google was one of the first to use analytics to increase the relevance of ads 
to users but also, crucially, to repurpose the growing cache of behavioural data 
especially after the advent of social media. The market exchange, as noted earlier, 
is not with those users but with other corporations. The term “data exhaust” 
downplays the reality of what is being captured from users but in reality, argues 
Zuboff, it is “behavioural surplus” (Zuboff 2016) For her, this mirrors geographer 
David Harvey’s argument concerning “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey 
2004). In so doing, even rights are erased, creating basic threats to both dignity 
and democracy.
With such a dramatically successful development within capitalism it is all too 
easy to succumb to complacency or cynicism – what can be done in the face of 
such accelerating new logics of accumulation and data dependence? The corpora-
tions involved are indeed the highest valued on the planet and the impunity with 
which they operate is staggering. These factors should not be minimized. Yet to 
ask only such questions is to ignore those who experience surveillance in everyday 
life and whose responses are far from monochrome. “Anticipatory conformity” 
may well express part of the response and certainly, much of the everyday world 
of surveillance experience shadows surveillance capitalism, such that doing sur-
veillance on others using social media, or on oneself, through self-tracking using 
wearables, does occur.
Of course, as a number of analysts has argued, the dominant world of surveil-
lance capitalism pulls many into its seductive force-field. And, equally true, we 
have all been exposed, for decades, to the alluring sirens of consumerism, now 
in digital dress. The very concept of freedom is pitifully reduced to individual-
istic self-determination and even to consumer choice that even extends beyond 
mere purchasing. And, more specifically, dominant forms of big data surveillance 
are echoed in the dominant aspects of surveillance culture. As I say, few seem to 
question what is happening and, apparently, little or no resistance is offered to the 
secondary uses of people’s “behavioural surplus,” the mundane, everyday data that 
our machines exude constantly.
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But there is also evidence, not only of dominant influences but also of residual 
and emergent approaches (Williams 1977) in which older outlooks guide surveil-
lance imaginaries and practices, or newer ones offer forms of querying or resistance 
to surveillance. Much work has been done on North America and Europe but 
studies of the Global South are also appearing, demonstrating that surveillance 
capitalism is expanding its frontiers of accumulation. Also, different age cohorts 
are represented here, but the two may also join forces – for example in privacy-
promoting or digital activist groups such as those seeking open access, such as 
OpenMedia in Canada. But to understand these, we have to consider another 
important concept, surveillance culture.
Surveillance culture
When I first worked in surveillance studies, more than 30 years ago, the key issues 
were government – the “surveillance state” – policing and workplace surveillance, 
often crystallized in the iconic video camera. Computerization was well under 
way and this affected each of the three areas, plus also in the use of credit cards, 
which began in the 1960s. Surveillance practices became more prominent in the 
area of consumption but were experienced in tangible, paper-based forms such as 
the rise of junk mail that targeted more and more specific groups of consumers. 
Surveillance was spilling over the rims of its previous containers and talk of “sur-
veillance society” began in the mid-1980s and took hold by the turn of the century 
as these practices became more pervasive.
But by the first decade of the twenty-first century things were changing again. 
The new technologies – seen especially in so-called dot-com companies, were 
faring badly. New opportunities appeared following 9/11 as security industries 
went into a higher gear and soon afterwards as social networking developed from 
MySpace and Friendster into the “social media” that are commonplace today. 
These are reflected in other activities, subtly at first, in which ordinary citizens were 
invited to “say something” about perceived security breaches, to report “unusual” 
events or objects, or to “tip off” authorities on the one hand, and on the other, as 
ordinary users of social media began to exploit the new possibilities, to check up 
on each other in more direct ways and even to conduct private investigations into 
strangers’ lives. A new “culture of surveillance” was taking shape.
There are many ways of considering surveillance culture. On the one hand, it 
has to do with the experience of surveillance in everyday life, as people negotiate 
ubiquitous cameras in public and private spaces, pass through security areas such 
as those at airports, encounter embedded surveillance in buildings, vehicles and 
proliferating devices, each of which collects, stores, transmits, analyzes and acts 
on data. And on the other hand, surveillance culture exists where people play a 
more active role. This may be changing personal practices in “watched” public 
spaces such as streets, malls or airports or in new modes of checking up on the 
lives of others known and unknown using conventional search engines or more 
likely through social media.
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All these aspects of surveillance culture, whether the experiences of surveillance or 
engagement with surveillance take their place within everyday surveillance 
imaginaries and practices. The former are the way that actors see the world of sur-
veillance and their part in it, which includes a sense of how things should be and 
sets of warning bells when something seems not quite right. We may expect, for 
instance, to be subject to have our bags checked at the airport and perhaps to enter 
a biometric or have our hands swabbed. Equally, we anticipate that certain online 
sites will require agreement with terms of service, or that the door will remain 
locked if our entry card is not up-to-date or that the car will not start if our blood 
alcohol level is too high.
Mundane surveillance practices work with this, such that people learn how 
best to get through security without delay – people who think they may be 
thought of as Middle Eastern or Muslim will plan this well in advance – to click 
acquiescence with the terms of service regardless of whether or not they were 
actually read, or to follow someone else through the security door rather than use 
the appropriate entry card. In the world of social media, people are most likely to 
check up on others known to them although about a third of American, British or 
Canadian citizens will check up on strangers, despite the fact that such snoopers 
believe that these people would be annoyed, upset or embarrassed if they knew 
(Smith and Lyon 2013).
Of course, surveillance culture is volatile, complicated, as a leading analyst, 
danah boyd (2015), observes. To examine surveillance imaginaries, by which 
people envision the world of surveillance and see their place within it, and their 
surveillance practices, which is how they engage with surveillance, is to find a 
wealth of evidence of heterogeneity, not mere homogeneity.
For a start, while a majority (in the US) have cellphones, around a quarter do 
not yet have a smartphone (Pew Research Centre 2018). Also, context is crucial. 
Much evidence shows that knowledge of surveillance is widespread but that only 
certain kinds of data gathering may be viewed negatively. I may share my health-
care information with my doctor and some family members, but be much more 
circumspect if I think that an insurance or pharmaceutical company may seek to 
see it. This is not just a matter of caring more about watchers who are known 
(friends, family) than unknown (corporate marketers). Many judge surveillance 
practices (not necessarily recognizing them as surveillant) according to criteria not 
of “privacy” but of “fairness” (Kennedy et al. 2015) and act accordingly.
For a long time, much research has demonstrated that surveillance involves 
gathering data to enable populations to be categorized so that different groups can 
be treated differently. This is social sorting (Lyon 2003). Dominant forms, espe-
cially those using so-called big data, tend to reinforce already existing disadvantage 
and marginalization. A fine example is Automating Inequality by Virginia Eubanks 
(2018). And as a recent Data & Society report concluded, “Marginal populations 
may be subjected to increased surveillance by both public and private actors. If 
predictive algorithms deem them to be “at-risk,” they may be labeled as such and 
further marginalized” (Data & Society 2014).
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The exclusionary impetus of surveillance as social sorting is thus augmented 
among those who are already vulnerable in racialized, gendered, class-based and 
other categories. But even this does not mean that the outcomes may be taken 
for granted. While vulnerable populations may find their life-chances further 
restricted by big data practices, at the same time, “gaps in data . . . might be used to 
empower or assist groups rendered invisible by targeted data collection.” Women 
on welfare will subvert surveillance in order to look after their children (Gilliom 
2001); brown-skinned air-travellers will perform for security in risk-reducing ways 
(Akseer 2017); poorer people in the housing market will use real estate classifica-
tions to mitigate their position (Burrows and Gane 2006); and smart phone users 
will exchange SIM cards for different purposes. Surveillance practices are manifold.
Situating surveillance culture, surveillance capitalism
To speak of surveillance culture and surveillance capitalism is clearly to engage in 
large-scale social analysis relating to twenty-first century surveillance. To begin, 
surveillance culture requires that common definitions of surveillance have to be 
stretched. Conventional definitions often start from an “operator” perspective that 
sees surveillance as something that happens to social actors, whether negotiating 
airport security, walking down the street under the gaze of cameras, or becom-
ing aware that using Instagram and WhatsApp on those smartphones means that 
personal identity, preferences and whereabouts are known. But in fact, as I argue 
here, surveillance is also something that people now engage with in daily life, send-
ing images of incidents to the police, installing home security systems or checking 
up on others, including strangers, using Facebook or some other social media 
platform. In everyday life, ordinary people contribute to a growing culture of sur-
veillance; watching is becoming a way of life.
In each case just mentioned, everyday surveillance is facilitated by relatively 
new technologies that have proliferated in recent decades, even as surveillance 
has risen in cultural significance due to its prominent use in government, corpo-
rate and security contexts. Surveillance cameras, for example, were encountered 
increasingly in urban areas from the 1970s but especially from the 1990s and thus 
became part of quotidian experience. For various reasons, CCTV systems not only 
came to be viewed as viable means of combating crime and disorder and even of 
providing safety on the street but were also marketed for domestic protection. In 
some Brazilian cities, for instance, the issue is fewer public cameras “intruding” on 
private spaces than privately owned and operated cameras with capacities to watch 
public spaces (Firmino 2018). Thus, the slide from rarely encountering to rou-
tinely experiencing and to regularly engaging with surveillance cameras occurred. 
Surveillance is thus normalized and taken for granted, even though debates persist 
at every level about its appropriateness and efficacy.
But these developments in surveillance culture occur in the same world 
characterized by the political economic realities already discussed; “surveillance 
capitalism,” in which contemporary data extraction is profoundly implicated. 
72 David Lyon
That is, for example, as users go online to use Google, Facebook or even – as 
academics – ResearchGate (Lyon and Melgaço 2019), scraps of data are sucked up 
as a vacuum cleaner sucks away detritus from rugs or sofas. But this digital dust 
does not go to landfills. Someone – Google was first! – saw value in it and now 
it is monetized to make millions. In other words, the surveillance culture has an 
intimate and mutually-informing relationship with surveillance capitalism. What 
is that relationship? As I hinted earlier, the dominant aspects of surveillance culture 
often play into surveillance capitalism, facilitating and normalizing it. And by the 
same token, much of surveillance culture depends on and is nurtured by surveil-
lance capitalism.
However, it is important to observe that focusing only on the operator 
aspects – the vacuum cleaning – or on the complacent and compliant aspects 
of surveillance culture can easily produce a sense of hopelessness or at least, 
cynicism. The “operators” will insist that the technological changes shaping 
the digital era are really unstoppable and that not to be data-driven is to miss 
out on efficiency and profitability or at least that law and regulation will never 
“catch up.” And those comfortable with surveillance culture will say that its 
convenience and efficiency in making desired connections with others is worth 
any minor quibbles about things like privacy or civil liberties.
To counteract the sense that nothing can be done I note that analyses of everyday 
surveillance imaginaries and practices (Taylor 2003) – “surveillance culture” – 
indicate that in fact a variety of responses is possible and, increasingly, visible. 
True, some shrug off the sucking up of data as something inconsequential; who 
cares? But beyond such dominant modes are residual approaches that question 
users donating data with no apparent return (Andrejevic 2013), and emergent 
modes that try to resist by arguing for new forms of regulation or by using tech-
nical means in digital judo moves (Dupont 2008). In the mid-twentieth century, 
some early studies of TV feared the growth of propaganda and the negative 
impact of the new medium, that “cultivated” viewers. But more subtle studies 
showed just how much “critical viewers” also exist, reading the news or inter-
preting the shows in myriad ways. Arguably, something similar is happening 
now, in relation to the digital and to surveillance. It is consonant with Engin Isin 
and Evelyn Ruppert’s observation, that while some internet users see themselves 
as simply subject to power, others believe that they can make a difference. They 
are subjects of power (Isin and Ruppert 2015).
What these authors note, in Being Digital Citizens, is this. While “subjects” is 
a useful and illuminating word, it has to be thought of in two ways at the same 
time. People are subjects to power in that everyday lives are profoundly affected 
positively and negatively by data and the internet – particularly, as argued here, 
by surveillance capitalism. But simultaneously people are subjects of power in that 
they may demonstrate subversive as well as submissive behaviours in online life – 
or “onlife” (Floridi 2015). Digital citizens come into being, in part, as data politics 
begin to form themselves in recognizable ways. Our very relationship as citizens 
in digitally dependent societies is now mediated by the internet and by data. And 
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as “digital citizens” make rights claims about those data, they do so prompted 
and provoked into self-governing and by attempting to exert political influence 
through such claims. Thus, while today’s strategies of power are already being 
emulated by others in subordinate positions they are also evaded, questioned and 
subverted by everyday tactics.
Data politics and an optics of hope
Having tried to make the case for seeing together the two phenomena of sur-
veillance capitalism and surveillance culture, I turn towards a more normative 
conclusion. I want to press the foregoing argument further. For a meaningful data 
politics to emerge, it would seem that human dignity and especially agency need 
not only to be seen in diverse responses to surveillance capitalism but also to be 
reasserted and encouraged. Given the manifest disrespect for dignity and fairness 
suffered under surveillance capitalism, indignation should rightly feature as an 
aspect of such social analysis. Surveillance capitalism and surveillance culture can-
not simply be studied dispassionately, however carefully and accurately the social 
data are presented. They affect identities, how people see and present themselves 
(subjectivities), life chances, the ways that opportunities open or close depending 
on the consumer and other categories in which, today, everyone is placed (social 
sorting) and democratic participation, or how far we can vote or whether or not 
that vote makes a difference (politics). In other words, human life is in many ways – 
put concisely, in relation to subjectivities, social sorting and struggle – negatively 
affected by surveillance capitalism.
Indignation is necessary but not sufficient, however. Analytically, the work of 
Michel de Certeau (1984) opens doors to a more hopeful sociology of surveil-
lance for the twenty-first century. While he freely acknowledges the strategies of 
power visible in late modern consumer capitalism, he urges that attention also be 
focused on the tactics visible in everyday life – tactics that do not simply mirror the 
dominant political economy, in our case, of surveillance capitalism. In the present 
context, this means paying careful attention to surveillance imaginaries and prac-
tices. These include the repurposing of technologies beyond what was envisioned 
by their designers, resisting social media marketing and finding fresh ways of using 
media – for instance, by accenting quality, not quantity. For example, Catchpool – 
whose tagline is “catch the best, leave the rest” – reduces mere noise for the sake of 
valuable forms of sharing, or Mighty Networks produces and distributes customiz-
able tools for people to create their own networks (Laurenson 2016).
As so often, reminders are needed that de Certeau’s tactics may operate at many 
levels. There are the everyday online interactions in which micro-responses to 
surveillance capitalism – even though it may not be named as such – occur and 
which, when magnified by social media, could make a difference. But there are 
also more deliberate activities that turn simple responses into rights claims and 
that, again, could be amplified by shared activities, this time through some of the 
many rights-claiming groups now springing up to alert users to possible abuses and 
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remedies. These are often associated with groups that also have technical expertise 
to assist those with none, to clarify their claims and their targets. The tactics may 
also be associated with more conventional and formal rights claims, made in rela-
tion to privacy and data protection legislation. All these need to be filled out with 
in-depth research, but of their existence there is little doubt. And moments such 
as the Facebook-Cambridge Analytica scandal, as the moment of the Snowden 
disclosures or the post-9/11 security surveillance overreach, are critical ones for 
the discovery that what seemed to be personal problems are shared public issues.
Here, I am not so much prescribing ways forward as proposing some open ques-
tions about where surveillance culture is heading and how some emerging trends 
might channel it in fresh ways. Contemporary cultural developments may foster 
human flourishing. Even a recent British report on data management couches its 
aims as the pursuit of human flourishing (Royal Society 2017). Along with a quest 
for fairness – for instance in the Cardiff University research group dedicated to 
“data justice” – both would-be responsible consumers and wider human rights 
groups assert more human scale approaches against tendencies towards a colder and 
more calculating surveillance capitalism.
This is where I believe that the notion of utopia-as-method (Levitas 2013) 
is instructive. This is not the familiar fictional accounts of idealized worlds, but 
rather, critical accounts of current cultural directions. These also act as potential 
means of proposing and promoting alternative futures that embody holistic, reflex-
ive and democratic imaginaries and practices. In other words, utopia-as-method 
contributes to the common good as shared values – chosen wisely, by convic-
tion and conscience, not consumer criteria – especially in relation to rights and 
responsibilities. One area that such shared understandings develop is in the realm 
of popular cultural forms, including utopias and dystopias.
The commonest metaphors in surveillance culture today still come from Big 
Brother, now largely rendered obsolete – in its details, not in its humane thrust – 
by the rise of surveillance capitalism. But this does not mean either that Orwell is 
irrelevant or that other metaphors and memes are unavailable. They may be found, 
for instance, in some older fiction such as Lord of the Rings or in the contemporary 
utopian/dystopian fiction of The Circle and of TV series such as “Black Mirror.” 
The task of the social sciences, alongside some very well-informed contributors to 
literary criticism (Marks, 2015, Rosen and Santesso 2013) should try to understand 
how the new metaphors are mobilized as means of comprehending and acting in 
relation to surveillance.
Surveillance capitalism is a newly dominant social, economic and political 
formation. But to understand surveillance only in those terms is to see it from 
an exclusively operator perspective. Raising awareness about its actual mode 
of operation and its erosion of relationships and rights is a vitally worthwhile 
task. However, also considering possible tactics that might destabilize or deflect 
some of its consequences will set the tone for a struggle that is already under 
way. It is unclear how the 2018 Facebook debacle will play out. However, the 
very fact of raised consciousness and widespread, publicly discussed uncertainty 
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about the balance between the pros and cons of involvement with Facebook is 
a sign that data hegemony is far from complete, and of the ongoing volatility of 
surveillance capitalism.
Seeking workable alternatives as well as promoting limits to the expectations of 
24/7 access – the “always-on” phenomenon – alongside the increasing pressure to 
find acceptable modes of regulating social media could mean that a turning point 
is being reached. Looking at the everyday life of surveillance as it is experienced, 
imagined and practiced – surveillance culture – offers not just a complementary and 
necessary perspective than the rather too prevalent paranoia, complicity and defeat-
ism associated with the critique of social media and surveillance capitalism, but the 
potential for an optics of hope. Why? Because the symbiotic growth of surveillance 
capitalism and culture will only be interrupted if the latter becomes more conscious 
of itself and more willing to ask basic questions: Do we really need this? How does 
it contribute to the common good and human flourishing? If those cultural ques-
tions, relating to how we actually live our lives, generate a fresh data politics – green 
shoots of which are already appearing – then those hopes will begin to be realized.
Note
1 Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at ASA Montreal August 2017; Universidade 
Federal do Rio de Janeiro October 2017; CICC atelier Université de Montréal, Nov 
2017; IAS Loughborough University Nov 2017. Brief version for the Saturday Club, 
Kingston, May 2 2018.
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MUTUAL ENTANGLEMENT AND 
COMPLEX SOVEREIGNTY IN 
CYBERSPACE
Ronald J. Deibert and Louis W. Pauly
When the Internet first emerged, many predicted that it would present a major 
challenge to the power of states in general and to the effective control of authori-
tarian states in particular (Johnson and Post 1996). More recent commentary has 
emphasized the opposite: that the Internet expands and intensifies the capacities 
of states within and across conventional territorial boundaries. While we now see 
clearly how social media and other digital technologies have empowered non-state 
actors in civil society, the verdict is quite mixed as to their ultimate impact on the 
sovereign authority of the state.1
Domestic-level information controls are today reinforced by norms promoted by 
states like China and Russia that try to shift governance away from multi-stakeholder 
or pluralist models toward more state-centric approaches. Even liberal democratic 
countries have lately been moving in the direction of territorially-defined policies 
of cyberspace governance through laws aimed at data localization and through the 
establishment of “cyber commands”. While efforts to re-territorialize cyberspace 
are undeniable, the extent to which states depend on mutual restraint to project 
power in and through cyberspace has been obscured. Extraterritorial projections of 
state power in this sphere are expanding, deepening, and becoming more elaborate. 
The most extensive of these projections come from the United States, but even the 
most autocratic regimes associated with efforts to promote “Internet sovereignty” 
today rely on the openness of cyberspace.
States are exercising extraterritorial power to acquire data about the world 
around them: to anticipate, analyze, and interdict threats; to shape the strategic envi-
ronment to their advantage; to promote their interests via the movement of goods 
and services, information, and capital. They are also using new communication 
technologies to broaden military command and control systems. The combined if 
not fully intended “network effect” of such extensive projections of power in and 
through cyberspace is to frustrate individual strategies aimed at territorial insulation. 
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This effect today is well-described as mutual entanglement (Nye 2017). The capac-
ity of states to project power domestically and extraterritorially rests on the material 
opportunities opened up by cyberspace itself, and that openness thwarts efforts to 
build impenetrable border controls. As states aim to shape cyberspace to their strate-
gic advantage, their governance domains both expand and contract. Specific policies 
are continually being reconfigured in a dynamic if not necessarily symmetrical con-
text of interaction. The legitimacy of those policies may be contested, but they rest 
on an apparently adequate degree of acquiescence internally and externally.
Drawing from recent research into state espionage and targeted digital attacks, as 
well as evidence now in the public domain from the Edward Snowden disclosures 
that cannot be ignored, this chapter provides an overview of extraterritorial pro-
jections of state power in and through cyberspace, from the United States to cases 
involving highly opaque autocratic regimes. This evidence suggests that efforts to 
bring digital networks back under territorial control are undercut by operations 
designed to use those networks for domestic surveillance and external security. In 
the end, re-territorialization strategies in cyberspace are self-limiting. The chapter 
concludes by sketching implications for sovereign authority in a dynamic system. 
The mutual entanglement characteristic of cyberspace today profoundly compli-
cates state strategies aimed at either anarchical fragmentation (where no one sets 
governing rules) or unquestioned hegemony (where rules are set by a dominant 
power) (Deudney 2007; Ruggie 1993).
The territorialization impulse in cyberspace
The OpenNet Initiative (ONI) – a university-based research project using a 
mixed methods approach to documenting Internet censorship – has conceptual-
ized state power over cyberspace within territorial boundaries in “generational” 
terms (Deibert 2015, 2017; Deibert and Rohozinski 2008). First generation con-
trols refer to defensive Internet censorship systems erected at national borders, with 
governments restricting their citizens’ access to online resources, the Great Firewall 
of China being the archetypal example. Internet filtering typically involves special 
software or hardware placed at key network chokepoints that inspect requests for 
web content, blocking those that are restricted from reaching their destinations. 
ONI tested for national-level Internet filtering in more than 70 countries and 
found evidence in more than 45 (Deibert et al. 2008; 2010; 2012). The number 
is likely expanding quickly, since many countries have begun censoring content 
involving the sexual exploitation of children, hate speech, and terrorist threats.
Second generation controls refer to government measures to control cyber-
space domestically through laws, policies, and other sorts of Internet policing, often 
undertaken with the cooperation, coercion, or co-optation of private companies. 
Examples include content removal requests, compelled access to customer data, and 
the application of defamation or libel laws to Internet content. Sometimes second-
generation controls are applied secretly, making documentation challenging for 
researchers. Occasionally we see glimpses of these controls through the window of 
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private sector transparency reports, such as those published by Google, Microsoft, 
or Twitter. The remarkable Vodafone Law Enforcement Disclosure Report, for 
example, extensively documented country-by-country requests for customer data 
(Vodafone 2014). Researchers have also employed reverse engineering methods 
to uncover hidden surveillance or censorship functions built inside popular appli-
cations, such as the surveillance embedded inside the Chinese version of Skype 
(Dalek et al. 2015; Knockel, McKune and Senft 2016; Knockel, Senft and Deibert 
2016; Villeneuve 2008). It is accurate to say that second-generation controls have 
become more complex, penetrating deeper into civil societies and filtering com-
munications through a thicket of rules, laws, and practices.
Third generation controls refer to the use by states of more “offensive” methods, 
such as targeted surveillance, digital espionage, and disinformation campaigns. If 
first generation controls sought to bolster borders, and second generation controls 
deepened the internal reach of state agencies, third generation controls are projected 
outwards. Although varying in resources and capabilities, many governments’ armed 
forces and intelligence agencies have developed aggressive external operations. 
Growing demand for offensive capabilities has produced a rapidly expanding mar-
ket for computer network attack and surveillance products and services developed 
by private companies. These firms range from Cold War giants like Raytheon and 
Northrop Grumman to more obscure “niche” entities, like Italy’s Hacking Team, 
the UK’s Gamma Group, or the Israeli “cyber warfare” company, the NSO Group 
(Harris 2014). The overall industry is growing at an annual rate of 24% per year and 
will likely exceed USD $600bn in annual revenue by 2023 (Stiennon 2016).
Across all three generations, cyber security has risen to the top of policy agendas, 
driven by repeated instances of large scale data breaches, vulnerabilities to critical infra-
structure, competitive issues, and domestic political concerns (Deibert and Rohozinski 
2010). To the three generations of controls, moreover, might be added a fourth: the 
efforts of some states to negotiate governance agreements at regional and international 
levels. Over the last several years, for example, a coalition of like-minded countries 
led by China and Russia, using the rhetoric of “Internet sovereignty” and leveraging 
the opportunity presented by the Snowden disclosures, has sought to move govern-
ance practices away from what they perceive as its current US-dominated system to 
one centered around the United Nations and organizations like the International 
Telecommunications Union (Deibert and Crete-Nishihata 2012).
Predictions of Internet “fragmentation” and a retreat toward “Cyber Westphalia” 
have become prominent (Demchak and Dombrowski 2011; Dombrowski 2016). 
Different sources have specifically been identified: filtering and blocking websites, 
social networks or other resources offering undesired contents; attacks on such 
networks and resources; digital protectionism blocking users’ access to and use 
of key platforms and tools for electronic commerce; centralizing and terminating 
international interconnections; attacks on national networks and key assets; local 
data processing and/or retention requirements; architectural or routing changes 
to keep data flows within a territory; prohibitions on the transborder movement 
of certain categories of data; strategies to construct nationally bounded “Internet 
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segments”; and international frameworks to legitimize restrictive practices (Drake, 
Cerf and Kleinwächter 2016).
Of these, the so-called “data localization” trend accelerated by specific reactions 
to the Edward Snowden disclosures is worth special emphasis. Those disclosures 
revealed intensive electronic intelligence-gathering by the US National Security 
Agency (NSA) and its close allies. In reaction, many others began insisting on the 
holding of local data centres inside national jurisdictions and tightly restricting trans-
border processing for certain classes of data. Whether such restrictions can actually 
prevent effective surveillance or, in the case of official investigations, reduce reli-
ance on cumbersome mutual legal assistance treaties (MLAT), is questionable. They 
also raise obvious concerns that their true intent may be more domestic in nature.
In hindsight, given the externalities around Internet communications (now 
used by well over three billion people on a daily basis worldwide), the impulse 
behind expanding state control efforts was foreseeable. It now seems inevitable 
that states would be ever more focused on trying to shape information environ-
ments quickly becoming integral to all aspects of society, from the cultural to the 
economic and political. Among other things, high-profile terrorist acts certainly 
encouraged citizens to demand such efforts. As obvious as such an impulse may 
now seem, however, its implications should not be exaggerated. It constitutes only 
one dimension of a complex process involving the extraterritorial projection of 
power by other states in and through cyberspace itself. The next sections surveys 
recent research illustrative of that process and its consequences.
The United States and the transformation of cyberspace
The contemporary cyber-security policies and practices of the United States offer 
the clearest example of extraterritorial power projection. The American defense 
of a borderless, open internet may simply be depicted as based entirely on liberal 
values and ideals, and conveniently contrasted with “territorializing” processes of 
states that oppose this agenda. The US posture is actually more complicated. Its 
“Internet freedom” agenda is arguably more a function of interests than values. It 
is in many ways a discursive or ideological support for the projection of US power 
in global cyberspace. In this respect, it is analogous to the US position on treating 
the oceans and outer space as a “commons”. The free movement of information 
globally (just as with free navigation of navies and satellites, and to a lesser degree, 
aircraft) serves global hegemonic power, not because US policymakers believe 
in the ideal of the open commons (although some very well might) but because 
sustaining a position of dominance depends on the ability to move goods, services, 
information, and capabilities across cyberspace.
US power projection is also connected both to long-term interests and to a 
changing threat environment. The US now operates nearly 800 military bases 
in more than 70 countries and territories worldwide (Vine 2015). This extended 
footprint is woven together by a bristling infrastructure of digital communica-
tions, today including 131 government and 149 military satellites in orbit as well 
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as another 273 US-owned commercial satellites (Union of Concerned Scientists 
2016). The Pentagon alone operates around 7,000 unmanned aerial drones (Friends 
Committee on National Legislation 2015). Today a Hellfire missile strike from a 
US Predator drone is guided by earth-orbiting global positioning satellites (GPS) to 
within a few metres of its target. The missile is typically fired by an operator based 
in a hangar in the mainland US, working on computer screens onto which are pro-
jected high-resolution images beamed back instantly by advanced imaging sensors.
Such technological advances, of course, track the emergence of the United 
States as a global superpower. They coincide with the development of the 
Internet itself and by earlier innovations in telecommunications, including under-
sea cables and digital computing systems now global in scope (Starosielski 2015). 
The United States, in fact, enjoys a distinct “home field advantage” with respect 
to much of the geopolitics of cyberspace. Most of the Tier 1 telecommunications 
companies that operate the backbone of the earth’s communications systems are 
headquartered in the United States; the largest software, social media, device, and 
Internet service providers are still mostly American (Deibert 2012). As a result, 
many firms can be compelled or quietly enlisted into US government policing 
and intelligence efforts – a lesson not lost on other governments. One of the more 
interesting consequences of the Snowden disclosures, however, has been the roll-
ing out of consumer level end-to-end encryption by US-based companies. The 
consequence is to deepen and extend global networks and frustrate policies aimed 
at strict data localization.
US intelligence agencies have long reached directly into networks physically 
based outside their territorial jurisdiction. Officials and their helpers can penetrate 
or exploit vulnerabilities at critical nodes in the global flow of communications 
through remote access to cables, servers, routers, wireless networks, and Internet 
Exchange Points (IXPs). In this regard, switches and other hardware shipped 
overseas are hardly invulnerable, and encryption standards through international 
standard setting bodies are malleable.
Consider just one very important NSA program, codenamed XKEYSCORE. 
XKEYSCORE provides a portal for analysts into the massive amounts of digi-
tal electronic communication data that are vacuumed up from access points 
around the world. The Snowden disclosures indicated that as of the late 2000s, 
XKEYSCORE-accessible communications data included not only emails, chats 
and web-browsing traffic, but also pictures, documents, voice calls, webcam pho-
tos, web searches, advertising analytics traffic, social media traffic, botnet traffic, 
logged keystrokes, computer network exploitation (CNE) targeting, intercepted 
username and password pairs, file uploads to online services, Skype sessions and 
more (Marquis-Boire, Greenwald, and Lee 2015). At that time, XKEYSCORE 
involved at least 700 servers in 150 field sites across a wide array of countries.
Observers commonly note that such programs suggest only that the United 
States is an exceptional power. That ignores, however, the experience of all “arms 
races” in history. US innovations in signals intelligence (SIGINT) practices are 
closely followed by its key allies. Second and third tier partners may be expected 
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to emulate them, and eventually so too will competitors. The Snowden disclosures 
may have accelerated this process, providing a “blueprint” of elite SIGINT tech-
niques that others surely now strive to imitate.
It is important to recognize that US power projection in and through cyberspace 
is already partially coordinated through a long-standing and deeply institutionalized 
alliance system, most commonly referred to as the “Five Eyes”, a partnership among 
the SIGINT agencies of the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. 
While Anglo-American history and culture, certain common political institutions 
and governing practices, and the experience of the Second World War still underpin 
the alliance, geography also accounts for much of its continuing vitality (Katzenstein 
2012). The five agencies extensively exchange intelligence that ensures seamless 
coverage over the vast majority of international signals and telecommunications traf-
fic. The United Kingdom alone remains a major hub for global flows of information 
to and from Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the United States (Müller-Maguhn 
et al. 2014). Undersea cables terminate on its southwestern and eastern shores, while 
other linkages, including longstanding financial networks, connect it to the rest 
of the world. Canada (historically focused on North America and the Arctic) and 
Australia and New Zealand (focused on Asia-Pacific) provide their own regional 
complements. In recent decades, prompted by terrorist threats, other security con-
cerns, and common economic interests, the Five Eyes have intensified collaboration 
with concentric rings of other states, including Denmark, France, Netherlands, 
Norway and then Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Sweden. In terms of actual 
practices of deep intelligence-sharing sufficient to construct what international rela-
tions scholars call a “security community”, it makes sense today to talk about a 
collaborative arrangement involving at least “Fourteen Eyes”.
The extraterritorial projection of autocratic power
Intense concerns about Internet fragmentation today typically center on the pol-
icies of a growing number of authoritarian regimes. Early predictions that the 
Internet would contribute to the demise of these forms of political rule were 
clearly misplaced. Autocratic governments have proven to be adept at building 
sweeping information control systems. Indeed, there are many characteristics of 
digital technologies – biometric databases, commercial spyware, and deep packet 
inspection systems – that can facilitate centralized rule. The publicity around the 
Snowden disclosures, moreover, may have accelerated moves to emulate controls 
pioneered by democratic states. In any event, there is no doubt that authori-
tarian government interference in Internet traffic – from content filtering to 
complete disruption of services – has become commonplace (Gunitsky 2015). 
Re-territorialization strategies, though, have to be viewed with skepticism.
China has commonly been seen as the progenitor for a new paradigm aimed at 
closing or tightly controlling cyberspace. It employs all three generations of infor-
mation controls, from its Great Firewall blocking access to websites and services 
hosted outside of China’s borders, to its extensive, legally mandated system of 
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social media controls imposed on domestic Internet service companies and provid-
ers. Companies employ thousands of individuals whose jobs are to censor posts 
on popular social media and other communications platforms. Many engineer 
their systems with surveillance functionalities, and all locally based companies are 
required to share user data with state security services upon request. Internationally, 
China pushes an agenda to build a new Internet governance regime assigning pri-
ority to state sovereignty and “non-interference”.
Nevertheless, China has not been able to hide its own extraterritorial reach. Its 
external operations are most evident in vast and well documented cyber espionage 
campaigns, which include both global targets and an extensive transnational net-
work of command and control servers based outside of China’s jurisdiction. The 
US security company Mandiant (n.d.), for example, traced one of many major 
China-based campaigns. Known as APT1 (“Advanced Persistent Threat 1”) and 
involving 937 Command and Control (C2) servers hosted on 849 distinct IP 
addresses in 13 countries, it has been convincingly linked to a unit of the People’s 
Liberation Army.
Apart from its extraterritorial projection of power through electronic espionage 
campaigns, China also has extensive transnational reach through its telecommuni-
cation and software industries. Huawei, the largest telecommunications equipment 
manufacturer in the world, has engineered routers that by accident or design 
allow unauthorized access (Blue 2012). Researchers have documented, through 
reverse engineering techniques, massive privacy and security vulnerabilities in 
several China-manufactured applications, including UC Browser, QQ Browser, 
and Baidu Browser. UC Browser is used by 500 million people, many outside of 
China. Baidu Browser’s software development kit, essentially a suite of code, has 
been adopted in tens of thousands of other applications that themselves have been 
downloaded hundreds of millions of times outside of China, which means that the 
same data collected by Baidu Browser and sent back to Baidu’s servers, for pos-
sible sharing with Chinese authorities, is sent in the same way. Although there is 
no publicly available evidence connecting these privacy and security vulnerabilities 
directly to Chinese state agencies, the mere collection of such fine-grained infor-
mation, coupled with well-established data retention and sharing practices inside 
Chinese industries, means the effect is the same. Non-Chinese national users of 
these applications know or should know that they are exposed to surveillance by 
Chinese authorities (VanderKlippe 2016). It is highly probable that China’s state 
security organs are harvesting this information, much the same way the Five Eyes 
harvest information collected by western companies.
One of the more remarkable examples of China’s extraterritorial projection of 
power in cyberspace is the “Great Cannon”, a digital attack tool co-located in 
China’s Great Firewall. It was discovered and documented by researchers at the 
University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab in collaboration with computer scientists at 
UC Berkeley and Princeton University (Marczak, Weaver et al. 2015). After reports 
emerged of denial-of-service attacks targeting the websites of overseas critics of the 
Chinese government, the researchers used several network measurement techniques 
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to document this new attack tool. They named it the Great Cannon because it 
repurposes a random set of external requests for access to websites inside China and 
then deploys them as packets in attacks aimed at overseas websites. Functionally 
speaking, the Great Cannon effectively “shoots” such requests back and thereby 
overwhelms servers located outside of China that Chinese operators wish to silence. 
The very nature of the attack tool – operating at the international gateway where 
China’s domestic networks connect with networks abroad – points to the complex 
ways in which territorial impulses and transnational flows of information are neces-
sarily entangled in the contemporary practice of digital power projection.
At the same time that Chinese authorities seek vigorously to defend their 
Internet borders, they also are pragmatic about the need to accommodate trans-
national data flows, principally for economic reasons (Lindsay 2015). The Great 
Firewall of China therefore remains porous by intention. To cite just one example, 
CloudFlare, a US-based cyber-security firm recently entered into a “virtual joint 
venture” with Chinese web-services firm Baidu to create a unified network that 
makes foreign websites more easily accessible in China and allows Chinese sites 
to run in destinations outside the country (Mozur 2015). While the agreement 
may seem orthogonal to the regime’s interests in strictly defending its territorial 
boundaries, it is perfectly congruent with the pragmatic approach the country’s 
elites actually take to encourage economic growth. Digital networks are seen as 
essential in that regard, but so too are countervailing efforts to restrict the exchange 
of ideas that run contrary to one-party rule or that touch on taboo topics, such as 
religious freedom, regional autonomy, democracy, and human rights.
China’s tech companies have no choice but to participate in this balancing act. 
The popular chat application, WeChat, provides a prominent case in point. With 
806 million monthly active users, it is the most popular such application in China and 
the fourth largest in the world. Citizen Lab researchers undertook several controlled 
experiments using combinations of China, Canada, and US registered phone num-
bers and accounts to test for Internet censorship on WeChat’s platform (Ruan et al. 
2016). They found substantial censorship on WeChat but split along several dimen-
sions. There is keyword filtering for users registered with a mainland China phone 
number but not for those registering with an international number. However, once 
a China-based user has registered with a mainland China phone number, censorship 
tools follow them around — even if they switch to an international phone number, 
or work, travel, or study abroad. In what appears to be a complete subversion of the 
Cyber Westphalia thesis, a company tethered to the Chinese state is projecting an 
Internet censorship regime far beyond China’s sovereign jurisdiction.
Another vivid illustration of China’s extraterritorial projection of power into 
cyberspace is its ambitious, though byzantine and secretive, national space pro-
gram. Since it launched its first satellite in 1970, China now has 177 satellites in 
orbit, second only to the United States (568) and surpassing Russia (133). These 
satellites include those whose purpose is communications, navigation, civil defense, 
remote sensing and surveillance, as well as science, and environmental monitoring. 
China also has a manned space program and ambitions to land a man on the Moon 
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by 2023. One of the cornerstones of China’s space program is commercial launch-
ing capabilities, much of which have implications for the future of cyberspace. 
Its Long March (Chang Zheng) family of rockets is responsible for 155 satellites 
currently in orbit, second only to the Ariane family operated by a European con-
sortium of countries (which is responsible for 200). That the supposed archetype 
of Cyber Westphalia is also one of the world’s leading purveyors of satellite-based 
global monitoring systems underscores the need for conceptual adjustment.
Iran is another country often cited as a prime mover in the fragmentation of 
the Internet, but its actual practices too are more complicated in nature. The 
country has one of the most extensive national Internet filtering systems, and its 
controls embody all three generations outlined earlier. In recent years, the coun-
try has created several new agencies to oversee information controls, including 
the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, the Cyber Army, the Committee Charged 
with Determining the Instances of Offensive Content, and the Cyber Defense 
Command. Iran has been developing plans and gradually rolling out technology 
for a national Intranet walled off from the global Internet, called the “Internet 
E-Paak” or “clean Internet”. It routinely throttles bandwidth to slow down con-
nections to virtual private networks and circumvention tools around major events, 
like elections (Citizen Lab and ASL19 2013; Small Media 2015). Iran has even 
collaborated with China, and Chinese companies, on its domestic information 
controls regime. China’s ZTE reportedly sold Iranian telecommunications carriers 
sophisticated equipment capable of monitoring backbone level communications 
and intercepting emails, and SMS, telephone calls (Stecklow 2012).
Yet Iran also employs a fairly advanced cyber espionage capability that is used 
to target state adversaries and to gather information on dissidents and human rights 
campaigners in the global Iranian diaspora. One of the cyber espionage campaigns 
attributed to the Iranian government, called Newscaster (Ward 2014), exploited 
several Internet and social media services to target senior US military and diplo-
matic personnel, congressional personnel, Washington-based journalists, American 
think tanks, defense contractors in the United States and Israel, as well as vocal 
supporters of Israel. Newscaster worked by creating fake social media accounts, 
linking to targets, and then sending spear-phishing emails containing documents 
embedded with malicious software, which were then used to harvest private email 
and log-in credentials. Citizen Lab researchers have documented a similar Iranian-
based spear-phishing campaign to trick users into giving up their credentials to 
Gmail accounts, even bypassing Google’s two-factor authentication security meas-
ures (Scott-Railton and Kleemola 2015).
The actions of Iran in cyberspace are thus a continuation of what Iran has 
long been doing in more conventional terms. For example, as part of clandestine 
intelligence support for the Assad regime in Syria, Iran has likely assisted in the 
organization of targeted digital attacks on the opposition (Regalado, Villeneuve and 
Scott-Railton 2015). Alongside the flow of finances, weapons, and strategic intel-
ligence to Hezbollah, Iranian intelligence may also have supplied eavesdropping and 
other information warfare technology leading up to and during the 2006 attacks on 
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Israel (Cordesman, Sullivan and Sullivan 2007; Wege 2012). After American and 
Israeli-organized Stuxnet targeting of its nuclear centrifuges, Iran may have repur-
posed the same malware to target the computers of Saudi Arabia’s Aramco refineries 
(Zetter 2014). To depict Iran as a model of Cyber Westphalia thus obscures the 
extent to which it has its own elaborate outward-facing digital strategy.
Also like China, as much as Iran wants to limit and contain the free inward flow of 
information, it depends on transborder communications for a myriad of commercial 
exchanges (Howard, Agarwal and Hussain 2011). Consider the practical trade-offs 
confronting Iran in its efforts to throttle access to certain VPNs used to circumvent 
Iranian firewalls. Traditionally, such circumvention has come at a price: connections 
to banking and other financial services using the same encryption protocols have 
been disrupted, to the chagrin of Iranian businesses and elites. Researchers have 
therefore observed Iranian information controls becoming much more fine-grained 
and precise, targeting the specific protocols associated with popular VPNs while 
limiting collateral damage to https connections associated with financial exchanges. 
This evolution of information controls shows both a maturation of techniques but 
also clear evidence of the importance of both licit and illicit trans-border traffic to 
the Iranian economy. Actual Iranian practices suggest a nuanced balancing act, but 
a robust and deepening international engagement in cyberspace.
Russia presents a similar case. Under the reign of Vladimir Putin, the country 
has gradually reverted to authoritarian rule, part of which includes a tightening 
grip on information within Russian territory. A major impetus behind these con-
trols was the 2011 anti-government protests, organized through social media, 
which took Russian authorities by surprise. In order to contain future demon-
strations of this sort, Russian authorities pressured Internet companies to comply 
with Russian government policies. Today, Russia evinces all of the elements of 
“Cyber Westphalia” – sweeping data localization laws imposed on foreign Internet 
giants like Facebook, Google, Twitter, and LinkedIn, a broadening Internet cen-
sorship regime, arrests and intimidation of independent media and bloggers, and an 
architecture of wholesale mass surveillance undertaken by the installation of equip-
ment at telecommunications companies, known as the SORM system (Soldatov 
and Borogan 2015). Russia and China, moreover, have cooperated on informa-
tion controls: in April 2016, Russia hosted the first Russia-China cyber security 
forum to share strategies and best practices. The meeting included Lu Wei, head 
of China’s State Internet Information Office and Fang Bixang, the man widely 
thought to be the “father” of China’s Great Firewall.
As in the cases of China and Iran, however, Russia’s information controls are not 
limited by its territorial boundaries. Russia’s approach to cyberspace is instead highly 
elaborated. It is a key part of a larger geopolitical strategy that includes industrial 
scale cyber espionage and targeted digital attacks, sophisticated propaganda and dis-
information campaigns through state-controlled media organs, and the extension of 
Russian equipment, technology and know-how to former client states, particularly 
in the countries of the former Soviet Union. For example, many members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States have in place a SORM-compliant system of 
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mass surveillance, the technical equipment for which is shared by Russian security 
services. Russian manufactured telecommunications routers are deployed through-
out Asia and may contain hidden surveillance functions engineered by design to 
allow Russian interception. CIS countries also coordinate their cyber security strat-
egies through regional forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the 
SCO, which also includes China, Iran, and Pakistan. The SCO have developed 
collective approaches to repelling social media inspired protests, which are typically 
framed by the rubric “counter-terrorism”.
Russia is widely considered to be a tier-one cyber espionage power connected 
to many international cyber espionage campaigns. It is assumed, moreover, that 
Russian SIGINT makes use of the talented organized criminal groups that have 
long flourished in Russia and whose skills are connected to thriving science, tech-
nology, engineering and mathematics programs. The use of organized crime for 
offensive cyber operations is a convenient way to reap the benefits of such attacks 
while providing a cloak of plausible deniability, as evidenced in Estonia in 2007 
and Georgia in 2008 (Deibert, Rohozinski and Crete-Nishihata 2012).
What we do know about Russian SIGINT campaigns is indicative of extraor-
dinary skill at leveraging a multitude of mostly free Internet services to reach far 
across global cyberspace to gather information. Consider the so-called “Turla 
Group” Russian cyber espionage campaign, which affected many high-value targets 
in dozens of countries worldwide, and which uses earth-orbiting satellite uplinks as 
command and control servers (Tanase 2015). Another sophisticated Russian cyber 
espionage campaign (FireEye 2015), referred to in the security industry as APT29, 
uses a digital mélange (Lennon 2015) of Internet tools, like Twitter, Github, as 
well as file sharing and cloud computing services, to distribute its command-and-
control infrastructure and help obfuscate the identity of those ultimately responsible. 
Military incursions into Crimea and Ukraine in 2014 and 2015 more directly illus-
trated an ability to maneuver through cyberspace at will, monitor activities, and 
mount targeted but isolated malware attacks meant to confuse, weaken, and com-
promise Ukrainian adversaries. At the same time, Russia had little incentive to 
disrupt Ukrainian telecommunications systems entirely. Even the December 2015 
attack on Ukraine’s power grid, which caused a massive power outage and which 
was attributed to Russian-based hackers, was limited in scope and scale.
One of the distinct traits of Russian cyber espionage are its “influence opera-
tions”, which have a long history connecting back to the Soviet period. They are 
digital variations of Cold War propaganda, disinformation, and other espionage 
campaigns. For example, Russia makes extensive use of social media to discredit 
and sow discord among adversaries, including the use of paid “trolls” who post 
messages favourable to the Putin regime, or harass those who are in opposition. 
Its long-standing use of “Kompromat” – “compromising material” - is commonly 
used as a technique to discredit political opponents with embarrassing information 
typically acquired clandestinely and then published. This was taken to a new level 
with intrusions into the email networks of prominent Democratic Party officials 
in 2016. Information acquired by Russian-backed cyber-criminal organizations 
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was then provided to WikiLeaks and other social media, ostensibly to discredit 
Presidential-candidate Hillary Clinton. While Russia promotes territorially-
based information controls in the international sphere, and routinely censors and 
monitors the Internet and social media within Russian territory, these and other 
well-publicized influence operations demonstrate that it also actively engages social 
media and other digital assets abroad in pursuit of its strategic objectives.
Perhaps the countries one would expect to be the least likely to project power 
extraterritorially would be lower-tier authoritarian, mixed or hybrid regimes 
and countries, like those in the Gulf, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and 
North Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union. Countries like 
Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Ethiopia, Egypt, Syria, Vietnam, Thailand, 
Singapore, Pakistan, Myanmar, Venezuela, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Kazakhstan might arguably be expected to be principal proponents of a com-
ing Cyber Westphalia. All of these countries have in fact moved aggressively to 
control domestic information space through technical and regulatory means, and 
in every case have in place Internet censorship systems to block access to infor-
mation that crosses their territorial borders. They are also considered principal 
supporters of Russian and Chinese-backed international initiatives on “Internet 
sovereignty”, and many of them have introduced data localization regulations. 
But the actual governance practices of a widening range of autocratic countries 
of the global South are not confined inside their territorial boundaries. Diaspora 
communities living in the industrialized north use telecommunications networks 
to send billions of dollars of remittances to back to their originating countries. 
These diaspora networks also organize politically in ways that may challenge 
autocratic regimes. Holes in digital firewalls are exploited to advance human 
rights campaigns and support independent media outlets. At the same time, auto-
crats themselves continue to depend on open extraterritorial communication 
channels to bolster their rule or prepare for the future by way of offshore bank-
ing havens and real estate investments. While their strategic aspirations may not 
match those of the United States, such activities require the external projection 
of digital power.
Finally, authoritarian countries constitute a growing and profitable client base for 
a vast and rapidly expanding cyber-security industry, which can help control infor-
mation within territorial boundaries and assist in efforts to investigate and neutralize 
threats abroad. Thanks to the commercial spyware industry, for example, some of 
the world’s least connected and most impoverished countries, which lack domestic 
science, technology, and mathematics capacities, are nonetheless able to purchase 
their own sophisticated “NSA”-like capabilities. Off-the-shelf digital tools are read-
ily available from companies headquartered in the west. Citizen Lab researchers 
have mapped the proliferation of such commercial spyware services to dozens of 
authoritarian regimes in all regions of the global South. Espionage operations under-
taken using these services typically target diaspora networks. They can be routed 
through multiple state jurisdictions to obfuscate their origins. Even US-based cloud-
computing infrastructure is now routinely employed in the espionage operations 
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of intelligence agencies based in the global South (Marczak et al. 2014; Marczak, 
Scott-Railton et al. 2015; Marczak, Scott-Railton and McKune 2015).
Conclusion
State agencies around the world are energetically attempting to re-establish ter-
ritorial control over the Internet. At the same time, they are increasingly engaged 
directly or indirectly in extraterritorial projections of power in and through 
cyberspace. Their mutual entanglement both expands and constrains their own 
strategic options. The effective sovereignty of states defined in terms of uncon-
tested territorial control in this domain has always been an illusion. The contested 
openness of cyberspace today, however, exposes the extent to which offensive and 
defensive policies have in fact constituted a new and very highly interdependent 
systemic architecture. Anarchy does not describe its political underpinnings, and 
neither does a straightforward notion of hierarchy. The interaction of dominant 
intelligence-sharing arrangements of rapidly expanding scope, challenges from 
autocratic governments simultaneously threatened and empowered by digital 
openness, and the rapid technological deepening of transnational networks per-
missive of the nearly instantaneous transmission of data –all render authoritative 
rule by states ever more complex in principle and in practice.
American hegemony in cyberspace was once manifested by governmental 
agencies and American-led firms and non-state actors. The observable fact today is 
that even core interests of the United States cannot be secured without the active 
collaboration of a growing community of allies and a degree of acquiescence 
and self-restraint by challengers. The currently surging extraterritorial exercise of 
both official and corporate digital power, moreover, entangles the United States 
and other public authorities around the world even as it transforms and reshapes 
cyberspace itself.
For every “Internet blackout” or “national Intranet” researchers identify, they 
also find the regimes behind them exploiting transnational communications sys-
tems and using common protocols to infiltrate adversaries, gather intelligence, 
and influence and shape events outside their territories. Together, these kinds of 
activities have a combined network effect, continuously re-embedding political 
authorities in distributed and fast-changing digital webs. Extraterritorial projec-
tions of state power contribute to a mutual entanglement that has collectively 
channelled and localized conflict, while restraining temptations to engage in all-
out electronic warfare (Lindsay 2017). States continue to depend on and benefit 
from global networks, and even the most autocratic of them confront compelling 
incentives not to disable or destroy them (Mueller 2010). Despite all the attention 
recently paid to issues of digital attacks, disinformation campaigns, and money 
laundering, researchers have uncovered no suggestion of an emerging global con-
sensus that would be required to secure impenetrable boundaries in cyberspace. 
The absence of such evidence, moreover, does not appear simply to be attribut-
able to the momentary material interests of dominant social and political elites. 
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The openness of cyberspace is endogenous to all dimensions of national security 
policy, the traditional core feature of territorial states.
Watch what actual state agencies do, not what they say. A paradox is revealed. 
Persistent competitive pressures incentivize attempts to manipulate telecommu-
nications networks internally and externally, but taking those global networks 
down is widely understood to be self-destructive and self-defeating. Territorially-
anchored states depend on trans-border networks to defend themselves and to 
project their power abroad. The more states become entangled in those networks, 
the less likely they are to degrade or destroy them, and the more likely they are 
to join overtly or tacitly in common cause if a rogue non-state actor seriously 
threatens them.
The broader implications of mutual entanglement in cyberspace bear on the 
changing character of global political authority itself. National, intergovernmen-
tal, and transnational forces together determine the contours of the very space 
within and through which states now act. Even dominant states must live with 
the structural denial of locality in this critical domain. The essential quality of 
cyberspace binds them. Indeed, the kinds of evidence outlined in this chapter 
suggests that cyberspace is having a transformative impact on the territorial state 
as conventionally conceived. In the end, global networks cannot be effectively 
and legitimately governed at the national level. A process of unbundling political 
authority and recasting it is underway. That process reflects the dynamic interplay 
of frustrated impulses toward re-territorialization and the imperatives of projecting 
power extraterritorially. A high degree of global policy ambiguity may therefore 
be expected for the foreseeable future, since multiple and overlapping claims over 
rights and responsibilities in cyberspace look set to remain in contention. The 
external projection of power in and through cyberspace, nevertheless, disturbs sys-
temic order and forces observers to contemplate the entangling effects of functional 
and political spill-overs (Braman 2013; Daskal 2015; Mueller 2017).
Mark Zacher long ago underlined the transformation underway within and 
among states in a system that inclined toward openness and encouraged deeper and 
more intrusive “violations” of Westphalian sovereignty: “cobwebs of agreement 
have grown, and states have become more aware of the importance of both order 
and openness for national prosperity” (Zacher and Sutton 1996, 232–3). Of course, 
the leaders of states have always adhered formally to conventional norms of sover-
eignty, but they have also often deviated when necessary or convenient (Krasner 
1999). Mutual entanglement in cyberspace suggests both mounting constraints on 
such tactical political calculations as well as stark disappointment for libertarian 
hopes of Internet freedom. The transformative complexities of sovereign author-
ity when a still territorially anchored political system meets an increasingly global 
social and economic system are observable in cyberspace (Buzan and Lawson 2015; 
Grande and Pauly, 2005; Rosenau 2003; Zürn 2018).
At the global level, it is not difficult to discern the outlines of emergent “digital 
security communities”. More implicit but also becoming discernible are workable 
understandings among strategic competitors. Despite very different perspectives 
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on the meaning or applicability of the rule of law and the supposed sanctity of the 
principle of non-interference in internal affairs, China and the United States, for 
example, have begun discussions on acceptable behaviour in cyberspace. They are 
doing so bilaterally as well as multilaterally through the United Nations and other 
forums (G20 Research Group 2015; United Nations 2015). The two countries 
even agreed in September 2015 on a limited set of restraining principles concern-
ing industrial espionage, the theft of intellectual property, the targeting of critical 
infrastructure, and the need to cooperate on investigations of electronic crimes 
(Harold, Libicki and Cevallos 2016; The White House 2015). Despite continu-
ing concerns about compliance, other countries are moving in the same direction 
as they contemplate expanding Chinese investment across a range of economic 
sectors. Future on-line activities, and the cooperation of like-minded authorities 
on either side of the autocracy divide, will determine whether new principles and 
policies become effective and broadly accepted as legitimate.
The risks of catastrophic miscalculations or accidents in cyberspace remain. But 
uncertainty at this point does not suggest disorderly fragmentation along territo-
rial lines. Through their trans-territorial interaction, the governments of states will 
likely continue to live with paradox. They look set to continue moving toward 
new forms of authority to govern the Internet – contested but acceptable enough 
to permit a dynamic system to persist. States still matter, but mutual entanglement 
in cyberspace reinforces the idea of complex sovereignty and mocks dreams of 
retreat to a simpler past.
Note
1 Portions of this chapter are derived from Ronald J. Deibert and Louis W. Pauly, “Cyber 
Westphalia and Beyond: Extraterritoriality and Mutual Entanglement in Cyberspace”, paper 
prepared for the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Baltimore, Maryland, 
February 2017, and Ronald J. Deibert and Louis W. Pauly, “Boundaries and Borders in Global 
Cyberspace”, in Borders, Boundaries, and the Future of Canadian Society, The Third Annual SD 
Clark Symposium on the Future of Canadian Society Celebrating Canada’s Sesquicentennial, 
10 November 2017. For comments, we thank Daniel Deudney, Joseph Nye, Abe Newman, 
Jon Lindsay, Lennart Maschmeyer, Hans Klein, Milton Mueller, and the editors of this volume. 
We also gratefully acknowledge support provided by the Canada Research Chairs Program 
and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
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6
DIGITAL DATA AND THE 
TRANSNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 
SPACE
Didier Bigo and Laurent Bonelli
Introduction
The Edward Snowden disclosures on the American National Security Agency’s 
(NSA) large-scale digital capture practices have spawned the opening of a series 
of political, juridical, philosophical, and academic debates. Discussions have pre-
dominately counterpoised the relationship between mobility and communications 
control, on the one hand, and the exponential growth in the amount of traces left by 
the daily activities of individuals using digital technologies, on the other. But what 
exactly are traces, what do they record, and how are they being recorded? Are they 
“raw data” available to all or, instead, data that belong to the realm of the private?1 
To whom do the data belong? To what extent do they constitute new sources of 
enrichment, awareness, commercial profits, statistical knowledge on populations, 
knowledge on the intimate lives of individuals, and, of course, surveillance?
If the internet was at one time perceived as the place par excellence for knowledge 
exploration and the organization of remote encounters, it is now increasingly being 
seen as a world that exacerbates the expansion of neoliberal capitalist logics. Within 
the directives of the latter, digital data become a new raw material that is both free 
and can be used to monitor the activities and behaviours of individuals with the help 
of automated data collection technologies. Challenging the relevance of national 
borders, the internet has also been understood as a key vector of globalized com-
munication, wherein anonymity has allowed for networks to be created according to 
the affinities and mutual interests of individuals. In destabilizing notions of internal 
and external geography and thereby blurring or superimposing borders, the internet 
has had an impact on uses of violence, security mechanisms, and intelligence logics.
In exchange for the “free” use of internet services and resources, commercial 
actors making the internet work and further developing digital technologies believe 
to have the inherent right to exploit data produced by individuals. As a consequence, 
Digital data & transnational intelligence 101
internet users have been subject to a “digital encomienda.”2 Organizations interested 
in intelligence, in the broad sense of the term—be it the police and the military, or 
immigration and customs officers—have come to see the internet as somewhat of 
a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it is a major risk as it devalues their pre-
existing professional routines. On the other hand, it presents unique opportunities 
to gain in-depth knowledge on individual practices, which had previously only been 
held in the hands of the private sector. These actors, however, have by no means 
reacted uniformly—either through functional adaptation or through the coordina-
tion of an “intelligence community”—to these pitfalls and promises. What they have 
all done, though, is subsequently integrate the collection of personal data and the 
analysis of these digital traces into their repertoire of activities.
In some cases, the interception of large amounts of data, with the help of 
algorithms, allows for the detection of behavioural abnormalities. This infor-
mation can subsequently be used to identify risk profiles. However, as we will 
argue in this chapter, the way that these practices are performed vary greatly 
depending on one’s degree of seniority in their occupational field, their capac-
ity in terms of personnel, their technical skills (hardware and software), as well 
as their subjective visions on what exactly counts as “intelligence.” Depending 
on their practical goals and know-how, intelligence agents produce different 
interpretations of what these influxes of data and analytical treatments can do for 
their profession.
These various actors first discussed amongst themselves and with politicians the 
value that data constituted by traces left on the internet, potentially amassed, and 
linked together using database software in order to generate statistical information 
might have for intelligence activities. This then raised the question of the utility of 
dedicating significant financial and human resources to the acquisition of remote 
interception technologies (satellite, digital) and their relative advantage in comparison 
to human means that could be used to reach the same results, notably by employ-
ing undercover techniques and informants. As we shall see, individual and collective 
actors responded to this dilemma quite differently. If various actors situated in the 
“field of intelligence professionals” have come to realize how easy it is to accumulate, 
exchange, and store digital data, to what extent has this accumulation of data been 
counterproductive, leading these professionals to miss the specific forest for the mil-
lions of trees?3 The most specialized services (intelligence-counterintelligence) are still 
not convinced by accumulation techniques (collect it all) and have instead preferred 
to keep their sensitive case files outside of shared collection and exchange circuits. 
The outbreak of a number of public controversies—notably following the disclo-
sures on the human rights violations committed by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) and its accomplices, the large-scale data capture practices of the NSA and the 
“Five Eyes,” (United States of America, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand) and the near-routine use of drones outside of active conflict zones—forced 
intelligence agencies to rethink the utility and value of these strategies and devices. 
Digital technologies were questioned not only in terms of their capacity to provide 
greater security, but also in terms of the legal questions their use raised, privacy 
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issues, and, more generally, their adequacy with the position-taking in terms of 
values of countries that claim to be democratic and contest the practices of authori-
tarian regimes (Bigo 2012, 2016).
In this chapter, we will examine only some of the agents situated in the intel-
ligence field of sensitive information. On the one hand, these professionals belong to 
intelligence agencies that see themselves as working to defend the national interests 
of their country. On the other hand, these professionals also exchange data with their 
counterparts in the national security agencies of other countries. These intelligence 
service agents thus have the capacity and the authority to intercept data not only 
at home but also abroad. For the most part, represented countries include former 
colonial and neo-colonial powers of the Global North, who esteem that they have 
a role to play at the regional or global level. Together, these agents form a transna-
tional space that is linked by virtue of historical alliances that were first established 
during World War II and, more recently, through the efforts of those who have 
come to play a major role in the geopolitics of Internet cables.4 This space has been 
named after a group specializing in communications surveillance: the Five Eyes, or 
the Five Eyes Plus. However, as we shall see, this transnational intelligence space is 
not limited to the intelligence agencies that are members of that exclusive group. 
The story of the alliance that lead to the creation of the Five Eyes is quite well 
known but has often been summarized as a story about common sensibilities shared 
between intelligence agencies with Anglo-Saxon origins, that created the neces-
sary conditions for a form of mutual trust to develop between political leaders and 
agency actors. However, we are not convinced of this historical-cultural narrative 
on trust established between similar countries. Such an argument implicitly assumes 
that each country has a clear national history as well as a homogenous intelligence 
policy, meaning that the only thing that the researcher would need to do, is to com-
pare these national trajectories to understand how trust first emerged between the 
concerned countries. Instead, we propose a study of the means and practices of intel-
ligence agencies in order to then chart their position within a transnational space, 
without assuming that national or cultural belonging creates positions of proximity 
between agencies. In determining our case selection based on power relations, our 
focus will be on intelligence agencies that are the most resource-endowed in quan-
titative terms, that demonstrate a degree of professionalism, and that have a long 
history of managing sensitive information. Inspired by the work of Pierre Bourdieu, 
our study seeks to systematize elements collected in interviews with intelligence 
professionals by employing a structural analysis of the space in which the selected 
intelligence agencies are situated. To do so, we perform a multiple correspondence 
analysis (MCA), which allows us to rigorously visualize the space of institutional 
positions based on a series of defining characteristics (type of missions conducted, 
supervisory authority, territory of action, staff numbers, technological capital, etc.). 
In making connection between these objective positions and the discourses of actors 
regarding their practices and the meaning of intelligence, we are able to identify 
homologies as well as divergences that structure cooperation and data exchanges 
between agencies.
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As we shall see in this study, it is not the number of internet traces left behind 
that matter. The fact that traces are produced does not automatically turn them into 
a source of wealth or power. Instead, what matters is how such traces are constituted 
as data and used for intelligence policy purposes as well as the horizon of suspicion 
in which they are used. So why intercept data? Simply because they are available 
and can be “picked” as flowers growing in a free space? Should we do this for all 
data in order to have a comprehensive graph that represents relationships between 
individuals and large groups of the population? Or should we restrict our use of 
data and leave them where they are, thereby preventing their use in cross-checking?
The existence of an intelligence policy that involved the large-scale surveillance 
of masses of individuals, categorized as suspect or as undesirable, has for the most 
part been trivialized. It has been argued that linking intelligence techniques with 
automated technologies that record digital traces left by the activities of individu-
als and their transactions is justified when it’s preventive and protective function 
can help to anticipate and avoid violence. Yet, in our opinion, the relationship 
between the existence of the digital and predictive intelligence is not in and of 
itself inescapable. As opposed to being due to the inherent nature of the tech-
nology, this association has been politically modelled in a specific international 
context and depends on power struggles between the actors who determine the 
use and exchange value of digital data. The value of data is determined by the 
degree to which they can generate suspicion—notably when it comes to future 
acts—even if correlations made are so weak that they do not hold when faced with 
the law. Thus, markedly in contrast with legal practices, the actors of this space of 
doubt, of suspicion, and of possibilities play the role of “prince counsellors” that 
provides advice before decisions are made by politicians. Moreover, the symbolic 
value of intelligence data depends less on its content—despite the ideology of 
secrecy that sanctifies this content—than it does on who produced it, in what 
context, and for what reason.
It is this last point that we will deal with more substantially as it was paradoxi-
cally concealed in general statements made on the surveillance “society” and on 
algorithmic reasoning, which incorrectly suggest that internet users from around 
the world have been complicit in their own voluntary servitude (Bauman and Lyon 
2013, Lehr 2019). This requires us to think reflexively about what the term “intel-
ligence services” (or “security services”) really means and the relations between 
the practices of intelligence agencies on one side and the modalities of digital data 
surveillance on the other side. Though fairly common in international relations, 
this chapter will not provide a disembodied analysis of intelligence practices or a 
history without actors, where intelligence agencies are seen as obeying the orders 
of political leaders who determine overarching strategies. Instead, we will high-
light the heterogeneous characteristics that define intelligence actors, pointing to 
their differences in terms of socialization, professional habitus, and of different 
types of missions and actions that are performed. In doing so, we will identify arcs 
of tension that exist between organizations whose logics of action and modes of 
reasoning are either antagonistic or, at the very least, advance opposed strategies. 
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Our analysis will thus shed light on power relations that, thus far, discussions on 
rivalries between services have failed to capture.
Data, information, intelligence: data as performances and 
products of competition between intelligence agencies
What do we call “data” when this terminology is used for and in relation to politi-
cal intelligence purposes? How are data generated and integrated into information 
chains that allow for the production of analyses that respond to the demands of 
politicians? What place then does this kind of data occupy in what scholars have 
termed the “intelligence cycle”? (Gill and Phythian 2016, McElreath, Graves, and 
Jensen III 2017, Murphy 2016).
Can the data be described, as some believe, as constituting all the traces of a 
person’s or group’s activities that may have been collected automatically or inten-
tionally and which are then grouped into files? Referred to as “raw” data, does the 
data contain generic information in terms of the location of a person associated with 
an event, at a given moment in the past or in the present? In a second step, can this 
information then be used to anticipate future behavior through the application of 
algorithmic software? Within the data, can a distinction be made between content 
data, which reveal personal opinions based on content and so-called “connection” 
data, that is “metadata” or tracking data that make associations between individuals 
based on the exchanging of messages or the sharing of websites as well as through 
the establishment of shared interests based on the frequentation of the same people 
and places? This distinction between content and connection data has been pre-
sented by many agencies as a technically-relevant difference, as there would be only 
limited constraints in the exploitation of the latter in comparison to the former.5 
This distinction appears in a number of reports and analytical documents, notably 
in the United States. However, in opposition to this impersonal interpretation of 
technical data, various European Courts have pointed out that all tracking and 
localization data, whether derived from content or connection data, interfere with 
the privacy of individuals, and as a result are protected by international laws and 
agreements on personal data.6 As we can see in these debates and developments, the 
issue of data ownership is absolutely crucial, as are the ways in which data are cre-
ated and used for different purposes. Based on this observation, it would then seem 
necessary to reverse the dominant thinking about data. In other words, data are not 
the sources of information and analysis, but they are instead the product of it.
Data ownership: an electronic encomienda
The issue of data and the definition of this term cannot be settled by way of a 
technical consensus. It is a political and legal controversy, which necessarily under-
mines any conception of raw data as simply technical property that keeps track of 
the flow of information and to some extent to origin of this information, but that 
is independent from the ends for which it is used.
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As we will argue here and have done so elsewhere, it seems that, on the contrary, 
it is exactly the different purposes for which data are used that play a role in the con-
struction of the meaning and the form that data take. These meanings and forms are 
not natural, nor are they raw. Rather, they are the product of specific performances 
done by a series of actors. This standpoint, however, is not always recognized or 
appreciated at its face value. In interviews with actors coming from various intel-
ligence agencies as well as in the narratives of scholars working on the “cycle” of 
intelligence (i.e. intelligence studies), physiocratic and industrialist visions are often 
mobilized as metaphors when describing the nature of data. For example, in physio-
cratic analogies, data is represented as a flower or vegetable that awaits harvesting—it 
is sown by internet users themselves, randomly moved, and left idle or exchanged 
for services provided by private companies, thereby no longer belonging to the sow-
ers. The data is collected like the celestial manna, granted not by a divine figure 
but instead by computer science. In industrialist depictions, data is compared to a 
precious mineral that can be extracted from veined ore rock. In such an analogy, it 
becomes important to have the right drilling tools that can detect what is important 
and consequently select and retain only what is of value. Given the mass amounts 
of heterogeneous and weakly correlated data that circulate, it would be necessary 
to capture, intercept, and trace data that correspond to a specific profile. Ideally, 
information would emerge from connections made by that profile, which could 
then be refined and cut, like diamonds. The desired output would be analysed and 
that would lead not only to quality information, but to useful information that can 
be mobilized in political decision-making processes. The transformation of data into 
politically-relevant information is performed through the analytical practices of intel-
ligence professionals and defines their very métier, which involves much more than 
algorithmic statistical correlations or the idea of simply collecting information that is 
already “out there.” The two metaphors therefore are not so much about the way 
these professionals work but are instead used to suggest that the “raw” data do not 
belong to anyone and are therefore there for the taking. In both visions, individuals 
are not seen as having ownership over their data. Instead, data are available to those 
who exploit them and don’t have value in and of themselves but acquire added 
value for those that make data connections and articulations. Data only “make sense” 
when information is extracted. Taking stock of this overall process, we argue a digi-
tal encomienda is at work.7 As during the Spanish colonization, the “natives” (here, 
the internet users) have been deprived of their ownership rights and of their status 
as citizens of the worldwide web. This creates the conditions of possibility for the 
“colonization” of the web to generate profits and intelligence data. In exchange, web 
users receive the benefits of more targeted marketing and consumption, remote con-
tacts and friendships (i.e. Friendship 2.0), and allegedly protection against terrorism.8
However, while intelligence agencies may be in favor of this primitive political 
economy of data, these data have an origin. As European courts and data protec-
tion authorities have repeatedly pointed out, these data have initial owners. The 
drafting and recent implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) in Europe confirms this.9
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Intelligence data: the work and competitions of  
intelligence actors
Justifying a series of interception and retention practices, “intelligence studies” 
theorizations of the “fabrication of information” and its transformation into 
intelligence as being part of a “cycle” of production essentially aim to naturalize 
the existence of data along with the right to exploit and aggregate them. This 
is done in relation to modes of reasoning that are often already constructed, 
meaning that data are used to confirm these modes of reasoning, not invalidate 
them. In opposition to this argument, we suggest that “intelligence” data are 
constructed in a performative manner by the very political decisions that initiate 
data searches, the social use of surveillance techniques that may or may not ren-
der something “visible,” and, lastly, the languages used by recipients (multiple, 
single, unwanted) to encode and decode intercepted data.10 The performances 
of intelligence actors are thus dependent and based on data belonging to individ-
uals. Very often, however, these actors colonize individual data and transform 
them into “intelligence tools” by serializing, anonymizing, and grouping data 
into files. Data from the intelligence world only becomes data when a politi-
cal interest in their production and preservation has been established, when 
decisions have been made on where to draw boundaries, which visible ele-
ments should be thrown out, and which traces should not be of interest. Data is 
produced with the aim of creating lists of threats, risks, and vulnerabilities and 
identifying suspects. They are creating Data Suspects.
In terms of “data politics,” our vision is to insist that data is a special per-
formance that reconfigures the relationship between the digital and the material, 
while influencing contemporary relations between intelligence, surveillance, vio-
lence and obedience. These relations and configurations depend on the internal 
games of intelligence actors and the way that they define security, insecurity, and 
fate (Bigo 2008).
From such a perspective, intelligence data is understood as the product of political 
manoeuvres that constitute these data from the very outset according to that which 
they are “supposed to see,” as though this was a neutral and objective act allowing 
politicians to make decisions. Yet, the act of creating data by orienting them so that 
they may prove the (legitimate) suspicion of different connections is very political—
not in the decisional but constitutive sense. Moreover, this creative process and its 
outputs rely on mechanisms of association, connection, filtering, and profiling, which 
end up categorizing some individuals as more suspect than others, more undesirable 
than others, and more threatening to the established order than others.
As a result, intelligence data are very rarely sources that permit for the establish-
ment of causalities. Instead, they are the result of a process that seeks to legitimize 
or delegitimize suspicions held by intelligence actors, which rely solely on cor-
relations and not on evidence, hence structural struggles and oppositions between 
judicial authorities and intelligence services. Intelligence agents make interpreta-
tions and draw portraits that create a form of spectacle, that these agents enact 
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with their lists of suspects and their operational analyses of possible futures. These 
interpretations represent the core of the files on which the various intelligence 
services are working.
One major difference, however, is that while these files were previously 
materially written and recorded on paper, they are now are digitally written and 
stored on computers. Does this material shift affect the way files are constituted 
and the modes of reasoning harbored by intelligence agents? Following the new 
materialism turn, some authors like Marieke de Goede argue that a profound 
transformation in the modes of reasoning that are at work in the construction of 
data, but this is not certain.11 This new mode of reasoning only seems to touch at 
the fringes of the intelligence craft, observed amongst services that deal with the 
mobility of travelers or suspicious financial operations, but not so much amongst 
intelligence services themselves. As Laurent Bonelli and Francesco Ragazzi (2014) 
have pointed out, the conjectural reasoning described by Ginzburg (1980) remains 
fundamental to the practices of numerous agents that prefer the “low tech.” So, 
it is not clear whether an “algorithmic” reasoning—which is based on large-scale 
correlations and a speculative reasoning specific to computer-based tools, instead 
of precise chains of causalities—could be opposed to and thought of to fully 
replace a conjectural reasoning. Drawing from our recent work, the dominant 
reflection and practice of intelligence agents continues to be organized around 
files or archives that are shared only by a small group of professionals. These 
documents are read by groups in connection to other information that is deemed 
secret and operational. The value of information derived from digital data is far 
from equal to that derived from “low tech” files. While some digital data may be 
useful for identification and localization, thereby getting past the quasi-structural 
anonymous character of the Internet, for many actors, the accumulation of het-
erogeneous data may contravene the understanding of actions. A reasoning based 
on algorithmic correlations is not able to capture individual targets, but instead 
creates culpability based on association. This is why a conjectural-based mode 
of reasoning may be complemented with speculative information and possibili-
ties, but it will continue to remain the core of a profession that ultimately works 
to study, discipline, and eventually chastise individuals. Without this practice of 
indexing, the professional practice of intelligence would comprise of no more 
than the production of geopolitical generalizations of tendencies, the projection 
of futures yet with no operational capacity.
Though critical in many respects, a considerable amount of the surveillance 
studies literature has come to consider too quickly the production and traceability 
of data as an inevitable feature of modern society. This interpretation, however, 
tends to approach data as “flat,” “rhizomatic,” and constituted by the “exhaust 
data” diffused between all social and international worlds. While traceability may 
be automatized and facilitate rapid communication, some authors overgeneralize 
the characteristics of digital data, thereby overlooking the data constitution process, 
which can make them particular, fragment their meanings, or lead to their integra-
tion as political products. These studies thus homogenize the policies and practices 
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of different worlds of intelligence, ignoring vertical hierarchies, competitions, and 
differences in the technical methods of surveillance that they use (Amoore 2013, 
de Goede 2012).
Some monitoring methods are transversal and capable of making the use of such 
techniques more horizontal by facilitating the remote transmission of information. 
However, this does not necessarily result in the homogenization of the resources 
and logics of action driving what the agents are looking for in practical terms. 
Existing theories of electronic surveillance do not sufficiently distinguish between 
social worlds, which then leads to the assumption that the digital world has a uni-
form effect that is determined by the technology itself. For example, the production 
of digital data in the worlds of health, of international commerce, and of security do 
not generate the same effects in each respective social world, nor does it determine 
fixed relations between those worlds. The way that actors use new technologies 
depends on their past dispositions as well as on their capacity or willingness to 
transform paper data into computer data. With regard to the latter, this maneuver 
depends as much on one’s technical capacities as it does their views on the impor-
tance of secrecy, confidentiality, and interest, which may dissuade some actors from 
stocking data or disseminating them. Data from the digital world thus affects forms 
of power and everyday politics, but the opposite is also equally true. Data are inte-
grated into social worlds and into everyday practices only if they are seen by actors 
as helping them in their power struggles. This is best observed when new technolo-
gies are modelled or articulated in relation to existing customs and functions.
In sum, computer technology does not “revolutionize” technology so much as 
it moulds and adapts itself according to differentiated registers that are brought into 
the routine practices of different social worlds, which together constitute politi-
cal intelligence. Moreover, computer technology can in fact reinforce divisions 
between actors and intensify existing points of tension by favouring certain actors 
over others. This privilege emanates from a general acceptance of the technical 
dimension of intelligence, whereby large-scale surveillance will be done remotely, 
with greater attention given to trend analysis that takes on a preventive and pre-
dictive dimension via use of “data derivative” operations.12 These technological 
innovations thus favor actors who both use it to revitalize the contributions of 
agents and operations in the field and to value the accumulation of heterogenous 
data, which can nevertheless highlight correlations and the human mind would 
not have been capable of identifying by running algorithmic analyses of big data. 
This is at least what we have observed in narratives used by the agents who are 
most interested in defining intelligence as the anticipation of hostile acts, no mat-
ter where they come from. This mode of reasoning is probably seen as convincing 
for new entrants into the field of intelligence, as they can only act at a distance 
and don’t have any field agents on the ground or “relays.” However, this under-
standing of intelligence is far less convincing among an older generation of actors, 
who have operational capacities and who think in terms of adversaries, enemies, 
and possibly suspects. This second group of individuals is also quite suspicious 
of the deindividualization of crime, theologies on the possibility of knowing the 
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unknowable, and efforts to plan the future as if it were a future perfect. These 
symbolic struggles over the value and manner intelligence should be done then 
then determine what data “is.”
In the next section, we will further study three professional intelligence groups 
by analyzing the structural modalities that define them as distinctive spaces, each 
defined by differentiated modes of socialization. Yet, each of these spaces is subject 
to the reformulation of their practices due to the socio-technical stakes of the digi-
tal, while simultaneously maintaining the ability the frame and structure the way 
that intelligence data is defined and practiced. So, when read in relational terms, 
some groups of actors are more or less distinct. When their work practices are 
transformed, actors are pushed to rethink their identities and power positions. In 
some cases, these reconfigurations may even challenge the strong felt sense of some 
that they live in a small world apart from the rest (i.e. the deep state), that has its 
own rules; a world wherein the use of violence in the name of state reason, secrecy, 
and impunity vis-à-vis the rule of law are the norm, and wherein these actors are 
committed to a sense of responsibility and loyalty to specific values that must be 
safeguarded and yet constantly adapted to practical challenges.
The transnational space of intelligence: the structural 
modalities and dispositions of actors regarding the digital
Intelligence studies has to a large extent suffered from a form of methodological 
nationalism that presupposes the existence of a national intelligence community, 
that collectively defends national interests, and implements national security strat-
egies. From this standpoint, data interception is typically read according to two 
different modalities, one concerning citizen and the other regarding non-citizens. 
When it comes to the foreign services, the exchange of data is not considered to be 
routine practice. Many scholarly works give the impression that most intelligence 
services are reluctant to share data, notably due to their commitment to secrecy. 
When data exchanges do occur, authors argue that this is only happening between 
national intelligence services that have developed mutual trust in the fight against 
shared enemies, such as during the World War II and the Cold War. While not 
taking issue with some aspects of this reading that may be erroneous, it is at the 
very least far too monolithic.
To challenge this depiction, over the last couple of years, we have developed 
a Bourdieusian-inspired analysis of the contemporary international by pointing to 
transnational fields of power, their dynamics, and the dispositions that the actors 
enact when what is at stake is the management and extraction of data for purposes 
of constituting watch lists of suspects (Ben Jaffel 2018, Bigo 2016, Bonelli and 
Ragazzi 2014). Specifying the activities of intelligence services into the general 
management of unease by security professionals, the idea of a guild of extraction 
of sensitive information has been proposed to analyze the current composition 
and roles of the different intelligence services in countries claiming that they are 
democracies and that they accept the idea of limits to secret, intrusive practices 
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regarding the whole population, be it regarding their citizens or foreigners (Bigo 
2018). As we shall see later in this chapter, our research shows that in this par-
ticular area of intelligence, we can observe specific social universes that relate to 
the objective properties of intelligence services and the manner that they con-
struct intelligence data. It seems that in the case of intelligence practices linked to 
“global” counter-terrorism—and likely other missions—transnational logics and 
allegiances are stronger than purely national ones. As intelligence data are consti-
tuted by the types of questions that are raised and methods of reasoning that are 
used, data exchanges are actually more routine between services that belong to 
different countries but that share the same visions, know-how and practices con-
cerning intelligence objectives than they are between services of the same country 
that deploy different or even complementary practical know-how. It is therefore 
necessary to understand the emergence of so-called trans-governmental networks 
between intelligence agencies, or more accurately transnational guilds that bring 
together agencies sharing the same specialized visions and whose agents have 
similar dispositions emanating from their socialization at work. It is therefore the 
professional habitus that can allow individuals and agencies to overcome national 
differences. In some cases, loyalties between agencies can be stronger than an insti-
tutional attachment to the political leaders of their country. To name just one 
example from a series of recent cases, in the context are nearly-routine exchanges, 
it seems that one department from the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) entrusted 
confidential information about the government of Angela Merkel and German 
politics to their National Security Agency (NSA) allies (Hegemann and Kahl 2016).
There is therefore a transnational intelligence space made up of different groups 
of national services that cooperate together in the management of digital data and of 
sensitive information, more generally. This transnational space is not structured and 
divided according to the national policies of governments—even if they do play a role 
by way of existing coordination structures. Instead, this space is defined by the types of 
information that actors seek out, the characteristics of these services, their composition, 
and their practices. So, what are the relationships between three different universes, 
which are each defined by different practices of intelligence as an occupation?
In order to clarify our working hypothesis, we have made a first attempt to 
map the transnational space of intelligence agencies in countries that agree to call 
themselves democracies and, at the same time, have regional or global foreign 
policy ambitions. Embracing a methodology that draws from the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu and international political sociology, we have used multiple correspond-
ence analysis (MCA) to draw this space. As a methodological tool, MCA essentially 
allows us to mathematically distribute the services in a two-dimensional space, 
gathering them according to their most significant resemblances and differences. 
While allowing for a more systematic analysis of qualitative data collected in inter-
views, MCA is a heuristic tool for identifying groups, which are by no means 
randomly constituted (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010).
The sheer size of the American services, and their budget, explains their over-
whelming engagement in cooperative initiatives and their role as the leaders of 
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networks that bring together countries from the so-called Global North that engage 
in activities beyond liberal democracies (Bigo, Bonelli, and Deltombe 2008). Since 
Edward Snowden’s disclosures on the activities of the NSA, the Five Eyes has become 
the most well-known of such networks. It brings together agencies from the United 
States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand that work with satellite, 
electronic, and internet communications data. This network is no longer limited to 
a group of five, as now it now includes more than a dozen intelligence agencies or 
sub-units from countries like France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden, which have all 
put in place infrastructures for the interception of data passing through submarine 
and terrestrial cables.13 Based on the understanding that nowadays nine countries 
are involved in the Five Eyes Plus network, we have selected 25 agencies from the 
represented member countries, which all claim to be democracies and also have 
the ambition of playing a regional or global political role. Categories of intelligence 
service agencies include counter-terrorism and counter-intelligence services (police 
and non-police), external intelligence services, and, when they exist, the technical 
services dedicated to large-scale data interception. For the time being, military intel-
ligence agencies working on military-specific issues have been excluded from this 
study, although they do sometimes play a role in diplomacy or even the fight against 
terrorism. Financial intelligence services also at times become involved in the fight 
against terrorism but have also been left out as their main activities relate to anti-
money laundering. Border control agencies have also been excluded.
TEXTBOX 6.1 METHODOLOGICAL DETAILS
For the United States, we have selected the following agencies: National 
Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI)14; for Canada: Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service (CSIS) and Communications Security Establishment (CSE); for the 
United Kingdom: Counter Terrorism Command (CTC), Security Service (MI5), 
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) and Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ); for New Zealand: New Zealand Security Intelligence 
Service (NZSIS) and Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB); for 
Australia: Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO), and Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS); for 
France: Direction générale de la Sécurité extérieure (DGSE), Direction géné-
rale de la Sécurité intérieure (DGSI) and Service central du renseignement 
territorial (SCRT); for Germany: Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Bundesamt 
für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), and Bundeskriminalamt (BKA); for Spain: Centro 
Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI), Comisaría General de Información (CGI) and 
Servicio de Información de la Guardia Civil (SIGC); and for Sweden: Försvarets 
Radioanstalt (FRA) and Säkerhetspolisen (Säpo).
(continued)
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For each of these 25 services, we analysed the following 9 active variables:
1. The territory of competency, with three modalities (internal, external, 
internal/external);
2. The legal authority of agents, with two modalities (yes, no);
3. Operational capacities, that is whether the agency has agents on the 
ground, with two modalities (yes, no);
4. Objectives assigned to the services, with two modalities (the fight against 
internal threats; the defense of national interest—which includes espionage);
5. The number of personnel, with three modalities (0–1999, 2000–4999, 5000+);
6. Technologies used, with three modalities (human intelligence HUMINT, 
technological intelligence signals intelligence (SIGINT), and mixed 
capacities MIXED_TECH);
7. Hierarchical authority, with three modalities (Ministry of the Interior or 
Ministry of Justice; Ministry of Defense or Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Head 
of Government);
8. Engagement in counter-intelligence activities, with two modalities (yes, no); 
and lastly,
9. The ability to conduct clandestine or covert operations, with two modalities 
(yes, no).
As a result of our MCA analysis, we have produced two graphs. The first graph 
(Figure 6.1) shows the most significant modalities that structure this transnational 
intelligence space by exploring the types of capital different services possess as 
well as their organizational attributes and their institutional objectives. The second 
graph (Figure 6.2) is based on an analysis of the objective properties of agencies, 
which allows for the visualization of specific subgroups or universes based on the 
identification of proximities and distances between the various services.
Axes 1 and 2 explain roughly 64% of associations between our nine categorical 
variables (respectively 44.03% for Axis 1 and 19.98% for Axis 2). On Axis 1, the most 
contributing variables on the left side of the graph (negative values) include domestic 
threats (7.8%), internal territories of competency (7.8%), the absence of clandestine 
operations (6.1%), counter-espionage activity (4.5%), attachment to the Ministries 
of the Interior or of Justice (6.1%), judicial authority (4.4%), and human intelligence 
(4.6%). The contributing variables run in opposition to those that appear on the right 
side of the graph (positive values), which include national interest (8.5%), internal/
external territories of competency (7%), clandestine operations (7.8%), attachment to 
the Ministries of Defense or of Foreign Affairs (6%), technological intelligence (7%), 
and mixed human/technological intelligence (1.5%).
(continued)
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FIGURE 6.1 Most Contributing Variables on Axes 1 and 2 of the MCA
On Axis 2, the most contributing variables on the bottom part of the graph 
(negative values) include technological intelligence (12.7%), the absence of field 
agents (12.7%), and internal/external territories of competency (7.5%). In con-
trast, the most contributing variables on the top part of the graph (positive values) 
include mixed human/technological intelligence (14.6%), the presence of field 
agents (4%), and external territories of competency (19.7%).
This distribution of the properties and dispositions that define each of the 
intelligence service agencies than make it possible to observe the proximities and 
distances between those institutional actors in space. As shown in Figure 6.2, this 
exercise allows for the identification of three distinct sets or groups of actors.
The first pole (1), situated on the left in the middle of the table, represents a space 
of proximity between services that primarily recruit police and prioritize internal 
security issues. This set of actors is most concerned with internal threats. At times, 
however, they may develop forms of external actions and cooperation in order to 
prevent internal threats instigated by actors coming from abroad. They conduct 
two different categories of missions: (1) political subversion, which includes but is 
not limited to anti-terrorism; and (2) counter-intelligence. This first subgroup is 
also defined by their affiliation with Ministries of the Interior or of Justice.
Within this first group, we can identify two subsets: 1) agencies that have at 
least partial judicial authority (law enforcement agencies) and 2), which do not 
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possess judicial authority. With respect to the first subset, we observe the presence 
of the German BKA, the Spanish CGI and SIGC, the American FBI, and the 
French DGSI. Situated in the second subset are the German BfV, the British MI5 
and CLC, the Swedish Säpo, the Canadian CSIS, the Australian ASIO, the New 
Zealand NZSIS, and the French SCRT. Regarding the relationship of these agen-
cies with digital and algorithmic reasonings, qualitative interviews with service 
agents suggest that they see the evolution of new information and communica-
tion technologies (NICTs) as both a constraint and a resource. On the one hand, 
NICTs are perceived as a constraint because of the flows of information that 
are now generated by individuals. Indeed, surveillance targets produce far more 
data today than they did in the past. The volume of available data means that 
qualitative analyses are a priori not possible. Yet, the amount of digital traces left 
by individuals is also a valuable resource for intelligence officers. For example, 
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in addition to telephone calls, SMS messages can be used to demonstrate the 
frequency of contact between individuals who previously sued other communi-
cation channels and who would not have otherwise been noticed. Additionally, 
digital communication makes it possible to geolocate individuals and to confirm 
the co-presence of two people in the same place at the same time. Similarly, the 
consultation and updating of information via Facebook also makes it possible to 
locate the internet user in question. While no one complains about the wealth 
of data that is available, these intelligence agencies often pinpoint the question of 
how to exploit this data as a major obstacle. One possibility is the use of computer 
software to filter the massive influx of digital data. Some software can also be used 
to draw graphs of relations based, for example, on correlations between called 
numbers and localizations in fixed time slots. These graphs can be cross-checked 
with elements collected using other investigation methods (i.e. witness hearings, 
interrogations, searches, etc.). It is only as of late, however, that digital data have 
begun to be used. Since their realization of the potential use they could make of 
digital data, internal intelligence services have of course adapted their practices to 
technological evolutions and corresponding societal transitions. However, new 
technologies have not destabilized the work logics of these agencies. This can be 
explained by the fact that while the studied agencies have increased staff numbers 
and strengthened units dedicated to Islamic political violence, they have only very 
marginally recruited new technological specialists. Therefore, they continue to 
principally recruit and integrate police offers, agents, and analysts whose skillsets 
correspond to more traditional intelligence occupational groups. Practical knowl-
edge on how to deal with human sources of information (i.e. informants), shadow 
suspects, or carry out interrogations continues to be dominant. The most techni-
cal tasks can instead be subcontracted to outside parties. For example, in France, 
geolocalization analyses are entrusted to authorized private companies, which 
examine the data that has been collected following judicial requisitions and then 
submit reports to intelligence agents. In this case, digital data actually support and 
nourish long-term modes of reasoning and institutional practices.
This first subset of actors is clearly distinguished from the second pole (2), 
which predominately includes agencies that recruit military actors into their ranks, 
have the operational capacity to missions on external territories, and use espionage 
techniques. This second subset includes agencies like the CIA and other external 
service agencies, such as the Spanish CNI, the British MI6, and the Australian 
ASIS—all situated at the bottom of the eclipse—that rely more on human intel-
ligence. Agencies like the French DGSE and the German BND share similar 
characteristics to the aforementioned agencies; however, in recent years, these two 
institutional actors have developed important data interception capabilities within 
specific departments that are dedicated to the interception of digital data so as to 
monitor social networks. Yet, they all remain under the general supervision of 
the Ministry of Defense or of Foreign Affairs. They also tend to see internal intel-
ligence services as potential “clients,” which can make specific service requests 
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to this second subset of actors. Amongst this subgroup, computer-based tools are 
predominately used to geolocate external targets, to keep in touch with overseas 
agents, and, occasionally, to drive armed drones in particular operational contexts. 
When carrying out politically costly operations, big data should thus not create 
confusion or inaccuracy in hitting targets, meaning that approximation is not really 
allowed. Digital data is not totally dismissed but is instead only used as a tool of 
exploration as it is responsibility on the ground, which comes before anything else.
The third pole (3) indicates the emergence of an autonomous subset of 
SIGINT-Internet agencies. The specificity of this group is that included agencies 
lack operational agents. Instead, these agencies provide other national intelligence 
services, both internal and external agencies, with the satellite, terrestrial, and digi-
tal data they need. This pole consists almost exclusively of Five Eyes agencies, 
with the exception of the Swedish FRA, which more or less joined the Five 
Eyes because of its role in the interception of terrestrial and submarine interna-
tional cables going to and from Russia. This particular space is at the origins of a 
new mode of reasoning that delegitimized the effectiveness of traditional forms of 
intelligence when faced with small, unknown groups. Before the 2000s, Admiral 
Poindexeter alluded to the development of a global data system identifying tar-
gets not based on the pinpointing of individuals already known to intelligence 
services, but instead through the detection of behavior abnormalities that do not 
correspond to system logics. Initially called Total Information Awareness (TIA), 
this mode of reasoning was subsequently referred to as “collect it all” for detecting 
“weak signal” (i.e. a needle in a haystack), which consists of grouping individuals 
who did not necessarily know each other together into collectives based on their 
association with a specific risk profile (Ericson and Haggerty 2006, Harris 2010, 
Murray 2010). Recalled by its old friends inside the new administration, following 
2001, Poindexeter had the means to realize this project of TIA, but the US Senate 
rejected it at the time for other reasons. Only a small part of it was enforced. Since, 
however, with its extraordinary capacity in terms of staff and budget, the NSA has 
once again embarked itself on this journey. But this time, the NSA has brought 
in the private sector, from data mining software companies and internet providers 
(i.e. the GAFAM) to telephone companies like Verizon.
Following the Snowden disclosures about the practices and ambitions that 
guided the NSA, we now know that several intelligence agencies, including the 
British GCHQ, argued that the potential surveillance of all would never work in 
operational terms. Instead, digital data collection needed to target small groups so 
that it could be complemented by human surveillance, judged as more effective. 
Other services followed the GCHQ in its strategy of recalibration. For exam-
ple, it appears that services involved in the interception of sensitive information 
wanted to obtain the necessary legal facilities to be able to undertake large-scale 
surveillance of potentially-dangerous groups by throwing a “broad net,” while 
simultaneously rejecting an algorithmic mode of reasoning. Interestingly, it is more 
financial surveillance services or, more recently, services controlling what type of 
people are authorized to cross borders—that is the newcomers in the intelligence 
Digital data & transnational intelligence 117
field—who make claims to being able to handle large amounts of data and persons 
by using weak signal approaches in order to predict their behaviour. According to 
them, the ethical-political costs of making false positives are not so important when 
dealing with suspected persons, they just have to “wait longer” on queuing.
This distribution in a two-dimensional space—which is not random—allows 
us to group together services from different countries according to the structural 
proximity of the type of institutional objectives they defend and the know-how 
they employ. In doing so, this method allows us to visualize cleavages between 
services from the same country, thereby contrasted to the dominant national-
territorial representation of intelligence agencies. As this mapping exercise 
suggests, the usual discourses on mutual trust only operate between agencies 
with similar or identical structural positions. The structuration of two of the 
three poles around the divide between external security and internal security is 
a rather historically trivial one. However, the emergence of a third pole around 
SIGINT-Internet agencies may play a considerable role in the destabilization of 
the status quo if this specific universe begins to successfully impose its definition 
of intelligence data according to its own practices. Such a reconfiguration would 
also require the support of politicians, which to a large extent correlates with 
preventive and predictive political discourses. So, it is essentially in the 2000s 
that computerization and digital technologies introduced a new arc of tensions 
into the transnational intelligence space over who produces, exchanges, and 
analyzes data. Such tensions, however, already existed between intelligence pro-
fessionals recruited from the military and those recruited from the police. Yet, it 
is the end of bipolarity that put into question and challenged existing rules and 
practices of espionage and counterintelligence.
To complement these findings, it would undoubtedly be interesting to know 
the extent to which politicians and top civil servants are able to impose imperatives 
of fusion, homogenization, or strict complementarity with regards to the practices 
of these three poles. Or whether, instead, these poles are autotomizing and create 
a transnational space of solidarity, complicity. Intelligence agencies, nevertheless, 
are to some extent subject to the will of political leaders who have control over 
budgetary and staff allocations. This effect of political control is more visible in 
countries that have put in place strong coordination structures. For example, the 
role of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the United Kingdom has been 
to create and reproduce strong cohesions between national intelligence agencies 
exactly to avoid transnational struggles and alliances. Yet, as shown in the Feinstein 
report, other countries, and especially the US, have encouraged these transnational 
games in order to maintain a shroud of opacity around the actions of typically 
the least supervised external actions. As we have discussed elsewhere, this phe-
nomenon of dynamics interaction means that in some cases the failures of some 
represent conditions of happiness for others. This is essentially what happened 
with the failure and controversy around the practices of torture at distance by 
the CIA and its accomplices15. This allowed for the delegitimization of the use 
of foreign military services in offensive counter-terrorism operations and allows 
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for less violent means with the NSA’s remote action model, which relied on the 
identification of terrorists within social networks (numeric and non-numeric) and 
the algorithmic identification of behavior abnormalities. In this case, the failure of 
a specific subset of external services and the inefficiency of the strategies they used, 
led to international disproval, which essentially worked to reinforce the decisions 
to strengthen SIGINT-Internet intelligence services by giving them the resources 
they had long been asking for.
Concluding remarks
So, what are the results of our Bourdieusian international political sociology-
inspired analysis? First, our analysis disproves the existence of a homogenous 
world (or community) of intelligence wherein all national agencies are compli-
mentary to one another and wherein the boundaries of their missions are clearly 
defined by the law or by political authority. Our analysis of the constitutive prac-
tices of intelligence actors and their meaning-makings of data has destabilized the 
illusionary idea of the intelligence community as a single world united by com-
mon surveillance techniques that are changing the sense of security (and leading 
globally to speculation). Logics of action cut across and transgress distinctions 
between the internal and the external, the national and the foreigner. The appar-
ent unity of a national intelligence community in each country must therefore 
be deconstructed to highlight the relationships that exist between different poles. 
These relationships are read in terms of how agencies construct intelligence data-
suspect for different purposes, how they negotiate amongst themselves as well as 
with politicians about what approaches should be considered as the most appro-
priate. These agencies often compete with one another, not only within national 
fields but also within a transnational space where solidarities—which may still 
have a hierarchical nature16—are made between agencies deploying more or less 
identical forms of know-how. This reality undermines the dominant and almost 
exclusive discourse that national security is a source of legitimate suspicion, mak-
ing it necessary to evoke a narrative on the prevention of attacks and to design 
global security policies against terrorism. Regarding the former, the more such 
narratives are questioned, the more it becomes tempting to present these transfor-
mations as the result of the emergence of the internet and digital evaluations, even 
though in fact this shift is the result of political transformations.
Distinctive logics defining cleavages between agencies are not pathologies. 
Rather, these differences are inherent to the very structure of the intelligence 
game. Efforts to merge services may not only reinforce inefficiency by reorganizing 
and destabilizing relations between different types of know-how but may also lead 
to the creation of hegemonic structures that will impose singular understandings 
of what data are and for what ends they should be used. This would undermine 
the plurality of interpretations as well as the richness of debates and discussions. 
To speak about these differentiated logics is not a return to the image of a tuff 
war. Instead, our aim is to provide a deeper understanding of the practices of 
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these agencies, which goes beyond official organizational charts given by politi-
cal structures or communications agencies. These distinctive logics may also be 
reproduced within agencies, depending on which recruitment criteria and forms 
of socialization are privileged. Some intelligence agencies have opted for strong 
internal homogeneity, trusting only one type of profession or graduates of a sin-
gle training school, in order to build solidarity. Others have inversely chosen to 
take on a diverse range of missions and thereby recruit people who have different 
characteristics in terms of training, gender, violence management practices, and 
use of numeric technologies. For example, a network engineer and a policeman 
obviously do not have the same relation to the digital, but they may nonetheless 
work for the same institution. While all dealing in some way with data, having 
know-how on how to use data technologies as a user should not be confused with 
skills required by software designer or by someone who creates profiles based on 
algorithms. The same goes for the latter, who build populations of target catego-
ries, and those who aspire to achieve the same mission, but do so by generating files 
on precise individuals and organizations, giving great importance to the individual 
psychologies and trajectories. These different types of intelligence agents all live 
and work more as analysts than as combatants, which makes them different from 
those that are deployed “on the ground” to use coercive means in foreign lands. 
Depending on one’s training, the resources at the disposal of agencies and their 
legitimacy of their actions, resources, and capitals are unevenly distributed amongst 
actors situated in the intelligence space.
As we have seen in our interviews, it seems that digital techniques are put to use 
in two ways. Firstly, they can be used in support of the more traditional framework 
of conjectural reasoning in order to provide necessary evidence for the judiciary. 
Secondly, they can also be used to impose a preventive and predictive reason-
ing. The logics and mechanisms of reasoning that are specific to each universe 
and its actors—be it the police, military, or communications—are therefore to 
be considered more important than the technologies themselves. In other words, 
it is not computer technologies that play a role on their own, but rather it is the 
entry of computer scientists into intelligence circles and the manner in which 
they frame problems in relation to technology. It is for this reason that the entry 
of new technologies should not be overestimated (as some interpretations tend to 
do). Such assumptions tell us little about the effects of technology on practices. 
For example, actors may continue to use old paper filed while simultaneously 
mobilizing computer-based tools simply for their cross-referencing speed. Digital 
technologies may also be employed in the technological regulation of databases and 
their interoperability. This exercise imposes certain characteristics and criteria on 
the formatting of data, which is helpful if they are to be exchanged on a regular 
basis and in large quantities. Digital technologies may come to play a significant 
role within specialized departments of the military or police services that are dedi-
cated to identification tasks and are supervised by new technical actors. Beyond 
recurring tensions and disputes precisely on the performativity of data, clashes may 
also arise between agents with different dispositions. More precisely, in worlds of 
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intelligence that previously worked primarily with non-digital information and 
data, the introduction of new techniques—including sophisticated ones—will not 
necessarily change existing modes of reasoning. It basically takes time for digital 
technologies professionals to successfully imposer their own interests and profes-
sional visions on more traditional actors situated in the intelligence field. However, 
private companies have played a substantial role in the recruitment of IT specialists, 
network engineers, data analysts, integration platform software designers, language 
and coding specialists, cryptologists, and mathematicians tasked with creating or 
combining algorithms that play on the recognition of weak signals in long series. 
While the individuals are employed by private actors with the overall ambition of 
selling products and services, as they increase in number, they begin to more sig-
nificantly populate a world that previously consisted almost exclusively of police, 
gendarmes, military, internal intelligence specialists, and external border guards. As 
a result, these new actors change the rules of the game of these social universes, 
and in changing rules and habits, they end up changing certain dispositions. This is 
notably the case in the establishment of good working relations between the world 
of private contractors and that of public service agents.
Issues and tensions raised by the emergence of this new category of sensitive 
information professionals have therefore not had a uniform, even impact across dif-
ferent intelligence universes. However, in terms of their transversal impact, this 
group of professionals has nonetheless attracted the attention of those increasingly 
supporting preventive and predictive approaches. And together, they have defended 
the idea that it is only the potentialities and possibilities that digital data bring to the 
world of intelligence that can satisfy the desires of politicians, the fear of populations, 
and the interests of security apparatuses in the remote management of populations. 
Now an essential element in the world of intelligence and surveillance, the capacities 
of digital techniques nonetheless continue to be debated, all the while linking high 
politics with the everyday and redefining the way national security is understood.
Notes
 1 The terminology used by the services is “raw data” for the data that are generated either 
by a research they launch or by what is called “captured data”, usually by machines or 
terminals, as a secondary function. For example, cash registers, smartphones, and speed-
ometers serve a main function but may collect data as a secondary task. In informatics, 
specialists called it “exhaust” data.
 2 See note 7 for an explanation of this term.
 3 Regarding the notion of field of professionals of sensitive information see Bigo 2018.
 4 See in this book the chapter by Ronald J. Diebert and Lou W. Pauly.
 5 Symbolically, the attempt to create a distinction between meta-data and data is a way to 
justify that data are not the property of the internet-user. It justifies exploitation of data 
and their circulation, compilation, disaggregation and reaggregation outside the knowl-
edge of the individual at the source of the data.
 6 On October 19, 2016, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided that 
the dynamic IP address of a website visitor is “personal data” under Directive 95/46EC 
(Data Protection Directive) in the hands of a website operator that has the means to 
compel an internet service provider to identify an individual based on the IP address.
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 7 The encomienda was a forced labor system prevalent in the Spanish Empire, whereby 
natives were stripped of their property rights. The Spanish Crown gave parcels of land to 
private individuals that worked in its name, and with that land additional natives who, in 
theory, worked in exchange for protection and their religious conversion. The relation-
ship between intelligence agencies, the Big Four, and individuals is comparable to the 
encomienda system in so far as internet users are refused ownership to their own data and 
the work that they do to produce and diffuse them.
 8 See Engin Isin and Evelyn Ruppert in this book.
 9 The General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 is a regulation in EU law on data 
protection and privacy for all individuals within the European Union and the European 
Economic Area. It also addresses the export of personal data outside the EU and EEA 
areas. See Elspeth Guild in this book.
 10 The term performance has many different meanings in English, which converge with 
what we insist on. Performance means achievement simultaneously results, outcomes, 
findings, but also benefit, delivery, and show, spectacle. In some ways the three connota-
tions are simultaneously true.
 11 Most debates on intelligence data exchange are based on the potential offered by technol-
ogy rather than the actual practices of intelligence service agents. This is also the case 
regarding the regulation of technology and road regulation. For example, it is not because 
a vehicle can travel at a constant speed of 200 kilometers per hour that it is allowed to do 
so and that the driver does so. The legal system is there to set limits and restrict techni-
cal potentialities. Authors like Louise Amoore and Marieke de Goede have sometimes 
framed practices and potentialities in equal terms, while equating present circumstances 
with emerging trends. This has led to an overly programmatic view of intelligence ser-
vices and their intentions. This is demonstrated in the way that newcomers are treated 
as emblematic of paradigmatic changes, when in fact there are struggles against the 
transformations brought forth by new actors, as is the case regarding the validity of the 
accumulation and retention of data alongside the accuracy of predictive algorithms. See 
notably de Goede 2008 and Amoore 2011.
 12 The data derivative comes into being from an amalgam of disaggregated data reaggre-
gated via mobile algorithm-based association rules and visualized in ‘real time’ as risk 
map, score or color-coded flag. As explained by Louise Amoore: It is not that derivative 
forms supersede disciplinary data modes, and indeed among the reaggregated data ele-
ments are conventionally collected visa and passport data, but rather that the relation 
between the elements is itself changed.
 13 Some journalists have spoken of the 9-Eyes, with the addition of Sweden, France, Spain 
and Germany; or even of the 14-Eyes with Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Norway and 
Denmark.
 14 Given the range of missions conducted by the FBI—spanning from criminal police work 
to internal intelligence—we have only taken into account 3,600 agents situated in the 
Counterterrorism Division.
 15 Guild, Elspeth, Didier Bigo, and Mark Gibney, eds. Extraordinary Rendition: Addressing the 
Challenges of Accountability. Routledge, 2018.
 16 For example, such a hierarchy is established by the fact that the NSA has more staff at its 
disposition than all of the European services combined.
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FROM FAKE TO JUNK NEWS
The data politics of online virality
Tommaso Venturini
“Fake news” is a key subject of data politics, but also a tricky one. As this chapter 
aims to show, the various phenomena signified by this misleading label have lit-
tle in common, except being opposite to the kind of algorithmic intelligence that 
most other chapters present as the main concern of data politics. This does not 
mean that “fake news” is not related to computational analytics or political inten-
tions, but it does mean that this relation is not straightforward.
To discuss this relation, I will go through a three-stage argument. First, I will crit-
icise the notion of “fake news”, dismissing the idea that this type of misinformation 
can be defined by its relationship to truth. Second, I will propose a different defini-
tion of this phenomenon based on its circulation rather than of its contents. Third, 
I will reintroduce the connection to data politics, by describing the economic, 
communicational, technological, cultural and political dimensions of junk news.
Junk news is not about algorithmic persuasion
The first stage of my argument consists in showing that the “data” and “politics” of 
“fake news” are not where they are supposed to be. This entails questioning the idea 
that “fake news” results from sophisticated psy-ops, based on computational tech-
niques processing social media data to distil highly persuasive messages and dispatch 
them to the most suggestible audiences. This idea has been popular in the debate over 
Cambridge Analytica (see Venturini & Rogers, 2019). Cambridge Analytica (or CA) is 
a disreputed marketing firm that, according to its own admissions, maliciously acquired 
data on several millions of Facebook profiles and used it to push Donald Trump’s elec-
tion. While the first part of this reconstruction is correct, the second is questionable.
In 2014, CA tried to buy data from the earlier “myPersonality project” of the 
University of Cambridge (Stillwell & Kosinski, 2012). The project was based on 
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a personality quiz delivered through a Facebook app, which collected the quiz 
answers and data on the user’s activity in the social network. When the nego-
tiations failed (because the researchers refused to lend their data to non-scientific 
uses), CA commissioned Aleksandr Kogan to replicate the protocol and collect a 
new batch of data. Kogan created a similar quiz, but introduced two crucial differ-
ences: first, he recruited his respondents through the microwork platform Amazon 
Mechanical Turk; second, it collected data not only on the users taking the quiz, 
but also on their friends (as allowed by the Facebook’s API until 2015). Through 
this “indirect harvesting”, Kogan was able to collect information on millions of 
Facebook profiles even though fewer than 300,000 people took his quiz.
Besides violating several basic ethics principles, the protocol developed by Kogan 
made it impossible for CA to actually carry out the sophisticated “psychographic 
analysis” that the consultancy boasts as its competitive advantage. Being harvested 
indirectly, 99.5% of the CA records do not contain any psychological information. 
Though the original research at Cambridge suggested the possibility to infer per-
sonality traits from Facebook traces (Kosinski, et al., 2013 and Youyou et al., 2015), 
it remains unclear whether such inference can yield subtler information than classic 
marketing. Kogan himself admitted that the standard Facebook’s advertisements 
have better coverage and segmentation. Investigations carried out by The Guardian 
(Cadwalladr, 2018) and Channel 4 (2018) further indicated that CA’s services might 
rely less on algorithmic intelligence than on standard disinformation techniques (eg. 
defamation, bribery and honey traps).
The Cambridge Analytica affair suggests that computational misinformation 
might be a marketing myth. But the definition of “fake news” as algorithmic prop-
aganda is also problematic because it presupposes that the goal of misinformation is 
deception. At close inspection, however, most of the contents that constitute the 
present upsurge of misinformation does not appear to ask for the “cognitive adher-
ence” of their addresses. Another example will illustrate this claim.
One of the fake contents most circulated during the 2017 French presidential 
campaign was a story about Emmanuel Macron (later to become the French presi-
dent) being homosexual and supported by a gay lobby. The most interesting thing 
about this story was that its falsehood was never in question (Bounegru et al, 2018). 
While hundreds of websites and social media accounts retransmitted the story, the 
vast majority explicitly labelled it as false. Apart from the original publication on 
the Russian information agency Sputnik News, few sources credited the rumour. 
Most venues cited the story to debunk it and to exhibit the trophy of a French fake 
news. The “Macron-is-gay” story struck a chord not because people believed it, but 
because it incarnated the “fake news” imagery: it involved the Russian propaganda; 
had sexual implications; resonated with rumours about Macron’s wedding, etc. 
While the “Macron is gay” story had little resonance, the “Russian-propaganda-
helps-French-online-trolls” story was a resounding success (even Sputnik News 
soon begun to denounce the story rather than promoting it).
This example reveals how misleading is the label of “fake news”. Announcing 
a “post-truth era” (Keyes, 2004), it presupposes that there was a time in which the 
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distinction between true and false was unproblematic. Now, if there is a lesson to 
be learned from half a century of science and technology studies (Hackett et al., 
2008 and Jasanoff et al., 1995) is that this separation is never straightforward. This 
does not mean that true and false are the same, but that their opposition is not 
binary or static. As STS scholars have shown, a Manichean true/false distinction is 
not enough to capture the vast spectrum of reliable-yet-not-without-uncertainties 
status of facts. Even more important: the true/false dichotomy fails to render the 
way in which enunciations are solidified by the work of all sorts of actors (Latour, 
1979 & 2005). Far from being established by sheer force of evidence, facts are built 
by a complex work of “truth-grounding” (Lynch, 2017).
The notion of “fake news” is misleading because it supposes that malicious 
pieces of news are manufactured, while reliable ones correspond directly to reality, 
denying the very essence of journalistic mediation in its efforts to select, combine, 
translate and present different pieces of information in a news stor (Schudson, 1989 
and Tuchman, 1978). The distinction worth making is not between manufactured 
and unaffected information, but between stories that are supported by a large and 
honest truth-grounding work and stories that are not.
Many stories labelled as fake news circulate without asking the “cognitive 
adherence” of those who spread them. Some are openly satirical; others are put out 
front their ideological biases; others are just titles used to lure readers into clicking. 
And while some of these contents are meant to trick their readers into believing 
them, this is rarely their only purpose, instead their objectives “might include act-
ing as monetisable clickbait for viral content pages, doing issue work for grassroots 
activist groups, grassroots campaigning work for political loyalists and providing 
humour for entertainment groups (Bounegru et al, in press).
As noted by the director of MIT Center for Civic Media, in a post entitled 
“Stop saying ‘fake news’. It’s not helping”, the impossibility to define disinforma-
tion on the base of its authenticity has turned the notion of “fake news” in
a vague and ambiguous term that spans everything from false balance (actual 
news that doesn’t deserve our attention), propaganda (weaponized speech 
designed to support one party over another) and disinformatzya (information 
designed to sow doubt and increase mistrust in institutions).
(Zuckerman, 2017)
Because of its vagueness, the term “fake news” has become a weapon to dis-
credit opposing sources of information (Donald Trump has provided several 
excellent examples of such use). According to Claire Ward, director of First Draft 
(an initiative bringing together the main players of journalism and social media):
The term “fake news” is insufficient and dangerous to use is because it has 
been appropriated by politicians around the world to describe news organi-
sations whose coverage they find to be problematic. The term “fake news” 
is being used as a mechanism for clamping down on the free press, and 
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serves to undermine trust in media institutions, hoping to create a situa-
tion whereby those in power can circumvent the press and reach supporters 
directly through social media.
(Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017)
Junk news as a viral pollution
So, if “fake news” is not about false information, what is it about? As the “Macron-
is-gay” example suggests, spread, rather than fakeness, is the birthmark of these 
contents that should be called “viral news” or more precisely “junk news” for, 
just as junk food, they are consumed because they are addictive, not because they 
are appreciated. Shifting the attention from falsity to diffusion does not belittle 
its sway. Quite the contrary, it suggests that these contents are all the more dan-
gerous because they cannot be defused simply by debunking them. Discussing a 
widespread fake story about the support that Pope Francis would have offered to 
Trump, danah boyd observes:
I can’t help but laugh at the irony of folks screaming up and down about fake 
news and pointing to the story about how the Pope backs Trump . . . From 
what I can gather, it seems as though liberals were far more likely to spread 
this story than conservatives. What more could you want if you ran a fake 
news site whose goal was to make money by getting people to spread misin-
formation? Getting doubters to click on clickbait is far more profitable than 
getting believers because they’re far more likely to spread the content in an 
effort to dispel the content.
(boyd, 2017)
“Junk news” is dangerous not because it is false, but because it saturates public debate, 
leaving little space to other discussions, reducing the richness of public debate and pre-
venting more important stories from being heard. Like rumours (Morin, 1969), junk 
news proliferates by transmission and transformation. In this, it provides a dark illus-
tration of the mechanism through which social phenomena are constructed according 
to Gabriel Tarde (1890). In his dispute with Durkheim over the fundaments of the 
nascent sociology, Tarde refused the idea that collective phenomena would be driven 
by underlying structures. Instead, he claimed that the social consists in the “simple” 
imitation of individual behaviours and in their progressive alteration (Latour, 2002):
A social thing [. . .] devolves and passes on, not from the social group col-
lectively to the individual, but rather from one individual [. . .] to another 
individual, and that, in the passage of one mind into another mind, it is 
refracted. The sum of these refractions, [. . .] is the entire reality of a social 
thing at a given moment; a reality which is constantly changing, just like any 
other reality, through imperceptible nuances.
(Tarde, 1898)
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Tarde found it difficult to defend its position empirically, because the research 
methods of his time did not allow to follow collective transmission at the scale 
and with the sharpness demanded by his argument. This may be possible today 
thanks to digital traceability (Boullier, 2015 and Latour et al., 2012). Junk news, 
thereby, is both the dream and the nightmare of Tarde’s sociology. The dream, 
because it offers an opportunity to map the transmission and transformation of col-
lective actions (Venturini, 2018); the nightmare, because it represents an Orwellian 
degeneration of such mechanisms.
According to Tiziana Terranova (2012), the “psychological economy” imagined 
by Tarde (1902) has found a dark accomplishment in the contemporary system 
of the “attention economy”. Drawing on Lazzarato (2002) and Stiegler (2008 
and 2010), she argues that “modern media enhanced and extended the range 
and scope of those processes of invention and imitation that for him [Tarde] 
constituted the essence of economic life” (Terranova, 2012 p. 11), but also 
‘caused the processes of individuation that connect psychic and social life to be 
short-circuited, resulting in the destructive hegemony of the short term over the 
long term’ (ibid. p. 12).
I both agree and disagree with this interpretation. While it is useful to turn 
to Tarde as a reminder that collective virality has not begun with social media, 
it would be wrong to believe that there is nothing new in the current weave of 
misinformation. Like most “attention economy” theories, such an interpretation 
is too generic. According to Crogan and Kinsley (2012) there are three main ways 
of conceptualising the “attention crisis”: as a form of biopower bridling critical 
thinking (Stigler, 2010); as a push to extend capitalist economy to leisure intel-
lectual activities (Beller, 2009, Lazzarato, 2014; Marazzi, 2008); as a neurological 
consequence of the exposure to digital technologies (Carr, 2010 and Hayles, 2007). 
While these arguments are convincing (cognition is certainly a site of political 
struggle, immaterial labour is indeed threatened by capitalist exploitation and intel-
lectual technologies do affect our neurological capabilities), they are also too broad 
to account for the specific misinformation treated in this chapter.
Five modes of junk news production
While collective virality is a constant and essential dimension of social existence, 
“junk information” is a relatively new phenomenon, because only recently viral-
ity has become the object of a complex system dedicated to its production and 
circulation. Such a system is effective (but also difficult to seize by research and 
regulation) because it brings together developments that are simultaneously:
1. Economic (the establishment of a market for online attention);
2. Communicational (the socialisation of a “prosumer” audience);
3. Technological (the development of behavioural algorithms and spreading bots);
4. Cultural (the development of virality-oriented subcultures);
5. Political (the technique of trolling).
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1. The economy of junk news
The economy of virality surfaced in the early 2000s when many Internet com-
panies gave up the hope of selling contents and services and decided to maximise 
advertising revenues. According to observers (especially Goldhaber, 1997), such 
evolution derived from the inevitable inversion of “information economy.” 
Because of its abundance, information cannot be the scarce resource driving digital 
economy. Instead, as observed by Herbert Simon in 1971, its increase gives value 
to its opposite, namely attention:
The wealth of information means a dearth of something else: a scarcity of 
whatever it is that information consumes. What information consumes is 
rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence a wealth of 
information creates a poverty of attention.
(Simon, 1971, p. 40)
Scarcity, however, is not enough. To be sold, attention needs to be “marketized” 
(Çalișkan & Callon, 2010), which in turn demands a “metrological system” to 
standardize and quantify the variety of things that we call “attention.” Setting 
up such a system had already proved difficult for broadcasting media (Bourdon 
& Méadel, 2014) and the solutions found for radio and television could not be 
applied to the Internet because of the larger number of online sources. Survey 
based rating systems could assess the visibility of the most top-tier websites, but 
cannot harness the teeming richness of online offers.
Google solved this problem in the early 2000s with the launch of two services 
called AdSense (allowing websites owners sell advertising space) and AdWords 
(allowing web advertisers to buy such a space). The distinctive feature of this 
network is the automation of its marketplace thanks to two algorithms. As in all 
advertisement systems, buyers are not interested in attention in general, but in 
attention on specific matters (if you sell kitchenware you want your ads in cook-
ing blogs rather than in sports forums). In AdWord, this matching is operated 
by allowing buyers to buy keywords and then displaying the ads on the AdSense 
websites that PageRank, the algorithm that made Google’s fortune as a search 
engine, (Cardon, 2013; Rieder, 2012), associates to such queries. In this way, 
PageRank. The second algorithm concerns the auctions through which the price 
of keywords is established. To allow these auctions to be carried out ceaselessly 
and with little human intervention, Google implemented a variant of the Vickrey 
system in which advertisers set their bids independently and the auction is won by 
highest bidder at the price proposed by the second-highest (Mehta et al. 2007).
This double automation allowed Google to handle micro-transactions 
unprofitable for traditional advertising agencies and to scale up its network to 
millions of buyers and sellers (thereby becoming the cornerstone of Google’s 
revenues). Google Ads is thus the precursor (and dominant player) of a series of 
“advertisement networks” offering to every website, no matter how marginal or 
flimsy, the possibility to sell its traffic (O’Reilly, 2007).
From fake to junk news 129
Another crucial feature of Google Ads is that the value of attention is calculated 
on the basis of the number of clicks generated by advertisements (unlike previ-
ous systems of audience measurement, which could only estimate the number of 
viewers). This “hit economy” (Rogers, 2002) creates incentives for the thriving of 
clickbait techniques. “Clickbaiting” is a crucial and yet understudied phenomenon 
consisting in the proliferation of advertisements with the only objective of being 
clicked. Clickbaits do seek the sustained attention pursued by newspapers, televi-
sion, radio or classic websites. They only need to be remarkable enough to pull 
visitors in for a few seconds. Lowering the barriers of the attention market and 
merchandising a fleeting attention, the hit economy encouraged the development 
of a clickbait industry that is responsible for much of the disinformation discussed 
in this chapter (Graham, 2017, p. 12).
For many junk news producers, the name of the game is not to create catchy 
stories to generate political effects, but to exploit political interest to clickbait atten-
tion. This is famously the case of the teenagers of the Macedonian city of Veles 
where many highly visited pro-Trump websites and Facebook pages were created 
(Tynan, 2016 and Subramanian, 2017):
The young Macedonians who run these sites say they don't care about 
Donald Trump. They are responding to straightforward economic incen-
tives:. . .they learned the best way to generate traffic is to get their politics 
stories to spread on Facebook — and the best way to generate shares on 
Facebook is to publish sensationalist and often false content that caters to 
Trump supporters. As a result, this strange hub of pro-Trump sites in the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is now playing a significant role in 
propagating . . . false and misleading content.
(Silverman & Alexander, 2016)
2. The communication mechanism of junk news
The fact that Web advertisements are paid by “click” and not by “impression” 
suggests that online attention is merchandised a form of engagement (albeit a shal-
low one). Audience studies have long demonstrated that publics are never mere 
receivers, but always active interpreters (Morley, 1993). Already in 1981, Dallas 
Smythe observed that the commodity sold by mass media is the “labour power” 
extracted from their audiences: “the work which audience members perform for 
the advertiser to whom they have been sold is learning to buy goods and to spend 
their income accordingly” (p. 243).
Such an “audience power” has become more important as online platforms have 
learnt to exploit even the lightest engagement of their audiences. In the 1990s, a dis-
tinction existed online between “posters”, the minority of individuals contributing 
to the life of digital communities, and “lurkers”, the silent majority who just read 
their discussions (Nonnecke & Preece, 2003). Such distinction has been thinned by 
the advent of social platforms, which have drastically reduced the effort necessary 
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to ‘act’ online through the so-called “social buttons” (Gerlitz & Helmond 2013). 
Introduced by content aggregators like Reddit and Digg, such buttons can be placed 
on any webpage and allow visitors to share such page on the aggregator. Thanks to 
social buttons, recommending a content has become as easy clicking on it.
“Like” and “share” buttons allow embedding in Facebook contents coming 
from virtually any webpage, making it possible to consume exteral contents 
without leaving the platform. Removing the need to manually copy and 
paste URLs, “these buttons facilitate the cross-syndication of web content 
and . . . introduce a participatory and user-focused approach to recommen-
dation” (Gerlitz & Helmond, 2013, p. 1351). Together with the automatic 
re-publishing of friends’ posts on personal profiles, the one-click-share function 
dissolves the distinction between lurkers and posters. All Facebook users are 
posters, for they all contribute to the circulation of contents by simple fact of 
having friends and liking contents.
The difference between the audience commodity on traditional mass media 
and on the Internet is that in the latter the users are also content producers: “the 
users engage in permanent creative activity, communication, community build-
ing and content production . . . [This] does not signify a democratization of the 
media towards participatory systems, but the total commodification of human 
creativity” (Fuchs, 2009, p. 82).
This does not mean that all uses of social platforms are shallow – as proven by 
activists all over the world (Gerbaudo, 2012). It means that social platforms rely on 
the merchandising of a click-and-share engagement that, in turn, encourages the 
circulation of messages that are not only sticky, but also “spreadable”, i.e. designed 
to be circulated and engaged with. According to Jenkins et al. (2013), spreadability 
is obtained by “the use of shared fantasies, humor, parody and references, unfin-
ished content, mystery, timely controversy, and rumors” (p. 202) – all elements 
typical of online misinformation. Even though falseness is not always associated 
with virality, it is not by chance that many junk news stories are also false. Precisely 
because they are not meant to obtain a deep cognitive adhesion but to arouse a 
superficial click-and-share engagement, junk news leverages the bias of fast think-
ing (Kahneman, 2011). Exaggerated, hyper-partisan stories are highly “spreadable” 
(Mihailidis & Viotty, 2017) and this explains why the majority of junk news is 
more similar to satire than to journalism (Horne & Adali, 2017).
3. The technology of junk news
Social media platforms did not just prepare the ground for junk news, they also 
set up a technological system to nurture it, through a series of techniques to 
maximise the “audience labour”. As noted earlier, one novelty of Google Ads 
is the billing by clicks (rather than by impressions). The clickthrough rate is also 
increasingly complemented “conversion rates” quantifying product sales, service 
registration, but also application downloads or content redistribution (Hoffman 
& Novak, 2000).
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Facebook, for instance, proposes eleven different advertising objectives defined 
as “what you want people to do when they see your ads” divided into three groups: 
awareness (brand awareness, reach), consideration (traffic, app installs, engagement, 
video views, lead generation, messages) and conversion (conversions, catalogue sales, 
store visits) (Facebook Business, 2018). Google uses its technological network to 
allow quantifying website actions (through Google Analytics), video views (through 
YouTube), phone calls (through forwarding numbers), app installs and app actions 
(through Android) and even offline actions (through customer relationship software).
Furthermore, platforms are not the only players in the tracking economy. 
Nowadays, most webpages contain software tracing visitors’ behaviours and many sell 
this information to companies that aggregate and resell them (Anthes, 2015 and Crain, 
2018). Increasingly, data brokers collect data directly through “third-party cookies”. 
A “cookie” is a file that stores information on users in the memory of their web-
browser. Traditionally, cookies were used by websites to collect information about 
their users and provide a more personalised experience. Lately, however, websites 
have started to be paid to host cookies belonging to data brokers (Mayers & Mitchell, 
2012). Thanks to these “third-party cookies”, junk news websites can monetise their 
traffic even when their visitors do not click on advertisements. Clickbaits sell audi-
ences’ attention indirectly, by helping data brokers to collect information on Internet 
users that will allow to feed them personalised advertisements on other websites.
Online tracking become thus a way to improve the matching between adver-
tisements and audiences. Once again, this mechanism was universalised by Google 
Ads, which does not simply award spaces to the highest bidders, but “weights” ten-
ders on the basis of their “quality score” ( Jansen & Mullen, 2008). The quality score 
is crucial, because it implies that advertisements with high “quality scores” can win 
auctions by bidding less than their competitors (Geddes, 2014, p. 215–256). This 
score measures the match between a specific advertisement and a specific auction 
and is computed through an undisclosed formula:
Real-time, auction-specific quality calculations of expected clickthrough 
rate, ad relevance, and landing page experience, among other factors, are 
used to calculate Ad Rank at auction time. These factors, which are based 
on things known only at the time of the auction, can heavily influence the 
quality of the user’s experience.
(Google Support 2018)
The expected clickthrough rate (the probability that users will engage with the ad) is 
the most important of these factors. This makes perfect sense in a system in which rev-
enues are generated only when users actually click on an announcement. Favouring 
the expected engagement benefits both advertisers and hosting websites (as well as 
Google, which retains 32% of the paid price) and, crucially for the argument of this 
chapter, introduces a positive feedback between tracking and engagement.
Through this feedback data collected on online behaviours becomes the basis for 
promoting the same behaviours. These feedback mechanisms are heavily deployed 
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in all online platforms and are an integral part of their addictive power. YouTube, 
for example, measures the time you spend on videos (and the time spent by users 
with similar viewing habits) to suggest videos that will maximise your viewing time. 
Likewise, Facebook measures scrolling behaviours to build personal pages that will 
induce more scrolling – which explains why the platform has reduced the possibility 
of posting on friends’ walls and favoured the automatic composition of “timelines” 
(Lorenz, 2017). The data used to nourish this behavioural feedback, of course, are 
also collected outside the platforms through third-party cookies as admitted by 
Twitter’s Growth Director:
These tailored suggestions are based on accounts followed by other Twitter 
users and visits to websites in the Twitter ecosystem. I receive visit information 
when sites have integrated Twitter buttons or widgets, similar to what many 
other web companies – including LinkedIn, Facebook and YouTube – do 
when they’re integrated into websites.
(Laraki, 2012)
The tracking/engagement loop explains the resources invested by media companies 
in deep learning algorithms (Mackenzie, 2017). Both the “deep” and “learning” 
nature of these algorithms deserve discussion. “Deep” refers to the plural and lay-
ered functioning of the techniques employed in contemporary artificial intelligence 
(neural networks in particular). Consider the recommendation algorithm recently 
introduced by YouTube to maximise users’ engagement (Covington et al., 2016). 
Instead of writing a complex equation that would match users and videos, the compu-
tation is broken down in dozens of detection blocks, each considering a single feature 
of the video or the user. The output of each of these elementary blocks becomes the 
input for a higher level of computation and so forth for several layers (sometime with 
recursive calls to lower levels). Though each of the blocks is relatively simple, their 
combination by the machine is extremely difficult to interpret (as acknowledged 
by Google computer scientists themselves, Olah et al., 2018): “So, when YouTube 
claims they can’t really say why the algorithm does what it does, they probably mean 
that very literally” (Gielen, 2017, see also Gielen & Rosen, 2016).
Because of their depth, neural networks are then black boxes that can only 
be validated through their results (which is why these techniques are consid-
ered a form of learning). Oftentimes, the ground truth of these comparisons 
is the human execution of the same operation (e.g., when an image detection 
algorithm is compared to manual classification). In the case of recommendation 
algorithms, however, the ground truth is the increase of the engagement, as 
recognised by YouTube engineers:
[F]or the final determination of the effectiveness of an algorithm or model, 
we rely on A/B testing via live experiments. In a live experiment, we can 
measure subtle changes in click-through rate, watch time, and many other 
metrics that measure user engagement.
(Covington et al., 2016, p. 192)
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Deep learning is thus characterized by a “radical behaviourism” (Cardon, 2010): 
online platforms don’t care about why their users engage with them, how engage-
ment is generated, or what engagement even means – the only thing that matters 
is increasing their measures of clicking, viewing, scrolling. Add to this that, in the 
last few years, platforms and marketing enterprises have introduced a multitude of 
“social bots” (Ferrara et al., 2014) performing automatically and on a large scale 
the same behaviours of users and thus amplifying viral dynamics (Bessi & Ferrara, 
2016; Shao et al., 2017).
This is why asking online platforms to implement filters to neutralise junk 
news is like asking fast-food chains to implement a recipe to reduce junk food 
consumption. The core of platforms’ algorithmic intelligence (and of their busi-
ness model) lies in the capacity to maximise the virality of online contents, in 
ways over which their very creators have little control. They may be able to stop 
blatantly false and mischievous contents, but they will not oppose the very virality 
that generates their profits.
4. The culture of fake news
While the role of behavioural algorithms should not be overlooked, technology is 
not the only forces at play in junk news production. People play a crucial role in the 
system, through the phenomenon of micro-celebrity and the emergence of virality-
oriented subcultures. Micro-celebrity refers to the renown obtained through social 
media by individuals who do not enjoy a high visibility in other arenas (such as sport, 
show business, economy or politics). While its emergence can be tracked back to 
reality-TV, micro-celebrity has been encouraged by the practice of social platforms 
to provide to their users some of the metrics collected for their advertising market.
These “vanity metrics” (Rogers, 2018) tend to capture a superficial kind of 
attention and measure a celebrity that is ephemeral and shallow – hence the 
suffix “micro-”. This does not mean, however, that micro-celebrity is inconse-
quential. The idea that every individual has an audience that can be gauged by 
the same metrics of commercial and political brands (Marwick & boyd, 2011) 
push many online users to adopt strategies of “personal branding” (Khamis et al., 
2017, Marwick, 2015,). This invites many users to curate their online engage-
ment and re-publish viral contents. Vanity metrics mobilise platform users in 
support of the spreading economy of online media (Hearn & Schoenhoff, 2016). 
By re-posting contents that they hope will interest their followers, users work 
to increase their visibility and at the same time contribute to the maintenance of 
interpersonal communication networks propitious for junk information. Much 
has been written about how social media allows companies and political leaders 
to circumvent traditional gatekeepers and address directly their audiences, but 
much should also be said about the way in which individuals maximising their 
personal reach amplify commercial (Murphy & Schhram, 2014) and political 
messages (Vaccari & Valeriani, 2015).
As a cultural phenomenon, virality plays out not only at the individual level, 
but also at the level of online subcultures. A particularly interesting case is that of 
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4chan – a popular Internet forum created in 2003 and characterized by two fea-
tures. First, 4chan encourages its users to post anonymously (the hacker movement 
“Anonymous” famously got its name from the pseudonym employed by the majority 
of 4chan posters). Anonymity works as a liberating feature that allows the publica-
tion of contents that would be outrageous in most other online and offline venues.
The second feature of 4chan is the way in which it promotes viral ephemerality. 
As many online forums, 4chan is organised in boards structured as a list of “threads” 
ranked according to the most recent post. Given the popularity of many 4chan boards, 
threads are immediately pushed down by new arrivals, unless they are “bumped up” 
by new comments. Based on a two-week sample, Bernstein et al. (2011), calculated 
that the median lifespan of a thread in the “random board” (4chan/b/) is 3.9 minutes, 
with the longest-lived thread lasting 6.2 hours. Though threads life in other boards 
may be a bit longer (Hagen, 2018), these figures indicate how 4chan has specialised 
in the kind of ephemeral attention typical of junk news.
Moreover, threads are limited to a maximum of 300 comments, which means 
that even threads generating lots of comments are eventually closed and deleted. 
To deal with this mechanism, the 4chan community introduced the practice of 
summarising popular discussions and re-posting them. This assures that the most 
popular ideas are constantly distilled and re-posted in a constant swing of fluidifica-
tion and condensation that closely resemble Tarde’s theory of social change.
The combination of a technical incentive encouraging swelling and of a social 
practice encouraging mutation (both occurring in an anonymous medium) has 
created an extremely virulent subculture that generated many of the most popular 
online memetic images (Shifman, 2013) and many of the fake news that polluted 
the US election (see Tuter et al., forthcoming).
Junk news thus is not only a commercial enterprise, but also a cultural phe-
nomenon. 4chan communities have developed vernacular practices, ideas and 
expressions. The political board, 4chan/pol/, has been particularly successful in 
this process of subculture creation, thus becoming the online epicentre of the 
“alt-right” (Nagle, 2017) and developing a universe of symbolic references that is 
both rich and opposed to the mainstream culture – in line with Hebdige’s (1979) 
definition of subcultures. 4chan/pol/ posters depict themselves at the population 
of a fictional country, the Kekistan, with its flag (a green and black version of the 
Nazi flag); its religion (the cult of the ancient Egyptian god of darkness “Kek”); 
its symbols (above all the character of “Pepe the Frog”); and its enemies (the 
“normies” of mainstream culture).
This last element is crucial because much of the Kekistani subculture revolves 
around the refusal of the “politically correct”. According to its members, this 
refusal justifies the racism, misogyny and extremism of their discourses. Kekistani 
“shitposters” (as in their self-definition) commonly adopt a mocking attitude and 
affirm that they do not stand by the ideas they profess but, instead, spread them as 
jokes and provocations to generate viral effects (the so-called “meme magic”) in 
other platforms such as Reddit (Squirrell, 2017), YouTube (de Keulenaar, 2018) 
and Twitter (Zannettou et al. 2017).
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5. The politics of junk news
It is against this economic, technological and cultural background that pressure 
groups and governments have seized the political uses of junk news. This use is 
very different way from classical propaganda (Chomsky, 1991; Jack, 2017) and 
resembles instead to the campaigns led by “sceptics” against health and envi-
ronmental regulations. According to Robert Proctor (Proctor & Schiebinger, 
2008) and Naomi Oreskes (Oreskes & Conway, 2010), groups of rogue scientists 
and marketing experts have been financed since the 1950s by industrial groups 
to counter the mounting evidence on the risks of tobacco smoking and later of 
acid rain, the ozone hole and climate change. Interestingly, these “merchants of 
doubts” do not deny these threats directly, but to nurture the doubt emphasising 
other potential risk causes. In direct confrontations, sceptics would insistently try 
to displace the discussion to marginal questions or use provocations to make the 
discussion noisier.
A similar communicational strategy is known under the name of “online troll-
ing” (Bishop, 2014; Schwartz, 2008). Trolls attack online discussions by asking 
silly questions; insulting other users; blatantly violating the community codes; and, 
in general, by pushing other users into useless controversies (Lee, 2005; Schachaf 
& Hara, 2010). Most of the time, trolls are not interested in the contents of the 
messages they post. Their objective is not to convince their addressees, but merely 
to provoke them, in a communicational game that bears many similarities to the 
memetic culture of 4chan (Bergstrom, 2011).
While trolling is classically carried out as ludic activity (Buckels et al., 2014), it 
has commercial and political equivalents. Firms and marketing companies have long 
tried to disguise their lobbying activities as forms of native engagement. This form 
of “sock-puppetry” consists in using false online personae to promote products (a 
technique known as “shilling” (Stevens et al., 2013; Luca & Zervas, 2016), or to 
simulate grassroot support (a technique known as “astroturfing,” Cho et al., 2011). 
More recently some companies have started using sock-puppets more aggressively 
to capture attention through deliberately outrageous messages (Mahdawi, 2015) or 
by attacking their opponents and disrupting their conversations (Foucart & Horel, 
2017). Once again, these forms of corporate trolling are not necessarily meant to 
spread false information, but to capture or deviate attention.
Political trolling has similar objectives and has been documented by jour-
nalistic investigations all over the world. One of the first of evidence that junk 
news is produced and spread by government agencies for political purposes has 
been offered by documents in the “Snowden archive,” revealing how a unit of 
the British intelligence agency prepared briefs on how “(1) to inject all sorts of 
false material onto the internet in order to destroy the reputation of its targets; 
and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques to manipulate online dis-
course and activism” (Greenwald, 2014).
Similarly, an investigation by the New York Times (Chen, 2015) has documented 
the setting up of campaigns of viral misinformation in Russia by the infamous 
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Internet Research Agency. This “troll factory” appears to be less interested in 
persuading public opinion of pro-Kremlin propaganda than in depriving online 
debate of all credibility:
The Internet still remains the one medium where the opposition can reliably get 
its message out. But their message is now surrounded by so much garbage from 
trolls that readers can become resistant before the message even gets to them.
(ibid.)
The same strategy has been also deployed by the Russian agency as a form of 
intervention in other countries (MacFarquhar, 2018; Seddon, 2014).
A third example of political trolling is offered by the study of King, Pan and 
Roberts (2017) of the so-called “50c party members”, an army of Internet com-
mentators hired by Chinese authorities to influence public opinion. One of the 
most interesting findings is that Chinese misinformation campaigns tend to be con-
centrated in bursts of a few days replicating “the bursts that occur naturally when 
discussions go viral” (ibid). Interestingly, this claim has not been denied, but in fact 
acknowledged by the Chinese government:
The Chinese internet media’s largest problem is . . . the amplification of 
negative and alternative information on Chinese domestic issues caused by 
opinion formation mechanisms that have been a part of the Internet since it 
was invented in the US; Chinese society, in the midst of a transformation, 
does not have the hedging mechanisms to deal with this amplification, so 
traditional public opinion guidance systems don’t seem to be pulling their 
weight when it comes to overcoming these problems.
(Appendix B of King, Pan & Roberts, 2017)
Finally, these communication strategies are amplified by automatic means. In the 
same way in which “social bots” contribute to the spread of commercial junk 
news, “political bots” are used for viral warfare (Cook at al., 2014). In their sim-
plest applications, bots are used to artificially increase the metrics of popularity of 
political leaders; in their most vicious they are employed to “flood” the discussions 
of opponents (Woolley, 2016):
During the Arab Spring, online activists were able to provide eyewitness 
accounts of uprisings in real time. In Syria, protesters used the hashtags #Syria, 
#Daraa and #Mar15 to appeal for support from a global teatre. . . spambots 
created by Bahrain company EGHNA were co-opted to create pro-regime 
accounts. They flooded the hashtags with pro-revolution narratives. This was 
essentially drowning out the protesters’ voices with irrelevant information – 
such as photography of Syria.
(Michael, 2017)
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Conclusions
So, junk news is, after all, a form of data politics. Yet, not in the way often 
imagined. When we consider the power of data, we often conjure some sort 
of Big Brother dystopia: a centralised organisation monitoring our actions 
through a technological panopticon and influencing them through cutting-
edge persuasion techniques. This is not the case for junk news, which does not 
draw on the collection of detailed datasets of personal information and does 
not exploit advanced influencing algorithms. “Fake news” is more prosaically 
“junk news”, for its cycle of production and distribution resembles to the one 
of junk food.
In a sense, this is even more worrying, because no single organisation (no mat-
ter how sophisticated) is as strong as a system with gears in the economy, media, 
technology, culture and politics. This is the take-away message of this chapter, that 
junk information is the consequence of a multiplicity of developments emerged in 
different spheres but directed to the same purpose: to accelerate but also trivialize 
the dynamics of variation and reproduction that Tarde saw as the two basic forces 
of collective life.
The creation of a standardised market for online publics and its expansion to the 
long tail of the Web; the quantification of engagement through metrics of clicking 
and sharing; the emergence of a flourishing clickbait economy and the diffusion 
of clickbait techniques to all types of communication; the training of online audi-
ences to contribute to the distribution of junk information; the introduction of 
third-party cookies and the advent of data brokers; the use of deep learning algo-
rithms amplify the consumption of viral contents; the deployment of armies of 
social and political bots; the rise of micro-celebrities and the pervasiveness of van-
ity metrics; the emergence of virality-oriented subcultures in specialised platforms 
and their spread to mainstream media; and the perfecting of political trolling and 
discussion hijacking. All these developments are aligned to promote a type of 
attention and of engagement that (because of their ephemerality and shallowness) 
are opposite to those necessary for a healthy democratic debate. This alignment is 
not fortuitous or vaguely inspired by the same zeitgeist, but connected through a 
series of reinforcing relations that need to be empirically exposed and legally dis-
mantled to slow down the rise of junk misinformation. The multiplication of the 
appeals to truth and fact-checking miss its target for it refers to a regime of infor-
mation (that of traditional journalism) that could not be further away from that of 
junk news. It only by understanding the system of digital virality that we can stand 
against online misinformation.
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SEEING LIKE BIG TECH
Security assemblages, technology, and the 
future of state bureaucracy
Félix Tréguer
In June 1831, a Frenchman, Alexandre Ferrier, sought to create the first privately-held 
optical telegraph line between Calais, in Northern France, and London. Ferrier was 
an adventurous entrepreneur who did not back away from bold ideas. The privately-
owned telecommunications infrastructure he set out to build would not only serve the 
interests of French industry barons willing to track stock prices in the financial capital 
of the world; it could also be of use for the diplomatic communications of the French 
government. The whole plan was risky but, after all, there was no law sanctioning the 
monopoly of the French state over telegraph networks.
To be on the safe side, Ferrier thought it was best to ask the government for an 
explicit authorisation. But Casimir Périer, then head of the French government, 
was hesitant as to what his answer should be. Yes, Ferrier’s proposal was unusual 
but, after all, many political and business elites agreed that the telegraph could be 
a boon for the emerging industrial revolution (Flichy 2009). Could the govern-
ment seriously consider meet that demand while keeping its monopoly over the 
telegraph? Many thought not.
Alphonse Foy – the man Périer turned to in order to make up his mind – 
had an entirely different view on the matter. As the newly-appointed Director of 
the Telegraph Service at the Ministry of Interior, Foy wrote a letter that offered 
a more-than-tepid response to Ferrier's project. “Mr. Ferrier's request is entirely 
inadmissible,” he wrote (Charbon 1991, 12). As a servant of the government, Foy 
was appalled by the notion that the French state could lose its monopoly over tele-
communications infrastructures. As Foy argued, “the existence of this telegraph 
communication would necessarily harm the present privilege of the government to 
be the first instructed of all-important news.” The government had to be the first 
one to see and learn about what was going on. But the fundamental belief expressed 
by Foy’s blunt refusal was that a privatised telecommunications infrastructure was 
a challenge that the modern state simply could not handle. All the techniques of 
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power – like surveillance and censorship – institutionalised since the 16th century 
in partnership with private actors to control the subversive effect of the printing 
press and of postal networks while allowing them to serve the interests of both the 
state and early capitalism would come crumbling down.
So over the next six years, the French administration worked on a plan to retain 
its monopoly over the deployment and exploitation of telegraph networks, while 
starting to open its use to the general public. In 1837, the Minister of the Interior, 
Adrien de Gasparin, appeared before the Parliament to defend a new law designed 
to put that plan into effect. The goal was to criminalise every transmission that was 
not authorised by the government and not sent over public telegraph lines.
But in many respects, Foy and Gasparin fought a rear-guard battle. As it had 
already done with older communication technologies, the state would soon move 
to a lighter-handed approach. From the 1840s on, the development of the electri-
cal telegraph accelerated national and transnational communications flows, as the 
industrial revolution spurred the demand for coordination and communications 
(Beniger 1986). By the end of the 19th century, private corporations did not only 
make extensive use of the telegraph and of the new communication technology 
of the time, the telephone; they also played a growing role in the construction 
and management of national and international infrastructures to serve the needs of 
states and globalising market actors (Barty-King 1980; Headrick 2012).
Fast-forward 150 years. Neoliberal policies launched in the 1980s have com-
pleted the dismantling of public and private monopolies over telecommunications 
networks, and digital technologies have profoundly intensified data flows. Once 
again, states have found ways to transpose their traditional techniques of power to 
digital communications (Galloway 2004; Goldsmith and Wu 2006). When they 
do – whether it is to engage in surveillance, censorship or propaganda – they almost 
always do so in interaction with companies who manage parts of the multi-layered 
architecture of the Internet.
In the process, actors who occupy key positions in the state’s intelligence and 
now law enforcement agencies have to constantly negotiate alliances with these 
private actors. Today, that means not only dealing with large firms in the media and 
telecom sectors whose relations to the security field can be traced back from the 16th 
and 19th centuries, but also with tech firms that have come to dominate the digital 
economy – mostly US-based multinational online service providers, software pro-
ducers and online platforms like Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft.
In other words, “Big Tech” joins “Big Media” and “Big Telco” as yet another 
oligopoly commanding over the all-important communication industries, and 
more generally the global economy. Today, Apple, Amazon, Google/Alphabet, 
Microsoft, and Facebook have acquired the highest market valuations globally 
(Statista 2018). Tech is now the largest sector in global capitalisation, amount-
ing to 3,582$bn, before financials (3,532$bn), consumer goods (2,660$bn), 
healthcare (2,300$bn), oil and gas (1,411$bn) or telecommunications (859$bn) 
(PwC 2017). Having championed new models based on the algorithmic regula-
tion of online communications as well as regimes of surveillance relying on the 
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systematic collection and analysis of behavioral data (Fuchs and Trottier 2015), 
these resourceful companies hold an irresistible appeal for security professionals 
tasked with controlling communication flows.
This, in turn, is leading to a historic shift in the public-private assemblages 
regulating communication networks, which actually points to a much wider trend 
in modern state power. In Seeing Like a State (1998), James C. Scott has shown 
how modern statecraft was built by ensuring legibility through measures, metrics 
and other “state simplifications” aimed at representing and acting upon both the 
natural and social worlds. In the age of Big Data, the techniques mastered by Big 
Tech are now seen as crucial to make the digitised world legible and governable. 
Faced with swelling data stocks and flows, the state needs to see like Big Tech. 
This gives way to a negotiation process aimed at co-opting its infrastructures and its 
data-processing techniques. Big Data governmentality hence spreads throughout 
the security field and beyond, across state bureaucracies.
Shifting public-private assemblages in the security field
To make sense of these ongoing negotiations, it is useful to start with the concept 
of security assemblages. With the rise of security privatisation in the context of neo-
liberal economics, the public-private category has become a key theme in security 
studies, with research on topics ranging from private security guards to the role of 
private companies in the logistics of military forces or subcontractors in the intel-
ligence field (Abrahamsen and Leander 2015; Williams 2010). But, against those 
insisting that the increasing role of private corporations in security is one more evi-
dence of the weakening of traditional state sovereignty, critical security scholars like 
Abrahamsen and Williams (2010, 23) have instead argued that “privatisation is not a 
challenge to prevailing structures of authority, but is embedded in, and inseparable 
from, transformations in governance.” Seeking to lay new theoretical foundations 
for understanding how private security is historically and socially constituted, the 
authors have introduced the concept of “global security assemblages”:
[Global security assemblages are] transnational structures and networks in 
which a range of different actors and normativities interact, cooperate and 
compete to produce new institutions, practices and forms of deterritorialized 
security governance.
(p. 90)
Against those authors who ground the concept of assemblage in the philosophy 
of Gilles Deleuze (e.g. Haggerty and Ericson 2000), Abrahamsen and Williams 
instead anchor it in the Bourdieusian concept of “fields” to highlight the evolution 
of material, symbolic and cultural forms of capital within the security field. Their 
approach also builds on Saskia Sassen’s notion of “disassembly” to highlight the 
fact that an assemblage is actually a process whereby some components of states are 
configured in new power structures, as formerly public functions are transferred 
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to the private sector. “Security assemblage,” then, refer to the way security gov-
ernance is increasingly achieved through fluctuating arrangements of networks of 
state, corporate and other voluntary actors, which together form “knots of statelike 
power” (Harcourt 2015).
That the tech industry may play an important role in security assemblages may 
not be surprising. After all, from Charles Babbage’s proposal of an Analytical Engine 
to Alan Turing’s Enigma, the genealogy of computers clearly shows an immediate 
connection between the development of these technologies, and the needs of mod-
ern bureaucracies – whether public or private. Data processing tools associated with 
statistical work and calculation have historically played a key role in the modern state 
power (Agar 2003; Desrosières 2002). They have also long been a cornerstone of the 
military-industrial complex, as evidenced for instance by scholarship on the role of 
IBM in the Holocaust (Black 2012) or inquiries on the history of the Silicon Valley 
and its intimate relationship with the US military (Bellamy Foster and McChesney 
2014; Edwards 1996; Harris 2014; Lécuyer 2007; Levine 2018; Nesbit 2017).
But what makes ongoing negotiations between Big Tech and the security field 
particularly interesting is that this oligopoly also originates from a corporate culture 
marked by a “counter-culture libertarianism” (Barbrook and Cameron 1995) – 
one that has deep historical roots (Turner 2006). As a consequence, from the point 
of view of many stakeholders, these organisations first appeared as relative outsiders 
to the security field. As the process of hybridisation between the state and the new 
masters of communication industries unfolds and has yet to stabilise, the security 
field intersects with other social fields that traverse these organisations and are 
influenced by this counter-cultural, oppositional ethos – like the field of computer 
security or that of digital rights. For this reason, the incorporation of Big Tech in 
the state’s security apparatus is marked with intense power struggles that are often 
made visible, for instance through the media.
Post-Snowden: cooperation or resistance?
These struggles can provide key insights to understand data politics and modern 
state power. In recent research conducted on the surveillance of Internet com-
munications by intelligence agencies, we approached these issues by looking at 
the debates around Internet surveillance in the aftermath of the 2013 Snowden 
disclosures in the United States and in France (Tréguer 2018). By following inter-
actions between Big Tech and governments as they moved from surveillance to 
other issues of interest to the security field (such as the weakening of encryption or 
the fight against terrorist propaganda), we worked through an inductive approach 
to identify factors influencing how these profit-seeking entities and their manag-
ers would fall in the cooperation/resistance spectrum, depending on the changing 
context and constraints that they face across time and space.
Among the factors making up this constraint structure were a firm’s internal 
corporate culture, past and ongoing dealings with the human rights field (e.g. past 
human rights scandals affecting them), the importance of user trust and the threat 
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of competition. The relative weight of these constraints in a given context made 
resistance to the demands of the security field more likely. In turn, the sensitivity 
of these firms to regulatory changes, the identification of their managers to what 
Mills called the “power elite” (Mills 1959), their dependence on public funding 
and procurements, and the existence of criminal sanctions for non-cooperation all 
made cooperation more likely.
Looking at post-Snowden debates in the United States and in France to see how 
this constraint structure played out, we noticed some differences between the two 
countries from 2013 to 2015. In the US (and although these actions had global 
repercussions), we first see overt and multi-pronged resistance strategies being 
staged by Big Tech, whether through “technical resistance” with the roll-out of 
encryption on their products, or legal and political resistance through litigation and 
political advocacy aimed at reigning in the power of intelligence agencies.
In part, these can be read as instances of “double dealings” in the field of human 
rights defenders and that of hackers and engineers who were mobilised to beef up 
privacy protections in response to the Snowden disclosures. In Bourdieu’s research 
such double-dealings refer to situations “whereby leaders, managers, officials or 
delegates of a field appear to be acting in a disinterested or principled manner 
‘for the field' and its values but are actually serving their own interests” (Webb, 
Schirato, and Danaher 2002). By aligning themselves with the privacy claims of 
their own workers concerned about their incursion in the military-industrial com-
plex, the demands of human rights organisations and those of the field of computer 
security, these firms were able to remobilise workers, mitigate reputational risk and 
restore the trust of their users and customers concerned by the revelations, thereby 
securing or even reinforcing their market positions.
Encryption is a case in point. Whereas media coverage often over-emphasised 
the tensions between Big Tech and governments on this issue – for instance in 
2016 when Apple refused a request by the FBI to collaborate in order to bypass 
encryption on a iPhone used by the San Bernadino shooter – such legal resistance 
often simply came down to respecting the state of the art, as computer engineers 
across the world worked to draw the lessons of the Snowden disclosures and beef 
up computer security globally (Rogers and Eden 2017).
Big Tech did not go much further. When strong, end-to-end encryption 
was rolled-out, the companies often declined to make it a by-default option. It 
was the case with Facebook Messenger, Microsoft’s Skype or Google’s Allo. An 
FBI source reacted to the launch of Allo by saying that “having [strong encryp-
tion] as an opt-in feature is certainly useful to us” (as quoted in Nakashima and 
Tsukayama 2016). Even when they are used by default, the strong encryption fea-
tures like those deployed by Facebook on WhatsApp only encrypt the content of 
communications, not the metadata (who communicates with whom, when, from 
where, etc.). In other words, these deployments still allowed companies to mine 
metadata so as to monitor their users’ behaviour and serve them with targeted 
advertising. Of course, such metadata can be, and frequently is, handed over to 
law enforcement (e.g. Biddle 2016; Fox-Brewster 2017).
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Looking at these developments, some scholars have argued that the spread of 
encryption on Big Tech’s infrastructures – which, according to NSA officials, had a 
significant inhibiting effect on the surveillance capabilities of law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies (McLaughlin 2016) – can be seen as a way of ensuring that 
the surveillance of users’ communication could only happen with the companies’ 
knowledge and consent, thereby reinforcing their position in the security field 
(Rubinstein and Van Hoboken 2014).
These shortcomings may primarily be driven by business considerations, rather 
than result from direct negotiations between Big Tech and the security field. But 
in mid-2015, a White House memo on encryption contemplated the possibility of 
“voluntary assistance,” possibly in a “private” way to avoid the chilling effects that 
publicity might have on such cooperation (US National Security Council 2015). 
Since then, US intelligence and its allies have indeed exerted more quiet pressure 
to boost cooperation (e.g. Sanger and Frenkel 2018). We also know from the 
Snowden archives that prior to 2013, the NSA spent $250 million a year to work 
with tech companies to make commercial software – and in particular encryption 
software – more exploitable (Ball, Borger, and Greenwald 2013).
Surveillance reform and the Snowden paradox
When it comes to legal and political resistance staged by Big Tech, they too have 
their limits. The case of the US indeed confirms that despite an increased degree 
of transparency, surveillance reform introduced since 2013 in liberal regimes has 
led to what we have called the “Snowden paradox” (Tréguer 2017): Intelligence 
reform, rather than rolling-out capacities for large-scale and “suspicionless” sur-
veillance, has provided a detailed legal basis for these capacities, bringing a few new 
safeguards and decreasing the level of secrecy to secure their legality and legitimacy.
In the US, the most important piece of legislation in this respect was the USA 
Freedom Act, passed in June 2015. Rather than allowing the NSA to collect and 
store domestic telephone records in bulk, the legislation effectively gives that 
authority to telecommunication providers (who will have to query their own 
databases with selectors provided by the NSA and hand over the matching data). 
In no way did this stop the growth of large-scale surveillance conducted by US 
intelligence. According to the reports published by the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence in 2017 and 2018, the amount of data collected by the NSA 
has surged since 2013 (Gallagher 2017; Volz 2018), including the data collected 
from Big Tech (according to the Google Transparency Report, by virtue of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, it provided data on 14,000 user accounts in 
the first semester of 2013; in the first half of 2017, that number rose to more than 
48,500 accounts – a 350% increase). Even legislative changes allowing companies 
to ask a judge to review gag orders attached to surveillance requests (preventing 
any public disclosure on the existence of such requests) have since been selectively 
used by companies like Google and Facebook, leading to criticisms from human 
rights organisations (Cardozo 2017).
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In France, US tech companies’ push for surveillance reform originally acted in 
a much more antagonist environment, partly resulting from existing public-private 
alliances with French telecom and defence firms and from repeated calls in favour 
of “digital sovereignty” by decreasing the dependency of the French security field 
on US companies. In fact, Big Tech’s initial attempt at resistance to the expansion 
of state surveillance capacities was immediately denounced by government officials 
as hypocritical, considering their own commercial surveillance practices. This sub-
sequently led to much less intense and more discreet forms of engagement when 
France expanded the surveillance powers of its intelligence agencies through this 
new legislation. As for the amount of data provided by Big Tech to the French 
police and judiciary in the past years, it has also sharply increased, in part due 
to a better compliance rate after a “group of contact” was established between 
technology companies and the Ministry of the Interior in 2015 (Cassini 2015). In 
the first half of 2013 (January–June), Google was served with 2,011 requests by 
French authorities (it complied with 49 % of them); Facebook was served with 
1,547 requests (39 % compliance rate). In the first half of 2017, Google received 
5,661 requests (it complied with 63 % of them); Facebook, 4,700 requests (74%). 
In four years, that makes for a 360% and 570% increase in the number of requests 
for which some data was produced, respectively.
Controlling data flows: A “fundamental shift” in  
“scale and nature”
After 2015 and save for a few exceptions, the influence of the human rights field 
on the global debate on surveillance reform withered along with media attention 
to state surveillance issues. Through securitisation discourses – where securitisation 
refers to speech acts calling for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the ter-
rorist threat (Buzan and Wæver 2003, 491) – the security agenda became dominated 
by the terrorist threat. This led to new calls on the part of the security field to limit 
encryption, boost surveillance capabilities, and fight against terrorist propaganda on 
online networks, often with the threat of new legislation and criminal sanctions if 
the companies failed to cooperate. In this context, similar trends towards greater 
cooperation materialised both in the US and Europe, suggesting strong transnational 
field effects across the Atlantic (Bigo 2016). Two topics are particularly illustrative.
One area of cooperation that will help increase the already impressive growth in 
data requests sent to Big Tech companies are ongoing reforms around extraterrito-
rial access to data. In March 2017, US President Donald Trump signed into law the 
CLOUD Act. This piece of legislation – first presented by the Department of Justice 
in mid-2016 – was added at the last minute to a spending bill to revise the legal 
framework regulating US law enforcement access to online data stored overseas as 
well as access to data by foreign law enforcement authorities to data held in the US.
The goal is to provide a streamlined legal avenue to bypass the often long 
and tedious procedures of international judicial cooperation provided by 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) (Vergnolle 2017) while clarifying 
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the extra-territorial effects of US law. With the CLOUD Act, if a country 
is deemed by the US government to have an adequate legal framework for 
surveillance, a bilateral agreement will be concluded giving to that country 
the possibility to directly send surveillance requests to US companies, without 
having to go through the US judiciary, even when the data is stored in the 
US. Conversely, US law enforcement agencies will be able to request any user 
data from US companies, regardless of the nationality of targeted persons and 
regardless of where the data is stored.
Drafted and passed with wide-ranging support from the tech sector (Smith B, 
2018; Walker 2017), the CLOUD Act further entrenches the privatisation of the 
justice system for regulating trans-border data flows. As a result of this legislation, 
tech companies who receive requests from a third country will be the only ones 
able to oppose these requests; with MLAT procedures, the whole process would 
have been supervised by foreign and US judges. It also gives new leverage to the US 
government – i.e. whether or not to conclude a bilateral agreement with foreign 
governments to give them direct access to the data troves of US companies – 
which may be abused to further the diplomatic interests of the US at the expense 
of human rights. These are just some of the most obvious problems of a legislation 
reaped with ambiguities (Singh Guiliani and Shah 2018; Wong 2017). In Europe, 
the adoption of the CLOUD Act was immediately followed by a proposal for a 
“directive on electronic evidence” aimed at enacting similar rules. Both initiatives 
could quickly expand worldwide through an ongoing revision of the Convention 
on Cybercrime of the Council of Europe.
In both the US and Europe, another hot topic has been that of terrorist propa-
ganda, and the intensifying pressure put on online service providers to police such 
speech. Since the Paris attacks of 2015 and a visit of the French Minister of the 
Interior to Silicon Valley, France has been the European leader in this push toward 
privatised censorship, which was quickly taken up at the level of the European 
Union. The European Commission and Europol have convened regular meet-
ings to get online platforms to sign a code on hate speech in 2016. In its report on 
the activity of its “Internet Referral Unit” created in 2015 to weed out extremist 
content online, Europol makes clear that these censorship activities are conducted 
outside of any legislative framework:
A referral activity (meaning the reporting of terrorist and extremist online 
content to the concerned online service provider) does not constitute an 
enforceable act. Thus, the decision and removal of the referred terrorist 
and extremist online content is taken by the concerned service provider 
under their own responsibility and accountability (in reference to their 
Terms and Conditions).
(Europol 2016, 4)
The US government followed suit in February 2016, when US Cabinet members 
and intelligence officials also met with tech companies. At the time, the White 
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House press secretary told reporters that “many of these technology companies that 
are participating in the meeting today are run by patriotic Americans and would 
want to cooperate” (as quoted in Jose and California 2016). A key aspect of the 
discussions laid in understanding how technology could be used to boost censor-
ship of terrorist propaganda and so-called counter-discourse. A few months later, 
companies like Google and Facebook were announcing major innovations in their 
efforts on extra-judicial automated censorship, something that the government 
could not do considering the “First amendment” issues raised by such policies 
(Menn and Volz 2016).
Of course, online censorship represents an important challenge considering the 
sheer volume of third-party content posted on these platforms: 300 hours of video 
are posted on YouTube every minute; and on Facebook, every day, 510,000 com-
ments are posted, 293,000 statuses are updated, and 136,000 photos are uploaded. 
So besides hiring thousands of content-moderators, often through subcontrac-
tors based in low-wage countries where basic social rights are discarded (Roberts 
2016), these efforts have led to significant investment in tools based on “Machine 
Learning” systems aimed at censoring terrorist-related content.
As the British Prime Minister Theresa May, explained at UN General Assembly 
in New York in September 2017:
Industry needs to go further and faster in automating the detection and 
removal of terrorist content online, and developing technological solutions 
which prevent it being uploaded in the first place. We need a fundamen-
tal shift in the scale and nature of our response – both from industry and 
governments.
(as quoted in Hope and McCann 2017)
A year later, in September 2018, the European Commission was announcing a 
proposal for transcribing the extra-judicial and automated mechanisms experi-
mented over the past years into EU law.
What is happening here, with these moves around extra-territorial access to 
data or the censorship of terrorist propaganda, is a major reconfiguration of secu-
rity assemblages tasked with the management of data flows and stocks, as new 
actors, technologies and regulations become necessary for the state to handle the 
surge in public and private communications entailed by digital technologies and 
keep its traditional techniques of power afloat. But the more we look at these 
new security assemblages involving Big Tech, the more we start to understand 
that they are but a sign of a broader reconfiguration of bureaucracies in the 
digital age.
Bureaucracies in the age of data governance
In her work on neo-liberal bureaucratisation, Béatrice Hibou has shown how, from 
the 1970s on, the logic of management migrated from the private realm to state 
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institutions (Hibou 2015). Through imperatives of “efficiency”, “cost-effectiveness”, 
“flexibility” and through practices of “auditing”, and “benchmarking”, bureaucratic 
practices within public administrations grew increasingly hostile to the post-war social 
values embedded in the public sector. With the so-called “New Public Management,” 
the abstract principles of neoliberalism were pushed so far as to cause a complete 
divorce between “efficiency” and the ends that state bureaucracies were supposed to 
pursue (Graeber 2015).
If, according Hibou, bureaucracy is seen “as a power concentrated in the 
hands of those who create the validated abstractions and put them at the core of 
government” (p. 86), it looks like Big Tech may fast be dominating the whole 
administrative field. Zuboff (2015) and others trace back the origin of this diffusion 
of power to Google’s popularisation of “data governance”, referring to bureau-
cratic models based on “data extraction and analysis”, “new contractual forms 
due to better monitoring”, “personalization and customization”, and “continuous 
experiments” championed by Google’s chief economist (Varian 2010, 2014). 
They were later relayed in the book How Google Works? (2015), authored by Eric 
Schmidt, Executive Chairman of Google/Alphabet from 2001 to 2017 and still a 
board member today, and Jonathan Rosenberg, a former Senior Vice President 
of Products at Google. In this book, the pair document business management les-
sons from Google, an experience that led them to “relearn everything” they knew 
through data-intensive models.
Data means knowledge means hard power
After having contributed to the shaping of US Internet diplomacy under the tenure 
of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (Assange 2014; Powers and Jablonski 
2015; Schmidt and Cohen 2013), Eric Schmidt has been the most visible agent of 
a crowd of current and former “Googlers” helping spread these models at the heart 
of the US military-industrial complex. In March 2016, Schmidt was appointed by 
the Secretary of Defense as chairman of the Defense Innovation Board (DIB). A 
position as advisor to the Pentagon that he still holds at the time of writing despite 
him quitting his official positions at Alphabet/Google in January 2018. On its 
webpage, the DIB is described as an innovation think-tank:
Through pilot programs and experiments within DoD, the DIB can bring 
in new perspectives from the private sector and academia, work with DoD 
partners to test hypotheses, gather data, and encourage the imagination and 
critical thinking need to consider new solutions. This process is rapid, creative, 
collaborative, and ultimately saves time and money.
(DIB 2017)
In one of its recommendations entitled “Forge New Approach to Data 
Collection, Sharing, and Analysis”, the DIB insists on the importance of data to 
21st century statehood:
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Data is the 21st century equivalent of a global natural resource, like timber, 
iron, or oil previously – indispensable for sustaining military innovation and 
advantage. The next global conflicts will be fueled by data. The rapidly 
expanding power of new mathematical and computing techniques to reveal 
insights into intentions and capabilities, and to enhance accuracy, lethality, 
and speed, depend on immense data sets to train algorithms and from which 
to extract information. The data that provide the raw materials from which 
to identify patterns, as well as the anomalies that defy them, constitute the 
fuel that powers the engine of Machine Learning (ML). Whoever amasses 
and organises the most data first will sustain technological superiority, so it is 
incumbent upon the Department to collect, store, share, analyze, and protect 
its data faster and better than its competitors. Data must be regarded as one 
of the most powerful resources in the Department’s arsenal.
(DIB 2017)
Companies like Google and their executives are selling solutions aimed at expanding 
the technological superiority and “efficiency” of security bureaucracies. According 
Scott Frohman, Google’s Director of Defense and Intelligence Sales, Big Tech can 
bring these “radical innovations” at “ultra-low cost.” “Through the use of Google's 
capabilities remade for the enterprise,” he writes on his LinkedIn profile, “the gov-
ernment gets innovation fast and with significantly reduced cost” (Frohman 2018).
The “Startup Nation” as a new bureaucratic paradigm
These trends go beyond the security field and expand to virtually all public poli-
cies. The integration of Big Tech in the administrative and political fields has been 
going on for at least a decade. It vastly expanded under the Obama administra-
tion, with over 251 individuals changing position between Google or related firms 
and the federal government, national political campaigns and Congress (‘Google’s 
Revolving Door (US)’ 2017).
Under Trump, it may look different on the surface. For one thing, the tech 
industry has voiced strong criticism of his immigration and climate policies 
(Streitfeld, Isaac and Benner 2017). Big Tech workers have also played an impor-
tant role in denouncing Google’s participation to drone warfare. At Microsoft they 
opposed a $19.4 million contract with US Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), while Amazon was criticised for selling facial recognition technologies to 
US police forces. Trump has of course “trolled” Big Tech, for instance by accusing 
them of censoring conservative views online (Swisher 2018).
But in the back rooms, it looks like business as usual. In a memorandum signed 
in late-March 2017 creating the “American Technology Council,” Donald Trump 
opened new channels for sustaining the reciprocal influence between the tech 
industry and the US government. The initiative is overseen by his son-in-law and 
Senior Advisor Jared Kushner and seeks to “modernize” the US public sector. 
Discussions have touched on how to make public procurement more flexible, cut 
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down on some 6,000 government-owned data centres by shifting those responsi-
bilities to the private sector, or on the release government-held data on a range of 
issues, particularly on health care, for private-sector use (Romm 2017).
In France too, where a lot of revolving door activity is also happening (“Google’s 
European Revolving Door” 2016; Léchenet 2017), the debate on the “reform of 
the state” has moved from the premises of the New Public Management to those 
of data governance. By coining terms like “Startup Nation” – an expression cham-
pioned by French President Emmanuel Macron – or the “Platform State,” today’s 
reformers are re-modelling bureaucracies and decision-making processes around the 
need to produce massive amounts of data, make it available and usable, maintain its 
integrity and feed it to powerful data-processing tools that will be used to “optimise” 
bureaucratic outputs (e.g. Algan and Cazenave 2016; Bertholet and Létourneau 
2017; Pezziardi and Verdier 2017). Even when these reformist discourses claim to 
be opposing the hegemony of US tech companies, they are in fact assuming the 
superiority of their models and diffusing them across public administrations. It is 
an instance of “mimetic rivalry” (Girard 2002), where what Evgeny Morozov has 
termed solutionism serves as a new technocratic utopia (Morozov 2013).
Despite calls of security insiders and state reformers to establish “digital sover-
eignty,” the products and services of US tech firms continue to have an irresistible 
appeal. In 2017, a contract between Microsoft and the French Ministry of Defence 
was signed despite widespread criticism. A year earlier, the DGSI, France’s domestic 
intelligence, contracted Palantir, a Big Data analytics firm very close to US intelli-
gence, to mine the vast amount of data seized during house raids and digital seizures 
authorised under the state of emergency post-November 2015 (Tesquet 2017).
As this latter example suggests, new security assemblages do not only embark 
large tech firms used daily by billions of Internet users. Many small companies 
specialised in data analytics or vulnerabilities are also partnering with intelligence 
agencies to sell their products and services (Deibert 2013). Older tech and utility 
companies in the defence, transportation or energy sectors are also trying to catch 
up by investing in Big Data analytics – sometimes in partnership with their US 
competitors like IBM to secure access to key technologies – and are fast-developing 
solutions for Big Data policing, just as local elected officials hope to get votes by 
framing these new programs as advancing the project of a “Smart City.”
The Government Machine and the rule of law
Such trends towards technical, managerial and technological responses to security 
challenges have been sweeping the modern security field for quite some time now 
(Abrahamsen and Williams 2010; Bonelli 2010). But as Big Tech becomes part of 
the state and now serves the “Government Machine” (Agar 2003), we might be 
reaching a tipping point in the history of governmentality.
That being said, political theory suggests that the blurring public-private dis-
tinction is a feature of state power, not a bug. According to Timothy Mitchell, we 
need to see the state not “as a free-standing entity, whether an agent, instrument, 
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organisation or structure, located apart from and opposed to another entity called 
society,” but rather as a multiplicity of political arrangements that produce struc-
tural effects that maintain social and political order (Mitchell 1991, 94). From this 
perspective, “the boundary of the state is merely the effect of such arrangements 
and does not mark a real edge. It is not the border of an actual object.” Rather, 
“producing and maintaining the distinction between state and society is itself a 
mechanism that generates resources of power.”
The “Big Tech vs. the Surveillance State” narrative emphasises that distinction. 
Post-2013, it served to counter that put forward by Snowden and journalists work-
ing on his disclosures of unabated and extra-legal cooperation. It helped reassure 
Internet users that these companies worked to protect their rights and resisted the 
state on their behalf. But soon enough, through more discreet moves, the state-
private distinction was again crushed when, to effectively control communications 
and avoid investing resources in the justice system, security professionals co-opted 
Big Tech and their censorship and surveillance techniques for their own ends. 
Such double-dealings are still ongoing.
Towards hybrid rule
Through public-private hybridisation, it becomes easier for governments to escape 
the important safeguards that our legal systems have developed over time to protect 
political rights, but which are apparently ill-suited (or at least too costly) to accom-
modate the surge in communications entailed by digital technologies. In this way, 
“political elites (. . .) rely on the private sector to shield national security activities,” 
thus “expanding state power while constraining democratic accountability” (Hurt 
and Lipschutz 2015, 2).
This was in part a deliberate strategy first envisioned in the mid-1990s, when 
security professionals – in particular at the Pentagon – feared the consequence of 
the compression of time and space induced by digital networks and sought for new 
ways of enacting state power. The result was the formulation of new doctrines and 
practices whereby “the military and law enforcement, the government and private 
industry, and domestic and foreign surveillance would necessarily mix in ways 
long seen as illicit if not illegal” (Jones 2017, 13). It followed that “constitutional 
interpretation, jurisdictional divisions, and the organisation of bureaucracies alike 
would need to undergo dramatic – and painful – change.”
As we have seen, part of such change resides in automation and extra-
judicialisation,which both lead to a profound shift in the history of the justice system. 
In his 1971–1972 lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault explained how, from 
the 14th century on, the old feudal institution of Parliaments was gradually co-opted 
by the Crown and entrusted with investigative powers (Foucault 2018). To assert its 
power without having to bear the costs of military occupation, the Prince relied on 
Parliaments to interrogate people, to make them say what they knew so as to pro-
duce knowledge on the basis of which he would adjudicate and eventually govern 
“his” territory and the population.
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In today’s computerised world, the legal restrictions of state power that were 
progressively coded into the justice system are radically overtaken by “data gov-
ernance.” Digital traces form the basis of a new statistical power-knowledge that 
is seen as the most effective and cost-efficient way of governing the natural and 
social worlds. In the process, the legal norms and principles which somewhat 
circumscribed the power of the Prince get lost in computer code. Once it has mor-
phed into algorithms, power becomes even more diluted and harder to challenge 
(Rouvroy, 2012). Can we even reasonably hope to make these ever more com-
plex algorithms auditable, and their designers accountable, when experts in “Deep 
Learning” and “Neural Networks” say that even they cannot understand how 
these increasingly unpredictable systems work (Knight 2017; Smith, A. 2018)?
Stopping the machine?
That begs the question of how best to challenge these new security assemblages.
For one thing, it is worth stressing that Big Data bureaucracies might not be that 
good at doing what they are supposed to. We can therefore oppose the arguments 
of those legitimising these new governance models on the grounds of accuracy 
and reliability. There are reasons – and growing evidence – to doubt that the new 
“regimes of truth” championed by “Big Data security assemblages” will in any 
meaningful way provide solutions to security issues (Aradau and Blanke 2015). 
Technological solutionism in the age of data governance, bolstered by market-
ing discourses, might only be recreating a veil of illusion of technocratic control, 
while putting evermore distance between bureaucracies and the social world they 
wish to make more orderly. After all, history tells us, bureaucracies tend to fail. 
By disregarding “all the subtleties of real social existence,” “reducing everything 
to preconceived mechanical or statistical formulae,” bureaucratic dispositifs like 
“forms, rules, statistics, or questionnaire” – even when fuelled by complex algo-
rithms and troves of data –, remain abstract simplifications that might only reinforce 
the forms of structural violence they are said to alleviate or even solve (Graeber 
2015, p. 75; see also Eubanks 2018, O’Neil 2016).
Bureaucracies often fail to meet their alleged goals but still, they strengthen 
the power of those who invest in them. They transform the social world and can 
go awfully wrong (Scott 1998). If, following Tim Mitchell and critical security 
scholars, we refuse to “see the state and private organizations as a single, totalized 
structure of power,” another complementary way of resisting these assemblages 
is to build on the conflicts that inevitably occur “between different government 
agencies, between corporate organizations, and within each of them” (Mitchell 
1991, 90). We can amplify the words of those who denounce the oppressive 
and manipulative use of modern computer technologies, applaud tech work-
ers opposing the direct involvement of their company in the military-industrial 
complex, or support security professionals seeking to automate intelligence over-
sight so as to catch up with large-scale surveillance systems and mitigate abuse. 
We can, and we should.
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But post-Snowden controversies also show that these forms of resistance create 
a risk that we will overlook the pervasiveness of the institutions and technologies, 
of the rationalities and practices that created the problem in the first place. The risk 
is that all we are able to come up with are legal, technological or bureaucratic fixes 
to try to contain the most disturbing aspects of data-driven bureaucracies, without 
affecting the longer-term trend of a technological arms race that only seems to 
intensify the issues it was allegedly meant to solve.
Some kind of deeper resistance might be warranted. In his writings on power, 
Foucault once asked: “How can the growth of capabilities” – and he explicitly 
mentioned “techniques of communication – “be disconnected from the intensi-
fication of power relations?” (Foucault 1984, 48). Computing technologies have 
since become immensely powerful and yet, we are still struggling to find a satisfac-
tory answer to this crucial question. Despite the hopes of early hackers and Internet 
pioneers, the decoupling of technology and power is not happening. The key 
question then becomes whether technology itself or law or ethics can actually be 
effective instruments to achieve such decoupling.
At this stage of technological development, if we feel like they cannot – at least 
not in the near foreseeable future – that means it is probably time to refocus on 
tackling the imaginaries and institutions that underlie the “growth of capabilities” 
itself: the blind faith in technological progress; the oft-repeated mantra that technol-
ogy is neutral, that its negative potential will somehow be contained; places like the 
universities, R&D labs, ministries, start-ups, shops and factories where complex and 
powerful technologies are designed, produced and traded. As philosopher Jacques 
Ellul observed, “we set huge machines in motion in order to arrive nowhere” 
(Ellul 1989, 51). If it is not Thomas More’s eu-topia (“no place”) that we are fast 
approaching but rather a “dystopian void” (The Luddbrarian 2018), what we need 
is not just a technological fix, a bureaucratic patch, a principled law or even a good 
ethics; what we need first and foremost is to get off and stop the machine.
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TOWARDS DATA JUSTICE
Bridging anti-surveillance and social  
justice activism1
Lina Dencik, Arne Hintz and Jonathan Cable
The Snowden leaks provided unprecedented insights into the operations of 
state-corporate surveillance and highlighted the indiscriminate nature of large-
scale data collection across communication networks and platforms in Western 
democracies, most notably the US National Security Agency (NSA) and the 
British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The documents 
illustrated the intricate ways in which everyday communication is integrated 
into an extensive regime of surveillance that relies considerably on the “data-
fication” of many aspects of social life. Ordinary users’ social activities are 
“sucked up as data, quantified and classified, making possible real-time tracking 
and monitoring” (Lyon 2014, 4). This information infrastructure characterizes 
a particular mode of governance, one that is rooted in a political economy in 
which the prevailing logic is to predict and modify human behaviour as a means 
to produce revenue and market control; what Zuboff (2015) has described as 
“surveillance capitalism”. Such data-driven forms of social organization have 
significant implications for citizenship (cf., Hintz, Dencik and Wahl-Jorgensen 
2018; Isin and Ruppert 2015) and particularly for how citizens might inter-
vene, challenge and resist this form of governance. As part of the interplay 
between data and politics, resistance can take several forms. Much onus has 
been on the collection and use of data, and prominence has been placed on the 
use of counter-surveillance technologies such as encryption or anonymisation 
tools along with a focus on advocacy pertaining to privacy and data protection 
amongst digital rights groups. This has provided windows of opportunity for 
technological developments and legislative changes that speak particularly to 
concerns with the implications of surveillance programmes for secure commu-
nication infrastructures and individual privacy (Hintz and Brown 2017; Rogers 
and Eden 2017). However, the degree to which such strategies and concerns 
have expanded towards the broader range of politically-active and interested 
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publics is less clear. Moreover, a common agenda around an engagement with 
the politics of or in data in which data is seen as “generative of new forms of 
power relations and politics at different and interconnected scales” (Ruppert, 
Isin and Bigo 2017, 2) is difficult to identify.
In this chapter we explore the relationship between these broader concerns and 
data by analysing responses to the Snowden leaks amongst political activists in the 
UK.2 The chapter draws from a series of in-depth interviews with UK-based activ-
ists engaged in a range of social justice concerns, exploring attitudes and practices 
in relation to mass data collection and digital surveillance. Based on this research, 
we develop the concept of “data justice” as a way of reframing prominent under-
standings of data politics.
The chapter starts by outlining the implications of the Snowden leaks for 
political activists before discussing how resistance to data-driven surveillance has 
predominantly emerged in their aftermath. We argue that resistance in the data-
fied society post-Snowden has tended to focus on techno-legal responses relating 
to the development and use of encryption and policy advocacy around privacy 
and data protection. This presents a particular way of framing and engaging with 
data politics. In light of this, we examine how these types of practices are nego-
tiated amongst political activists and outline the extent to which the activists 
we interviewed view such resistance as part of their social justice agendas. We 
observe a significant level of ambiguity around technological resistance strategies, 
while policy responses to the Snowden leaks have largely been confined within 
particular expert communities. In the final part of the chapter, we therefore 
propose a (re)conceptualization of resistance to data collection and use that can 
address the implications of this data-driven form of governance in relation to 
broader social justice agendas. To that end, we introduce the notion of data jus-
tice which, we argue, would help contextualize datafication, connect it to social 
and economic justice concerns, and thereby contribute to transforming the role 
of data politics in current civil society practice and, potentially, public debate. 
This is particularly significant in light of the central role of data-driven processes 
in contemporary capitalism.
The Snowden leaks and political activism
The revelations of programmes designed to “bulk” collect data on citizen engage-
ment with digital infrastructures3 indicate the extent to which contemporary forms 
of governance are increasingly based on the ability to monitor, track and poten-
tially predict the behaviour of entire populations. This is part of a broader emphasis 
on the role of “big data” in current societies (Kitchin 2014) that highlights the 
surveillance implications of the “big data” discourse. As Lyon (2015) has argued, 
surveillance culture came prominently into view simultaneously with the intensi-
fied security-discourse following 9/11 and the so-called war on terror. In particular, 
the uncertainty of the form and nature of potential threats in such a political climate 
provides an apparent necessity and justification for limitless measures to be taken to 
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ward off any such possible dangers. The focus, therefore, moves to the operation-
alization of how to perceive of these potential threats, in which the apparatuses of 
surveillance play an integral role (Massumi 2015). In such circumstance, the rise of 
“surveillance society” marks a social context characterized by an increasing amount 
of surveillance taking place alongside an explosion in the possible methods and 
means for observing and monitoring people’s behaviour (Lyon 2001).
A central concern for Snowden and others has been the extent to which 
extensive forms of monitoring lead to a “chilling effect” in society that stifles 
the possibilities for challenging institutions of power and advocating for social 
change. Although the theory of “chilling effects” has historically been difficult 
to empirically prove and remains controversial, the debate on it following the 
Snowden leaks concerned the extent to which government surveillance may 
deter people from engaging in certain legal (or even desirable) online activities 
because they fear punishment or criminal sanction, and do not trust the legal 
system to protect their innocence (Penney 2016). Such surveillance “effects” 
were documented in a survey carried out by the PEN American Center in the 
immediate aftermath of the Snowden leaks in which they found that writers are 
engaging in self-censorship as a result (PEN 2013). Further studies have shown 
a reluctance amongst citizens to engage with politically sensitive topics online, 
such as a decline in “privacy-sensitive” search terms on Google (Marthews and 
Tucker 2015), a decline in page views of Wikipedia articles relating to terrorism 
(Penney 2016), and a “spiral of silence” in surveillance debates on social media 
(Hampton et al. 2014). As Greenwald claims:
Merely organizing movements of dissent becomes difficult when the gov-
ernment is watching everything people are doing. But mass surveillance 
kills dissent in a deeper and more important place as well: in the mind, 
where the individual trains him- or herself to think only in line with what 
is expected and demanded.
(2014, 177–178)
Furthermore, the Snowden leaks revealed the expansive notion of “target” that 
has come to be operationalized in such a mode of governance, going far beyond 
what may be obvious misconduct or wrong-doing. Greenwald points out:
The perception that invasive surveillance is confined only to a marginalized 
and deserving group of those “doing wrong” – the bad people – ensures that 
the majority acquiesces to the abuse of power or even cheers it on. But that 
view radically misunderstands what goals drive all institutions of authority. 
“Doing something wrong” in the eyes of such institutions encompasses far 
more than illegal acts, violent behavior and terrorist plots. It typically extends 
to meaningful dissent and any genuine challenge. It is the nature of authority 
to equate dissent with wrongdoing, or at least with a threat.
(Greenwald 2014, 183)
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The Snowden leaks provided substantial evidence for the ways in which a wide 
range of politically active citizens are under scrutiny in this ever-expanding 
threat environment. For example, documents showed that government agen-
cies in both the US and the UK have actively been engaging in the monitoring 
of political groups with a “watchlist” including international organisations 
such as Medecins Du Monde (Doctors of the World), UNICEF, Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch, as well as prominent individuals such 
as Ahmad Muaffaq Zaidan (Al-Jazeera’s Pakistan Bureau Chief), Agha Saeed (a 
former political science professor who advocates for Muslim civil liberties and 
Palestinians rights), and groups such as Anonymous (Harding 2014; Privacy 
International and Amnesty International, 2015). State surveillance practices 
have also extended to the monitoring of politically-interested citizens with 
programmes such as the one carried out by GCHQ in the aftermath of the 
“Cablegate” publications which sought to track any visitor to the Wikileaks 
site by tapping into fibre-optic cables and collecting IP addresses of visitors 
to the site as well as the search terms used to reach the site (Greenwald and 
Gallagher 2014).
These disclosures build on previous and continued practices of surveillance of 
activist groups and dissenting voices. In the UK, revelations of undercover police 
officers infiltrating a range of activist groups over a longer period of time, includ-
ing environmental and animal rights activists, have illustrated the invasive tactics 
used to monitor and suppress protest and dissent (Lubbers 2015). This is alongside 
other documented forms of managing and containing resistance, tracking activities 
and intercepting planned actions, whether by corporate agencies or state bodies 
(cf. Lubbers 2012; Smith and Chamberlain 2015; Uldam 2016). The navigation 
and circumvention of surveillance is therefore a fully integrated and long-standing 
tradition in some activist circles (della Porta 1996; Earl 2003; Leistert 2013). 
However, with the emergence of big data-driven surveillance programmes, regimes 
of governance and control have increasingly been based on digital infrastructures 
that facilitate “dataveillance” – a form of continuous surveillance through the use 
of (meta)data (Raley 2013). These regimes are rooted in the economic logic of 
“surveillance capitalism” in which accumulation is pursued through the ability 
to extract, monitor, personalize, and experiment based on the pervasive and con-
tinuous recording of digital transactions (Varian 2014; Zuboff 2015). Not only 
does the entrenchment of this logic within everyday communication technologies 
cement a fundamentally asymmetrical power relation between activists and those 
wishing to carry out surveillance on them (Leistert 2012), but the nature of these, 
often invisible, infrastructures also carries with it central pertinence and signifi-
cance for activists seeking to challenge existing power relations and mobilize social 
change. As Lovink and Rossiter (2015) have argued, a politics of the “postdigital” 
in which the digital has become so omnipresent that it has been pushed to the 
background and become naturalized, demands of activism to focus on the network 
architectures at the centre of power in order to pursue genuine social justice and 
emancipatory ideals.
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Anti-surveillance and techno-legal resistance
Efforts to resist data-extractive technologies have taken several forms, particularly in 
relation to surveillance. As Mann and Ferenbok (2013) have argued, multiple types 
of “veillance” intersect, undermine and challenge each other in the monitoring of 
modern societies. Surveillance – veillance in which the viewer is in a position 
of power over the subject – is often met with efforts to revert or ‘equalize’ such 
power. Mann has placed emphasis on the advent of “sousveillance” in this regard, 
where the subject is gazing back at power “from below”, exemplified by technolo-
gies such as wearable cameras and other efforts to capture, process, store, recall 
and transmit human-centered sensory information (Mann 2005, 636). However, 
as Bakir (2015) points out, modes of resistance to surveillance also include coun-
terveillance and univeillance that speak more to the sabotaging and blocking of 
surveillance as well as ways of making intelligence services more accountable.
Much resistance to surveillance following the Snowden leaks has centred on 
these latter strategies – particularly on developing and “mainstreaming” alternative 
technologies alongside campaigns for tighter policies on the protection of personal 
data. To start with, forums to provide secure digital infrastructures to activists have 
proliferated, with “numerous digital rights and internet freedom initiatives seizing 
the moment to propose new communication methods for activists (and everyday 
citizens) that are strengthened through encryption”. (Aouragh et al. 2015, 213). 
These have included renewed focus on privacy-enhancing tools such as the TOR 
browser, the GPG email encryption system and the encrypted phone and text 
messaging software Signal. An increasing number of websites now support the 
more secure https protocol rather than the standard http, and a growing number 
of internet users have downloaded tools such as “https everywhere” that con-
nect to those more secure websites. Privacy guides such as the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation’s “Surveillance Self-Defense” (https://ssd.eff.org/en) and the Tactical 
Tech Collective’s “Security in a Box” (https://tacticaltech.org/projects/security-
box) explain the use of privacy-enhancing tools and offer advice on secure online 
communication. “Crypto-parties” have brought necessary training in such tools to 
towns and cities worldwide (O’Neill 2015).
Technical solutions to mass data collection have included, furthermore, the 
development of self-organized communications infrastructures as alternatives to 
corporate services such as Google and Facebook. Groups such as Riseup.net, 
Autistici and Sindomino have offered mailing lists, blog platforms and collabora-
tive online workspaces that protect user privacy and are hosted on the groups’ 
own secure servers. Indymedia, arguably the first social media platform, was run 
by activists in the same manner, and attempts to create other non-commercial 
and privacy-enhancing social networks have continued. The development of 
technological alternatives that reinforce autonomous and civil society-based 
media infrastructure has been a key part of anti-surveillance activism (Hintz and 
Milan, 2013). Their adoption by activist communities may have grown since the 
Snowden leaks began but remains limited, so far, as the vast resources available to 
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large corporate providers and the ease of use of their products – from Gmail to 
YouTube to Facebook – have meant a far more widespread uptake (Askanius and 
Uldam 2011; Terranova and Donovan 2013).
However, following the Snowden leaks internet companies have had to address 
customer concerns regarding data security, too. While they mostly enjoyed friendly 
relations with, in particular, the US government in pre-Snowden times, divisions 
between the industry sector and the state emerged after Snowden as criticism of 
these companies’ data practices grew (Wizner, 2017). The confrontation between 
the FBI and Apple in early 2016 crystallized this new and troubled relation (even 
if momentarily), in which Apple managed to appear as protector of user interests 
against state intrusions. The introduction of end-to-end encryption by services 
such as WhatsApp demonstrated a new trend which aligned, to a degree, with 
the efforts of non-commercial tech activists. Campaign projects such as “Ranking 
Digital Rights” (https://rankingdigitalrights.org/) have advanced the focus on cor-
porate policies by, for example, creating an “Accountability Index” that measures 
company commitment to user privacy and freedom of expression.
While the focus on infrastructure providers and technological development has 
been prominent, many digital rights campaigns have addressed the state and sought 
policy reform. In the UK, organisations such as Privacy International, the Open 
Rights Group, Big Brother Watch, Article 19 and Liberty have regularly issued 
statements regarding their concerns about mass data collection, have organized pub-
lic debates and have lobbied legislators. As an immediate response to the Snowden 
leaks, these groups and others formed a coalition – Don’t Spy On Us – which 
combined some of this advocacy work towards a common campaign. Their voice 
was significant in the specialized discourses around, for example, the Investigatory 
Powers Act – the main post-Snowden piece of UK legislative reform. They have 
formulated fundamental critiques of surveillance practices, but they have also, 
increasingly, been recognized as a legitimate participant in policy debates that holds 
relevant expertise. As one anti-surveillance campaigner noted: “Previously NGOs 
would have fought just to kill a new law and probably been unsuccessful in doing 
so; now they can say: here’s how we can genuinely improve it and have a proper 
conversation with the Home Office” (quoted in Hintz and Brown 2017).
Litigation has emerged as a key strategy of policy advocacy. Campaign organisa-
tions such as Privacy International, Liberty and Amnesty International challenged 
GCHQ’s data collection practices at the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) 
which decided that some of the agency’s activities were unlawful. Others, such as 
the Open Rights Group, Big Brother Watch and Human Rights Watch brought 
cases against the British government before the European Court of Human Rights 
and the European Court of Justice. While the results of legal challenges have been 
mixed, they have forced governments to admit to previously secret practices and 
have thereby opened up avenues for policy reform (Hintz and Brown 2017).
At the intersection between policy and technology, civil society activists have 
also contributed to the work of institutions that define and regulate the stand-
ards and protocols of digital communication. In some of these bodies, such as the 
Towards data justice 173
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), they participate in individual capacity and 
based on their personal expertise, next to experts from industry and government. 
In others, such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), they form specific caucuses, for example the Non-commercial User 
Constituency (NCUC). As technical standards and protocols typically allow some 
actions and disallow others, and enable some uses and restrict others, their develop-
ment constitutes a latent and invisible form of policymaking and therefore places 
standards organisations in both a highly influential and slightly obscure position 
(cf., DeNardis 2009; Lessig 1999). In response to the Snowden leaks, several of 
these bodies started to address the vulnerabilities exposed in the revelations by set-
ting up working groups, developing proposals on how to incorporate privacy in 
standards, and, in some cases, agreeing that these concerns should become a prior-
ity of standards development (Rogers and Eden 2017).
Digital rights activists and civil society-based technological developers have 
been influential in all these venues. Yet their efforts have largely remained within a 
specialized discourse and a constituency of experts. Our goal with this research was 
to explore to what extent activists concerned with other social justice issues have 
engaged with these agendas, and whether there is scope for linking these (possibly) 
divergent concerns.
Resistance to datafication amongst political activists
In the rest of this chapter, we therefore explore the extent to which such resistance to 
digital surveillance features in broader activist practices and how concerns with data 
are understood. This research is based on a number of semi-structured interviews 
carried out with political activists in the UK as part of the larger project “Digital 
Citizenship and Surveillance Society: UK State-Media-Citizen Relations After the 
Snowden Leaks”. These interviews were conducted with a range of political activists, 
both from big NGOs as well as smaller community and grassroots organisations based 
in the UK, that were not specifically engaged with digital rights or technology activ-
ism, and individuals within those groups who were not specifically responsible for 
technical infrastructures of communication. These groups were chosen on the basis of 
having a more or less adversarial relationship with the state, covering a range of causes, 
and predominantly out of an existing network of contacts. They therefore cover a rel-
atively wide spectrum of civil society activity. The sample consisted of 11 interviews 
(see Table 9.1) carried out in person (8) or on Skype (3) during March–June 2015, 
lasting on average 60 minutes and focused on the following themes: a) understanding 
and experience of surveillance; b) knowledge and opinions of the Snowden leaks; 
c) attitudes towards state surveillance; d) online behaviour and practices; e) changes 
and responses to the Snowden leaks.
In the context of the above discussion, this chapter is particularly concerned with 
the extent to which resistance to digital surveillance features in activist practices and 
agendas and how data politics more broadly is understood. We extracted prominent 
themes from our interviews around these issues, based on a thematic analysis that 
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TABLE 9.1 List of Interviews
Organization Orientation
Global Justice Now (GJN) Economic justice
Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) Anti-arms
CAGE Anti-discrimination
Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) Community integration
Greenpeace Environmentalism
Stop the War Coalition (STWC) Anti-war
Muslim Council of Wales (MCoW) Community integration
Trade Union Congress (TUC) Workers’ rights
Anti-fracking activist Environmentalism
ACORN Community organizing (housing)
People’s Assembly Against Austerity (PAAA) Anti-austerity
focused on understandings of surveillance, uses of encryption software, changes in 
communication practices following the Snowden leaks, and attitudes towards digi-
tal rights advocacy. Below we outline key themes emerging from our interviews 
in relation to how anti-surveillance and data politics is situated in activist practices. 
In the first part we discuss general understandings of surveillance, data collection, 
and responses to the Snowden leaks. In the second part we move on to discuss how 
resistance to mass data collection in terms of encryption and advocacy around digital 
rights is understood and practiced amongst the activists we interviewed.
Responses to Snowden
To start with, the interviews demonstrated that the issue of state surveillance is very 
familiar amongst political activists in the UK, particularly due to a troublesome his-
tory of police infiltration into activist groups. Many of the activists we spoke with 
had either direct experiences of police infiltrating groups they were part of or they 
knew someone who had experienced infiltration. Digital surveillance and big data 
surveillance of the kind revealed in the Snowden leaks was less prominent and salient 
in initial descriptions of surveillance. However, many of the activists we interviewed 
expressed a general awareness and expectation that these activities are going on, 
from either corporations or state, or a combination of both. Several activists pointed 
to specific experiences that might demonstrate the monitoring of online activities:
I think there’s been instances where the police have turned up to our meet-
ings or rung ahead of venues we’ve been using and warned the venues not 
to allow us to have a meeting (. . .) they’re obviously keeping tabs on our 
Facebook activities but then that’s public so you totally expect that. Similarly 
with Twitter . . . we’re pretty sure that there’s a police presence on some-
thing called Basecamp which is where we organize online.
(Anti-fracking activist)
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What was revealed in the Snowden leaks, therefore, came as little surprise to the 
majority of our interviewees although the scale of the surveillance programmes 
revealed in the documents did exceed expectation for many activists:
I think, kind of like most people my impression is there has been a hell of 
a lot more going on than anyone has known about. The capabilities of the 
security services are much greater than anyone suspected but there is much 
less political and judicial oversight of this, and indeed some of this is done on 
a dubious legal basis.
(TUC activist)
The lack of surprise, or the widespread expectation, of what the Snowden leaks 
revealed therefore also muted any direct reaction to the Snowden leaks amongst 
most of the activists we interviewed. With the exception of Greenpeace who 
reviewed and revised their communication infrastructure as an immediate and 
direct result of the Snowden leaks, our interviewees expressed little, if any, 
direct response to the revelations.4 Rather, awareness and continued negotiation 
with the realities of surveillance has developed over time and the Snowden leaks 
fit into this longer-term consciousness instead of being transformative in and of 
themselves:
I think it’s about being always aware of the general threat. I don’t think in 
fact that Snowden in particular has had an impact on a single aspect of how 
we work . . . In a sense he confirmed what was the sort of thing people sus-
pected was happening anyway, but I don’t think that revelation has changed 
anything we do.
(CAAT activist)
Of course, this does not mean that precautions are not taken against digital sur-
veillance as part of activist practice. Some of the people we interviewed spoke 
of tactics employed to circumvent different forms of digital surveillance, such as 
using anonymisation tools (e.g. a VPN) for researching targets, preferring face-
to-face meetings for organizing actions, and using encrypted emails for sharing 
personal data. This also highlights how circumvention of data collection is more 
prominent for particular kinds of activities (e.g. internal organizational use). 
Overwhelmingly, however, our interviews illustrate the extent to which the 
dependence on digital communications, and mainstream social media in particu-
lar, for pursuing activist agendas undermines efforts to actively circumvent or 
resist data-driven surveillance. Activist groups use digital infrastructures that are 
subject to large-scale data collection for several aspects of their activities, includ-
ing general awareness-raising, advocacy, mobilizing, organizing and expanding 
their actions and membership base, using programmes and tools integrated into 
social media interfaces. They do so because of the perceived reach that social 
media platforms afford and because activists themselves rely on the “datafication” 
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of social relations in order to collect data and extend networks of connections, 
both for organization and mobilization of activities:
[NationBuilder] is a programme which is designed for campaign organi-
sations. Obama used it in his campaign. Labour are using it. It basically 
integrates your website with a database and social media as well so sucks in 
social media profiles out of Facebook and Twitter and things like that.
(ACORN activist)
You start off by setting up a Facebook event and then the activists learn tools 
like the invite all app where you don’t have to keep on inviting individual 
friends, it invites 500 at a time. So we will then spread that all around people 
so then you can drive the invites up to 5 or 6 thousand very quickly.
(PAAA activist)
Such dependency on this kind of digital infrastructure in conjunction with a gen-
eral awareness that communication is being monitored and stored in turn manifests 
itself by forms of self-regulating online behaviour. Despite their widespread use of 
mainstream platforms, activists noted they are cautious about not saying anything 
“too controversial” on social media, or choose to withdraw entirely from using 
social media to discuss politics:
My advice to our people, our community, is just be careful before saying 
anything, before making a statement . . . and think about it, what the reper-
cussions would be and how it could be misconstrued. So prevention is better.
(MCoW activist)
It can get picked up and used in a court or, partly in a court case or possibly 
liable. I think people are worried about liable.
(STWC activist)
These types of concerns speak partly to the “chilling effect” mentioned above in 
which some online activities and communication are deterred out of a fear of the 
repercussions and mistrust towards the system.
Resisting data collection
Despite such concerns being expressed, the active circumvention of data-extracting 
technologies such as widespread uptake of encryption or anonymisation tools 
remained limited to just a few of the groups we interviewed, with Greenpeace 
expressing the most extensive and comprehensive secure communication infra-
structure. Predominantly, the activists we interviewed did not use encryption or 
anonymisation tools as an integrated part of their communication practices. In rea-
soning this, we can see a number of themes emerge. Firstly, several interviewees 
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spoke of a perceived “lack of knowledge”, insufficient technical ability and not 
being able to “afford” to implement alternative communication practices. These 
kinds of perceptions are often also combined with notions of convenience in which 
mainstream platforms are favoured for their familiarity and ease of use:
We just want ease of access to be honest. Actually, I can send an email to a few 
thousand people and do a few other things and I don’t need to spend days or 
weeks actually learning how to do it because I’m not very technically minded.
(ACORN activist)
The question of convenience is linked to a second significant theme that emerged 
on this topic. Activists feel that using encryption strides against their ambitions 
of being an “open” and “inclusive” group or organization. Several of our inter-
viewees emphasized the transparent nature of their activities, including also the 
legality of their tactics, and their wish to be a “public” movement. In positioning 
their response in this way, we can identify an important perception of encryption 
as being linked to “hidden” practices or “exclusive” forms of communication. 
In contrast to understanding encryption according to its established purpose as a 
means of security and protection, and as an enabler of both privacy and freedom of 
expression (Kaye 2015), the strong role of a popular “nothing to hide” discourse is 
evident even among activists. A number of interviewees understood such tools as 
contradicting or undermining their self-identification:
We’ve got nothing to hide, we’re not doing anything illegal and we’re not 
doing anything that’s not defendable. So you know . . . if the security services 
want to challenge what we’re doing then we’ll have that debate out in public. 
And anyway, I suppose at the back of our minds is that it probably wouldn’t 
work anyway is my guess. Without spending huge amounts of time or resources.
(STWC activist)
We’re having to campaign all of the time, we’re not secret organisations, 
or organisations of tight-knit groups of people campaigning together. We 
are mass movements, and we are open. For us social media is great because 
it makes communication easy and of course we know people look at social 
media but our messages are not hard to get.
(TUC activist)
The point here is not the choice of tactics that these groups use. Rather, the atti-
tude expressed here demonstrates that privacy-enhancing technology is seen to be 
pertinent to only a particular strand of political activism and directly undermines 
another. Indeed, there was a prevalent sentiment in several of our interviews that 
being part of “mainstream” groups reduced the need for concern with digital sur-
veillance practices. That is, resisting or circumventing data collection as an activist 
practice is predominantly confined to those engaging in “radical” political activism. 
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Consequently, this might also deter those “in the middle” from becoming more 
“radical”, making “people more cautious” (ACORN activist), and thereby keep 
the mainstream “in check”. This sentiment is reasoned not just in terms of the legal-
ity of tactics that different activist groups employ, but also in terms of the perception 
of their own influence and the extent to which they see themselves as adversarial 
to the state (our sample includes a variation of activists in this regard). In this sense, 
only activists who understand themselves as being sufficiently of interest to the state 
feel the need to concern themselves with data-driven surveillance as an issue or 
integrate secure technologies into their practices.
Such perceptions also extend to activists’ engagement with advocacy on legisla-
tion relating to privacy or digital rights issues more broadly. Although solidarity 
and support of the cause was expressed across the board, most activists we inter-
viewed did not see themselves or the organisations and groups they are part of as 
being actively engaged with issues relating to digital rights, such as privacy or data 
protection. Rather, despite mentions of some informal links with organizations 
such as Privacy International and Statewatch5, most of the activists we interviewed 
made a distinction between their own activist work and that of technology activists 
and digital rights groups:
Some people focus on things like surveillance and some people focus on the 
workplace, some people do community things.
(ACORN activist)
I think there are organisations that are doing that work already and it’s for us 
to be knowledgeable and a bit of a step ahead of the game, but I don’t think 
it’s for us to campaign on surveillance.
(Anti-fracking activist)
Despite a general critique of mass data collection, resisting it actively does not 
feature in activists’ own agendas and is instead “out-sourced” to expert communi-
ties. In this sense also, resistance to data collection was not seen as providing a base 
for a broader movement, but rather an issue in which you need to “specialize” 
(PAAA activist).
“Data justice” and the bridging of activism(s)
Our interviews with activists illustrate that a general awareness and expectation 
of surveillance is prevalent amongst activist communities in the UK, but con-
cerns with data-driven surveillance of the kind revealed in the Snowden leaks 
remain somewhat marginalized in activist perceptions and practices. Rather, 
the entrenched dependency on mainstream communication platforms that are 
predominantly insecure provide an environment for activist practices in which 
it is seen as difficult and problematic to engage in resistance to data collection 
either through technological means or in terms of protest and advocacy for 
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greater privacy and data protection. More generally, we can identify a “discon-
nect” between concerns with data-driven surveillance and other (broader) social 
justice concerns.
How, then, might we address this disconnect? Aouragh et  al. (2015) argue 
that the “division of labour” between what they label “tech justice” and “social 
justice” activists emerges partly from the socio-technical practices that have been 
advanced in secure communication campaigns in which there is a distinct user-
developer dichotomy that places the onus on the (individual) “user” to protect 
themselves (identifying risks using “threat modeling”) with tools provided by the 
“developer”. Similarly, Kazansky (2016) found, based on her experience with 
providing information security training for human rights activists, that training 
is often designed towards the individual user rather than as a collective project 
that considers the enabling social structures needed for secure communication to 
become an integrated activist practice. This speaks to the shortcomings identi-
fied by Ruppert, Isin and Bigo (2017), with the common atomism prevalent in 
views on data politics and the onus on immediacy that pervades responses. That 
is, the view of the internet as addressed to atomized individuals who then need to 
protect themselves against the immediacy of a threat engendered. This view, they 
argue, is based on the ontological premise of “hyper-individualism” in which the 
addressee is “the atomized subject whose data is individualized rather than under-
stood as a product of collective relations with other subjects and technologies” 
(Ruppert, Isin and Bigo 2017, 3) Policy reform advocacy, meanwhile, does not 
address individual users but, nevertheless, the specific audience of policymakers 
and thereby erects different boundaries, based on issue-specific expertise and dis-
course (Hintz and Brown 2017).
Such approaches, Aouragh et al. contend, configure modes of delegation that 
actually come to negate possibilities for overlaps between different justice claims 
and reproduce “a perhaps unintended hierarchy based on traditional models of 
production” (2015, 216). Drawing on their research with “tech justice” activists, 
they therefore argue for connecting security engineers with the language of collec-
tive action within a political project and, more broadly, for dissolving the perceived 
divisions of justice claims that persist between these activist camps.
Building on this ambition, we want to further advance the debate based on our 
research with “social justice” activists by suggesting a broader framework that may 
allow us to develop a more integrated understanding of data collection in relation 
to social justice agendas. As outlined above, the terms upon which resistance to sur-
veillance has predominantly been approached have placed data debates within the 
parameters of particular expert communities, namely technology activists and digital 
rights groups. This techno-legal framing of resistance, although partly dictated by 
the activist opportunity structures currently available, limits our understanding of the 
implications of these data-driven practices that underpin contemporary surveillance 
and dilutes their politicized nature. The consequences of this limitation include, 
for example, a relatively uncritical perspective among digital rights advocacy com-
munities on “targeted” surveillance which is often seen as a benign alternative to 
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indiscriminate “mass” surveillance but abstracts from the experiences of minority 
communities and political activists as typically targeted groups (Gürses, Kundnani 
and Van Hoboken 2016). Further, this limited perspective may lead to a perception 
of industry surveillance as largely politically benevolent and the turn to the tech 
companies of Silicon Valley as our “protectors” in the counter-surveillance strug-
gle, armed with PR-friendly encryption tools. Moreover, a techno-legal framing of 
the issue risks masking the struggles through which people come to be governed 
by data (Ruppert, Isin and Bigo 2017). As Gürses, Kundnani and Van Hoboken 
(2016) suggest, these problematic positions point to the need for a political analy-
sis as our starting point for countering the systems of data collection and use that 
have been developed; one that simultaneously broadens the discussion beyond the 
narrow confines of techno-legal parameters and speaks to the concerns of activists 
across technology and social justice camps.
As part of such an analysis, we advance the notion of “data justice” as a way 
to highlight the place of data-driven surveillance, and related big data decision-
making and governance, in conceptions of social justice. Whilst recognizing the 
procedural inference in the term “justice”, by data justice we are referring to the 
implications that data-driven processes at the core of surveillance capitalism have 
for the pursuit of substantive social and economic justice claims. This, we sug-
gest, encompasses both the targeting of surveillance against activists leading to 
repression, self-censorship and chilling-effects in the organization, mobilization, 
and pursuit of social justice as well as the role of data collection in (new) forms of 
governance that shape society in line with particular political and economic agen-
das. As Andrejevic (2015) has outlined, the nature of the surveillance programmes 
revealed in the Snowden leaks are intimately linked to a system of economics and 
a state-corporate interest not necessarily in individual people, but in detecting and 
predicting patterns, profiling and sorting groups. Big data surveillance brings up 
issues not just of privacy, but also of social sorting and preemption (Lyon 2014) and 
is generative of new power relations and politics (Ruppert, Isin and Bigo 2017). 
Although much more difficult to ascertain in concrete terms, this has significant 
implications for people’s lives and the society they will live in. Data justice as a 
framework is intended to guide a research trajectory and types of activity that bring 
out and underscore this politics of data and the implications of these practices for 
substantive social justice claims. This is obviously a bigger task beyond our cur-
rent scope, but here we can highlight some questions that have already planted the 
seeds for further illumination and advancement of our understanding of resistance 
to datafication in this regard.
Whilst “data justice” as a concept and framework is still in nascent form, 
different interpretations are being advanced that share a concern with outlining 
data in relation to structural inequality and social (in)justice (Heeks 2017; Heeks 
and Renken 2016; Hintz, Dencik and Wahl-Jorgensen 2018; Newman 2015; 
Taylor 2017). Grassroots groups and social justice campaigns have started to 
apply this more comprehensive approach to datafication and, in some cases, have 
done so within a “data justice” framework. For example, the Detroit Digital 
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Justice Coalition (http://detroitdjc.org) has worked with local residents in iden-
tifying potential social harms that may emerge through the collection of citizen 
data by public institutions. In particular, they are concerned with the crimi-
nalization and surveillance of low-income communities, people of colour and 
other targeted groups. As a result, they have developed a set of guidelines for 
equitable practices in collecting, disseminating and using data in relation to social 
and historical context. The US/Canadian Environmental Data & Governance 
Initiative, EDGI (https://envirodatagov.org/), has preserved vulnerable scien-
tific data in the aftermath of the US election of Trump in 2016 and, in the 
process, has developed a deeper understanding of the politics, generation, own-
ership and uses of environmental data. Their perspective on “environmental data 
justice” “brings together the concerns of the emergent area of data justice with 
the long-standing principles of environmental justice” (https://envirodatagov.
org/towards-edj-statement/). The local administration in Barcelona, mean-
while, has been actively developing alternative infrastructures, with an emphasis 
on decentralized technologies that are designed for more citizen-led and partici-
patory platforms and where ownership of data belongs to the citizens. Such ideas 
are also prevalent in the growing “platform cooperativism” movement that sets 
out to challenge the dominance of contemporary platform capitalism in order 
to create a fairer future of work in a digital economy by building on the values 
of cooperativism.
These sorts of initiatives speak partly to the framework we are proposing here 
by reframing data debates to consider how digital infrastructures and data-driven 
processes have implications for broader society beyond individual privacy. We 
want to further progress this agenda by suggesting that “data justice” can provide 
a conceptual foundation for exploring how mass data collection implicates differ-
ent understandings of social justice as well as a potential action-building tool for 
addressing such implications. This requires us to further examine the ideological 
basis of data-driven processes, situating this form of governance within a political 
agenda that extends to particular conceptions of society and the demarcation of 
“good” and “bad” citizens. Furthermore, it leads us to scrutinize the interests and 
power relations at play in ‘datafied’ societies that enfranchise some and disenfran-
chise others, highlighting also forms of exclusion and discrimination. Moreover, 
it requires us to stipulate how society is and ought to be organized in relation 
to digital infrastructures – on social, political, economic, cultural and ecological 
terms – that can consider and develop the meaning of justice in this context. This 
includes questions of how to think about notions such as security, autonomy, 
dignity, fairness and sustainability in a data-driven society and make us ask what, 
for example, the implications are for community cohesion and discrimination; for 
welfare and inequality; for workers’ rights; or for the environment, for poverty, 
and for conflict. Most importantly, advancing this agenda transforms data-driven 
processes from a special-interest “issue” into a core dimension of social, political, 
cultural, ecological and economic justice, and thus responds to the central position 
of data in contemporary capitalism.
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By advancing the framework of “data justice” our point is to illustrate how 
the relationship between political activism and surveillance is not one in which 
activists are only at risk for expressing dissent, but one in which the very infra-
structures of surveillance (big data) have direct consequences for the social justice 
claims they are seeking to make. Data justice integrates the concerns with the 
collection, use and analysis of data with activists’ agendas, not just to protect 
themselves, but also to achieve the social change they want to make. As such, this 
may offer an opportunity to bridge the current “disconnect” we have found in 
anti-surveillance resistance and provide resources for a political and social move-
ment that can engage with data debates beyond techno-legal solutionism. It may 
also contribute to the call for a conception of data subjects more in relation to 
rights-claiming citizens (Ruppert, Isin and Bigo 2017). This, we would argue, is 
urgently needed in the shift towards data-driven forms of governance rooted in 
surveillance capitalism.
Conclusion
The need to engage with data politics in a way that situates concerns with 
data-driven processes within a broader framework of social justice is becoming 
increasingly prevalent, and is being approached from a number of different angles.6 
In this chapter we have addressed this topic by looking specifically at attitudes 
and practices pertaining to resisting data-driven surveillance. The Snowden leaks 
constitute an important moment for exploring these questions as they provided 
substantial evidence for the extent of the collection and use of digitally-generated 
data (or big data) and illustrated the intricate relationship between the infrastruc-
tures of our everyday technologies and emerging forms of governance and control. 
Pertinent debate, activity and advocacy has flourished in response to the Snowden 
leaks, opening up opportunities for many existing technology- and digital rights-
concerned communities to mobilize, expand and influence political processes and 
social attitudes. However, due to the dominant political culture and opportunity 
structures available to active participants in the resistance against surveillance, 
debates on data collection and use, and critical engagement with data politics more 
broadly, have struggled to move beyond the participation of particular expert com-
munities. A concern with digital surveillance, in this context, has come to be 
viewed as a “specialist” issue in which achieving “tech justice” is predominantly 
centred on technical and legal solutions relating to privacy and data protection. We 
have seen this in our research on attitudes and practices amongst political activists 
engaged in broader social justice issues, from environmentalism to labour justice to 
anti-discrimination, who have predominantly come to view data-driven surveil-
lance as an issue that does not substantially feature on their agenda.
Rather, what emerges in the broader ecology of civil society pursuits of justice, is 
a kind of “disconnect” between those concerned with technology issues and those 
concerned with social justice issues as two separate camps. Of course, we recognize 
that this comes partly from the necessity to set priorities and focus on particular 
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topics when activist energies and resources are frequently limited. However, we 
argue that the nature of surveillance revealed in the Snowden leaks speaks to an 
urgent need to broaden the parameters for how data collection and use has been 
understood and discussed that implicates activists across the tech and social justice 
camps, collectively. The ability to monitor, record and store digital transactions 
on a massive scale creates an environment that substantially limits the possibilities 
for dissent and protest, whether through self-censorship, chilling-effects or active 
repression. Moreover, however, it constitutes a form of governance that is rooted 
in and simultaneously advances particular social, economic, and political agendas 
that enfranchise some whilst disenfranchising others, and prioritizes certain ways of 
organizing society at the expense of others.
By introducing the notion of “data justice” in this chapter we want to con-
tribute to the shift and broadening of our understanding of the role of data-driven 
processes in contemporary society. By advancing data justice as a framework for 
debate and research, we want to set the parameters for a discussion on datafica-
tion that can illuminate the implications for social justice, both in terms of the 
conditions for communicating autonomously and practicing dissent as well as the 
social and economic (in)justices that are produced by this form of governance (and, 
therefore, what might be the possible alternatives). Referring to “data justice” 
recognizes the political economy of the system that underpins the possibilities for 
extensive data collection and use, whilst drawing attention to the political agenda 
that is driving its implementation. This, we argue, comes to impact on political 
activists and their pursuits of social justice in significant ways and provides an impe-
tus for a broad collective movement to engage in pertinent data-related debates. 
Such a collective approach is needed, we suggest, in light of a shift to surveillance 
capitalism in which the collection, use and analysis of our data increasingly comes 
to shape the opportunities and possibilities available to us and the kind of society 
we live in.
Notes
The research for this chapter was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council as 
part of the project “Digital Citizenship and Surveillance Society: UK State-Media-Citizen 
relations after the Snowden leaks”.
1 Note that a version of this was originally published in Big Data & Society.
2 The chapter is based on research carried out for the collaborative research project “Digital 
Citizenship and Surveillance Society: UK State-Media-Citizen relations after the Snowden 
leaks” at Cardiff University funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, the first 
comprehensive review of the implications of the Snowden revelations from a UK perspective.
3 Details of the revelations can be found at The Snowden Archive: http://www.cjfe.org/
snowden
4 We were later informed that CAGE has also significantly changed their communication 
infrastructure, but this development happened after our interview period.
5 Interestingly, also, CAGE participated for the first time in the large hacker convention 
Chaos Communication Congress in December 2015.
6 See, for example, the ‘Data Justice Conference’ that took place in Cardiff in the United 
Kingdom in May 2018: https://datajusticelab.org/data-justice-conference/
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THESES ON AUTOMATION  
AND LABOUR
Brett Neilson and Ned Rossiter
Automation has already happened
Never mind the future. Automation has already ripped through the past. From 
medieval robots to the fake chess-playing device that appears in the first of Walter 
Benjamin’s (1969) “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” automata have troubled 
“paired ideas about life and death, nature and manufacture, foreign and familiar” 
(Truitt 2015, 1). As Adelheid Voskuhl notes in Androids in the Enlightenment (2013), 
only in the age of industrial factory production does automation begin to instil the 
fear that modern selves and societies have become indistinguishable from machines. 
Andrew Ure, Charles Babbage, and Karl Marx were the prophets of this anxiety. 
From the spinning jenny to the assembly line of car manufacturing, automation 
tied industrial modernity to the experience and conditions of labour. Global labour 
history has taught us that capitalism appeared as much in the plantation as in the 
factory, and that the worker is as much a slave as a freely contracted individual. We 
learn a similar lesson by considering the power of the machine. In the “Fragment 
on Machines,” Marx (1973, 693) writes:
The science which compels the inanimate limbs of the machinery, by their 
construction, to act purposefully, as an automaton, does not exist in the 
worker’s consciousness, but rather acts upon him through the machine as an 
alien power, as the power of the machine itself.
Here lies a central paradox that repeats itself in studies of automation and labour. 
Automation reduces workers to “conscious linkages” of the machine, making labour 
“a mere abstraction of activity,” but the machine in so far as it comprises an automatic 
system becomes “living active machinery,” a “mighty organism” (692) endowed 
“with consciousness and a will” to minimize human resistance (Marx 1977, 527).
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If, as Ben Trott (2017) advises, we read Marx’s “Fragment on Machines” as 
science fiction, we need to take seriously the suggestion that automation registers 
capital’s ability to absorb and valorize social knowledge and social life, to the point 
that accumulation no longer rests exclusively on the sale and purchase of labour-
power. Now as before, the fear is that automation makes labour redundant. From 
the time of the industrial revolution, debate has raged about the implications of 
automation for employment. Adam Smith (1776) linked machinery to the divi-
sion of labour and emphasized its labour saving capacity. Jean-Baptiste Say (1803) 
was confident about the ability of markets to adjust to the introduction of auto-
mated machinery. In his 1817 text Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, David 
Ricardo (1951, 392) argued that the labour market would adjust to automation but 
recognized that concerns about job displacement were “conformable to the correct 
principles of political economy.” Thomas Malthus (1836) maintained that demand 
dynamics spurred by cheaper production techniques would offset employment loss 
due to automation. Despite historical change, these positions tend to repeat them-
selves whenever the emergence of new automated technologies raises the prospect 
that capital might dispense with labour.
Let us take two twentieth century examples, written in the decades when the 
introduction of the computer was first beginning to change industrial labour pro-
cesses. In Efficiency, Equality and the Ownership of Property, James E. Meade (1964, 
25–26) worried that “new labour required with the new automated machines” 
would be “less than the growth of the labour force plus the labour made redun-
dant by the scrapping of physically worn-out old machinery.” By contrast, Wasily 
Leontief and Faye Duchin (1986) emphasized the possibility for new employment 
to arise in the design, operation, and maintenance of automated technologies. In 
The Future Impact of Automation on Workers, they utilized the input-output model 
of economic analysis to forecast scenarios for the impact of computer-based auto-
mation across different sectors of the U.S. economy through to the year 2000. 
Charting ripple effects across industries by generating coefficients from a series of 
matrices, they concluded that while automation will have negative employment 
effects in sectors such as manufacturing, office work, health, and education, there 
would be inverse effects in sectors such as robotics. In reality, in the years between 
1986 and 2000, the effects of computer-based automation intertwined with those 
of offshoring domestic production from the U.S. and other established industrial 
nations. Notably this same period corresponded to the emergence of East Asia, and 
particularly China, as a site of computer hardware manufacture. In considering the 
effects of automation on labour, we cannot afford to approach, as did Marx when 
he made assumptions to undergird arithmetic proof of his arguments, “the whole 
world of trade as one nation” (Marx 1977, 727).
The tendency of automation to play differently across industries, occupations, 
and nation-states must stay in view today when the integration and extension 
of digital technologies is again at the centre of a defining transformation of life, 
economy, and society. Over recent years, there has been a consistent stream of 
news reports and policy documents forecasting the displacement of labour not only 
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in manufacturing but also in white-collar industries (see, for instance, Frey and 
Osborne 2013, Hoskins 2016, Méda 2016, Regalado 2012). Going beyond Harry 
Braverman’s warnings about deskilling and the separation of manual and mental 
work in Labor and Monopoly Capital (1974), the claim is that the economy will 
not reabsorb these positions according to the familiar model by which new jobs 
emerge in science-based and technological sectors. In other words, the structural 
ascent of workers into higher level tertiary industries and economies hit a peak 
over the last thirty years and is now facing gradual, and in some sectors quite dra-
matic, termination. This has implications beyond the sectors classically affected by 
automation. A substantial displacement of labour will also challenge education and 
training institutions along with health, professional services, food and hospitality, 
and retail sectors if these prognoses on automation eventuate.
How are we to balance this predicted crisis of work against the capacities of 
technologies that drive current developments in automation specific to artificial 
intelligence (AI) and machine learning? A logic of substitution by which the machine 
stands in for the human worker, performing her task in more efficient and less costly 
ways, drives anxieties over labour redundancy. But questions about machines dis-
placing jobs are not just economic matters. They also raise existential and ontological 
issues about the relation between life and mechanisms. At a time when computa-
tional processing has the possibility to generate “autonomous modes of automated 
epistemic production,” we have to ask, with M. Beatrice Fazi (2018, 2), whether 
techniques like machine learning give rise to a radically “alien thought,” quite distinct 
from that of the human mental worker. If we recognize the “possibility of novel 
thought” as “specific to what algorithmic automation is and does” (10), we cannot 
reduce the question of the relation between living labour and the machine to one 
of substitution or simulation. Automated technologies exert a force on the world – 
a force predicated on struggle, on social and technical relations that often enough 
come into conflict, or clash ontologically with the all-too-human predicament of 
labour. What, then, is the politics that emerges from the confrontation with these 
technologies? One can run to the state or embrace the private sector, or indeed rec-
ognize the co-mingling of these entities and move across the two. We prefer instead 
to grapple with the operations of power in pursuit of political analysis and critique 
that engages techniques and practices of world making.
Automation makes futures
We all know the science fiction scenario where robots take over. Perhaps this 
scenario does not eventuate. But what happens if automation takes over future plan-
ning? Automated planning is a branch of knowledge engineering that uses machine 
learning to synthesize computationally “ordered sets of actions that perform a given 
task” (Jiminéz et  al. 2012, 433). Not restricted to the operations of robots and 
unmanned vehicles, these techniques serve up plural scenarios for strategic planning 
in corporate worlds. Promoted on LinkedIn – the purest of social networks, where 
making connections answers only the purpose of making connections – automated 
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scenario planning is a “future governance model” replete with “real-time ongoing 
reviews” and “metrics to drive pragmatic and informed decisions” (Coull 2016). As 
Stefano Harney quips in an interview with Michael Schapira and Jesse Montgomery 
(2017), “most managers have already been replaced by machines . . . We know they 
work not only within the parameters of an algorithm but with its predictions and 
prescriptions. They are only there to implement and call it leadership.”
One influential report predicts that 47 per cent of all U.S. jobs are at risk of 
automation over the next twenty years, with up to 55 per cent of current jobs in 
metropolitan areas expected to disappear (Frey and Osborne 2013). Policy organi-
zations report similar figures for Australia, with estimates of 40 per cent of jobs 
susceptible to automation processes (CEDA 2015). Importantly, Frey and Osborne 
estimate that approximately 30 per cent of jobs in the U.S. will be offshored over 
this same period. Such a dynamic suggests that automation is not exclusively about 
technology replacing human labour, but is rather a transformation accompanied 
by an ongoing complexification of the international division of labour in which 
some human labour forces perform work equivalent to the machine. Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk is perhaps the best-known example of this, where workers 
undertake routine data entry tasks for low wages (Irani 2015). Deutsche Bank chief 
executive John Cryan is particularly blunt in his prognosis of automation in the 
finance sector: “The truthful answer is we won’t need as many people,” he says. “In 
our banks we have people behaving like robots doing mechanical things, tomorrow 
we’re going to have robots behaving like people” (quoted in Noonan 2017).
Cryan’s comment brings full circle the dynamic we registered with respect to 
Marx’s discussion of workers and automation in the “Fragment on Machines.” 
Marx (1973, 693) worried that automation subsumes labour “under the total pro-
cess of the machinery itself,” rendering workers as mere linkages and thus robbing 
them of the human qualities of living labour. The transformation of living labour 
“into a mere living accessory” of machinery, Marx writes, “posits the absorption 
of the labour process in its material character as a mere moment of the realization 
process of capital” (693). Now the inverse of this process unfolds. Having created 
dehumanized workers, capital now replaces them with machines themselves, not 
because machine learning or other techniques of artificial intelligence share the 
human intelligence of living labour but because the latter has been reduced to such 
a level that it can now be artificially emulated, with the implication that we now 
live in a world more stupid than ever. Intelligence has fled the scene, or rather 
been recalibrated within the horizon of engineering and task-driven requirements 
of institution and economy.
No longer is the automation of institutional processes a practice restricted to the 
factory or bank. One could make similar attributions to any number of workplace 
settings, including those supposedly dedicated to “creative” or “intellectual” pro-
duction. The university and higher education sector, for instance, are not immune 
from these transformations. Indeed, they have been part of the vanguard in devel-
opments that collapse the distinction between human and machine. University 
executives devise strategic policy that is indistinguishable from one university to the 
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next. Highly trained academics perform mind-numbing data entry tasks as a core 
component of their teaching workloads. Data analytics on student attention spans 
across course materials determined by template-driven learning objectives drive cur-
riculum design. One can safely surmise that the cognitive autonomy of humans is 
becoming secondary to the vanilla dreams of machine-driven efficiencies.
As already mentioned, part of the discourse on the automation of labour is 
framed within debates on economic globalization and the offshoring of services. 
Automation also provides a precedent for exercises of reshoring. These involve 
the return of productive processes displaced from industrialized nations during the 
golden decades of offshoring. They require labour-eliminating technologies that 
can operate independently of the high labour costs in these countries. The paradig-
matic example of such reshoring is the 2017 opening of an Adidas “speedfactory” 
in the German town of Ansbach. Equipped with “sewbots” and 3D printers that 
take instructions directly from design software, this facility not only allows rapid 
switching between the manufacture of different products but also drastically short-
ens the supply chain. Customers in European markets can access recently (and 
even custom) designed goods more quickly while Adidas cuts transportation costs. 
According to an International Labour Organization report (Chang, Ryanhart, and 
Huynh 2016), such developments threaten 90 per cent of garment and footwear 
jobs in Cambodia and Vietnam. These changes also explain why a return to eight-
eenth century economic technologies like the tariff, whatever its popular political 
appeal, is unlikely to alleviate problems of unemployment in the wealthy world.
The tech-sector has been a key driver in promoting the vision of a future 
without employment, where robots and intelligent systems deliver the utopian 
imaginary of leisure-driven life tasked with perpetual consumption. Reminiscent 
of earlier visions such as those of André Gorz (1980), these scenarios raise questions 
of sustainable business turnover and social reproduction – including the prospect of 
a universal basic income. Advocacy of the social wage is no longer restricted to 
postcapitalist hopefuls or those who agitate for the refusal of work. Championing 
the universal basic income has become de rigueur for tech companies and platform 
capitalists who worry that the “piece work” they dole out will be insufficient to 
sustain or reproduce the precarious labour forces upon which they depend.
A dystopian narrative is a perhaps more pervasive one in which the near future 
is underscored by enormous technological disruption. The masses are cast adrift 
in a world without work, where automation, as Sigfried Giedion (1948) claimed 
of mechanization, takes command. Under these conditions, the security of lib-
eral democratic governance becomes a footnote in the history of machine-driven 
economies. As Isabell Lorey (2015) notes, governing through insecurity becomes 
the norm. Finding a path beyond the “new catastrophism” (Urry 2016, 33–53) that 
haunts such future scenarios requires attention to empirical conditions within data 
industries at the centre of digital automation.
A countervailing claim envisages the reabsorption of labour through other means. 
Questioning the accuracy of reports declaring the termination of employment for 
many, critics from fields such as science and technology studies consider automation 
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in a longer historical cycle that has more often resulted in the development of new 
forms of work (Wajcman 2017). Feminist scholars have noted the ways in which 
modern technological development liberated women from the bonded labour of 
domestic chores, enabling entry into new roles in workforces transformed by auto-
mation (Huws 2014). Where left-wing variations of accelerationism (Williams and 
Srnicek 2016) seek to reconcile machine-driven economies with the challenges 
of living within a capitalist world system, Nick Land’s (2014) nihilistic vision of 
separate continental spaces for variously educated workforces hit by automation 
dramatizes anxiety around Ballardian and ultimately racialized imaginaries. It’s no 
surprise that Land has become the poster boy for alt-right in recent times.
The prospect of an abolition of labour and arrival of cybernetic socialism has 
undergone undulations of enthusiasm among the left since the 1950s (for a trade 
press account of such scenarios, see Greenfield 2017, 192–193). More recently, a 
left variation of accelerationism pins post-work futures and the liberation of time to 
computational advances in automation and an intensification of capital accumula-
tion. The elimination of work envisaged by critics such as Nick Srnicek and Alex 
Williams (2016) accompanies a repurposing of the means of production to invent 
postcapitalist futures. We are far less enthusiastic about such visions. Not because 
we don’t share some of their sentiments or dream of a better world, but rather we 
see no rapid erosion of labour on global scales accompanying the latest wave of 
alarm surrounding automation.
To claim that automation makes futures is to refuse this alarm in ways that reg-
ister the capacity for automation to make multiple futures. It is to reject the vision 
of accelerationism as much as countervailing claims that automation has no political 
consequence. In the face of the predictive power of data analytics, it is to reclaim the 
future in the name of uncertainty and surprise. It is to restore to politics the virtues 
of patience and expectation. Finally, it is to recognize the generative and destructive 
potentiality of automation asserted not only in opposition to the qualities of labour 
but also across myriad spaces in different and not necessarily consistent ways.
Automation needs data
The agglomeration of data is central to developments in AI and machine learning. 
Systems complexity is as good as the volume of data drawn on as agents in the 
design of computational parameters. But data are not simply given. To the extent 
that data have a referential dimension, their provenance lies with the technical 
devices and parametric designs from which they stem. Managed and amplified by 
software applications like mySQL and Hadoop, the neo-positivist fallacy assumed 
of data by academics, administrators, and executives alike posits the referent as 
external to the operation. The creation of datasets, let alone the smoothing out 
of frictions, contingencies, and differences between them, requires labour, even 
if this labour itself submits to automation. Fatigue is a continuum across the work 
of humans and machines. Performance measures index economic value calculated 
in relation to the optimization of efficiency. Data, like the human body, never 
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rest so much as signal their availability to engines of extraction. A latency defines 
moments of temporary suspension: from retrieval to task, the body of data learns 
the lesson of relevance. Consigned to storage and the vulnerability of the archive – 
this is what awaits both data and life deemed without purpose.
Critical data studies have taught us that data are never raw (Gitelman 2013). But 
how are data “cooked” within the circumstances of their collection, storage, and 
transmission? Such questions are vital for assessing the data politics that animate 
current automation. AI and machine learning use recursive techniques to update 
datasets in ways that allow them to evolve and improve their functionality. While 
statisticians and early data scientists worked with “sample” datasets, the evolution 
of so-called big data means that automation can now incorporate massive amounts 
of data in all their granularity, nuance, and detail. Big data analytics is all about the 
cut (Amoore and Piotukh 2015). Without partitions, there is no analysis. Context, 
or what we refer to as storage and the archive, jeopardizes the authority of deci-
sion. The algorithms that make decisions around the allocation of resources related 
to urban planning, for instance, need a constant supply of data. But not just any 
data will do. Data must be groomed for machine learning. There is a wide variety 
of techniques employed to make data ready for processing: selection, formatting, 
cleaning, scaling, decomposition, aggregation. Evelyn Ruppert (2017) refers to the 
deployment of these methods as the “crafting” of automation, emphasizing the role 
of metadata (or data about data) in establishing practices to secure trust in data. In 
recent times, the automation of such data preparation tasks through the establish-
ment of data quality and governance rules has become a new front of extraction. 
Automation prompts more automation.
Xerox (2015) corporation invests in the continuity of craft and automation: 
“We believe that craft and automation are not opposites but complementary 
forces,” declares a company publication. Here we see the ethos of the guild and 
the arts and craft movement celebrated by William Morris updated for twenty-first 
century corporate culture. But whatever efforts of skill and care are required for 
data integration exercises that resist the leverage introduced by metadata, the shap-
ing of data is never merely a technical exercise. No dataset is neutral. Data absorb 
the social biases of the contexts in which they are generated and collected. The 
much commented-upon nexus of data and race is only the most obvious example 
of this. Algorithms are building new infrastructures of racism – for instance, in 
policing or credit rating. Consider the way financial institutions draw data from 
“racialized sources” such as local public records, social networking companies, 
academic records, mobile phone usage, non-financial payment histories, and even 
psychometric testing to construct credit ratings for the “unbanked” or those with-
out credit records or files (Aitken 2017). Whether automated or human, the work 
of crafting data occurs within institutional settings and cultures that bind integra-
tion and analytics to economy and space.
Data analysis may turn nerds into celebrities, but the sociality of training and 
professionalisation of skills peculiar to the nineteenth century guild movement is 
nowhere to be found in the data extraction industries. As demonstrated by the 
194 Brett Neilson and Ned Rossiter
Cambridge Analytica–Facebook controversy of early 2018, the chief motive for 
corporations in the data economy is to decouple service from oversight by reg-
ulatory authorities. Once capital accumulation is unburdened of the subtractive 
imposition of state taxation regimes and restrictive legislation on data privacy, the 
economy and spatialization of data are free to play to the highest bidder. Politics 
becomes the art of the deal, not just the negotiation of distraction or the mobiliza-
tion of preemption.
The launch of OpenAI in 2015 by Silicon Valley entrepreneurs to benefit 
“humanity as a whole” and guard against the “existential threat” of artificial intel-
ligence is another exercise in cynical opportunism moonlighting as a data sharing 
exercise for all until the IPO, when the winner takes all. The question to ask of this 
organization is not about the ownership of the algorithms that run AI and machine 
learning platforms but the ownership of the datasets on which such platforms run. 
Data have become a kind of currency (“data is the new oil”). This is one reason 
why making data “open” or free to share has become a kind of evangelistic move-
ment, crossing activist groups, software projects, and government institutions. As 
Nathaniel Tkacz (2012, 399) argues, such openness “actively works against the 
development of a political language – if we take the political to extend beyond 
questions of just governance to the circulation and distribution of power and force.”
The deep imbrication of openness with ideals of political liberalism gives rise to 
hopes that making data publicly available will somehow generate citizens who use 
that data to inform action and debate. We are less hopeful that open data politics 
will produce such subjects. Nonetheless, a subject persists no matter the force of 
automation and AI, which will never be total as long as human life remains. This 
is a subject produced in and through struggle. At stake is a political subjectivity 
that holds no default allegiance to the liberal democratic state and its protocols of 
expression. The political subject we speak of here does not await authorisation 
to act. Nor does it celebrate its own right to have rights, to privacy for example. 
Instead, this subject seeks to understand how regimes of property, both public 
and private, limit the exercise of freedom. This subject does not shun technol-
ogy. Rather, it subsists in a world of technical objects, collectively directing the 
machine ensemble in ways that contest and modulate the interiority of algorith-
mic decisions with the force of the outside. Data politics are not exclusive to the 
claiming of rights so much as the production of subjectivity within environments 
whose data architectures register conflicts between the politics of decentralization-
centralization and the impossibility of pure distribution.
Aside from questions about what data are made open, how they are made 
available, and how they are used, the issue of how such openness leaves undis-
turbed (or even supports) proprietary regimes of data ownership and control needs 
to be broached. Opening data makes no challenge or difference to the specula-
tive economies that surround the transfer of data from one party to another in 
corporate worlds. Indeed, European Commission research (Berends et al. 2017, 7) – 
itself outsourced to consulting firm Capgemini – emphasizes how private com-
panies “transform open data from raw material into a service or product.” This is 
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the business model of open source software companies. Little surprise that gov-
ernments and intergovernmental organizations celebrate the passage of open data 
into private projects when it assists in reporting economic activity and growth. 
The requirement of open data to conform to standardized formats in order to 
be machine readable may establish what Felix Stalder considers “an important 
precondition for implementing the power of algorithms in a democratic manner” 
(2018, 167). We are more circumspect on this point. Certainly, questions of access 
and collective contribution to the production of a digital commons is facilitated 
by structures that support open data but, as Stalder goes on to note, examples such 
as the rise of the sharing economy demonstrate how labour enters a race to the 
bottom once open data become a commercial resource. In this sense, whoever sets 
the standards rules the world. The expansion of a data commons is not only a com-
mercial precondition for data exploitation; technologies of automation also benefit 
from a deeper reservoir of data from which to calibrate their logics of operation 
(pattern recognition, preemption, prediction, and so forth).
Whatever openness or ownership protocols surround data, we need also to ask 
questions about the infrastructures that support that data. Key among these are data 
centres, whose capillaries of cables port data across racks of servers and cages of 
demarcation. Aside from a skeleton staff of technicians, security, and maintenance 
personnel, these are sites emptied of labour with labour distributed on the client 
end. While automation in the data centre requires data, there is not any great need 
for on-site workers. In this regard, the infrastructural object of the data centre offers 
one materialization and systemic instantiation of how automation scrambles and 
recasts regimes of labour. Not least it registers how data politics intersect with geo-
politics, scattering labour forces connected at the client end of data infrastructures 
across political territories while also generating their own forms of territoriality and 
institutional power that parallel and rival the Westphalian architectures that haunt 
visions of statehood and internationalism.
Promoting the benefits of AI and machine learning, one recent tech-report 
notes: “There is also potential for AI technology to automate functions carried out 
by IT operations teams. Machine learning offers a way to manage infrastructure 
and react quickly to faults without human intervention” (Finnegan 2016). When 
human presence is marginal to the work of automation, the material form of the 
data society is not ipso facto one that has eradicated conditions of exploitation from 
the orbit of human existence and life in general. We all know how dependent 
platform economies are on the sociality of engagement. Whether it is the gang of 
FANG (Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, Google) coming out of Silicon Valley or the 
AI testing of facial recognition technologies for population management in China 
and internet services of Tencent and Alibaba, “participation” is the command 
action of exploitation required of humanity in the economy of data. Whether 
begrudgingly or with joy, participation is the primary technique of governing 
populations without purpose. Once agglomerated in datasets and made actionable 
by the instruction of code, the injunction to participate becomes secondary to the 
automation of operations. Data do not respond to interpellation.
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Recognizing such participation as a front of exploitation is a first step to addressing 
and acting upon the discrepancy between living labour and the organization of social 
cooperation that is characteristic of the economic and social arrangements that spur 
capital valorization and accumulation in the contemporary world. Harnessing a cri-
tique of automated modes of production should not be something undertaken by an 
intellectual elite or vanguard. Indeed, the work of critique is just as much another pas-
sage of supply absorbed with indifference by the engines of data capitalism. Critique 
thus holds a recursive function that does nothing to transform the assumption of 
power, even if it retains a power to transform modes of cognition and political prac-
tice within the milieu of the social. This is the doubleness of critique: the production 
of value oblivious to the sign, and a signal of possibility and refusal to submit. The 
dependency of automation on data binds the machine world to the insubordination 
of labour even once automation learns the script of auto-generation.
Automation intensifies extraction
How then do data intercede between labour and capital? If from the viewpoint of 
media, automation presents the growing ubiquity of systems that appear autono-
mous or sovereign, from the perspective of capital it creates a scenario of increased 
dependence on so-called externalities. This predicament presents the paradox, or, 
better, relations of inverse proportionality, for which we must account in position-
ing labour with respect to automation. Automation is never bored, even if it is 
boring. Automation depletes the world of drama while it performs its routines of 
task work. Automation stages a vision of the world in which data is king, where the 
centre of gravity is the termination of labour. The seeming autonomy of automa-
tion instantiates the command of “sovereign media” in the realm of infrastructural 
territories (Adilkno 1998). At stake in such sovereignty is neither Hobbesian tacit 
consent nor Schmittian exception. Sovereign media are not about the projection 
of power as a search for truth, justice, or the capacity to coerce, but concern “only 
data which can be taken apart and reassembled in trillions of bytes” (Lovink and 
Richardson 2001). Sovereign media assume power through oblivion to the out-
side. This is also their weakness. Relations of dependency ruin the machine dream 
of perpetual accumulation. This is the revenge of labour.
In presenting capital with new frontiers of accumulation, data offer capital an 
outside to prospect and drawn upon. Here we can refer to Rosa Luxemburg’s The 
Accumulation of Capital (2003), which argues that accumulation requires something 
more than a society composed of capitalists and workers. If, for Luxemburg, this 
outside comprised non-capitalist territories that colonialism could annex, the fronts 
offered by data are more profuse. Most of us are already familiar with the naming of 
these edges as economic sectors: finance, logistics, manufacturing, retail, security, 
healthcare, and urban “solutions.”
The metaphor of data as a raw resource is ubiquitous enough, present whenever 
we hear talk of data mining. It is important to highlight the moment of extraction 
that this metaphor registers, even as we question that data can ever be raw and 
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plumb the ruptures as much as the continuities between resource extraction and 
data mining. As many have pointed out, what is extracted from the resource of data 
is not naturally given wealth but forms of social cooperation. Just think of the data 
extracted from social media use or the movement of pedestrians through a city. As in 
the cases of resource mining, monocultural agriculture, or other more traditionally 
extractive activities, such extraction also has its productive sides. Farming, milling, 
and modelling are metaphors often used to describe processes that turn such data 
into usable products for AI and machine learning. Nonetheless, we must also analyze 
the moment of extraction, since it is in this moment that the arrangements of data, 
labour, and capital specific to the current practices of automation become apparent.
Analyzing the situation in this way furnishes us conceptual tools with which to 
distinguish present frontiers of automation from those pertaining in the industrial 
(and national) moment of capitalism. In the factory, capital directly organized the 
materiality of productive cooperation and the introduction of the fixed capital of 
automation subsumed the variable capital of labour and subjected it to processes of 
intensification. Labour increasingly gravitated toward a state of equilibrium with the 
machine. Under present conditions of automation, capital is essentially indifferent 
to the relations of cooperation upon which it draws. Labour remains a condition 
of possibility for capital, but capital does not directly organize the relations of social 
cooperation upon which data economies rest. Consider the collection of data about 
users by social media companies, the financial hedging based on the slicing up of 
debts held by subprime mortgagees, or the ways in which the logistical coordination 
of supply chains push back costs to producers who can use whatever methods they 
like to keep prices low. In each of these instances, there is a moment of extraction 
enabled by the production and transfer of data. Clearly, modes of social organization 
are diverse across the different scenarios and practices that generate data for capital’s 
engines. This diversity poses challenges for political organization, which in the cur-
rent conjuncture necessarily grapples with the heterogenization of labour, across 
spatial parameters and legal differences as much as forms of insecurity and precarity 
that challenge the employment relations that prevailed in industrial modernity.
Automation amplifies abstraction. No longer can labour assume the possibility 
to enter a room to negotiate conditions of work and recompense for the toil of 
bodies and brains. There is no authority to arbitrate when automation glides on 
zero-hour contract jobs. No doubt, there are still unions with varying degrees of 
interventionist power – organized labour forces in the maritime, warehousing, 
and transport industries are among those most able to claim victories in disputes 
over conditions. But once data are captured, the automation of accumulation 
proceeds apace, absorbing and valorizing social knowledge and life in ways that 
extend way beyond delimited workplace relations. The classical repertoire of 
organization and protest no longer aligns with contemporary modes of capital 
accumulation. #Deletefacebook only generates data for Twitter. The boycott 
becomes just another means of capture. Even those Uber workers who use the 
app to organize makeshift stop-works or go-slows are bound to the data routines 
that make such assembly possible.
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Sabotage seems an attractive possibility in these situations. But sabotage doesn’t 
necessarily constitute a moment of organization adequate to new conditions, it 
just blocks the conduits for a while, spurring workarounds and securitizations on 
the part of capital. Likewise, the classical strike is not an effective weapon for 
labour against the distributed architectures and automated agents of data valori-
zation. There is no there there, even if the infrastructures of capital are entirely 
concrete. The question of organizational form is key here. We must confront these 
conditions if we want to invent modes of labour organization that are adequate to 
automation and economies of data extraction.
Only by probing the ruptures and contradictions of capital within systems 
of data extraction can sites of struggle – protocological, social, legal, topo-
logical – manifest as conditions of possibility for new forms and techniques of 
organizing. A new conceptual language immanent to technical operations has 
the potential to align the politics of organization with the ongoing conflicts of 
extraction and exploitation. We need to recognize, for instance, that the frac-
tion of capital that “unlocks value” from high frequency financial trading does 
not seek to organize the future productive activities upon which automated 
financial trades hedge. We also need to understand how productive processes in 
factories or transport hubs that are driven to the bottom by automated routines 
of logistical coordination. Similarly, the fraction of capital that automates using 
data generated by shoppers, patients, or social media users does not directly 
organize patterns of behaviour among these subjects. Rather, capital extracts a 
quota of value produced within these relations. Extraction, in this sense, names 
the forms and practices of valorization and exploitation that materialize when 
operations of capital encounter patterns of human cooperation and sociality 
external to them.
If data centres are the automated mills that enable such extraction, we have to 
ask questions about the displacement of the human from this machinery of capital. 
One way to characterize the social cooperation from which capital creates value 
by extracting data is to say it involves the “production of humans by humans” 
as opposed to the production of commodities in the industrial factory (Marazzi 
2005). The production of subjectivity and forms of life are increasingly central 
to capitalist valorization. If we introduce automation to this scenario, it becomes 
tempting to view the frontiers of such valorization as producing old battle lines 
between the human and machine: humans cooperate to make value and machines 
extract that value as data.
We would do better to heed Félix Guattari’s (2011) notion of the machinic 
assemblage, which brings humans and nonhumans into dynamic interaction on a 
single ontological plane. In the present wave of automation, media may assume a 
sovereign prerogative, but only because they are shackled to their environments. 
This is the crucial difference between automation and mechanization. We know 
this from cybernetics. Automated technologies are not machines that do the same 
thing every time. Like kinetic sculptures, the making of which provides one of 
the most dynamic fields for the critique of current automation, they operate by 
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interacting with their surroundings. We must further explore the nexus of media 
and environment to position data infrastructures in their geopolitical as much as 
their natural settings.
Automation adapts to environments
The informatic machines that drive today’s automation are different creatures 
from the thermodynamic machines that populated the nineteenth century fac-
tory. Sure, digital technologies consume electricity and other kinds of power – in 
vast amounts when aggregated or observed in the economies of scale created by 
data centres. These machines also produce their own forms of waste, including 
heat, noise, and carbon dioxide. This energy consumption and waste produc-
tion can never be forgotten when considering the relation of computer-based 
automation to the environment, as numerous practitioners of green media stud-
ies (Cubitt 2017; Miller and Maxwell 2012) remind us. Yet digital technologies 
run on the fantasy that they leave no trace in the atmosphere. As Alexander 
Galloway (2018) puts it, “the essence of the informatic machine is found in form, 
not energy or presence.” From this perspective, the precedent for digitally based 
automation lies not in the spinning jenny as much as the Jacquard loom, which 
introduced patterns into mechanized weaving through information printed on 
cardboard ribbons – a version of the punch cards used in computing well into the 
1970s. The computer purports to transcend its body and environment, to occupy 
a realm of abstraction that negotiates relations of exchange, differentiation, and 
equivalence. How do we understand this claim to autonomy, the computer’s 
desire to be free of its environment?
No matter how urgent it may be in the age of the Anthropocene, moralizing 
about energy and waste can only take us part way towards answering this question. 
Automated technologies undeniably interact with their environments in thermo-
dynamic ways. They also rely on their environments as sources of information, as 
the very basis of their so-called autonomy. Automation is not a mechanized rou-
tine that performs the same action over and again. Contrary to visions that paint 
current transformations as updated versions of some old industrial revolution, we 
no longer live in Charlie Chaplin’s Modern Times. Rather, automation lives by 
adapting to its environments, even if only in input-output ways mediated by pat-
terns of machine learning.
Media as environment define societies of automation. As German media phi-
losopher Erich Hörl (2017, 9) maintains, environmentality is the emergent mode 
of governmentality in which media are capable of self-organization. Literary theo-
rist and historian of cybernetics N. Katherine Hayles (2017) extends this baseline 
of computational control in her study of the “cognitive nonconscious” to examine 
automated traffic systems in Los Angeles where algorithms, processors, and data-
bases extract patterns and modify operations in response to changing externalities. 
Such theoretical insights bear on a study of how automated technologies govern or 
displace labour within manufacturing and service industries.
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We also find a key signal here in the vulnerability of environmentality as an 
emergent mode of governance. The backup of data across facilities clustered in a 
region or dispersed across a global geography of infrastructure tells us not just that 
duplication makes data secure, but also that failure is a component part of designing 
environments receptive to contingency. In seeking to close the disruptive force of 
externalities, data centres embody the core concept of “noise” trawled over in the 
renowned Macy conferences on cybernetics running from after World War II and 
finishing in 1960. Organized as informal conversations and published in a series 
of proceedings, an extraordinary range of figures representing the cutting-edge of 
research in disciplines including mathematics, biology, architecture, anthropology, 
medicine, communications, psychiatry, and linguistics attended the Macy confer-
ences. Reading across the proceedings of these years (Pias 2003), it is striking how 
preoccupied the debates were with the constitutive role of noise or feedback as 
both a reflexive and recursive operation within cybernetic systems. While never 
articulated as such, we can now understand this fascination as an emergent recog-
nition of environment as a complex of relations that govern and make operative 
communication and cognition, reproduction and dissemination.
Understanding the environmentality of automation in this way gives us a new 
angle on the relation of labour to digital technologies. Usually labour seems far 
too human-centred a category to populate arguments about the urgencies of 
environmental change. Insofar as automating technologies are nonhuman agents, 
they share something with other nonhuman actors such as animals, plants, and 
rocks. Not surprisingly, there is no shortage of claims that automation benefits the 
environment, either by making production leaner (a claim that forgets the energy 
burnt and waste emitted by data infrastructures) or through the automation of 
environmental control – energy monitoring systems and the like. Machines and 
nature ally against the productive vanities of human labour. But if we understand 
environment as the noise of automation, we situate it, like labour, as a constitu-
tive outside of automating systems. Far from alienating labour from the world of 
nature and thus inverting the Lockean schema by which labour turns nature into 
property, we need to consider how labour fits into the environment in ways that 
do not reduce the latter to a resource for exploitation. Environment is not only 
nature. For this reason, we find Edward Burtynsky’s (2006) aestheticization of 
manufactured landscapes more compelling testaments to the challenges of environ-
mentality than celebrations of actors and networks that fix agency on objects such 
as mushrooms that might fend off the end of the world (Tsing 2015). Automation 
needs a politics that questions survivalism. The panoramic views of human-altered 
landscapes that sweep across Burtynsky’s film are just one way of registering the 
aesthetics of automation.
Automation fails
“Fuck content,” writes Michael Rock (2013) in an eponymous essay that cel-
ebrates the designer’s purview to shape. We might as well take this as a mantra 
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for automated aesthetics. Just think of the personalized social media feed, an auto-
mated object arranging updates and info, viewpoints and videos. What counts is 
the form. Whether the content is hate speech, fake news, schlock, or banality, 
the feed serves it up just the same, at least until other automated systems detect-
ing porn and other vices “recognize objectionable parts by seeing a sizable mass 
of them in order to infer their relations” (Steyerl 2017, 36). Once the assembly of 
masses on the street prompted anxiety on the part of authorities. Nowadays spikes 
in data draw the attention of algorithms in search of irregularities. We also see 
the triumph of form in Snapchat’s face filters, so enamoured by bored teenagers. 
It’s all about how the doggy ears, flower crown, or rainbow vomit automatically 
adjust to the selfie layered below. The Viola-Jones facial recognition algorithm is 
the real star, not the adolescent indulging the narcissism of facial metamorphosis. 
Machine vision formalizes the world as an algorithmic topology from which a 
variety of contents – trackable objects, readable numbers, or parseable text – can be 
extracted. As Jacques Rancière (2004) reminds us, aesthetics is never purely about 
beauty or style, but inherently political in that they determine who gets to speak 
and who remains silent, what gets visualized and what remains invisible. Beyond 
the logic of representation is the politics of operation.
Yet the politics of operation bring with them an aesthetics of failure. There 
is a failure of aesthetics to register the operationality that so often glides beneath 
the threshold of sensation and perception (aesthesis). Operations incorporate 
failure as a generative force. In this respect, operations never end even if their 
component parts, elements, and dynamics transmogrify and adapt according to 
the theatre of failure. Faults and failures are a regular feature of operations, so 
routing mechanisms must make use of redundancies offered by hardware. The 
typologies of fault tolerance move us into different classifications of failure: fail-
ure type, failure region, failure neighbourhood, failure mode, and failure time 
(Yang Liu et al. 2013, 51–53). Failure in the form of “crashes and viruses, bloat-
ware, malware, and vaporware,” as media theorist Florian Cramer (2005, 9) 
notes, comprises the “irrationality of rational systems.” Once failure becomes 
normative within the spectrum of operations, we might lament the way in which 
the machine smooths over or absorbs contingency. To harbour such nostalgia 
is to overlook the persistence of labour. System failure provides labour with a 
shadow in which to cloak itself from regimes of inspection. Disruption to the 
storage and processing of data includes power outages, cooling system failure, 
the manufacturing of defective switches and faulty devices, security glitches, 
memory errors, zombie servers, and the like.
Despite the trend toward automating data infrastructures, the constitutive 
outside of labour remains as an externality not yet entirely congruent with the 
calibrated logic of automation. No matter that micro-contracting platforms cor-
rode the distinction between automating tasks and the font of human labour, 
ingenuity persists in the human capacity to beaver out the root cause of a problem 
in the event of machine failure. Not limited by parameters that struggle with 
unforeseen contingency, the human retains what Hayles (2017) terms “the power 
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of the cognitive nonconscious.” In pursuit of technical agency on par with neu-
ral networks of the human brain, research and development in AI and machine 
learning has still to conquer this last frontier that makes human labour a viable 
proposition in regimes of capital accumulation. Hayles: “the gap between biologi-
cal nonconscious cognition and technical nonconscious cognition still yawns as 
wide as the Grand Canyon on a sunlit morning” (3).
Critical ethnographies of infrastructure (Star 1999) teach us that the material 
substrates that underlie and enable contemporary life become evident only when 
they break down. Brian Larkin (2013) questions this perspective by pointing to the 
aesthetics of infrastructure, its monumental or even fetish-like qualities. We are 
all familiar with the banal failures that automation wreaks on our daily lives – for 
example, automated software updates make our image files and websites crash. 
Automation can also become a fetish that operates beyond its technical functions. 
It can stand for capital’s fantasy of doing away with labour and routing around the 
subject. Couched in the idiom of object-oriented ontology or coded in object-
oriented programming languages like Python, we must balance this fantasy with 
the knowledge that living labour remains a constitutive outside of automation.
Automation also fails in this sense. At some point, it has to measure up against 
the human capacity to refuse. Such refusal can manifest itself in acts of infrastruc-
tural sabotage, which take the form of cyber espionage, election rigging, hacking 
into systems, and so forth. It is also manifest in the world of data centres, where we 
find an industry of infiltration and misappropriation not advertised in job descrip-
tions on bulletin boards. The culture of darknets is replete with trade secrets, 
high-level organizational data, backend advice on accessing secure systems, etc. 
Sites like 4chan.org are sufficiently emboldened to make enough of this sort of 
material openly public (Coleman 2014). While in the world of finance, the phe-
nomenon of so-called dark pools generates a “bordered space of private financial 
transactions that is increasingly free from national and international regulatory 
authorities” (Sassen 2013). A more political yearning for autonomy is evident in 
the repurposing of data infrastructures in ways that tread a delicate line between 
the conviction that human design is sovereign and the realization that machinic 
automation increasingly takes command.
The automation of society and economy registers the shift from the govern-
ance of supply chains and labour regimes subject to real-time key performance 
indicators measured within enterprise resource planning software to higher-level 
automated systems designed around the cybernetic principle of noise and feedback 
of externalities. With logistical media, the programmer and engineer effectively 
occupy the seat of control. They design the parametric architectures and code the 
machines. The advent of AI and machine learning marks the arrival of autonomous 
media – computational systems independent of human oversight and able to exert 
a form of sovereign authority over the organization and management of society.
Ultimately, the question of how labour transitions to a society of automation is 
a political question, and not only because the subject of labour was for a century 
or more imagined as a political actor that could transform the social. We must 
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also recognize how capital in its own right has emerged as a political actor on the 
global stage, producing territories, legislations, and fronts of violence. Indeed, con-
juring a society irreducible to regimes of measure is a collective undertaking that 
requires a knowledge of operations in a world that already seems to have complied 
with all the terms and conditions. Such an undertaking can never see automation 
as a moment of total closure. The central paradox by which automation reduces 
labour to a mere abstraction but makes the machine a living entity remains in play. 
Automation fails to close this opening. Recognizing the machine’s capacity to 
become a subject is no less crucial than registering the human subjectivity that cap-
ital attempts to route around. Automation defines a field of political struggle. This 
is why AI and machine learning are unlikely to resolve the time-honoured ques-
tion of whether technology eliminates employment or moves it to other realms. 
Automation’s magic will continue to serve as a proxy for its internal clockwork. 
The politics of reorientation must script new horizons as externalities not yet traf-
ficked through global infrastructures of control.
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DATA’S EMPIRE
Postcolonial data politics
Engin Isin and Evelyn Ruppert
Postcolonial data politics
This chapter addresses a question that is rarely, if at all, raised about the ways in which 
data politics plays out differently in colonial, postcolonial, and imperial states and their 
respective force in international relations (Burbank and Cooper 2010, Gilroy 2004, 
Kumar 2017, Muldoon 1999). The chapter makes a case for a distinct “postcolonial 
data politics” to draw attention to how data politics plays out differently in the Global 
South than the Global North. We develop this case by first examining its conditions 
of possibility: the colonial power and knowledge (institutions, disciplines, objects, and 
subjects) that constituted and continue to shape postcolonial states and their relation-
ships with imperial states. One such condition that we exemplify is how the quest for a 
British imperial census in the nineteenth century and its technologies of colonial gov-
ernment of counting, categorising, and ordering were inherited, reshaped, and reused 
by postcolonial governments. Understanding the constitutive force of this genealogy 
is key to interpreting how the vast amounts of data collected through the internet and 
devices continues yet reconfigures colonial logics and objects of knowledge.
In the second edition of Imagined Communities (1991) Benedict Anderson 
concludes that he was “hasty” and “superficial” in the original edition (1983) in 
assuming that twentieth-century postcolonial states were modelled after modern 
nineteenth-century European states (2006, 163). He suggests that to understand 
nationalism in postcolonial states, its genealogy should be traced to colonial gov-
ernments instituted by imperial powers before the nineteenth century. He thinks 
that it is necessary to understand “imaginings of the colonial state”. He admits 
that “this conclusion may seem surprising, since colonial states were typically anti-
nationalist, and often violently so. But if one looks beneath colonial ideologies and 
policies to the grammar in which, from the mid nineteenth century, they were 
deployed, the lineage becomes decidedly more clear” (2006, 163). For students 
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of colonialism and imperialism, neither the proposition that postcolonial states 
inherited practices from colonial institutions nor that imperial states transplanted 
practices from colonial governments – something that Michel Foucault (2003, 103) 
had identified in 1975 as a “return” effect – would come as a surprise.
Anderson argued that this genealogy was expressed and deployed most promi-
nently in three colonial institutions – the census, the map, and the museum: 
“together”, he says, “they profoundly shaped the way in which the colonial state 
imagined its dominion – the nature of the human beings it ruled, the geography of 
its domain, and the legitimacy of its ancestry” (2006, 163). His analysis of each insti-
tution in imperial states that colonised Southeast Asia have been widely discussed as 
well as his claim that its lessons should have comparative value as it includes territories 
colonised by the all “white” imperial powers of Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, 
The Netherlands, and the United States (Appadurai 1993; Christopher 2009, 2008; 
Cordell, Ittmann, and Maddox 2010).
Anderson’s analyses of the census (population), the map (territory), and the museum 
(memory) are pertinent for the argument we want to make in this chapter. As modes 
of knowledge, especially the census and the map, were not merely descriptive exer-
cises that represented populations and territories but were performative technologies 
that literally produced them. As James Scott says, maps
were . . . not just maps. Rather, they were maps that, when allied with state 
power, would enable much of the reality they depicted to be remade. Thus 
a state cadastral map created to designate taxable property-holders does not 
merely describe a system of land tenure; it creates such a system through its 
ability to give its categories the force of law.
(J.C. Scott 1999, 3)
If the map was not merely a representation of a given territory, it came to consti-
tute territory as an object of power: possession and dominion were synonyms of 
the colony. The same can be said about both the census and the museum. They 
were not merely representations of “population” and “memory” but practices 
through which they became objects of power. This was of course compellingly 
developed by Bernard Cohn (1996) in his studies of British imperial government 
in India. On the census Anderson largely focused on the production of ethnic and 
racial categories and how they helped shape the imagination of the nation consti-
tuted by the very categories imperial powers instituted.
It should be said that it is not only that the will to power and knowledge mobilised 
the census but also the constitutive performative force of that which it produced: 
population. The enormous amount of data collected, collated, interpreted, analysed, 
and disseminated about the colonies provided the ways in which the dominions and 
possessions were imagined in the sense Anderson always maintained: as produced. 
This is the performative sense in which the data produced about an object at the same 
time exceeds its will to power and attains constitutive powers in shaping and form-
ing that object. This is certainly the sense in which Edward Said’s (2003) critique of 
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orientalism as a discourse – practical, academic, and literary – constituting the orient 
specially but the colony generally highlighted. As Young puts it
Said’s use of the notion of a discourse to demonstrate the way in which 
forms of knowledge were constructed within a particular kind of language, 
which in turn was replete with all sorts of cultural assumptions, enabled 
Orientalism, and colonialism more generally, to be analysed as an ideological 
production across different kinds of texts produced historically from a wide 
range of different institutions, disciplines and geographical areas.
(Young 2016, 385)
The most important lesson we have learned from political sociology and 
anthropology of empires is that while an empire that embodies a will to power 
may come to pass and its mode of dominion or possession may become postcolo-
nial, the constitutive powers of knowledge (institutions, disciplines, objects, and 
subjects) continue to shape postcolonial states and their relationships with imperial 
states. Conversely, modern European empires never developed knowledge-power 
practices in isolation from their metropoles. Thus, we use the terms colonial, 
postcolonial, and imperial states to highlight their genealogy and insist on using 
“empire” neither as ubiquitous and omnipresent nor as a geographically con-
tiguous and historically homogenous form of rule (Kumar 2010). Rather, we use 
“empire” to signify a form of rule whose performativity constitutes power relations 
between dominant and dominated institutions and as such can be geographically 
dispersed and historically heterogeneous (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999).
Our argument is that the continuing and constitutive powers of knowledge (of 
population, of territory, and of memory) should have significant bearing on how we 
now think about the vast amounts of data collected through the internet and devices 
that are said to usher in a new era of data politics. We argue in this chapter that 
postcolonial data politics should be a distinct domain of analysis by focusing on how 
colonial dominions and possessions are now being reconfigured as objects of knowl-
edge. We develop this argument in three stages. In the following section, we focus 
especially on the British Empire and its massive efforts to establish an imperial census 
beginning from the 1840s to the 1940s. This is to illustrate how the census repre-
sented a mode of data politics that produced colonial populations as objects of power. 
Then we will focus on two cases from contemporary data politics where postcolonial 
states are being increasingly brought under the orbit of massive data collection, col-
lation, and interpretation regimes by new kinds of authorities whose mode may not 
be imperial yet whose form of rule distinctly is. Then we will conclude with some 
thoughts on resistances to data’s empire and possibilities of decolonising data politics.
Governing peoples: biopolitics and empire
There has been a lively debate on empires over the last twenty years. There is no 
doubt that this debate owes a great deal to Said’s Orientalism (2003) and Culture 
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and Imperialism (1994) – two books that shaped and framed the subsequent field of 
postcolonial studies (Young 2016). Perhaps counterintuitively, postcolonial studies 
opened up, amongst other things, the possibility of understanding the continuity 
between colonial and postcolonial states and the role of imperial states (those states 
that established conquered or settler colonies and dominions). What Anderson 
called his oversight – that he did not originally see the relation between colonial and 
postcolonial states, regarding the latter’s nationalism as the negation of the former – 
is indeed an insight that arises strongly from postcolonial studies. It has been now 
widely debated that rather than “disappearing” especially, European empires have 
taken on new forms. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper (2010) have, for exam-
ple, entirely shifted the ground by comparatively investigating empires as ongoing 
forms of rule for governing peoples and populations. Similarly, Krishnan Kumar 
(2017) focused on five world empires and their continuing presence in the con-
temporary world. To be sure, the conclusion to draw from this burgeoning debate 
and the shifting ground is not that “empires are alive and well” but that empire is a 
changing form of rule that shapes global population management and creates evolv-
ing forms of subject peoples (Hevia 2012, Ittmann, Cordell, and Maddox 2010, 
Pagden 2001, Steinmetz 2013). Within postcolonial studies the terms metropole 
and postcolony or “the Global North” and “the Global South” are used to indicate 
a deterritorialised geography where “Souths in the geographic North and Norths in 
the geographic South” are entangled (Mahler 2018, 19, Mbembe 2001). It is in this 
deterritorialised sense that we adopt the terms metropole, colony and postcolony 
when referring to empire as a form of rule.
There is so much more to say than we can in this chapter about this debate 
but we will briefly draw out its significance for our argument for a postcolo-
nial data politics. We want to illustrate this by first returning to Michel Foucault 
who not only influenced figures such as Edward Said and postcolonial studies 
but also inaugurated studying “population” as an object of modern government – 
understood as a broad concern with the administration of things and people. Yet, 
as Anne Stoler (1995) famously argued, with the exception of a brief note on the 
“return effect” that we have mentioned earlier, Foucault did not concern him-
self with colonial government let alone colonial technologies of power such as 
the census, the map, or the museum in the colony (D. Scott 1995). One would 
have expected that studies on “colonial government” and especially the colonial 
census and the production of colonial populations would have flourished, but this 
happened only to a limited extent and there are not many studies of colonial 
populations and their principles of production especially in the context of imperial 
government (Christopher 2008, Cordell, Ittmann, and Maddox 2010, Ittmann, 
Cordell, and Maddox 2010). Early studies have not been followed through with 
detailed investigations especially outside India (Appadurai 1993, Cohn 1996, 
Ludden 1993, Kalpagam 2000b). It is well worth then revisiting Foucault (albeit 
briefly) on population, draw out the relations between biopolitics and “data poli-
tics” as we see it, and provide an overview of the British Empire’s attempts at 
creating an imperial census as a prologue to postcolonial data politics.
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In his Collège de France lectures on Society Must be Defended (1975–1976) 
and Population, Security, Territory (1977–1978), Michel Foucault (2007, 2003) 
outlines what he sees as the specificity of modern government. The publication 
of these lectures (in English) nearly twenty years after their delivery has been a 
revelation for those who took the last chapter of his History of Sexuality (1978) as 
a ground-breaking attempt to identify the specificity of modern government. In 
these lectures he more clearly outlines how he thinks the concept of government 
acquires a broad meaning in the sixteenth century when the verb “to govern” 
functions in a wide range of domains to indicate any benevolent or prescrip-
tive activity to command the movements and subsistence of people (2007, 122). 
Foucault concludes that “one thing clearly emerges through all these meanings, 
which is that one never governs a state, a territory, or a political structure. Those 
whom one governs are people, individuals, or groups” (2007, 122). The target and 
object of government is always a people, individuals, or groups. Yet, at this point, 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, governing peoples is a sovereign exer-
cise: it is direct, violent, and unforgiving.
Foucault argues that by the second half of the eighteenth century a new form of 
power adds another meaning of government, which he eventually calls “discipli-
nary”. He does not think that “sovereign” and “disciplinary” mechanisms of power 
are to be juxtaposed against each other. Rather, these two mechanisms of power 
work with different rationalities. Still, this is probably not the most original argu-
ment of Foucault. It is when he becomes aware that toward the end of the eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries a new mechanism of power emerges. In a much-
quoted statement Foucault says “unlike discipline, which is addressed to bodies, 
the new non-disciplinary power is applied not to human-as-body but to the living 
human, to human-as-living-being; ultimately, if you like, to human-as-species” 
(Foucault 2003, 242). If disciplinary power is concerned with the function, move-
ment, and fitness of the body, regulatory power is concerned with the birth, death, 
and health of the species-body. Foucault calls this emerging regime of regulatory 
mechanisms of power that are concerned with the species-body as biopolitics – 
so-called because of its concern with natality, mortality, and fertility (Foucault 
2003, 243). If then the body is the problem of disciplines, then population becomes 
the problem of regulation (Foucault 2003, 245). The key argument Foucault makes 
is that although population was an object of power and knowledge before the 
late-eighteenth century, it became an object of management that required new 
techniques of data collection (e.g., census) and new methods of analysis (e.g., 
demography, statistics). Although Foucault is not always consistent, we do not 
think that he offers these three logics of government – sovereignty, discipline, and 
regulation – as supplanting or displacing each other but that the specificity of mod-
ern government consists in their multiple and intersecting deployments appropriate 
to each target of government.
Of course, much has been debated over Foucault’s lectures especially on ter-
ritory, population, and security over the last decade or so and we do not aim to 
discuss the main issues of agreement and disagreement. From our perspective we 
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want to note that despite the substantial debate over Foucault’s claims about early 
modern and modern European states when European empires were also accumu-
lating territories, creating populations and advancing competing claims over (and 
warring for) sovereignties in the colonies, his claims remain crucial for understand-
ing the development of colonial government (Curtis 2004, Kalpagam 2000a, 2001, 
D. Scott 1995, Wilson 2011). What Ian Hacking (2015) identified as the avalanche 
of printed numbers between the 1820s and 1840s when “population” was invented 
is precisely the period in which British imperial government identified its colonial 
populations differently. We want to illustrate this briefly with the efforts to con-
duct an imperial census during the British Empire.
Consistent with Foucault’s claim that population becomes a new kind of object of 
government in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, the British Empire 
had a renewed interest in its colonial dominions and possessions and news ways of 
accounting for them. As Foucault would also emphasise, this was not the first time 
that states had an interest in their populations but their modes of accumulating data 
about them signalled something different. A.J. Christopher traces the quest for a cen-
sus of the British Empire from 1840 to 1940. He argues that mapping and the census 
were the two most important enquiries undertaken by the empire. The quest for an 
imperial census actually starts somewhat earlier, in 1801, when a decennial enumera-
tion of the United Kingdom was instituted and when a question emerged about how 
to count colonies in this enumeration. How to act at a distance to govern unfamiliar 
events, places, and people for the empire was eventually resolved with the census as 
a technology of knowledge production. As Christopher says “as such it represents a 
significant attempt by the state to number and assess the population and its character-
istics and so obtain a view of the society it seeks to govern” (Christopher 2008, 269).
This idea of an imperial census was put forward in the 1840s and remained an 
objective for a hundred years (Christopher 2008, 271). It followed the introduction 
in 1800 of “An act for taking an Account of the Population of Great Britain, and the 
Increase or Diminution thereof”, which directed the taking of a census of England 
and Wales in 1801. It involved the first comprehensive, systematic and centralised 
collection of information on households and individuals. Previously, numerous local 
and central institutions and officials linked to the central state, such as ecclesiastical 
courts, justices of the peace and overseers of the poor, regularly collected informa-
tion about people in their jurisdictions (Higgs 2004). The census, along with civil 
registration, replaced that which had been largely carried out by local administra-
tions and dispersed across thousands of archives (parish chests, diocesan registers, 
estate papers). However, until 1841 censuses did not list individuals but instead 
provided simple head counts (numbers of men, women, families, and houses) and 
information about household characteristics such as occupations and ages. The 
schedules were also completed by officers of the established church or of the poor 
law system who calculated totals from parish registers. The first nominal census was 
not conducted until 1841 by the newly established General Register Office (GRO), 
which initiated “the practice of instructing enumerators to hand out schedules to 
household heads for them to supply details of the members of their households on 
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Census night” (Higgs 2004, 72). However, while individuals were counted, unlike 
parish records the object was the population (Ruppert 2012) where individuals “are 
no longer pertinent as the objective, but simply as the instrument, relay, or condi-
tion for obtaining something at the level of population” (Foucault 2007, 42).
It is in relation to the centralised collection of data on individuals within the 
British state that the idea of an imperial census was enacted in 1821 with a Colonial 
Office requirement that each colonial government produce an annual statistical and 
informational Blue Book (Christopher 2008, 271). The same request specified that 
population be divided into white, free coloured, and slave categories. After the abo-
lition of slavery in 1833 the categories were simplified into white and coloured. 
Although by the 1840s virtually all colonial governments had taken annual statis-
tics, each developed divergent practices and produced incompatible annual Blue 
Books. To solve this fragmentation of information the Colonial Office in London 
developed the concept of a unified census of the British Empire. With the estab-
lishment of the General Register Office and the appointment of William Farr as 
Superintendent of Statistics, who served from 1839 to 1879, the idea of an imperial 
census was articulated (Christopher 2008, 272). The General Register Office with 
the Superintendent of Statistics served as the “centre of calculation” for the analysis, 
interpretation, collation, compilation, and presentation of the imperial census. This 
is also when the quest began for dividing the colonies into coherent and comparable 
enumeration districts by following administrative divisions and boundaries, enu-
merating both settled and mobile populations, standardising enumeration periods, 
counting indigenous populations differently, establishing a person’s name as a unique 
identifier, and enumerating not only age and race but also occupation according to 
categories originally developed by William Farr (Christopher 2008, 273–274).
The quest produced various censuses throughout the rest of the nineteenth 
century with myriad fits and starts and problems as well as resistances and non-
compliances based on different grounds. Colonial Governors were required to 
explain not only divergences but also resistances. Regrettably, there is no system-
atic study of these divergences and resistances in the British colonies but an event in 
1861 attests to such resistance and perhaps provides evidence of imperial responses. 
Ceylon avoided conducting the 1861 census and when asked an explanation the 
Governor simply gave that it was seen as a precursor to taxation, a response that 
was common in both metropole and colony (Ruppert 2014). Ten years later when 
Ceylon did conduct a census, its Governor was apparently compelled to reassure 
the power elite of the colony by stating that
the Census has no connection whatever with taxation but is taken solely 
for the purpose of ascertaining the number, ages and occupations of the 
inhabitants of the island. The information is required in order to ascertain 
whether or not the population of Ceylon are prosperous and increasing in 
number, and to enable the Government to devise measures for promoting 
the improvement of the country and the welfare of the people.
(quoted in Christopher 2008, 276)
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As Christopher notes
the quest for a systematic synchronised population census of the British 
Empire lasted for a hundred years. It represented an attempt by the 
Colonial Office to obtain a view of the Empire as a whole as an aid to its 
efficient administration, although the precise use of the census was never 
explicitly stated.
(Christopher 2008, 284)
He concludes that “nevertheless, only one official integrated Report on the 
Census of the British Empire was ever published” (2008, 284). Christopher thinks 
two significant factors contributed to this “failure”. First, although successive 
Registrars General of England and Wales periodically monitored the development 
of the project, the colony was always secondary to metropole. As such, the colony 
received only limited resources especially for processing the data collected (2008, 
284). Second, which is important from our point of view, was that British Empire 
found it difficult to co-ordinate diverse, multiple, and relatively autonomous colo-
nial governments (Christopher 2008, 284). This is worth investigating further. To 
what extent colonial governments resisted an imperial census and to what extent 
this constituted on the part of colonial authorities gaining power-knowledge over 
their “own” populations are questions that arise from the quest.
Nonetheless, the quest for an imperial census that lasted a century attests to 
how counting, categorising, and ordering worked as technologies of colonial 
government and how these technologies were inherited, reshaped, and reused 
by postcolonial governments. We suggest that the transition from colonial to 
postcolonial governments involved considerable continuity of technologies of 
government, especially the use of data for counting, categorising, and ordering. 
The quest for a unified census of the British Empire between 1840 and 1940 
produced vast amounts of data but eventually became a failed project in the sense 
that James Scott defined the emergence of the state. Even if it eventually failed to 
accomplish its stated objectives the quest, with its trials, tribulations, ridges and 
troughs, produced an emerging logic of imperial government. Additionally, the 
quest led to myriad other intentional or collateral effects such as the invention of 
new governmental practices, and bureaucratic and technological infrastructures. 
Furthermore, although Christopher considers the census as “stocktaking” – as gov-
ernments typically do - it is well to remember James Scott’s conclusion (1999, 3): 
quests of mapping territory or enumerating population were not merely descrip-
tion exercises but are technologies of government that “give [their] categories the 
force of law”. Moreover, it is well to remember Hacking’s distinction between 
overt and “subversive” effects of the census. He says that the overt amassing 
of gigantic amounts of data rarely results in its intended effects. For Hacking 
“[t]he fetishistic collection of overt statistical data about populations has as its 
motto ‘information and control,’ but it would more truly be ‘disinformation and 
mismanagement’” (Hacking 2015, 281). Yet, Hacking says,
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there is a quite unintended effect of enumerating, and I call this subversive. 
Enumeration demands kinds of thing; or people to count. Counting is hun-
gry for categories. Many of the categories we now use to describe people are 
by-products of the needs of enumeration.
(Hacking 2015, 280)
He concludes that “biopolitics as the transition from the counting of hearths to the 
counting of bodies” (which we noted earlier) follows from this. Thus, “the sub-
versive effect of this transition was to create new categories into which people had 
to fall, and so to create and to render rigid new conceptualizations of the human 
being” (Hacking 2015, 281).
We see a century of quest to produce a census of an empire therefore not so much 
as a quest to describe it but as a quest to govern people in a different way. What 
drives the will to knowledge – the insatiable accumulation of data, classifications 
(race, ethnicity, language, religion), categorisations (caste, tribe, kin), interpretations 
(normal, abnormal, deserving, underserving, dangerous, useful), inferences, rela-
tions, processes, identifications – is the will to power: a force to maintain, nurture, 
sustain, and encourage capacities that are useful for the purposes for which there 
is an interest in the object. The census and its practices – collecting, collating, and 
presenting data and drawing conclusions about the population as an object – were 
not only for creating a coherent and consistent method – which always failed – but 
the will to know that satisfied the will to power. The more difficult it was to estab-
lish a coherent or consistent system the more driven was the will to know. Yet this 
will to know was bound to exceed the technologies that afforded it: the census was 
increasingly surrounded by and indeed gave rise to various knowledge practices: 
ethnographies, comparisons, theories, interpretations, disagreements, and debates 
that veritably began creating an image of the colonial state and society. Census, 
or the attempts to create an imperial census, generated various forms of data and 
knowledge as well as agents and authorities who subsequently as experts developed 
autonomous interests and practices in data that created a condition of possibility for 
the birth of the postcolony.
The development of the modern census throughout the nineteenth century 
is often told through methodological nationalism: a survey of nation-by-nation 
developments where each nation develops its legislative authority and adminis-
trative machinery and conceived of populations as contained within national 
boundaries (Chernilo 2011, Dumitru 2014, Scheel et  al. 2016, Wimmer and 
Glick Schiller 2002). Yet the articulation of census standards is also an impe-
rial development of a different order. Almost at the same time when European 
imperial states began to develop census practices an international field of data poli-
tics emerged where newly developed methods and techniques and their experts 
began to establish and compete in the development of protocols for international 
co-operation and standardisation. The First International Statistical Congress was 
held in Brussels in 1853, which adopted formal international recommendations 
for conducting a census urging comparability amongst various national censuses. 
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In 1872, the International Statistical Institute met in St. Petersburg and adopted 
not only standards for conducting censuses but also methods and data (Goyer and 
Domschke 1983, 8). When the same institute met in 1897 the idea of a census of 
the whole world was articulated. Shortly after its formation following the second 
world war, in 1950, the United Nations (UN) defined one of its urgent tasks as the 
development of census methods and data standardisation. Practically, this involved 
tweaking standards developed since the 1850s. It was not until 1970 that the UN 
developed its World Population Census Program (Goyer and Domschke 1983, 9). 
Since then the United Nations has progressively developed census guidelines to 
achieve greater standardisation across all states and regional organisations such as 
the European Commission have enacted statutes and regulations that comply with 
and extend these to achieve harmonised European data statistics. Despite these 
efforts, the interpretation and implementation of standards has been uneven and 
variable due to a combination of political, technical and historical differences. As 
we noted in relation to the quest for an imperial census, effects of governmental 
logics are not reducible to their stated intentions and objectives but give rise to 
myriad collateral strategies, responses and effects.
Notwithstanding this variability the will to know through censuses has per-
formative effects including the emergence of its agents within a transnational field 
of statistics (Scheel et al. 2016). The emergence of guilds of experts and star figures 
of statistics such as William Farr (1807–1883) signals only a glimpse of a veritable 
structure of expertise about both metropole and colonial populations and the inter-
ests of experts that were related yet by no means reducible to the interests of the 
old European empires and perhaps constituted a different empire – data’s empire – 
that secured and maintained its hold on colonial populations long after they had 
become postcolonial. As Hacking mused thirty-five years ago “it will be salutary 
if some of us go on noticing mutations within the more gradual expansion of the 
biopolitical empire” (2015, 281).
This still remains a hypothesis, as it were, since there are not many studies 
on the attempt to create a British imperial census let alone relate it to imperial 
government. But new studies such as those by Karl Ittmann, Dennis Cordell, 
Gregory Maddox (Ittmann, Cordell, and Maddox 2010) and their colleagues on 
attempts in Africa and by Jen Emigh, Dylan Riley, and Ahmed Patricia (Emigh, 
Riley, and Ahmed 2016) in Asia already indicate that Foucault’s hypotheses 
about government and population are bearing fruit – albeit with modifications 
and enhancements – for studying the imperial and colonial government of popu-
lations. We expect that these studies will grow and will form part of what we 
call “postcolonial data politics” and enable us to better understand the relation 
between the production of colonial populations through the accumulation of 
data and imperial government. Meanwhile, we also think there is an urgent need 
for studies that examine contemporary data politics and its postcolonial implica-
tions. We now want to illustrate what we see as emerging areas of investigation 
in postcolonial data politics, which Hacking calls “biopolitical empire” and which 
we recast as “data’s empire”.
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Governing postcolonial peoples
It is within the historic amassing of data that we approach the current “deluge” of 
data (Hey and Trefethen 2003) – which now has come to be named “big data” – 
to consider what bearing the constitutive powers of knowledge (of population, 
of territory, and of memory) has for this new era of data politics. The range and 
volume of data about populations and other objects being generated through the 
internet and myriad digital devices by organisations, agencies, corporations and 
governments is unprecedented. But beyond volume, data is also being remade in 
standardised forms that traverse national borders and with qualities that are increas-
ingly granular, immediate, varied, and detailed. From Facebook claims that it can 
make a map of everyone in the world (Meyer 2016) and that it “reaches more 
people than the U.S. Census data says exist” (Swant 2017) to Google Street View 
being proposed as an alternative for generating census statistics on socioeconomic 
characteristics (Gebru et al. 2017), there is no shortage of claims to knowledge. 
Arguably, no kingdom, state, empire, government, transnational or global organi-
sation or corporation has ever held such command over the production, storage 
and analysis of data. The implications of these developments associated with big 
data have been mostly debated in relation to privacy, anonymity, security, speech, 
and other concerns that are cast in terms appropriate to Euro-American metro-
poles. As we have argued, just as metropole-colony relations were configured 
through the invention of biopolitics, we expect that new developments in big data 
are reconfiguring not only metropole-postcolony relations but also biopolitics. To 
put it differently, not only do the issues of concern such as privacy and security 
play out very differently in the metropole than in the postcolony but also agents of 
power-knowledge and their targets of government are also being constituted dif-
ferently. Moreover, data politics are also playing out differently in the metropole 
and postcolony precisely because of different trajectories through which certain 
rights are protected, developed, or violated.
All this is most evident in big data projects in Africa. African postcolonial states 
are said to face a longstanding “knowledge problem” because of flawed development 
data on metrics such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and economic development 
(Jerven and Johnston 2015). Some African national statistical departments have more 
resources and stronger capacity and experience than others, such that development 
problems include the unevenness and often absence of “good” statistical data (Jerven 
2013). It is in this context that big data is imagined as an opportunity to know Africa 
and other postcolonial states in unprecedented ways, which are critical for decisions 
about development in areas such as healthcare, security, economic productivity, and 
disaster and resource management, and so on (Hilbert 2016).
That is the promise reflected in the United Nations Global Pulse initiative, 
which is principally focused on adopting big data for monitoring and reaching sus-
tainable development goals and managing humanitarian action. The initiative was 
established based on the recognition that big data offers the opportunity to gain a 
better understanding of changes in human well-being, and to get real-time feedback 
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on how well policy responses are working (United Nations 2018). It is “intended as 
a Call to Action to inspire development agencies and particularly evaluators to col-
laborate with data scientists and analysts in the exploration and application of new 
data sources, methods, and technologies” for “programme monitoring, evaluation 
and learning” (Bamberger 2016, 22). Global Pulse is only one of several initiatives 
involving projects that engage with either publicly available or big data donated by 
“large multinational corporations such as Orange and Twitter for purposes of mon-
itoring and evaluating social or economic dynamics in LMICs (Low and Medium 
Income Countries)” (Taylor and Broeders 2015, 231). The initiative engages with 
and is part of a broad network of international researchers and organisations work-
ing with big data on development projects and who publish, discuss and circulate 
results, and share knowledge about interventions.
More generally, Global Pulse is part of a “field of study” referred to as 
“Information Communication Technologies for [international] Development” – 
ICT4D – described as “an interdisciplinary practice that combines tech with 
international development, human rights, and public health” to collect, store, 
process, analyze and share data for development (Anonymous 2016). The kinds 
of data vary and can include everything from health care data to mobile phone 
metadata, sensor and biometric data and survey data.
Projects involving big data analytics are undertaken as part of Global Pulse have 
included numerous experiments with mobile phone data such as the mapping of 
poverty in China using call data records and mapping population displacement in 
Nepal following the April 2015 earthquake (Bamberger 2016, 41). Others include 
using social media to explore HIV-related stigma in Rio, guiding emergency ser-
vices in the aftermath of the Haiti earthquake, and detecting and managing forest 
and peat fires in Indonesia. One 2013 project involved the analysis of anonymised 
mobile phone data to visualise population movements in Senegal (Global Pulse 
2015). Through the use of visualisations, a series of mobility profiles were pro-
duced for different regions to identify how changes in patterns of mobility could 
indicate changes in livelihoods or coping strategies, or exposure to new shocks. 
Monitoring such changes for vulnerable groups in “real time” was identified 
as potentially offering a “powerful humanitarian early warning mechanism for 
informed decision-making and rapid response” (Global Pulse 2015, 1). These are 
just a few amongst a large number of big data projects.
While much has been made about the potential of these various forms of big 
data to finally “know” postcolonial populations, critics rightly point to the “poli-
tics, power dynamics and ongoing patterns of privilege and marginalisation on a 
global scale” of ICT4D initiatives and especially the lack of ethical processes such 
as informed consent and opt-out procedures that “continue the legacy of colonial-
ism within aid work” (Anonymous 2016). They argue that many projects in the 
postcolony lack data protection for personally identifiable data, which would be 
unacceptable in the metropole where the governments or corporations that own 
and control data are located. These practices mean
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there is a danger of setting up a form of imperialism based on personal data. 
Just as the royal powers of old reached far into the lives of distant colonised 
people, technology companies gain immense control with every terabyte of 
personal data they store and analyze.
(Simmons 2015)
For Simmons, technology companies that are predominantly owned and located in 
the United States are colonial in their actions as they perform like sovereign nations 
and increasingly operate across borders.
The reach of these practices, however, extends to both metropole and postco-
lonial populations and thus they need to be understood, as we argued, in relation 
to each other. That is, technology companies operate transnationally to harvest the 
data people generate in their day-to-day lives through a form of “accumulation 
by dispossession that colonizes and commodifies everyday life in ways previ-
ously impossible” (Thatcher, O’Sullivan, and Mahmoudi 2016, 990). Thatcher 
et al. interpret this through the metaphor of “data colonialism” to highlight “the 
power asymmetries inherent in contemporary forms of data commodification.” 
However, just as censuses and other forms of state produced data were uneven in 
their colonisation, big data are leading to a “new kind of digital divide” in “data-
based knowledge” due to the unevenness of technological diffusion as a result of 
“lack of infrastructure, human capital, economic resource availability and insti-
tutional frameworks” (Hilbert 2016, 135). Beyond these “contextual” variables, 
just as in colonisation, the varying assemblages of experts, methods, technologies, 
data, organisations, guilds, associations, practices, authorities and other interests are 
constitutive of uneven effects beyond the control of the technology companies.
For these reasons, while these critiques are apt the situation is more complex. 
Importantly for our argument, they do not capture what we suggest is the continu-
ity and discontinuity from the regulatory logic of biopolitics that characterised data 
politics of the last two centuries and was concerned with population as a species-
body. We thus refer to “data’s empire” to signal an emergent regime of government 
that involves new as well as existing mechanisms of domination between the metro-
pole and postcolony that is producing a species-body with different characteristics 
and with heterogeneous effects. These characteristics are yet to be fully investigated. 
What we offer in this chapter is thus a preliminary outline of emergent mechanisms 
that are distinct and overlapping and have continuities and breaks from past ones. 
We then discuss their potential implications for the biopolitics of our present.
The species-body is re-assembled. Numerous actors and arrangements (tech-
nologies, practices, data, methods, agencies, authorities, professions, and so on) 
make up data’s empire. Beyond the “public–private partnerships” and “growing 
agency of corporations as development actors” (Taylor and Broeders 2015, 229), 
various combinations of actors that traverse both national borders and public-
private sectors are engaged in the production of the species-body. They involve 
states, agencies, organisations, corporations, and institutions that come together 
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to process data for different purposes of government. ICT4D projects, for exam-
ple, are funded by governments and nongovernmental organisations (e.g., UN), 
corporations, private foundations, and private individuals. Many involve col-
laborations between government and non-government organisations and various 
professions such as statisticians and data scientists. Examples include a project that 
analysed financial transaction data of the BBVA bank to measure the economic 
resilience of populations to natural disasters in Mexico and another used satellite 
imagery data produced by various governments to track poverty trends in Uganda 
(Bamberger 2016). Significantly, the agents of these assemblages occupy relative 
positions within the transnational field that includes professionals such as data sci-
entists, statisticians, programmers, software developers, methodologists and so on 
who traverse transnational and national borders (Scheel et al. 2016). Rather than 
state authorities being replaced or superseded by corporations or private sector 
actors, the fields of power and knowledge and the agents and practices that make 
them up are being diversified and recomposed. Furthermore, numerous projects 
such as those of Global Pulse are not separate from but part of this transnational 
field that engages with big data in the metropole. Just as a quest for an imperial 
census happened simultaneously to the development of national modern censuses, 
so too are quests to know populations through big data happening transnationally.
This is one reason we suggest that the species-body is re-assembled. Its pro-
duction includes various combinations of technologies such as the hardware of 
computers but also sensors, satellites, antennas and mobile devices and beyond 
software to include analytics such as algorithms, AI, machine learning, and cloud 
computing. These different combinations of sources and technologies traverse 
borders and fields as do the data they produce. Mobile phone data, for example, 
is produced in myriad contexts and taken up and combined with other data to 
enact phenomena such as migration flows, disaster responses, and economic well-
being (Tazzioli 2018). More generally, millions of data points can be assembled 
on several hundred variables related to a topic of interest such as an individual’s 
transactions, weather patterns, and social media postings. Many data sources can be 
brought together into a “high-dimensional space” that envelopes and flattens dif-
ferences between data (Mackenzie 2015, 434). In these ways, rather than replacing 
existing data regimes, myriad data are combined from a “continuum” that includes 
“big data” (digital transactions, social media, sensors, etc.), “large data” (census, 
survey, administrative, etc.) and “small data” (qualitative interviews, focus groups, 
etc.) (Bamberger 2016, 39).
So, while the imperial quest for a census sought to colonise through stand-
ardised and pre-defined methods and data organised and managed principally by 
imperial states, data’s empire consists of a proliferation of data that is produced in 
ways that are dispersed and distributed (Ruppert, Law, and Savage 2013). Data can 
move and circulate between different sites of production and be “repurposed”, 
that is, used for generating knowledge to serve governing objectives sometimes far 
removed from that for which the data were originally produced. Call data records 
of mobile phone operators for instance are repurposed to know changes in the 
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livelihoods of a population and can be done so across spaces not confined to terri-
torial borders and in relatively standardised, comparable and interoperable formats. 
That is, the data of the transnational field is standardised in ways not previously 
attained or even attainable by previous data regimes.
The species-body is multiple. This multiplication does not merely constitute 
“new” representations of “old” populations. The multiplication of assemblages also 
multiplies the object, the species-body. To understand the species-body as multiple 
is to first understand data as a performative entity: it does not merely describe but 
produces the objects it represents. It is for this reason data can be understood as 
an actant within assemblages for what they might perform changes depending on 
the relations they enter and through which they have agentic qualities. What data 
perform is brought into being by assemblages of experts, methods, technologies, 
data, organisations, guilds, associations, practices, authorities, and other interests 
but it is never under the strict control of any of them. It is through its circulation 
and repurposing that data are detached from the assemblages that make them up 
and come to act on and colonise objects as well as subjects in myriad ways.
The species-body is performed. Multiplication engenders subversive effects. 
If the massive efforts of the British Empire over a century failed to produce an 
imperial census it did succeed in producing colonial populations and institution-
alising ways of representing, measuring, counting, and acting on them. And as 
Hacking argued, a subversive effect of such enumerations was the making of cat-
egories that rendered “rigid new conceptualisations of the human being.” The 
subversive effects of data’s empire today supplement this logic of categorisation as 
a governing strategy to colonise individual and population bodies but differently. 
Conventional population statistics typically involve sociodemographic categories 
and then collecting data through usually self-elicited accounts that use various 
methods to fit people into them. While this logic persists, the repurposing of big 
data involves analytics that identify categories and classifications of populations 
rather than imposing them in advance. Categories on mobility or economic health 
are generated as a consequence of analytics such as machine learning that do not 
identify associations between a limited set of existing variables, but explore multi-
dimensional patterns amongst “hundreds and in some cases tens of thousands of 
variables and sample sizes of millions or billions data” (Mackenzie 2015, 434). 
Differences are not understood as “variables” as in classical statistics, but derived 
from combinations of attributes or “features” from myriad “forms of data (text, 
images, video, transactions, sensors), not just the variables measured using classi-
cal statistical tabulations of surveys, polls or random sampling” (Mackenzie 2015, 
433). For these reasons, Mackenzie argues these analytics involve a different mode 
of knowing differences through classification, which involves “the generalization 
of prediction”. That is, while predictive modelling is not new and indeed part of 
all regimes of power/knowledge, the innovation is its expansion to incorporate not 
only large volumes of data but a wide range of features or attributes (e.g., transac-
tional data, social media posts, weather readings) within a generalised space to find 
“useful approximations” (Mackenzie 2015, 435). In development projects, this is 
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expressed as the creation of “standardized data categories into which many differ-
ent types/sets of information can be fitted so that data are comparable over time 
and space” (Bamberger 2016, 38).
While features or variables can be diverse, a key difference from the conven-
tional statistical production of population is the registering of multiple forms of 
conduct or what people do such as their movements and actions (transactions, 
choices, statements, interactions) where the focus of inquiry is not on the indi-
vidual factors that affect conduct, but on aggregate patterns and connections: 
contagion, influence, association, etc. (Ruppert, Law, and Savage 2013). It is the 
continuous tracing of the conduct of the species-body that analytics of mobility, 
sentiment or transactions are based. The species-body is thus a performing body 
that is not stable but always becoming. For example, in the Senegal project, an 
algorithm grouped individuals within different livelihood zones according to their 
movement trajectories throughout a year to reveal distinct mobility patterns and 
groupings (Bamberger 2016, 1).
The species-body is visualised. The species-body is not only multiple and 
enacted. It is also visualised. As Edward Tufte (1983) famously insisted, visualisa-
tion can be a technique “for reasoning about statistical information” (9) that ‘reveals 
data’ and can be more ‘precise than conventional statistical computations’ (13). 
Now with millions of data points, visualisation has become a key technique of 
making data visible and forms “part of the toolkit that data miners and data scientists 
employ to navigate, transform or otherwise explore data” (Mackenzie 2015, 437).
Visualisations can identify patterns previously unseen and include interactive 
elements and dashboards that enable seeing the effects of combining different 
data on features of a population (Bamberger 2016). In the Senegal project, data 
on monthly rainfall for each livelihood zone could be incorporated at “different 
geographical and temporal resolutions using remote sensing data from NASA” to 
visualise the impact on population movements (Global Pulse 2015, 2). Beyond 
representation, visualisation is thus also an analytic that makes it possible to detect 
and observe the species-body. Unlike the maps documented by Anderson, visu-
alisation reveals populations as patterns, trends and tendencies immanent in the 
species-body as a changing being.
The species-body is alive. Combined together, the multiplicity, performativity, 
agency and subversive effects of data render it uncontrollable by a central authority 
yet manageable because of the possibilities of detecting the species-body and then 
calibrating the conduct of the individual body. It is this last aspect of data that best 
signifies what we mean by “data’s empire”. Rather than the periodic “stocktaking” 
of conventional statistics, populations are living bodies that have pulses, flows, and 
patterns. In turn, data serves a dual function: for identifying attributes or features 
(e.g., sentiments about the economy) but then monitoring and evaluating those 
features over time (e.g., daily changes in sentiments about the economy) and then 
intervening through specific governing projects. The former engages data in much 
the same way as classical data regimes: populations as entities to be measured. 
However, the latter is what big data makes possible: the potential to monitor and 
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evaluate the performance of the species-body on a more continuous basis. It is a 
logic captured in four stages of data analytics: descriptive and exploratory analysis 
(what is happening, often in real-time); doing predictive analytics (“what is likely 
to happen”); detection (“tracking who is likely to succeed and who will fail”); 
and evaluation and data diagnostics (“how to improve programme performance”) 
(Bamberger 2016, 60–61). What these four stages capture is how data performs 
the relation between sovereign, disciplinary and regulatory logics. In the Senegal 
project, rather than evaluating using historic survey data, real-time information of 
trends and changes in mobility provide “early warning of emerging vulnerabilities” 
thereby enabling rapid response (Bamberger 2016, 1). Response then is at the pro-
ject level and involves humanitarian interventions to address shocks to livelihoods, 
for example. In other cases, it can involve targeting conducts (mobility, violence, 
education) to discipline and regulate individual bodies. Furthermore, the relation 
between stages is understood as cyclical and involves complex relations and “feed-
back loops” between monitoring, evaluation, and interventions. In relation to 
prediction, Mackenzie (2015) notes that big data analytic models are based on the 
assumption that relatively stable classifications exist. Yet, the performativity of pre-
diction means that these are mutable and thus models must frequently be changed 
to maintain their predictive power (Mackenzie 2015, 442). For these reasons, the 
species-body is not measured but calibrated where governing programmes and 
projects need to be “smart, agile and adaptive” (Bamberger 2016).
Decolonising data’s empire
When placed within both longer and shorter series of developments in biopolitics 
and its allied technologies (statistics, demography, census), more recent develop-
ments in predictive analytics, algorithms, machine learning, and the like begin to 
appear in a different light. The latter are not recent or simply technical develop-
ments but belong to a series of long- and short-duration transformations since the 
end of the eighteenth century that inaugurate, supplant, and supplement ways and 
logics of governing peoples. It is important to place these ways and logics into his-
torical series to understand what is enduring and what is changing. If indeed modern 
logics of governing the Euro-American metropoles were implicated in governing 
colonial populations in ways that we have yet to understand, how is the species-
body performed today by a combination of technologies of big data, large data, and 
small data? If the species-body is now reassembled, multiple, performed, visualised, 
and alive in ways that were inconceivable a generation ago how does this inaugurate 
new logics of governing peoples? How does it reconfigure metropole-colony and 
metropole-postcolony relations? And in turn, with what governing effects?
Like the “failed” British imperial census, the will to know the species-body of 
the world by organisations such as the United Nations and its regional commissions 
experience resistance through the uneven interpretation and implementation of 
standards, and varying practices and data production regimes in both the metropole 
and the postcolony. In part this is a consequence of practices being caught within 
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national approaches and contexts and their variable capacities and investments. 
What does this mean for the regulatory logic of biopolitics and with what subver-
sive effects for how people are categorised and how populations are constituted as 
objects of governing? We articulated this question through a discussion of some 
contemporary practices of international organisations and how they are mobilising 
big data to address limitations in past efforts to produce data about and to know 
postcolonial populations. We argue that the continuity between these efforts and 
quests to do an imperial census of the British Empire becomes more prominent and 
apparent in postcolonial states that have been drawn into the orbit of “develop-
ment” discourses with the increasing involvement of technology companies that 
both spur and produce data needs for government. Unlike conventional empires, 
however, which are still in operation through various practices, data’s empire func-
tions through assemblages of actors, arrangements, technologies, and logics that are 
transversal: neither their practices nor objects of government are confined or lim-
ited a given territory and its security. That the species-body is multiple, performed, 
visualised, and alive means it has acquired qualities that, unlike conventional vital 
statistics, measure vital signs of populations, as the increasing use of the terms 
“pulse” and “sense” indicate.
We are not yet ready to name and add these mechanisms as a fourth regime 
to Foucault’s trilogy – sovereignty, discipline, and regulation. We suggest these 
mechanisms indicate an emergent logic of how population knowledge about 
the species-body is being enacted. While these mechanisms have been variously 
identified by other researchers, we have sought to bring them together in rela-
tion to identifying them as part of an emerging logic. We don’t think this logic 
supplants or displaces sovereignty, discipline, or regulation but it is a key logic 
that is emerging within contemporary data regimes. For us data’s empire is unlike 
early modern and modern Euromerican empires yet it inherits logics of govern-
ment from them and institutes these new mechanisms of power and principles 
of knowledge.
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PART IV
Rights
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THE RIGHT TO DATA OBLIVION
Giovanni Ziccardi
Introduction: accumulation of digital data in  
the information society
In a modern (and connected) information society, the “life” (and “death”) of digital 
data (Moreman and Lewis 2014), whether it involves information collected about 
a person’s online activities (persisting even after his or her death), comments posted 
in memory of a missed friend (Parker 2014; Wilmot 2016), tweets of condolences 
(Weiser 2016) and chat logs of conversations, is increasingly at the center of legal 
and social issues and public debates. The right to control, erase, or move “digital 
footprints” collected through free and paid services has definitely become a central 
political and legal issue (Steinhart, Nagasawa, and Wielenberg 2014).
Deleting “digital footprints”, especially information or news that a person 
would like to remove from the Internet by pursuing a “right to oblivion”, is 
increasingly a matter of data politics, and is now evident in international legal and 
political debates. These debates, incidentally, are fully connected to the modern 
idea of “algorithmic society”, which features “large, multinational social media 
platforms that sit between traditional nation states and ordinary individuals, and 
the use of algorithms and artificial intelligence agents to govern populations” 
(Balkin 2018, 1151).
The ability to remember, and to communicate a great deal of information, is 
what enables humans to connect their past and present and project themselves 
into the future. Arguably, human civilization is made possible by the ability to 
transmit memories, from one person to another and from one generation to the 
next (Malone 2013). The Internet has accelerated the possibilities of preserving, 
communicating and transmitting information and knowledge. Today the Internet 
allows people to take advantage of a wide variety of digital sources, or to become 
creators of content. At the same time, it is clear a great capacity for preserving 
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digital information, combined with the wide possibility of the creation and com-
munication of content offered by the Internet and the ability to search and analyze 
data through complex algorithms. The provision of such research possibilities to 
each user as in the case of search engines, usher a paradigm shift and a revolution 
in the information society (Floridi 2014).
Such data has already been defined, by scholars and in legislative drafts that aim 
to regulate the phenomenon, as “digital assets” that have a real value (a commercial 
or an emotional value, or both). Referring to  the financial/commercial interests 
involved, recent studies commissioned by IT security companies rated a digital 
asset (for a typical online user) at the significant sum of $35,000 per capita (Siciliano 
2013). In the opinion of many, such evaluation requires a new specific regulation 
far different from rules for material goods. One of the first legal issues has con-
cerned, for example, the value of commercial video and audio files downloaded by 
users and stored in the computer of a deceased person (Wong 2013). In the United 
States of America, more than thirty States are issuing – or have already enacted – 
rules aimed at solving the post-life problem of accounts, profiles and data (Herrera 
2017). In Europe, these concerns have been the focus of the promulgation of the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (European Regulation 2016/679, 
which entered into force on 24 May 2016 and implemented in all Member States 
from 25 May 2018), together with the possibility of processing similar information 
and related rights in an automated manner (Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Floridi 2017).
Legal and technology experts agree that legislative regulation of the life cycle of 
digital data needs to be focused on two facets of the problem:
 i) the information technology side, which includes data security, data protection 
and the best technical approaches to preserve the information for the use of 
future generations (Schneier 2008), and
ii) the legal side, that involves property rights related to digital assets, the privacy of 
the deceased (seen as the last opportunity to protect a person’s confidentiality, or 
to keep secret all information that he or she has not intented to reveal) and the 
heirs’ rights to know certain information they need to claim an inherited property 
or right (Moreman and Lewis 2014; Steinhart, Nagasawa, and Wielenberg 2014).
Unfortunately, control of the life and death of digital data and information 
in today’s hyper-connected societies – especially related to very popular social 
network platforms – has turned out to be a very thorny, and particularly difficult, 
subject to handle (Carroll and Landry 2010). First of all, an algorithmic society, as 
Balkin refers to it, permits the collection of vast amounts of data about persons, 
and facilitates new forms of surveillance, control, discrimination and manipulation, 
both by governments and by private companies. Balkin calls this the “problem 
of Big Data” (Balkin 2018, 1153). What is becoming increasingly recognised by 
scholars, technicians, politicians and users is that people can exercise ever dimin-
ishing control of the life and death of the vast amount of data about them that is 
generated daily, and that it has become impossible to follow the “destiny” of their 
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data once generated or digitized and put online. Technological precautions can 
limit potential harms but, at the same time, it is clear that, in most situations, it is 
not possible to control the life (or death) of data that circulates about a particular 
object or person (Garber 2016).
Moreover, the Internet and social networking platforms are moving relentlessly 
into the creation of two, three and more profiles related to a person (Hildebrandt 
and Koops 2010), by joining and correlating information (and interpreting traces) 
that are left behind during daily digital activities. This implies that a person has one 
or more “electronic bodies” existing online, being updated and, often, beyond 
their control. The notion of “electronic body” or “electronic person” was elabo-
rated, among others, by the Italian jurist Stefano Rodotà (Rodotà 2015). Internet 
platforms operate and create data even when a person is offline. These activities 
make the profile of people’s “living clones” (or “avatars”) on Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, blog, chat and WhatsApp groups more and more accurate and similar 
to “real” individuals (Lafrance 2016).
People who have profiles on different services that are, however, very similar in 
content, are very common: they connect, for example, accounts and update activi-
ties on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram to allow, with only one action/post, the 
automated update of all profiles (Carroll and Romano 2010). At the same time, 
users who customize each single account and who publish only a certain type of 
photo on Instagram and report different information depending on whether they 
are on Twitter or Facebook are now very common too. In the latter case, by care-
fully analyzing the type of text used, and the tone and syntax of the conversations, 
persons can be distinguished from one another. This means that often a person’s 
digital side is much more dynamic and subject to variations and as such “liquid”, fol-
lowing the evocative definition of Bauman (2000). On the other hand, technology 
works more and more independently of a person’s instructions, and generates new 
information about the character of the digital person through algorithms that learn, 
assimilate, re-elaborate and publish data with greater accuracy to profile the user.
Digital data are generated, over time, and technologies work to control 
its longevity. The first consideration that this gives rise to is how important 
is the need for a death of digital data to bring back control of information to 
the person. If indeed big data is seen as the new oil, its life and death pose 
big technological, social and epistemological challenges (Floridi 2012). Balkin 
is particularly clear about how the development of algorithms and artificial 
intelligence play a role in these challenges because “the Algorithmic Society 
depends on huge databases that can cheaply and easily be collected, collated, 
and analyzed”, and the digital age
makes all of this possible because digital communication involves creating 
data, copying it, storing it, and moving the copies from one place to another. 
In the digital age, more and more things that people say and do leave digital 
traces that can be collected, copied, collated and analyzed.
(Balkin 2018, 1155)
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It is perhaps fair to say that today, in many cases the problem of digital social 
networks is no longer to remember, but is to forget. Often, operations, decisions and 
choices that used to be left to human judgement, are now deferred to algorithms 
(Mittelstadt et al. 2016), with several technological and ethical implications (Floridi 
2014). What then are the possibilities of legal and political intervention that can 
give control to people over the right to the life and death of data about themselves? 
Any such intervention on the fate of digital data and its oblivion after the death 
of a person would have to involve an adequate understanding of the nature of the 
digital data, its protection, its relationship with the privacy of the individual and, 
above all, the specific workings of social networks through which digital data is 
disseminated, transformed, correlated and resistant to erasure.
The life and death of digital data and its oblivion thus combines political, 
technological and legal issues to generate very complex situations. Political issues 
have become especially critical given both the economic and social power that 
social networking and other platforms have acquired, and the possibility that 
national and international laws could actually regulate them in the face of such 
power. Additionally, the capacity to trace and control digital data about ourselves 
is every declining as a result of the workings of automation and algormithms. 
Taken together it is very challenging to propose a framework that could enable 
tracing and controlling a person’s digital data. In response to this challenge, I 
shall first outline some of the complexities of the life and death of digital data. 
Then I will focus on data portability and data oblivion as two legal issues that 
frame this as data politics.
The life and death of digital data
The online activities of a person involve, as a first consequence, the genera-
tion of digital data about them such as that concerning their physical, economic 
or social characteristics. This data can be created either by the person or the 
workings of digital technologies and platforms through, for example, the pro-
cessing of data, correlations between data or the profiling of a person’s activities. 
According to a Global Web Index survey of 2015,1 it was estimated that an 
average Internet user has about six social media accounts or profiles on different 
Internet services (the survey analyzed the presence of users in fifty social media 
platforms). If we add these six accounts to other social network accounts or to 
typical and common profiles that connect an individual to cloud services, e-mail 
accounts, home banking credentials and online video providers, the number of 
these profiles can easily reach twenty per person. Day after day a wealth of data 
is generated by these services and is moved, changed and processed. Slowly over 
time these activities generate capital, which becomes interconnected to social life 
and whose accumulation or lack thereof can generate new problems (cultural, 
economic, political, social). Often, users do not realize that, in everyday life, 
Internet services can also, at the discretion of providers, put a real “death pen-
alty” to such digital data. All services are provided with well-defined contractual 
The right to data oblivion 235
terms that most users rarely read carefully, and which in several cases specify the 
right of the service provider to “abandon” the user, i.e. to suspend or, worse, to 
cancel the service. Usually, in paid services – like, for example, the activation of 
a certified e-mail box or a cloud service - such a possibility is slightly mitigated 
by requiring prior notice, or granting a short amount of time to recover all data 
thus enabling the user to store them elsewhere.
For “free services” with millions, if not billions, of users, providers have wide mar-
gins of discretion. It could be sufficient for the provider to believe that a contract rule 
has been violated in order to suspend the service and delete all the data. However, 
among other issues, often erasing is not complete as data remains on backup com-
puters or in a provider’s archives such that the data will continue to live without the 
knowledge of the user who, on the contrary, believes them to be erased.
It is important, therefore, to recognise that the digital data created by the 
investments, attention and time of users live under the threat that could, from 
time to time, put an end to them and yet may continue to live without their 
knowledge. The responsibility is placed on the user who has to read user agree-
ments carefully, be prepared, and must make regular backups and retrieve data 
when a service is terminated. Many platforms provide a plethora of complex 
procedures by which users can download, refine, tweak or delete data and can 
lead users to believe that they are doing all these things whilst it is impossible to 
know how and where the data continues to live.
There are, however, services that die a “natural death”, namely because they are 
suddenly out of the market, overtaken by competitors or bought by other compa-
nies in the same sector and then ended (a very common procedure in technological 
services). Recall, for example, the booms of Second Life, Orkut, Geocities: all ser-
vices that had channeled millions of users, data, information, activities and “lives” 
and that, from one moment to another, have ceased to exist or have been signifi-
cantly reduced in their importance and size.
How then might we conceive of the possibilities of controlling digital data after 
the physical death of the person? Given that this data can continue to generate 
tangible economic and cultural value and generate further information through the 
workings of social networks, algorithms and the correlation of big data, how can 
this value be connected to the rights of the person?
In response to these complex and dynamic questions, I identify two “legal-
informatics” issues: the right to data portability and the right to be forgotten, as 
fundamental challenges of data politics today.
A first legal-informatics issue: data portability
When a service dies, the problem becomes that of data portability, namely to ensure 
that there is a possibility of continuing the digital lives of users in another IT system. 
In the new GDPR, there is an Article about the portability of personal data for those 
services where data are accumulated over several years, such as a mortgage, loan or 
e-mail account. It establishes the right to have the data in an orderly, structured and 
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machine-readable format and in a processable form to allow them a later life and not 
a technological death.
Considerando 68 of the Regulation, with the intention of illustrating the gen-
eral principles underlying the idea of portability, clarifies this right, which is directly 
linked to the life of the data in the future, and which is then reaffirmed in Article 
20 of the Regulation itself. Thus, in the first illustrative part of the Regulation (that 
consisting in 173 recitals/“Considerando”), we have the indication of the impor-
tance of the principle, which is then made as a rule in the specific Article of the 
Regulation itself. The idea of a right to data portability is very similar to the one 
that underlies the portability of a cell phone number, enabling a person to choose 
to keep the same number and “take it” to another provider that, for example, 
offers cheaper conditions. The new right to portability intends to promote data 
subjects’ control over their personal data, and facilitate the circulation, copying or 
transmission of data from one information technology environment to another.
In order to further strengthen control over data, it is seen as appropriate for the 
person to have the right, if the personal data are processed by automated means, to 
receive in a structured, common, machine readable format personal data that they 
have previously provided to a data controller thus enabling them to transmit the 
data to another controller. Yet, this Regulation cannot deal with the digital death of 
data that depend heavily on service, market trends and the technologies and formats 
used (Moreman and Lewis 2014). It is no coincidence that, after more than thirty 
years of mass network connectivity, there are many data that are related, in terms 
of their lives or death, to a service and a format or, conversely, have already been 
orphaned. In some instances, these services are not orphaned due to the physical 
death of the user but by the logical death of the service that hosted them or because 
they are now incompatible with current formats, technologies and standards.
A second legal-informatics issue: the right to be forgotten
While data portability is related to the right to control the life of one’s data, a 
second major challenge for jurists and technicians is the question of how to guar-
antee the right to forget digital data in a digital context that, on the contrary, does 
everything to keep data alive. One issue is that the right to “oblivion” brings into 
conflict the right to free information and free speech, privacy, press rights and right 
to knowledge, with the right of people to have some aspects of their lives forgot-
ten thereby enabling them to start again (Brock 2016). If the right to oblivion is 
recognized as part of respecting and protecting fundamental rights in an informa-
tion society that tends to shape and profile each person, then legal measures are 
necessary to guarantee it at least to a certain level, since a technical forgetfulness is 
impossible to be completely assured.
From a legal point of view, the right to oblivion was stated in 2014 by the judg-
ment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the “Google Spain” case 
(Case C-131/12, decision of 13 May 2014). Briefly, the right to oblivion, or “right 
to be forgotten”, is “a feature of European data privacy law” (Balkin 2018, 1201) 
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that was extended to online search engines in 2014 by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. Balkin recalls how
the case arose out of a 2010 complaint to the Spanish Data Protection Agency 
by a Spanish lawyer, Mario Costeja González. Costeja González complained 
that people searching for his name on the Internet would discover two brief 
newspaper accounts in January and February 1998 available on the site of 
the La Vanguardia newspaper. These stories were public announcements 
“mentioning Mr Costeja González’s name” in connection “with attachment 
proceedings for the recovery of social security debts.” Costeja González 
argued that the ability of the public to access these stories violated his rights 
under the European Data Privacy Directive, and he asked for the newspaper 
to delete his name and Google to remove links to the newspaper accounts.
(Balkin 2018, 1149)
This is a ruling that has generated, however, a sort of “transatlantic divide”: the 
United States of America, the jurisdiction where most of the important technol-
ogy companies today have collected and processed data, did not welcome this 
judgment, since it has created a legal category far from their way of regulating tech-
nology in relation to the freedom of expression and the First Amendment. A legal 
category will moreover require rethinking part of their business model to meet the 
many requests for removal of information. In practice, this means that Europe is 
already prospecting sanctions that are often disproportionate to force large provid-
ers to react quickly to the many issues that are arising with regard to the need to 
remove contents (especially issues that have a major impact on public opinion).
As McNealy has stated, although EU member States hail the creation of this 
right to be forgotten as improving individual privacy rights, “such a right creates a 
problem for U.S. online news organizations. Not only does such a law come into 
direct conflict with protections found in the First Amendment, but it also conflicts 
with traditional privacy jurisprudence, which states that information made public 
cannot become private again” (McNealy 2012, 120). However, a technological 
regulation that is only intended to endure the threat of sanctions, and which does 
not arise from a process of dialogue and confrontation between Europe and the 
United States of America, is likely to prove very fragile in the short term.
At the same time, public opinion, political and jurist demands for the deletion 
of social network data is often raised in the wake of tragic events that make it clear 
that is impossible to interrupt the circulation of digital data after it has entered 
digital or social network platforms. The most striking case in 2016 in Italy was that 
involving Tiziana Cantone, a girl who committed suicide after having encountered 
the practical difficulty of removing sensitive information from the social network 
Facebook and from prominent web sites and search engines. This was not a case 
of the applicability of the right to oblivion in the Google Spain case mentioned 
earlier where the circulation of information was the result of a crime. Rather in this 
instance it concerned the resistance and technical persistence of online digital data 
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and the perennial memory capacity of the network. Often similar popular upheav-
als, however, lead to regulatory reactions that are sometimes characterized by 
rashness and legal inaccuracy, and which criminalize technology rather than focus 
on the heart of the problem. In many countries, for example, after tragic events 
related to the impossibility of removing data online, reactions have included elimi-
nating the possibility of anonymity on networks, imposing more serious penalties 
for providers, increasing penalties related to the crime of defamation or revenge 
porn, increasing personal and companies’ liability for online activities or forbidding 
encrypted communications between individuals.
We now find ourselves in a situation where memory cannot be removed or 
that its removal has become political. Are we heading towards a situation where 
memory will be conditioned by search engines, algorithms and persistent data, and 
where, above all, forgetfulness will no longer be possible and muddled memories 
will always be ready to be resurrected? Or, on the contrary, will legal remedies be 
able to guarantee everyone the right to be forgotten? Surely it will not be a political 
struggle fought against technology, but with technology, although data processing 
today is more about profiling the user and gaining profits from his actions than 
about protecting rights.
A new focus on forgetfulness will probably also require a radical change in the 
economic and profit maximizing focus of an information society. McNealy, cit-
ing Koops (2012), defines correctly from the literature three forms of the right to 
be forgotten: the right to have information deleted after a certain time, the right 
to have a “clean slate”, and the right to be connected only to present information 
(McNealy 2012, 121). According to McNealy, “the first conception of the right 
centers on the idea that individuals should have the opportunity to require other 
individuals and organizations in possession of information about them to erase 
it”, whether individuals or another person upload(s) information about the person 
online (McNealy 2012, 121). McNealy further notes that
difficulties arise with enforcement of such a right because multiple parties 
exist that might be in possession of the personal information, as well as the 
possibility that some possessors of information might be required to retain 
information under the law.
(McNealy 2012, 121)
The second and third forms of the right to be forgotten, the clean slate and the 
right to only be connected to current information, according to McNealy, “are 
similar. Both center on the idea that individuals can grow and change, and should 
not, therefore, be forever connected to information from the past that could be 
damaging [. . .] In these cases, individuals, for the most part, do not have the spec-
tre of past ills or bad decisions available for others to use to judge them. The right 
to be forgotten would then allow people to “shape their own lives,” instead of hav-
ing the memories of others do so for them (McNealy 2012, 121–122). To this end, 
Murata and Orito offer this definition of the right: “An individual has the right 
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to be free from any use of information concerning him/her which causes harmful 
effects on him/her” (Murata and Orito 2011, 199). While the right to portabil-
ity has already been recognized in legislation, particularly in the GDPR, and the 
Google Spain ruling, it poses far more complex social and political problems that 
arise in an information society.
The impossibility of a technological oblivion
In an information society without oblivion, people live constantly without the 
option of “undoing” an action (for example: permanently delete a post, or an 
e-mail message), or having a second chance. In a pre-digital era, Balkin notes, 
“old newspaper articles that contained embarrassing information were quite lit-
erally yesterday’s news. People threw away the old copies and one had to go to 
library or some other location where the archives were stored” (Balkin 2018, 
1203). In the digital age:
organizations publish but do not delete. Instead, old articles are freely search-
able in newspaper archives, which remain online. This fact changes the 
nature of a newspaper as an institution of the public sphere. The newspaper 
is no longer simply a report of the day’s events, to be cast aside tomorrow 
and stored, if at all, in a relatively small number of libraries and other archival 
locations that are not quickly and easily accessible to the public. Instead, the 
newspaper becomes an increasingly important and valuable online archive. 
It becomes an institution of memory that is widely and easily accessible 
through search engines. Newspapers become important records of history 
experienced in real time that remain present for people to search and read 
days, months, and years later.
(Balkin 2018, 1203)
When embarrassing material was published in newspapers in the past, Balkin 
concludes,
the subjects eventually enjoyed practical obscurity when the newspapers were 
discarded (so that access to older newspaper stories was limited to those who 
visited libraries and archives). This practical obscurity has vanished because 
of search engines. Embarrassing articles may show up in search engine results 
and continue to appear indefinitely. By targeting search engine providers, 
the right to be forgotten attempts to restore the practical obscurity (and thus 
privacy protection) of the pre-digital era.
(Balkin 2018, 1203)
Complete oblivion – intended as the real and concrete possibility of erasing or, better, 
of destroying any information that is no longer of public interest – is incompatible with the 
very architecture of an information society and the social networks and search engines 
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that make it up. Once information has been rendered in digital form and entered 
into the articulated set of connections that make up information society today – 
whether a blog, a WhatsApp chat, a social network discussion, or a comment – it is 
technically impossible to ensure its permanent removal and prevent it from returning 
online. Certainly, sophisticated operations can be carried out to mitigate the exposure 
or visibility of that information (such as the de-indexing, or the removal from an 
archive) to allow relative and momentary forgetting, but the process of digitization 
itself, and the ubiquity and capillarity of today’s widespread digital technologies, makes 
it unrealistic to think that removing data from social networks after its digitization will 
secure its death. The risk that it will come back is always and consistently real.
Legal talk about oblivion in the digital world is, in many respects, thus a fiction. 
It promises the possibility that data can remain “under the surface”, not become 
“trendy” or a subject of widespread attention. But can any more than that be 
expected? Today the most viewed content is that on top of the list of search engine 
results and the attention of the navigators typically never moves – unless there 
is a targeted specific interest – beyond the first two or three pages of results. All 
those operations that aim to tweak, mitigate, and reduce the visibility of certain 
information, may indeed have a practical effect and provide a good degree of 
protection of the rights of the subject. It thus appears that immediate forgetting 
can be controlled, but not the long-term oblivion. The latter possibility of being 
forgotten and erasing memory at the press of a button, recalls scenes such as in 
George Orwell’s movie 1984, where Winston Smith works as a “censor of history” 
and removes articles from Times pages that are no longer politically acceptable. 
At the same time, some scholars have argued that we should worry less about 
how to remember, and more about how to forget. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, in 
his book, Delete, has very carefully recalled, in many ways, how the inadequacy of 
human memory was, in reality, a valuable asset and could, over time, facilitate our 
social interactions (Mayer-Schönberger 2011). Past rumours, mistakes, gossip and 
conflicting thoughts were usually lost with the passing of time, giving people the 
ability to overcome imperfections in their lives and to start again, or simply leave 
behind parts of their past because they are no longer relevant.
Yet, as I have been arguing, this possibility of abandoning the story behind us 
has gradually been eroded by modern technologies. Mailboxes, social networks and 
online archives are perpetual extensions to our fallacious memories. Information is 
no longer lost even if we do not keep it in mind or in memory due to our human 
limitations. We can no longer move on from our past, and even small and irrel-
evant parts of it can return.
In some areas, for example criminal law, forgetting is not only considered 
acceptable and socially useful, but is considered vital. Annotations of small offenses 
are usually removed from official documents after a period of time, such as when 
small offenses committed by minors are cancelled before they become adults. The 
reason is simple: mistakes in judging youth and minor offenses must not prevent 
a person’s reintegration into society. Ultimately, a second chance is offered to a 
minor, something that technology now potentially prevents.
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In an information society that does not offer forgetting as a possibility, any 
behaviour that leaves a digital trace in the present can do immediate damage to a 
person’s life but also have future damaging consequences. Often, immediate effects 
can be the least damaging: in social networks, certain events may attract attention 
for a few days, unless they concern public figures, and then remain quiescent. 
The potentially greater danger is that information will remain for the next ten or 
fifteen years or beyond and searchable with likely more and more sophisticated 
algorithms and search engines.
Conclusions: three forms of data oblivion
The information society is becoming increasingly complex. Algorithms, big data, 
the speed of information transmission and frequent violations of the privacy of the 
individual radically condition the life of digital data, and the ability to delete it and 
to guarantee a right to be forgotten. Legal, economic and political choices must 
be made together to address three forms of oblivion and their related interests and 
rights: i) social, iii) technical, and iii) legal oblivion.
Social oblivion concerns the persistence and circulation of personal data in 
information societies; the technical relates to the resistance of technology to the 
removal of data or the re-submitting of contents that were once deleted but are still 
present on personal computers and other devices and could be circulated again on 
the Internet; and legal oblivion refers to forgetting data, deleting information, and 
the de-indexing of news that has been elaborated by legal means through case law 
or norms. These three types of oblivion are inextricably linked and yet sometimes 
mutually incompatible: legal obligation can be guaranteed by a Court but may 
not become effective (and implemented) for technical reasons, or deleted data can 
continue to circulate in various social networks. The technological has, in fact, 
completely changed and challenged the legal form of oblivion.
Social oblivion is the right to be forgotten in a society, in the context in which 
one lives, with particular reference to certain aspects of one’s life. It is the guarantee 
of being able to “start over again”. However, social oblivion is now interwoven 
with technological oblivion, because people’s information can be retrieved from 
the Internet, search engines and social networks, that make up an information 
society. If data is online, it will have the capacity to stay forever and vulnerable to 
being circulated thereby multiplying its effects.
Technically, forgetfulness is more similar to  erasing and making digital data 
disappear. As previously noted, there is much scepticism about the possibility of 
a complete and persistent elimination. However, in many cases, technical forget-
ting can at least serve to make certain information less visible or more difficult 
to search. Legal obligation is, perhaps, the most definite (and restrictive) form of 
oblivion and is related to requirements elaborated by jurisprudence or norms. The 
connection to technological oblivion though often shows its limits. The right to 
be forgotten, according to the landmark Google Spain case, should now also be 
understood as the right to be forgotten by search engines: a protection granted to 
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all subjects who do not want to be remembered online for certain things they 
have done in the past, allowing the possibility of de-indexing that information 
from a search engine. However, the European judgment mentioned earlier refers 
to data that are not defamatory, false or confidential but true and originally and 
legitimately published but which, over time, have become unsuitable for to the 
more recent personal identity of the subject “portrait” and as such are no longer 
current or of public interest. Perhaps, this last point is the most delicate: how does 
this new right to forget deal with the right to chronicle and the right to publish 
everything that is related to facts of public interest? Should chronicle rights prevail 
over the right to personal identity, in the event that there is a public interest in the 
dissemination of facts, or not?
In theory, the right to oblivion (borrowing, this time, a typical United States 
approach) should not apply to information that has a public interest: for example, 
information related to personalities who hold public office, or political activities, 
and have a lower expectation of privacy. From this point of view, it seems to be a 
right strictly related to the concept of personal identity and to the representation 
of an individual in society. The Italian Privacy Authority has tried to clarify this 
point by stating, recently, that the right to be forgiven for legal action of particular 
gravity, and whose proceedings have been concluded, cannot be invoked since the 
public interest prevails to know similar news. The subject matter of the Authority’s 
attention began in 2006 and ended in 2012, and concerned a former municipal 
councillor involved in an investigation. The person concerned claimed that, since 
he had no public office and was now in the private sector, the presence of news 
dating back to ten years before and now of no interest to him caused harm to his 
image, privacy and career. The Authority states that it is true that the time that has 
lapsed is the essential component of the right to oblivion, but also that if the infor-
mation requested for removal is related to serious offenses and has caused a strong 
social concern, then deletions must be evaluated with less favour.
What this case highlights is that the relation between history, memory, tra-
ditional oblivion and technological forgetting and procedures necessary for the 
latter to be activated is not straightforward, and can create practical problems for 
both subjects and experts. What this reveals is that we are in the presence of a 
typical case where a “classic” theme has to be reinterpreted in a new light to adapt 
it to, in the case of an information society, the world of search engines and social 
networks. The judgment of “Google Spain” and the decisions of local independ-
ent, administrative and judicial authorities have obliged all industry operators to 
reason on certain aspects, and these nuances also affect citizens who want to 
exercise this right. In particular, the process of de-indexing now appears to be 
reserved in the first instance to search engines (which will make decisions based 
not only on the indications of the European Court but also on the basis of cri-
teria and parameters established internally), secondly to independent authorities 
(for example the Data Protection Authority in Italy) or traditional courts, which 
will be able to operate on the basis of criteria different from those adopted by the 
search engines decision-makers.
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It is clear, first of all, that there is a need for a case-by-case evaluation of each 
request as the right to be forgotten is closely linked to the subject’s identity, person-
hood and civil rights. Technically, however, a case-by-case assessment can create 
enormous problems. After the European decision, many requests for removal have 
been made. According to the latest transparency reports of Google from May 2014 
to September 2018 there were 2.7 million requests for de-indexing.2 If requests con-
tinue to increase, providers will need to reorganize their business models such that 
human assessors can seriously analyse them on a case-by-case basis. Such a require-
ment has been implemented via Article 71 of the GDPR. It states that a person 
should have the right not to be subject to a decision (which may include a measure 
that takes into account personal aspects that concern them) based solely on automated 
processing and that has legal effects that significantly affect them. By preventing cer-
tain automated decisions without human intervention legal authorities have thereby 
foreclosed what could be one of the worst Kafkaesque nightmares.
Yet another consideration in this complex picture is the problem of time: the 
interpretation of a right to oblivion in an information society is linked to a con-
ception of  the passage of time. Data requested for removal must be “old” but, in 
the absence of certain parameters, how this will be observed will be subject to yet 
unknown interpretation practices. What is also important is the rule that oblivion, 
according to the “Google Spain” decision, should not apply to data related to seri-
ous crimes and sensitive social alarms or to facts that have raised great controversy, 
attention or public debate. The right to oblivion thus aims to preserve the publicity 
of data that concerns the individual and their life in a society, but which can put 
into danger their personal rights and reputation.
It is indeed appropriate to carefully assess the difference between the de-indexing 
of information – a category introduced by the European ruling – and the deletion of 
data. In fact, the right to forget in an information society may well become the de-
indexing of data – that is to say that the data is not deleted but ceases to be indexed, 
that is made visible by search engines (for example, in the recent GDPR).
To help the user to get even better in this maze, Google stated in a report, via its 
Advisory Council, some parameters and rules of conduct in an effort to clarify this 
issue. These rules show the approach that Google has decided to take to address the 
requirements forced by the ruling and the interpretive criteria it deemed appropri-
ate to adopt. The authors of this 2015 report, reunited in a “Advisory Council to 
Google on the Right to Be Forgotten”, state, in the beginning, that:
We were invited, as independent experts, to join the Advisory Council to 
Google on the Right to be Forgotten following the Court of Justice of the 
European Union’s ruling in Google Spain and Inc. vs. Agencia Española 
de Protección de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja Gonzalez C131/12 
(“the Ruling”) in May 2014. Google asked us to advise it on performing 
the balancing act between an individual’s right to privacy and the public’s 
interest in access to information. (p. 1) [. . .] We were convened to advise 
on criteria that Google should use in striking a balance, such as what role the 
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data subject plays in public life, or whether the information is outdated or no 
longer relevant. We also considered the best process and inputs to Google’s 
decision making, including input from the original publishers of information 
at issue, as potentially important aspects of the balancing exercise. (p. 2). The 
Ruling has been widely referred to as creating a “Right to be Forgotten.” 
This reference is so generally understood that this Advisory Council was 
convened to advise on the implementation of this right. In fact, the Ruling 
does not establish a general Right to be Forgotten. [. . .] Implementation of 
the Ruling does not have the effect of “forgetting” information about a data 
subject. Instead, it requires Google to remove links returned in search results 
based on an individual’s name when those results are “inadequate, irrelevant 
or no longer relevant, or excessive.” Google is not required to remove those 
results if there is an overriding public interest in them “for particular reasons, 
such as the role played by the data subject in public life.
(p. 3)
What is clear is that implementation of the Ruling does not have the effect of 
“forgetting” information about a data subject. Instead, it requires Google to remove 
links returned in search results based on an individual’s name when those results are 
“inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive.” Google is not required 
to remove those results if there is an overriding public interest in them “for par-
ticular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public life” (p. 3).
In the report, first of all, four criteria (none of which are decisive or pre-
dominant) are highlighted, on the basis of which the company considers a correct 
assessment of the possibility of de-indexing certain data: i) the role of the subject 
concerned; ii) the type of information covered by the request; iii) the source of 
information, and iv) the passing of time. The first criterion, the role of the person 
concerned, is set out clear in the document: the role of the person concerned in 
the public context must be emphasized depending on whether it is in the order 
of: a) subjects with a clear and effective role in the public dimension, and the 
greater the public relevance, the smaller the chance that a de-indexing request 
will be accepted by Google in the light of the overriding public interest in seeking 
information; b) subjects without a prominent role in public life, and de-indexing 
requests should be easier to find by the search engine; c) subjects with a public 
limited role in specific areas, where is not possible to detect a greater or lesser 
likelihood of removal (pp. 7–8).
As regards the type of information that can be the subject of the case, the 
Advisory Council considered it appropriate to define two categories of “data 
type”. The first category includes images or movies that represent the person con-
cerned, information about his sexual life and economic situation, identification and 
authorization credentials, sensitive data, contacts, minor information, untruthful 
news or data that expose the person concerned to harm. In relation to these news 
and data, confidentiality is presumed to prevail, although the existence of a public 
interest might justify an exception to this principle.
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In the second category, however, all the information normally held by a 
public interest would be covered. These include information on religious issues, 
political debates, or information related to public health and consumer protection 
or criminal activity, or data that contribute to debate on topics of general interest 
or with a historical interest, as well as information relating to scientific research or 
forms of artistic expression. In relation to this information, public interest in the 
news, and radical transparency (Lessig 2009), are presumed to prevail over a right 
to oblivion.
Referring to the source of the disputed news, Google claims that, in verifying 
the existence of a public interest, the source of the information and its purpose 
must be considered. For example, a major public interest can be considered to 
be based on news spread in journalistic activity or, in any case, on the activity of 
authoritative information sites. Finally, there is a temporal factor, it is said, that is 
essential in determining the existence of the right to de-index. Time is of particular 
importance in cases where the person’s public role is actually changed with the 
passing of time.
When submitting requests for de-indexing, the interested party must provide all 
the relevant information so that the site managers can make an appropriate assess-
ment. As for the relationship between site managers and the de-indexing process, 
the Advisory Council also recommends that the search engine operator, as a “good 
practice”, must indicate the removal of the content from the website, within the 
limits provided for by law. As is clear, the margin of discretion is high, and the 
earlier-mentioned parameters provide first and useful guidelines, but leave room 
for wide interpretation that, on the one hand, could allow better tailoring of a 
decision to the specificities of a concrete case and, on the other hand, may protect 
the rights of individuals and respect freedom of information and free speech.
For Balkin, the right to be forgotten raises three issues (Balkin 2018). The first 
one is called “Collateral Censorship”. In Balkin’s opinion, “the right to be forgot-
ten is a classic example of collateral censorship. Instead of going after the speaker, 
the state targets the infrastructure provider, and it threatens to hold the search 
engine company liable if it does not delink embarrassing articles from newspapers. 
The government puts pressure on the infrastructure owner to muffle (but not 
completely silence) the voice of the original speaker. The speaker is not completely 
silenced because if one knows the URL of the offending article, one can still access 
it; but of course, the point of the delisting is that without a search engine link most 
people will not be able to find it” (Balkin 2018, 1203).
The second issue is that the right to be forgotten “threatens the global Internet 
because the concern is that courts will eventually require global delinking as the 
appropriate remedy” (Balkin 2018, 1204). The last issue is that “the right to be 
forgotten is an example of how nation states (and in this case, the European Union) 
have tried to coopt private infrastructure owners and their capacities for private 
governance” (Balkin 2018, 1210).
What the right to be forgotten has reignited is the political issue of the right 
to oblivion and its impossibility in an information society where digital data are 
246 Giovanni Ziccardi
susceptible to potentially infinite preservation and circulation. The protection of 
digital data is no longer about an alternative between deletion and non-deletion, 
but the choice between, at the very least, three different options: the total deletion 
from the source website, the de-indexing of the entire content and the de-indexing 
by name. The choice of one option rather than another involves different repercus-
sions with regard to the balance between the rights of the author of the content or 
of the website of origin and those of the person concerned.
The social relevance of search engines as a means to access information on the 
Internet, together with the presence of monopolistic and oligopolistic positions, 
provide the conditions to control indexing and de-indexing. Regarding the right 
to de-indexization and, in a broader sense, the removal of search engine results, 
some political and technological choices could improve the situation. For example, 
the adoption of uniform procedures, guaranteed and transparent, to delimit, cir-
cumscribe and control the decision-making power and the discretion of the search 
engine, could limit dominant positions in the existing framework.
Addressing of all these issues and the interconnections between technological, 
social and political issues within this framework is proving to be very complex. 
The renunciation by the United States of part of the control by delegating to 
search engines and large platforms initial decision-making on the deletion of infor-
mation, alongside the exponential spread of artificial intelligence, algorithms and 
big data, are pushing away the possibility of effective legal control. The provisions 
contained in the GDPR with reference to the portability of data and, above all, 
the more powerful right of deletion, are useful attempts at rebalancing rights, and 
at any rate, illustrate a complex site of data politics.
Notes
1 GWI Social – Globalwebindex’s Quarterly Report on the latest trends in social 
networking, Q1 2015, www.thewebmate.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/GWI-
Social-Report-Q1-2015.pdf, p. 5.
2 Avail. at: https://transparencyreport.google.com/eu-privacy/overview?hl=it
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DATA CITIZENS
How to reinvent rights
Jennifer Gabrys
Introduction
Air pollution is increasingly recognized as one of the biggest public health crises on 
the planet (Das and Horton, 2017). Indeed, next to climate change, air pollution 
is a major environmental event that is affecting cities worldwide. From Beijing to 
London, and from Tehran to Warsaw, cities are experiencing varying levels of air 
pollution that harm urban dwellers’ health and that have significant economic costs. 
While world cities and manufacturing cities, resource cities and emerging cities all 
suffer from poor air quality, pollution levels are often quite disparate across these 
multiple sites. In New Delhi, instruments recently topped out at “999”1 and were 
not able to register further increases in pollution levels. The environmental crisis of air 
pollution overwhelmed the devices that were meant to measure and, by extension, 
the data used to govern the ill effects of air pollution. Responses to air pollution across 
cities worldwide are now formed through a complex mix of expert-based monitoring 
networks, official air quality indices, public health guidelines, home filtration systems, 
breathing technologies, low-emission transport routes, citizen monitoring and politi-
cal protest, along with local dynamics in the spread and concentration of pollutants, 
and international and intercontinental movements of air.
The “right to clean air” is variously upheld and observed in different urban 
environments. Although the official infrastructures for monitoring air pollution are 
meant to assure urban dwellers that constant monitoring, control and even care 
is given to the air that they breathe, ruptures in the systems and technologies of 
governance regularly occur. The expert practices and techniques that would ensure 
that urban air is breathable become the target for questioning and frustration. Urban 
dwellers at times doubt the accuracy of the air quality data that is made public; or 
they rail against the inertia within urban and national governments that they feel do 
little to improve air quality. For many urban dwellers, expertise folds in on itself in 
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these scenarios, and seems to become more of a defensive structure for “elites,” and 
less of a process of accountability. Expertise alone, and expertise in its usual static 
configuration, is inexorably remade through the urban-environmental demands of 
air pollution. Citizen monitoring of air quality, and the citizen data that it generates, 
then become ways to challenge, contest and account for harmful environmental 
conditions and to pursue the right to clean air.
While data is often seen to be something that is collected about citizens (typi-
cally by large technology companies), there are just as many instances now arising of 
citizens generating their own data. Whether to document lived experiences through 
social media platforms, to sense air pollution to challenge governmental readings, 
or to address conflict in areas of development, citizens are collecting, analyzing and 
communicating data in order to operationalize new types of evidence. This chapter 
documents how citizen practices of using low-cost and digital sensor technologies to 
monitor air quality and changing urban environments in Southeast London gener-
ate distinct modes of citizen data, as well as specific formations of data citizens and 
data relations. In collaboration with the Citizen Sense research project, residents, 
workers and volunteers in the Deptford and New Cross neighborhoods of Southeast 
London took up air pollution sensing technologies to monitor air quality. Citizen 
sensing technologies were often located adjacent to construction sites and traffic 
corridors where rapid urban development was underway in order to demonstrate 
problems with air quality. Citizen generated data then became one way to attempt 
to intervene in and reshape processes of urbanization, especially as they contribute 
to environmental harm.
By discussing this specific set of citizen data practices tuned to urban envi-
ronmental change, I investigate the ways in which data becomes a medium for 
democratic engagement, and how participants become “data citizens” through the 
collection and operationalization of data. I ask: How do multiple and different 
types of data and data practices, including citizen sensing, constitute distinct data 
citizens? In what ways do data citizens mobilize rights—to data, to the air, to the 
city and to political life? And how does citizen data potentially both supplant and 
reinvent rights as the way in which urban inhabitants mobilize in support of the 
urban realm? I take up these questions to consider what sorts of political subjects 
concretize through the collection and production of data to document, contest and 
argue for urban environments.
Above and beyond a right to clean air, citizen data practices on the one hand 
could become a way to materialize a distinct “right to the city.” Drawing on the 
work of Henri Lefebvre (1996), this chapter examines how data citizens might 
express a right to the city through rights to data. For Lefebvre, the right to the city 
was a call to consider how participation in the city might be enabled for often-
excluded urban inhabitants. Such participation spanned from the right to public 
space, difference, housing, political engagement, social life and even information 
technology. The right to the city complemented and potentially extended the 
“abstract rights” of citizens (1996, 157). Lefebvre was reinventing rights and their 
practice—as open ended and in the making—through his call to the right to the city. 
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As I suggest here, the right to data could be read as one articulation of the right to 
the city, where citizens might participate in the analysis and making of evidence in 
order to support and create urban life. This is a particular way of understanding the 
right to the city through the right of citizens to generate, collect, analyze and com-
municate data that can dispute and question official accounts of problems such as 
air quality in relation to urban processes. Through these data practices, distinctive 
modes of data citizens that claim a right to the city could materialize.
However, the right to the city, despite its call to accommodate diverse urban 
inhabitants, could on another level compel particular modes of participation in 
order for urban citizens to be recognized as such—as active participants, made vis-
ible through recognizable rights claims or legible interventions. In relation to the 
citizen sensing of air quality in Southeast London, I then consider how practices 
of participation, rights and citizenship do not always unfold so easily. Drawing on 
Lauren Berlant (2011) and her discussion of proliferating, multiple, intimate and 
even depressive modes of citizenship, this chapter seeks to differentiate modes of data 
citizenship and urban citizenship that challenge—and potentially reinvent—the right 
to the city and the right to data through alternative approaches to participation and 
citizenship. Data citizens might in one way be less oriented toward the overt ambi-
tions of rights, and more engaged with finding provisional techniques for staving off 
and surviving dispossession, pollution and injustice that often accompany increasing 
urbanization. A right to the city promises powers of engagement and transformation 
that can seem to be remote possibilities for many urban dwellers. For urban citizens 
turned data citizens, rights (even of the Lefebvrian sort) could appear as a murky 
form of “cruel optimism” (Berlant, 2011).
This chapter then considers how the mobilization of data and evidence can 
potentially displace and reinvent rights—including the right to the city. Rather 
than refer to rights, here data—“the facts”—becomes a moveable baseline for mak-
ing arguments in support of urban life, but without a clear arrangement of rights as 
such. Rather than appeal to a right to housing, for instance, urban inhabitants might 
demonstrate the amount of new construction that is not affordable to local resi-
dents, thereby creating data-based arguments that generate particular observations 
about unlivable conditions. In contrast to citizens who practice a right to the city, 
here data becomes a stopgap measure to sustain an urban way of life that is continu-
ally under threat, but for which very few rights exist. Data citizens form where the 
right to the city meets cruel optimism.
Citizen data could, in this sense, be a technique that manifests on the other 
edge of cruel optimism. People who might not feel that rights are a clear point 
of political attachment, in principle or practice, instead create evidentiary tech-
niques to challenge the dispossession, environmental damage and injustice of 
neoliberal urbanization. Data for Black Lives is an example of such a movement 
that involves developing alternative data collection and analysis techniques to 
create new narratives and to demonstrate systemic racism. In this practice, rights 
are not always self evident, since there are many rights that black peoples have 
but that are often not protected or observed, and there are many more data-based 
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arguments that might be made that do not have a clear reference to rights. Instead 
of data mobilized to support rights as such, data could then be mobilized to 
support struggles for survival in the absence of rights. Data citizens are not iden-
tifiable here through the usual categories of membership, whether to nation-state 
or group, or through reference to designated rights as such, but rather through 
operational practices that form particular political subjects, relations and com-
munities by working with and through evidence. This is a way of reinventing 
rights in practice by working through concrete struggles to evidence harm and 
to generate more livable urban worlds. I now turn to consider how urban citizen 
sensing data is mobilized in these ways.
Right to the city, right to data
In a chapter on data, it might seem circuitous to engage first in a discussion of the 
right to the city. But such an engagement is deliberate, since it brings about another 
approach for investigating the distinct contributions to be made by urban citizen 
sensor data on environmental conditions such as air quality. Data might often be 
an expression of certain types of rights when connected to online and social media 
spaces, such as rights to privacy, to be forgotten, to data protection, and to open 
data. Here, I take up another way of thinking about how data citizens might form 
through the right to the city. Lefebvre developed the “right to the city” as a way 
to move from “thought to action,” and to break open the abstract—and expert—
urban science discourses that often seemed to operate on a self-referential and 
“meta” level (1996, 152). The “right to the city” is first and foremost a statement 
about how participation in the city makes and remakes the city—as an “oeuvre” 
(1996, 173–174). As a place of exchanges and encounters, the city has the potential 
to spark into being new urban societies, new urban subjects and new praxis (1996, 
149–150). The right to the city, as well as the right to difference, the right to ways 
of life, the right to inhabitation and the right to information, are thoughts that gal-
vanize such praxis (1996). Indeed, for Lefebvre, “a thought which tends towards 
an opening leads the struggle” (1996, 63). The praxis that Lefebvre imagines and 
proposes is not one of generating manageable outputs. Instead, it is a praxis that 
seeks to create the city as an ongoing collective project.
Praxis then involves the actual undertaking of the right to the city. Praxis is 
a constellation that forms through the exploration of the right to the city as a 
thought and struggle. Because it constitutes “social life,” for Lefebvre praxis can be 
investigated sociologically, since “sociological thought seeks an understanding and 
reconstitution of the integrative capacities of the urban as well as the conditions of 
practical participation” (1996, 153; cf. Balibar, Cassin and Laugier, 2014). As a way 
of working across formative principles and concrete ways of life, praxis also dem-
onstrates how “there is an urgent need to change intellectual approaches and tools” 
that might incorporate new and unfamiliar methods (1996, 151). This research on 
citizen sensing in many ways forms as an inquiry into such conditions of practical 
participation, while it also seeks to experiment with new and unfamiliar methods 
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of urban inhabitation. Praxis captures the thinking and the doing, as well as the 
generation of new thoughts and practices that can transform customary approaches, 
here to urban environmental problems.
The “right to the city” is a concept that has been extensively discussed and 
debated in urban research and practice. While there is not space here to summa-
rize this vast field of research, there are two particular strands that are particularly 
relevant for this study. The first is an emerging area that looks at Lefebvre’s 
under-examined reference to the right to information as a key component of the 
right to the city. Indeed, Lefebvre (1996) suggested that the right to information 
would go along with the right to the city and the right to difference so that urban 
inhabitants (or citadins) could provide their own accounts of urban life. Here, Joe 
Shaw and Mark Graham (2017) have discussed how citizens might have the right 
to information that is open, transparent and in support of urban democratic life. 
They contrast this project with the less generous practices of Google, which they 
suggest constructs exclusionary cities through its search and mapping functions. 
The second area of research is a more long-standing set of investigations that 
engage with the right to the city as a way to support and understand grassroots, 
DIY and citizen-led projects. Writers from Margaret Crawford (2011) to Mark 
Purcell (2002) and Don Mitchell (2003), as well as Doina Petrescu and Kim 
Trogal (2017) have elaborated on the ways in which cities form through concrete 
actions and engagements.
These studies are important reference points since on the one hand they dem-
onstrate that the right to the city can both mobilize and capture collective urban 
energies, but on the other hand that it also leaves open many questions about 
who has the right to the city, and under which circumstances. While the right to 
the city could seem to be characterized by a set of universal requirements such as 
housing, there are always more (incomplete) rights emerging. The practice of real-
izing these rights is also in process, and often marked by struggle. The rights that 
materialize through practice are less a formal legal script, and more a dynamic and 
experimental opening into urban life. They are “rights in the making” (Lefebvre 
1996, 179). In this way, the undertaking of the right to the city is more relational 
rather than teleological, since it is less focused on arriving at a finished urban form, 
and more attuned to the ways of life that are experienced and sustained, as well as 
the political subjects that urban inhabitants become in these collective urban pro-
jects (see also Harvey, 2008).
For Lefebvre, rights are aspirational and pursued as part of a hopeful praxis. The 
right to the city is a proposition for how cities might be made more expansive, 
generous, creative and accommodating for all urban citizens. The right to the city 
then sparks another way of thinking about rights and the city by forming a thought 
about collective urban life that galvanizes everyday practice. The right to the city 
here goes beyond human rights or liberal rights, and to a certain extent encom-
passes a sort of “new right” similar to environmental rights (Isin and Ruppert 
2015, 23). But in another way, the right to the city involves the reshaping of rights 
as something collectively constituted, something made in everyday practice, and 
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something that forms the urban worlds that we inhabit. So too would the right to 
information, or here the right to data, involve a practice of rights in the making 
that seeks to realize ways of engaging with data that contributes to the formation 
of political subjects, relations and communities.
As compelling as the proposal is for the right to the city, in the contemporary 
post-1968 context it is difficult not to read Lefebvre’s text alongside other articula-
tions of rights and citizenship that also grapple with utopic or optimistic political 
impulses, only to point out that there may be a harsh aspect to such political aspi-
rations. Berlant (2011) has engaged extensively with the promises and perils of 
citizenship, along with modes of democratic engagement that are affectively bind-
ing, yet which also can be productive of “cruel optimism” in their brandishing of 
possibility that does not manifest. While right to the city projects have achieved sig-
nificant presence through analyses of grassroots urbanism (Mitchell 2003; Petrescu 
and Trogal 2017), and have also been integrated into urban campaigns and United 
Nations Habitat goals (UN 2017), still for urban dwellers in many parts of the world 
the right to the city is ever-elusive in how it might materialize in lived urban expe-
rience that is marked by ongoing struggle.
The right to the city seems to promise that a more democratic and livable 
city could be realized through praxis. Yet in the process of attempting to realize 
collective urbanization, many struggling urbanites are often worn out and worn 
down. As Berlant writes about such political attachments, people are “worn out 
by the promises that they have attached to in this world” (2011, 28). Moreover, 
for all of its evocative power, the right to the city can seem to work within a 
universal, normative, masculine, and actively enabled form of urban citizenship. 
Such citizenship would in part require that urban dwellers struggle and confront 
the city in its injustices and exclusions, often in public forums and settings. While 
there have been a number of studies focused on the tactical, subversive and DIY 
approaches to urbanism (e.g., Iveson 2013), these are often temporary interven-
tions that are undertaken by particular groups of urban dwellers, and which do 
not necessarily extend to remaking processes of urbanization, or to challeng-
ing the “liberal monohumanist premises” (Wynter and McKittrick 2015, 11) of 
urban citizenship.
While the right to the city is meant to be equally available to all, these rights 
are conjectured through various modes of being present and struggling for those 
rights. Indeed, it could be said that for many people, the very act of attempting to 
take up the right to the city would attract considerable harm and violence, since 
people of color, women, disabled people, migrants, and many other urban dwell-
ers are not as easily entitled to urban practices that implement a right to the city. 
In other words, they do not necessarily have “the right to have rights” (Arendt 
1951; DeGooyer et  al. 2018). Indeed, as Purcell has noted, “The right to the 
city is not inherently liberatory” (2002, 103). Not all urban inhabitants will be 
equally empowered, if at all, in the struggle for the right to the city. Those who 
do realize empowerment could create new exclusions for other urban inhabit-
ants. Although Lefebvre sought to be “radically inclusive” where urban rights 
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extended to everyone and “not just to officially designated ‘citizens’” (Crawford 
2011, 35), urban struggles inevitably materialize in concrete ways that have dif-
ferent consequences for diverse urban inhabitants in how they are addressed.
While for Lefebvre the right to the city should be available to all—and he was 
interested in this being a diverse all—Berlant somewhat differently seeks a prolif-
eration of citizenship, as well as the forms of relation that accompany these modes 
of citizenship. Rather than bundle rights into a practice available to a singular if 
diverse all, she tunes into the plurality of political subjects and the struggles they 
encounter. In this way, struggle is no less crucial for Berlant, but it is through strug-
gle that even more modes of citizenship might be realized (Berlant and Seitz 2013). 
Engaging with this proliferation of modes of citizenship, I would suggest that such 
diversity of different political subjects also extends to a diversity of urban worlds 
inhabited. Citizenship is a sited, collective and relational practice that takes up and 
responds to a city in different ways. As Berlant notes, “Citizenship is the practical 
site of a theoretical existence, in that it allows for the reproduction of a variety of 
kinds of law in everyday life” (2007, 38). These modes of practice demonstrate 
commitments to struggle for worlds that might be more livable, but they also are 
unevenly available and show that failure is likely.
Failure, however, is not the flip side of success, but rather is a recognition of the 
pitfalls in praxis, where a thought that leads a struggle will also encounter the gritty 
conditions in which struggle unfolds. Failure in this sense involves the “impasses of 
the political” (2011, 4) where the usual modes of engagement become untenable. 
The reinvention of citizenship, rights, communities and the worlds that are made 
and sustained through political relations can, in these moments of impasse, begin 
to appear more viable. As Berlant writes,
It may be a relation of cruel optimism, when, despite an awareness that the 
normative political sphere appears as a shrunken, broken, or distant place of 
activity among elites, members of the body politic return periodically to its 
recommitment ceremony and scenes.
(2011, 227)
Such recommitment can involve paying attention to how political formations hold 
together, how they fall apart, and how they might be remade toward a “more livable 
and intimate sociality” (2011, 227). Striking an atmospheric note, Berlant suggests 
that “ambient citizenship,” where the affective infrastructures of everyday life are 
tuned into, presents a way to move beyond the normative structures of governance 
to reveal how these more livable conditions might be realized (2011, 230–231). This 
is another zone of the political, which develops along with citizenship practices as 
part of the infrastructural commoning of political life (Berlant 2016).
Here I consider how “cruel optimism” accompanies the right to the city. The 
point of such an endeavor is less to lambast the aspirations of the right to the city, 
and more to engage with the inevitable complications and complexities that come 
from trying to engage in urban democratic processes. The right to data, moreover, 
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becomes one particular way in which the right to the city is pursued and expressed, 
and yet also can be derailed, whether through sclerotic urban governance struc-
tures, rigid arenas of expertise, or exclusionary processes for making an account 
of urban worlds beyond economic growth. The right to data, which is neither 
self-evident nor given, is then tied to ways of constituting distinct modes of data 
citizens that proliferate in these sites of urban struggle.
Creating data citizens
“Data citizen” is a term that is in broad use across industry, research and activism 
to variously describe the ways in which subjects are constituted as techno-political 
actors through their data practices. Within the tech industry, data citizen is used 
in a general way to suggest an ease and accessibility of participation with data 
technology, and with data analysis techniques more specifically. “Citizen” is often 
appended to digital technology to give a seemingly democratic gleam to these 
developments, from citizen sensing to data citizens. While “data citizen” is vari-
ously deployed to refer to the intersection of data and subjects, it can often be 
somewhat unclear what makes these citizens political subjects as such, and how 
data contributes to this formation. For instance, in what ways does political par-
ticipation unfold through engagement with data? Are these practices direct and 
deliberate engagements to collect data to act on a political problem, or do they 
involve becoming entangled within infrastructures of data collection and mobili-
zation that are necessarily political—or both?
Data citizens, as science and technology researchers Judith Gregory and Geoffrey 
Bowker discuss, can assemble through particular quantitative techniques such as 
those facilitated by wearable technologies. In their estimation, data citizens are 
constituted with and through “an ecology of microdata,” rather than preceding this 
relation as such. “We are,” they suggest, “constituted differently as data citizens at 
different technological moments” (2016, 220). Data citizens do not assemble with 
wearables through a premeditated plan to participate, but rather through the ecolo-
gies that are joined up through their ongoing data collection. Indeed, such data 
citizens might find that their “rights” to data are restricted if they attempt to access 
and use their own data or the data of others in these ecologies. Data citizens, in this 
sense, are not necessarily always working in a deliberative or democratic vein. If 
we consider the “conditions of practical participation” discussed earlier, there are 
multiple instances of participation that do not lead to a “right to” anything as such. 
Instead, participation can become the basis for further de-democratization, even 
while the term citizen is mobilized to suggest otherwise. Participation can in this 
way generate conditions of cruel optimism.
There are then multiple and competing modes of political subjectivity that 
materialize through the language and practices of “data citizens.” These plural 
ontologies, far from consolidating into a single trajectory of empowerment, instead 
demonstrate the multiple uses and abuses to which data citizens can be put. Given 
that data citizens materialize through concrete practices, the modes and forms of 
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data citizens are inevitably multiple. The practices of gathering and mobilizing 
data can be crucial to the formation of data citizens as particular political subjects. 
Numerous writers, from Isin and Ruppert (2015) to Gabrys, Pritchard and Barratt 
(2016), have suggested that citizenship can be expressed and materialized through 
data practices, which constitute rather than predetermine political subjects.
In this way, data citizen as a term takes on distinct meaning in relation to 
citizen sensing. Here, data citizen as a term transforms and generates new perspec-
tives on data and citizens through urban sensing experiments, where the creation 
of citizen data in relation to the urban environment can have particular effects. 
Environmental sensors are meant to enable and activate particular forms of envi-
ronmental citizenship. They embody a version of the good life that is meant to 
be in reach for anyone, anywhere. Plugging in, activating a digital kit and join-
ing a disparate community of users, are the steps to be followed that in principle 
should mobilize environmental rights in the making. Yet rather than unfold a more 
straightforward form of political engagement, citizen sensing kits and the citizen 
data they generate can often given rise to even more complex struggles with urban 
environmental life. Considerable work goes in to collecting and analyzing data 
sets, yet citizen data is often treated with suspicion and disregarded by regulators 
and industry. Indeed, even the right of citizens to monitor environments can be 
thrown into question, with practices, protocols and devices all subject to legal 
intervention and scrutiny (Kravets 2017; Pidot 2015). The promise of the political 
subject who is meant to form through the collection and communication of envi-
ronmental data is then troubled. It is at this site of struggle that other forms of data 
citizens and urban citizens proliferate, less as fully formed legal actors, and more as 
persons attached to, yet haunted by, the promises of democratic life.
As one of the stated areas of inquiry for this collection, in order to understand 
and influence formations of data politics it is also necessary to understand how 
data citizens materialize (Ruppert, Isin and Bigo 2017). As Gregory and Bowker’s 
work suggests, many studies on data citizens focus on technologies and data gener-
ated through wearables or social media, which perform particular expressions of 
consumer-subjects. In this analysis of citizen sensing, however, data citizens mate-
rialize through the production of citizen data using low-cost digital environmental 
monitoring technologies. Citizen sensing technologies are promoted as a way to 
encourage participation in environmental problems. Yet the process of sensing 
environments, collecting data, documenting and addressing environmental harm 
is also the site of an uneven formation of a citizen-sensing political subject. While 
citizen sensing technologies could very well reinforce and reinscribe these modali-
ties of consumer-subjects, I suggest there are different ways of engaging with the 
possibilities of citizen data in relation to urban change and conflict that can rework 
both data citizens and processes of urbanization. The right to the city and the prac-
tices that it mobilizes become ways to rethink and rework the ongoing struggles 
with data in situ, as struggles that remake cities and their inhabitants, as well as their 
rights. If data practices contribute to the formation of citizens as political subjects, 
then it would seem they are also fused with the articulation of rights in the making.
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This analysis examines engagements with data citizens and citizen data to 
consider how data is on the one hand produced in and connected to urban envi-
ronments through sensors that monitor air quality; and on the other hand to study 
how citizens form environmental evidence that relates to their lived experiences. 
Urban sensing and the data it generates can become a way to make claims to 
and about urban environments by articulating individual and collective grievances 
about pollution, development, displacement and dispossession. Data practices in 
this milieu become expressions of urban citizenship, where a right to the city could 
be undertaken through sensor data and on-the-ground observations. In these re-
articulations of rights to data and to the city, there are also surfacings of distinct 
modes of citizens and citizenship, as processes, relations, and communities, rather 
than fixed prescriptions for political life. Data citizens are constituted through prac-
tices of forming and making evidence, whether by generating their own data or 
compiling and analyzing diverse datasets—or both. But the data citizen as politi-
cal subject is neither settled in relation to articulated rights nor easily identifiable 
through membership to a group such as a nation-state. Rather, data citizens can 
form through struggles with the erosion or absence of rights, and through the 
inability or futility of appealing to rights. Evidentiary techniques then become an 
ongoing process for materializing data citizenship as an affective and collective 
infrastructure for engaging with and intervening in urban worlds.
Citizen data, urban worlds
For the past six years, I have been leading the Citizen Sense research project, 
which investigates the use of DIY and low-cost digital environmental sensors. The 
research group has looked at existing sensor practices used to monitor radiation 
after Fukushima, and practices to monitor methane emissions at lost, abandoned and 
orphaned oil and gas wells in Pennsylvania, among many other forms of citizen-
based environmental monitoring. One component of these investigations has been 
to look at the rise of digital sensors as environmental tools that are more readily 
available, and that are meant to expand the possible participants in environmental 
monitoring beyond expert scientists and technologists. This is the promise of sen-
sors, but there is relatively little research to see how these practices actually play out.
Adopting a participatory and practice-based set of research methods, the Citizen 
Sense research group has identified communities and practitioners already using 
different sorts of environmental monitors, and then through a process of dialogue 
and distributed creation developed monitoring kits that could be used in response 
to environmental problems. While our research group assembles monitoring tool-
kits for adaptation and use, the process of building a monitoring infrastructure takes 
place with communities and in response to their specific concerns. In our most 
recent research spanning nearly two years from 2016 to 2017, we collaborated with 
residents of the Deptford and New Cross neighborhoods in Southeast London to 
monitor air quality in relation to traffic, development and industry emissions. This 
site of former industry, dockyards and a historic naval shipyard has undergone 
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successive waves of regeneration. Since at least the 1990s to the present day, com-
munities have organized in order to be able to contribute to, respond to or contest 
processes of development. In the current context, the urban fabric in this location 
has been reworked and gentrified through new development schemes, master plans 
and public-private initiatives. Here, the city is being made and remade, less as an 
expression of the right to the city, and more as a set of developer projects that lead 
to ongoing contestations over the urban environment.
Indeed, a number of development sites were and continue to be actively con-
tested by residents, where planning permission was sought (and in some instances, 
granted) to develop relatively unaffordable housing in the place of community 
gardens and social housing. Participants in this neighborhood have then been espe-
cially concerned about rapid rates of construction underway, as well as large (and 
typically luxury) housing developments yet to come that would significantly alter 
the area. One small area, Creekside, located on the eastern edge of Deptford had 
at least five separate development sites underway during the time of this monitor-
ing study. Residents suspected that such developments were likely contributors to 
increased air pollutants throughout the development lifecycle. From demolition 
and site clearance, to construction and heavy goods vehicles, as well as increased 
density and traffic once development is completed, the environmental effects of 
construction can be felt for years. At the same time, the impacts of construction are 
inevitably bound up with the perceived lack of economic and social justice related 
to new developments, as people are displaced from social housing and often not 
able to afford to live in the area once the brunt of negative environmental effects 
from development had been endured.
In order to contest development, as well as to seek compensation from develop-
ers in the form of community development funds, many residents and community 
groups had undertaken environmental monitoring projects in order to demon-
strate the ill effects of living with ongoing construction. From traffic counts to 
air quality studies using diffusion tubes, local citizens generated multiple forms of 
data about their environments. People also encountered, analyzed, and used data 
from governmental entities and industry, including in the form of planning docu-
ments in online portals; community meeting minutes; environmental impact and 
environmental assessment reports; official air quality data; construction company 
self-reporting on pollutant levels (including air, noise and light); utility company 
data on pollutants from national infrastructure projects (including air and noise); 
tree map data designating tree locations and numbers; tree removal applications; 
social statistics on population, density, and income; social media data (including 
Twitter and Facebook); crowdfunding data; petition data; word-of-mouth data 
(often on new development schemes); and many more types of data on the London 
Data Store and the Lewisham Borough website.
In these numerous engagements with data, environments and governance, peo-
ple became data citizens in part through wrestling with these multiple forms of data. 
They analyzed data that was publically available, they sought data through FOIs, 
they documented events and environmental disturbances by creating their own 
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datasets, and they communicated and contested changes to the urban environment 
through these multiple data sources. Citizens also produced their own data often 
as a way to counter or qualify government statements and industry claims. People 
produced data in the absence of official monitoring networks, or where auster-
ity measures meant that data was not sufficiently analyzed or acted upon. These 
multiple data practices are all ways of making evidence, in part through creating 
new citizen data, and in part through linking different data sources in new ways 
to create particular accounts of processes of urbanization, and to intervene in these 
processes. It was in this context that the Citizen Sense research group collaborated 
with residents to develop a citizen-led air-quality monitoring network that would 
generate data to be integrated into these complex and multiple data practices, and 
to research the ways in which data citizenship might materialize or transform.
Setting up a citizen monitoring network
Because many inhabitants in this part of Southeast London already had established 
data practices of various sorts, whether in the form of environmental monitor-
ing or analyzing government datasets, our collaboration with communities then 
involved learning more about their data practices, while also engaging in dialogue, 
workshops, walks, meetings, and site visits to communicate about the particular 
configurations of citizen sensing technologies. Far from acting as “experts” with a 
singular way of accounting for urban environments, we contributed data practices 
that joined up with existing community infrastructures, while also investigating 
how these infrastructures could adapt and grow. We were, in the process, also 
becoming particular data citizens as we collaborated with inhabitants and learned 
more about concerns in the area.
Along with learning more about ongoing community campaigns in the area, we 
worked with residents to develop an air quality monitoring kit. In response to the 
area and concerns, we developed bespoke sensors that we called the “Dustbox.” 
This device was a small plug-and-play sensor measuring particulate matter 2.5 
(PM
2.5
), a particularly hazardous air pollutant. The Dustboxes were housed in 
3D-printed ceramic forms based on the shape of particulates when viewed under 
an electron microscope. The sensors were developed to be a tactical and affective 
device that would build up into an engaging community-monitoring infrastruc-
ture. We first held a workshop and walk to introduce participants to the device, 
as well as to discuss key monitoring locations and to address air quality topics. We 
then set up a monitoring network that included up to 30 Dustbox sensors moni-
toring PM
2.5
 over a span of nearly 10 months, although the number of Dustboxes 
running varied throughout the monitoring period. Numerous visits were made to 
monitoring sites to set up devices, connect them to Wi-Fi networks, find suitable 
outdoor space for monitoring urban air, and troubleshoot along the way as devices 
went offline or required repairs (see also Houston, Gabrys and Pritchard, 2019).
In addition to setting up the Dustbox sensors, we built a database and online plat-
form that we called “Airsift,” where participants could view and analyze their data 
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in relative real-time. The Airsift tool was an attempt to investigate not just citizen 
sensing technologies as DIY devices, but also to work toward DIY data analysis as a 
key part of how citizen data could be investigated and used. Using Airsift, we found 
that this spatially dense community network of sensors allowed us to zero in on 
particular urban patterns, processes and distributions of pollutants. Often working 
at the scale of 1-hour and 24-hour mean levels of particulates, we could attend to 
the specific and comparative timing and distribution of pollutants in the area, which 
allowed us to gain a much more detailed picture of urban activities underway.
If citizens collect data but their data is closed down or inaccessible to analysis, 
then this practice might more accurately be referred to as crowdsourcing, since the 
data is owned and mined by actors other than the citizens who collect the data. 
Working with the community and building on our previous citizen sensing projects, 
we developed and refined the Airsift DIY data platform so that citizens could review 
and analyze their own data as well as other data in the network. We held workshops 
to discuss ways of analyzing and using data in support of community projects. Data 
in this sense was more than “open,” since it was not simply a CSV file made available 
by a government entity in a data repository, for instance, but instead was embedded 
in the situated monitoring and data collection practices, as well as available for analy-
sis, and mobilized within projects to advocate for the urban environment.
Working with citizen data and assembling data stories
As the monitoring network was forming as set of technology installations and urban 
relations, we worked with participants in a series of data workshops to introduce 
the Airsift tool, to work through analyses of different citizen datasets, to compare 
different monitoring sites, and to strategize about where else in the area might be 
useful to place monitors and gather data. The data that was accumulating from 30 
Dustboxes sited across Southeast London began to inform particular modes of data 
citizenship. When arguments about urban housing were not heeded by the local 
council—as there was neither a specific “right” to be claimed, nor did people feel 
as though a rights claim would be respected—participants combined further data 
about air quality to form evidence about the impacts from ongoing construction.
As a register of urban environmental processes, the Dustbox citizen data began 
to unfold in relation to everyday urban life. Moments when air pollutants were 
registering particularly high levels became an event where participants would pool 
collective knowledge about industry activity, fires, high pollution drifting in from 
Europe or other events such as intensive construction activity that might help to 
explain peak readings. In this sense, quantitative sensor data did not provide an 
absolute or definitive reading of urban events. Instead, citizen data became most 
illuminated when multiple observations and other forms of data came together to 
corroborate and also transform lived urban experience.
We captured our collective findings from the 10 months of Dustbox monitoring 
in seven Deptford Data Stories that document and analyze the citizen data, as well 
as interweave the numerical measurements with on-the-ground observations and 
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images that form urban air pollution narratives. We discovered that major traffic 
intersections and construction activity, as well as the River Thames, all show up as 
likely pollution sources, often at levels well above the WHO 24-hour guideline of 
25 µg/m3. We also found that green spaces and sheltered gardens can have much 
lower levels of PM
2.5
. The Deptford Data Stories provided a way to engage with citi-
zen data beyond presenting measurements to instead link up lived urban experience 
with interpretations of the citizen datasets and proposals for concrete action in the 
urban realm. Citizen data in this case was not seeking to fulfill a regulatory function, 
but rather it was asking different questions and providing different insights about air 
quality pollution in relation to broader urban environmental processes. 
Here, the right to the city and the right to data concretized into particular modes 
of data citizenship that drew on existing urban relations while building new ones, 
that tied into community projects while advancing other propositions for how 
urbanization might unfold. Processes of making evidence—the right to data—also 
created particular ways of claiming the right to the city. Yet these rights were 
unevenly recognized by local and national government, by industry and developers, 
and by other “stakeholders” who might respond to data citizens as they claim a right 
to the city, a right to data, and the right to clean air. Proposals made in relation to 
data gathered were then frequently developed in response to the impasses experi-
enced and anticipated while advocating for the urban environment.
Plural data, plural urbanisms
While data citizens form through the multiple registers of urban environmental 
data, they also have the potential to challenge the usual ways of documenting and 
addressing environmental conditions. The practices of data citizens, furthermore, 
raise distinctly different perspectives on urban conditions. The right to data in many 
ways materializes not the right to the city, but rather the multiple cities that urban 
inhabitants traverse and bring into being. Indeed, one air quality officer I have 
spoken to about air pollution levels in London stated that there was little that could 
be done about PM
2.5
 levels in their borough, as the annual average of 19 µg/m3 
varied by only +/-1 µg/m3 across their monitoring area, and particulate levels were 
seen to be attributable to pollution traveling from outside of the immediate area, 
or even from Europe or farther afield. From the expert’s-eye view it might seem 
sensible to agree with the intractability of this problem, even though annual PM
2.5
 
levels of 19 µg/m3 are nearly twice the World Health Organisation (WHO) annual 
guideline of 10 µg/m3. Yet expert practices and infrastructures are here attending 
to the problem of air pollution in a particular way, assessing data sets according to 
annual averages as a measure of compliance (or not) with air quality objectives. The 
numbers, which apparently capture the facts of air pollution in London, will not 
budge, and so it seems we are stuck with the air we’ve got.
But data citizens can offer a different picture of urban air pollution, where differ-
ently granulated patterns arise and distinct city processes come into view. Inevitably, 
in the process of researching and using sensor technologies multiple questions arise 
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as to the accuracy of devices, the actors who are able to put forward evidence with 
sensor data, and the procedures and protocols that might be in place to ensure the 
validity of citizen data. When citizens work with “indicative” air quality sensors 
that produce “just good enough data” (Gabrys, Pritchard and Barratt, 2016), how-
ever, we have found that the compliance-based approach of air quality monitoring 
offers just one particular way of investigating urban air pollution. Citizen air quality 
monitoring can demonstrate a much different set of attachments and concerns, as 
well as ways of working with data and evidence. Here, citizen data does not attempt 
to replicate or become an organ of expertise. However, it does differently constitute 
the problem of air pollution, which points to the plural urbanisms that converge 
through major and ongoing environmental crises such as air pollution. Data citi-
zens, in this sense, are generated in relation to numerous forms of data and data 
practices, which become sites of collective making, interpretation and narration.
At the same time, the right to data and the right to the city become entan-
gled with the right to produce evidence. Certain ways of establishing the facts of 
environmental problems are treated as more credible than others, with significant 
consequences for how cities develop and urban life is lived. Ruha Benjamin sug-
gests that empiricism often only works for some, since no amount of evidence will 
be accepted if the “facts” challenge the status quo or are presented by marginal 
voices. As she writes, “The facts, alone, will not save us” (2016, 2). The data citi-
zen, in this sense, is not automatically an enlightened political subject. Indeed, it 
could be an exclusive and exclusionary position, since data also requires environ-
ments of relevance in which to take hold. Whatever accomplishment citizen data 
makes in its observations, infrastructure and collective experiencing, in order for 
it to evidence environmental harm and realize improved environmental condi-
tions it also needs to set in motion the worlds that enable that data to have effect. 
Effect in this sense is less about the success or failure of data, and more about the 
impasses that can arise when prevailing forms of political engagement break down 
or demonstrate their hollow promises. The practices of data citizens can in this 
way constitute processes of proposing and working toward these worlds where 
citizen data matter, and where the effects of data contribute to more livable pro-
cesses of urbanization.
Conclusion: Propositions for citizen data and urban worlds
In a recent examination of sensing air quality in Program Earth (Gabrys 2016), I sug-
gest that it might be possible to engage with data neither as free-floating facts, nor 
as the monolithic products of expertise, but rather as creatures that are constituted 
with and through environments of relevance. I draw on Alfred North Whitehead’s 
discussion of creatures as the actual entities and occasions that concresce through 
processes and relations (Whitehead 1985). When we consider how monitoring 
practices are ways of creaturing air pollution data, then it is also possible to attend 
to the environments of relevance in which data is formed, the problems it responds 
to and is attached to, and its importance for those who generate this evidence. 
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Creaturing is a process whereby data can come to matter. But as I suggest here, 
the different creatures of air pollution data can also create sites of struggle. Which 
data matters, and which urban worlds are sustained? Which data is overlooked, and 
which urban worlds are extinguished?
While air pollution monitoring instruments can be made to align, more or less, 
to detect a similar pollutant level in space and time, the actual uptake, use, deploy-
ment of sensors as well as the generation of data veers into different directions when 
used by air quality officials for regulation, and when used by residents observing and 
documenting changes in the urban fabric. Not to attend to citizen data is to neglect 
urban dwellers’ attachments to their cities, to the problems that matter in their 
urban lives, and to the practices whereby they document, analyze and communi-
cate evidence that speaks to their concerns. To make expertise the only register for 
producing legitimate data is to forgo and forget the importance of the environments 
that sustain data and allows it to have effect. It is also to suggest that an annual aver-
age calculated to comply with a regulatory guideline is the only way to organize 
the problem of air pollution—as well as the only way of considering how to create 
possible preventative and mitigating actions. To adhere to one expert version of 
collecting data and making facts is also to miss the question of which problems these 
facts pertain to, and which worlds they sustain (see also Stengers 2011).
It is possible both for experts’ data indicating that annual-mean levels of PM
2.5
 
are 19 µg/m3 and for citizens’ data indicating specific patterns of elevated emissions 
when viewed as 1-hour and 24-hour datasets to be “accurate.” Each of these forms 
of data takes hold and gains relevance in distinct environments, and as specific 
responses to environmental problems. If a more pluralistic ontology of data were 
to be realized, then both—and more—of these creatures of data would need to be 
recognized as relevant to our inundated urban habitats. Indeed, the very qualities of 
expertise could begin to shift and respond along with the environmental conditions 
that are meant to be governed toward more collective projects, which might be 
better addressed through multiple urban experiences and data. Here is where data 
citizens materialize as figures constituted through the relations and communities in 
and on behalf of which evidence would be mobilized.
Such pluralistic ontologies extend from data and the problems it responds to, as 
well as the modes of citizenship and rights-in-the-making that might be material-
ized through data practices. No singular figure of the data citizen concretizes here. 
These are, as Berlant has suggested, proliferating forms of citizenship, since they are 
tied to the worlds that are endured, narrated, created and hoped for. Drawing on, 
yet also critically interrogating Lefebvre’s well-known concept of the right to the 
city, while also gathering theoretical resources from Berlant’s “cruel optimism,” I 
have investigated citizen data as it is constructed and mobilized in and on behalf of 
urban worlds. Citizens who collect or analyze data might register new and signifi-
cant observations, but these forms of evidence might not make a dent in political or 
regulatory processes. In this sense, rights to data are not easily configured through 
clear codes of access and use, since data might be “open” but only certain groups 
are able to mobilize or make claims with such data, often in relation to other data 
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sources and with access to particular trajectories of power. The right to the city, 
as expressed through citizen data collection, can be a project that is undertaken 
through struggle, and that falls flat if political environments and relations do not 
exist for building on that struggle.
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, an increasing amount of legisla-
tion is being enacted in order to protect citizens’ rights in relation to data, whether 
through tracking, the right to be forgotten, the right to open data, the right to 
transparency or more. However, the generation of citizen data through citizen 
sensing technologies raises different sorts of issues that might on the one hand be 
more aligned in some ways with the expansive version of rights articulated by 
Lefebvre in the right to the city. On the other hand, Berlant’s work is also instruc-
tive as it suggests that proliferating modes of citizenship are indications of different 
experiences that will inform how rights in the making are taken up, if at all, as well 
as the struggles they produce. These different affective engagements are produc-
tive of different ways of being in the world, as they make different worlds. The 
question of rights then traverses through to the question of worlds. With rights in 
the making, what sorts of worlds are also in the making? If rights are no longer an 
adequate description of the work that data citizens undertake, then how do these 
practices generate distinct modes of political engagement? Citizen data practices 
undertaken in relation to urban environmental problems raise this challenging set 
of questions. People take up devices and make their own data and analyze a range 
of datasets, motivated often by their concerns about unjust process of urbanization 
to which they have no official rights. Rights such as the right to clean air might 
exist in some cities and countries, but these rights are frequently not observed. 
Interventional citizen data practices potentially reinvent the terrain of rights—how 
they are formed, expressed, transformed, claimed or abandoned. Such data prac-
tices form along with political subjects and collectives that are in search of more 
livable urban worlds, but which rights do not fully support.
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Note
1 As reported in “India: Health Emergency Declared as Toxic Air Shrouds New Delhi,” 
Democracy Now (8 November 2017), www.democracynow.org/2017/11/8/headlines/
india_health_emergency_declared_as_toxic_air_shrouds_new_delhi. Based on this story, 
it is unclear which pollutants measured “999” on the Air Quality Index (AQI). The AQI 
is available at https://aqicn.org/city/delhi.
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DATA RIGHTS
Claiming privacy rights through  
international institutions
Elspeth Guild
Introduction
This chapter examines the coming into existence of the data citizen. The data citizen 
is more than a data subject who is merely the object of state measures to protect the 
subject’s right to privacy. The data citizen is an actor who is entitled by reason of 
national but most importantly international law to respect for his or her privacy. The 
data citizen is a rights holder in international law regarding his or her personal data. 
The data citizen is a citizen in so far as he or she is entitled to a bundle of rights in the 
Marshallian sense (Marshall and Bottomore 1992). The source of these rights may 
be national law, but that national law must be in conformity with international law, 
which creates the citizen’s right to privacy. This has two consequences – firstly, the 
data citizen is not a citizen because a state has conferred on him or her that status. He 
or she is a citizen through the claim to rights in international law. Secondly, the data 
citizen is contesting and seeking to establish his or her citizenship right to privacy 
and is using the intersection of international and national law as a nexus through 
which to achieve these claims. Through these challenges, controversies and strug-
gles, the data citizen is under construction. This process is likely to continue for at 
least the next three decades.
By focusing on the emergence of the data citizen, the rather sterile legal debate 
on the relationship between privacy and data protection falls away. Instead, as the 
data citizen comes into existence, he or she does so by reason of the struggle for 
control of his or her privacy against both public and private actors. In legal language, 
this struggle is often framed through the human rights principle of consent to use of 
personal data. A data citizen’s personal data belongs to him or her for ever, no mat-
ter who has collected it. Every time a public or private enterprise wishes to use the 
data citizen’s personal data, it must seek the consent of the data citizen. That consent 
must be expressed in full knowledge of the exact use that will be made of his or her 
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personal data. A data citizen cannot waive his or her right to consent regarding what 
is done with his or her data, or be coerced into doing so. A state can only interfere 
with the data citizen’s personal data where it can justify that interference on the 
basis of the exceptions set out in international law (for instance in pursuit of crime, 
terrorism, etc.) and subject to all the limitations that apply to the exception such 
as justification, judicial oversight etc. This chapter examines how this data citizen 
is coming into existence notwithstanding the profound obstacles that both some 
private sector actors and some states are putting in the citizen’s way.
Why data citizens?
Revelations about the extent of state surveillance of electronic communications in 
June 2013 by Edward Snowden had a substantial impact on civil society and state 
authorities in Europe. The view that mass surveillance of electronic communica-
tions is an interference with a profound element of privacy of the person was widely 
expressed. Privacy and its regulatory counterpart, data protection, have traditionally 
been defined in the context of citizen’s rights within liberal democracies (Bennett and 
Raab, 2006). The definition of privacy and the categorisation of personal (and sensi-
tive personal) data for the purposes of state protection, while varying according to 
national sensitivities, has nonetheless been focused on and expressed in the language 
of the state-citizen relationship. The formulation of privacy and data protection as 
components of international human rights has taken place within a framework that 
does not differentiate on the basis of nationality (Chander and Lê 2014, 677–739). 
International obligations (such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights) and regional obligations (such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) are all coached in the language 
of human rights, which is to say, applicable to everyone irrespective of citizenship. 
Yet, if one looks at the controversies about protection of privacy and personal data 
obligations, almost all of them revolve around claims by citizens against their own 
state. While a citizen-foreigner divide is not part of the human rights commitments 
of states in respect of privacy (or data protection) in practice, it is almost exclusively 
citizens who challenge state practices in respect of this human right. This contro-
versy is revealed by the language used: (a) data “subjects” – the humans whose 
entitlement towards their personal data and privacy is passive, regulated by the 
state, and only transformed into an active right by constitutional rights for citizens 
(b) data “rights” – the struggle of people to have definitive rights over their personal 
data and thereby become actors (the antithesis of the argument made in US law that 
personal data belongs to the entity that collected it) irrespective of what constitution 
applies and (c) data citizens – an incipient category founded in international human 
rights law that entitled people to human rights over their personal data, irrespective 
of their state citizenship, and which is characterised by a genuine right of the citizen 
to consent or refuse to consent to the use of his or her personal data.
On entering this territory of controversy, it is important to remember that 
the right to privacy of everyone (the language of international human rights) is 
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a human right. It takes primacy over all claims, public or private sector, to use 
personal data. These actors can only use personal data of the data citizen on two 
conditions – either the data citizen has agreed and given valid consent, or there is 
an argument in public policy (for instance the investigation of a crime), which is 
sufficiently clear and precisely articulated to permit an exception to be made and 
the consent of the data citizen to be dispensed with. The duty of states to guaran-
tee to data citizens the protection of their personal data is the way in which states 
are required to deliver the data citizen’s privacy. Data protection is a necessary tool 
in the delivery of the privacy right. It is not some separate category only tangen-
tially related to the right to privacy. It is the obligation on states to deliver on the 
privacy right of the data citizen.
Data citizen
The transformation of the capacity to capture and use electronic communications 
is creating a data citizen whose rights and obligations do not derive exclusively 
from the state. The reason for this is the profoundly transnational nature of the 
transmission of personal data across international borders. The citizen of one coun-
try who sends an email to a colleague in the next office cannot rely on national 
law on privacy and its implementation through data protection by his or her own 
state. This is because that email may well cross many international borders as it is 
chopped into pieces, transmitted around the world by whatever is the fastest route 
and reassembled, and delivered to the colleague in the next office. The national law 
of one country cannot necessarily protect the privacy of citizens of that state as the 
internet does not respect national borders in the transmission of personal data of 
citizens. This process means that personal data may travel through the jurisdictions 
of many different countries before arriving at its destination. Each country will 
have different rules on privacy and data protection. A number of effects that are 
commonly bundled up in the concept of globalization have muddied the waters. 
First, within the private sector, personal data of individuals is often categorised 
as consumer data rather than citizens’ data. The private sector, particularly in the 
form of transnational companies, frequently want to treat this personal data in 
countries other than those where the data was collected. This can be because 
the data citizen’s rights are better protected in one country than in another and 
transnational companies may seek to avoid strict rules on consent by using juris-
dictions of weak or non-existent data protection to manipulate their personal data 
information. Thus, while the individual may remain a citizen in his or her own 
country, his or her personal data that has been collected by a private sector body 
may be sent for processing to some other country. While for the purposes of the 
company, the individual remains a consumer, for the purposes of the individual, he 
or she has moved from being a citizen in his or her own state vis-à-vis the personal 
data that was collected to being a foreigner vis-à-vis the country where his or her 
personal data is being processed. Differences in privacy and data protection laws at 
the national level and in the extent to which states have adhered to international 
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human rights obligations relating to privacy and personal data become central for 
the individual as regards what happens to his or her privacy (Bennett 2017).
Secondly, people move. According to the UN World Tourism Organization 
(UNWTO 2018), there were more than 1 billion tourists who moved from one 
country to another in 2016 (counted on the basis of arrivals). The vast majority of 
these people are citizens of their country of departure, but on leaving become for-
eigners in the country where they arrive. Their travel activities transform them from 
citizens into foreigners and back again every time they move from home abroad 
and back. People who travel across international borders have become a category 
of persons about whom very substantial amounts of information are gathered. The 
private sector collects information from such persons for its own marketing and 
monitoring purposes; these are customers. The sector also collects information for 
states under a variety of obligations, though generally this is through personal data 
sharing arrangements about data that the sector already collects.
The best known is the Passenger Name Record (PNR) data sharing duty, which 
a small but growing number of governments (so far) impose on all airlines carrying 
people to their country or travelling through their airspace.1 The EU is establish-
ing a similar programme (Mitsilegas, Valsamis, and Vavoula 2017, 232). Here, the 
personal data is about individuals. They have to provide it to airlines in the context 
of booking flights, receiving boarding cards, etc., though most of those individuals 
were citizens in their own state and maybe contracting with local companies. The 
data is made available to state authorities not only elsewhere in the world but also 
in their own state; states claim the right to treat that personal data as belonging to 
foreigners and use it for intrusive automated processing purposes (though there will 
also be own nationals among them).
Thirdly, international travel results in the collection and use of personal data in 
other ambiguous citizen-foreigner contexts. For instance, anyone who is subject 
to a mandatory visa requirement to travel to a specific country will be obliged 
to provide information to the destination country in order to obtain a visa.2 The 
information that individuals may be required to provide about themselves in order 
to obtain a visa can be quite extensive and intrusive. For example, for those who 
must obtain a Schengen visa to visit any of the EU states that participate in the 
Schengen area, consulates may require that they produce wages slips for a period 
of months before the intended departure, information about family members and 
their whereabouts, biometric data including fingerprints etc. All this personal 
information is then stored in the Visa Information System and made available to 
law enforcement authorities in the EU (Schengen) Member States. While the per-
sonal data will be collected from the individual while he or she is a citizen in his 
or her own country (and thus at least potentially subject also to national laws), it is 
collected by the authorities of a foreign state, transmitted to a database in the EU 
and made available to many law enforcement authorities of countries with which 
the individual may never have had any contact at all. The act of seeking a visa for a 
short stay in a foreign country is the trigger that the foreign country uses to collect, 
process and share that personal data with a wide range of actors and other states.
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Fourth, when people move for longer periods, for instance to study in a foreign 
country or work there for a while, they will need to provide much more detailed 
personal data to the immigration authorities of the host state. Immigration forms 
for residence on these grounds often run to many pages and must be supported 
by sensitive personal data about finances, health status etc. However, that personal 
data may or may not be secure. For example, the UK forms require the individual 
to consent to the use of his or her data in the following terms:
I understand that all information provided by me to the Home Office will 
be treated in confidence but that it may be disclosed to other government 
departments, agencies, local authorities, the police, foreign governments and 
other bodies for immigration purposes or to enable them to perform their 
functions, and that, if such bodies provide the Home Office with any infor-
mation about me which may be relevant for immigration purposes, it may 
be used in reaching a decision on my application.
Under a UK-US agreement, the US authorities are entitled to access to all the 
information that the individual provided to the UK authorities for the considera-
tion of his or her immigration application. Data citizens: citizens of what state?
How do states and data citizens interact on the basis of their relationship – 
state/citizen, foreigner/state? How do people claim data rights that transcend the 
traditional citizen foreigner divide, and where do they look for these new rights 
to transform themselves into data citizens? I will address this question from two 
perspectives. First, how have international human rights obligations with respect 
to privacy or personal data protection become the place to search for data rights 
outside the framework of state constitutions for their citizens? And second, what 
are the state practices at play that seek to blur the lines and undermine their own 
state constitutional guarantees to citizens? I will examine these questions under the 
following categories:
1. Privacy and personal data protection and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) – is everyone the data citizen?
2. Personal data sharing agreements in the area of borders and immigration 
among states versus the data citizen.
In examining these two categories, I will return to some of the examples I have 
referred to in this introduction and provide a fuller and more in-depth examination 
of the issues at stake.
Data citizens and international human rights: the ICCPR
The Snowden revelations regarding mass surveillance have not only had very 
substantial political repercussions over 2013 and into 2014, but have also raised 
profound legal questions. Among these is the question of the protection of the 
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privacy and data of citizens in comparison with the protection of the same rights 
in respect of foreigners. One of the most striking aspects of the response of the 
US Government to the concerns articulated by governments of other countries 
about the revelations of US mass surveillance internationally has been the US 
President’s assurance to US citizens, but only to US citizens, that their privacy 
will be fully protected. While the privacy of foreigners will be augmented, the 
(then) President made it very clear that foreigners cannot rely on the same pri-
vacy protections as US citizens. The reason for this is because in the logic of 
the President’s speech, foreigners are more of a security risk to the USA than its 
own citizens.
Specifically, the then US President Barack Obama’s speech of 17 January 2014 
stated that “the legal safeguards that restrict surveillance against U.S. persons with-
out a warrant do not apply to foreign persons overseas” (White House Press Office 
2014). Here, the citizen-national constitutional rights framework of privacy is 
clearly demonstrated. The US Government’s reliance on law as national constitu-
tional law is clearly drawn. In pursuit of these constitutional issues related to the 
Snowden revelations, the US President clarified how the state would protect the 
constitutional rights of US citizen (at least those who stay in the USA). The steps 
that the President promised in the speech included
we will reform programs and procedures in place to provide greater trans-
parency to our surveillance activities, and fortify the safeguards that protect 
the privacy of U.S. persons . . . we will provide additional protections 
for activities conducted under Section 702, which allows the govern-
ment to intercept the communications of foreign targets overseas who 
have information that’s important for our national security. Specifically, 
I am asking the Attorney General and DNI [Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence] to institute reforms that place additional restrictions 
on government’s ability to retain, search, and use in criminal cases com-
munications between Americans and foreign citizens incidentally collected 
under Section 702.”
The fracture of the national constitutional logic on the right to privacy appeared 
at a slightly later stage in the President’s speech when he stated, “I have taken the 
unprecedented step of extending certain protections that we have for the American 
people to people overseas. I’ve directed the DNI, in consultation with the Attorney 
General, to develop these safeguards, which will limit the duration that we can 
hold personal information, while also restricting the use of this information” (Ibid). 
This nod to concerns of governments elsewhere in the world to the surveillance of 
their citizens is couched in the terms of noblesse oblige; the unprecedented quality 
of the US Government’s commitment to protect the privacy of foreigners is not 
acknowledge by the US authorities as founded in any legal obligation to do so. It is 
unprecedented because it goes beyond the legal obligations of the US government 
under its national constitution. The qualification of the protection of the privacy 
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of foreigners as “unprecedented” reveals a profound refusal to accept the premise 
that the international human rights obligations of states (including the USA) affect 
the way in which states act towards personal data of foreigners.
Yet, three interconnected but separate human rights issues arise as regards mass 
surveillance. The first, which is the most fundamental but is the most frequently 
ignored, is the prohibition on arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy,3 
alternatively formulated as the right of every person to respect for his or her private 
and family life.4 The second, which is generally the subject of more substantial 
political and media noise, is the duty of states to protect personal data. The noise 
around personal data protection general depends on the differing national legisla-
tion that is designed to give effect to the right to privacy. The third is the right of 
expression, the so-called “chilling factor” that knowledge of mass surveillance has 
on people’s willingness and ability to express their opinions freely (La Rue 2011). 
This human rights violation related to mass surveillance has been most forensically 
analysed in the contest of academic work on effect of surveillance by the former 
East German Stasi and Romanian Securitate on their people’s right of expression.5 
The conclusion of these works is that knowledge of or the well-founded suspicion 
that state authorities are listening into private conversations and communication 
has profound consequences on the ability of people to express themselves freely.
Those political actors who have an interest in promoting the legality of mass 
surveillance usually put forward two arguments. The first is that national and 
international security is always an exception to both the duty of every state to 
respect people’s privacy and the duty to protect personal data. Where national 
and international security interests are at stake, states are not only entitled to rely 
on the qualification of the rights but also may have differing standards, which are 
nonetheless consistent with the margin of appreciation applicable to the rights.6 
This is the most trenchantly defended of arguments, as when this one falls away, 
those actors seeking to justify mass surveillance find themselves on weaker legal 
ground (Harris 2010). The second argument is that states’ obligations to protect 
personal data are subject to very different rules and requirements according to the 
political preferences of different states. Thus, as there is no harmonization of the 
specific rules as to what is acceptable data protection internationally, states that are 
exercising their national and international security prerogatives only need to fulfil 
their own national data protection rules.7 For the moment, the response to the 
chilling effect on the right to freedom of expression has been rather muted at least 
by those political actors interested in promoting mass surveillance as a necessary 
security tool.Yet, the right to respect for a person’s privacy is an overarching inter-
national human right. It is found in the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 19488 and its constraining legal form is contained in the UN’s International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966.9 Any interference with the privacy 
of a person must first and foremost be subject to the consent of that person. That 
consent must be informed, that is to say the individual must know exactly what 
he or she is consenting to, how his or her personal data may be used and the pre-
cise limits to that use. Uninformed consent is not consent. The right to consent 
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or refuse use of personal data belongs to the individual not the state. Thus, any 
interference without consent is an exception and as such must be strictly limited. 
Where the state seeks to interfere with that right and to collect and use personal 
data, which constitutes an intrusion into the privacy of the person concerned, such 
an interference must be justified by the state authorities. First it must be permitted 
by law and that law must be sufficiently clear and public that everyone can know 
what the law states and how to adjust their behaviour accordingly. Any exception 
permitted by law to a human right must be interpreted narrowly. It must have a 
legitimate objective and be necessary to achieve that objective only. There must be 
no alternative, which would be less intrusive into the life of the person that could 
instead be used. There must be judicial oversight of any state interference and a 
person affected by an interference must have access to justice to challenge that 
interference (Bennett 2011). Mass surveillance by its very nature is not targeted at 
any person specifically thus the possibility to justify the interference with the pri-
vacy of any person individually is an exceedingly difficult task. Where such mass, 
weakly targeted surveillance techniques have been used in Europe, the European 
Court of Human Rights has found them inconsistent with the right to respect for 
privacy. The core problem is that mass surveillance is, by definition, arbitrary.10 
The challenge for the data citizen is twofold: first, to establish his or her existence 
as a citizen with rights in the transnational world of personal data transmission, and 
second, to push the international community to take responsible for the protection 
of the data citizen’s data through concrete measures clarifying the data citizen’s 
right to his or her privacy and achieving agreement and practical guidelines and 
roadmaps for states to deliver the data rights of this new kind of citizen.
Moving then from the state of human rights to the political struggle regarding 
mass surveillance, clearly the US authorities are faced with a dilemma in inter-
national human rights law, an area about which they have always been rather 
wary. The 1950s approach to international human rights law was to claim that 
the instruments do no more than set out principles and are not ‘real’ law in any 
significant way and are certainly not available for people to rely upon (Ishay 2008). 
This political position has been undermined by the development of very precise 
international obligations, the establishment of Treaty Bodies with jurisdiction to 
receive and adjudicate on complaints by individuals regarding alleged breaches of 
their international human rights and the embrace of international human rights law 
by national courts (Falk 2002). The principles approach to international human 
rights law is no longer tenable, it is a fig leaf deployed occasionally by states seeking 
to act arbitrarily (Ghandhi 2012). As the Snowden revelations became increasingly 
politically salient among international issues in 2013–4, a number of states, pri-
marily led by the Brazilian and German authorities began to address the issue of 
how to deal with US mass surveillance and interception of communications. There 
was much discussion about bilateral negotiations and unilateral action, for instance 
building new cables that avoid US territory (Blau 2014, 14–16). However, it was 
rapidly evident that bilateral and unilateral approaches were not going to be satisfac-
tory. In Europe, the UK authorities were carrying out mass surveillance for their 
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US counterparts and others – the so-called Five Eyes, the surveillance alliance of 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the USA and the UK (Greenwald, Poitras and 
MacAskill 2013) – yet were not only members of the Council of Europe but also 
of the European Union. This was only one example of the problem of unilateral 
or bilateral approaches. Clearly only multilateral efforts were likely to bring results 
where the weight of the USA and some of its collaborators could be counterbal-
anced by a loose alliance of other states. As soon as the issue is defined in this way, 
the obvious venue to commence a response is the UN General Assembly and the 
territory on which to prepare the response is international human rights obligations – 
the prohibition of arbitrary interference with peoples’ privacy.
This is the road that the Brazilian and German authorities followed. By August 
2013 the moves were afoot for a resolution of the General Assembly. Five non-
governmental organizations were closely linked with the efforts; Access, Amnesty 
International, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Human Rights Watch and Privacy 
International were also applying pressure for a strongly worded resolution. The 
Brazilian and German authorities were by no means alone in their efforts to 
achieve agreement of a UN General Assembly Resolution. Many smaller states, 
most notably Austria, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, but also 
others, very strongly supported the work from the beginning even seconding staff 
to assist with the workload. The matter was assigned to the General Assembly’s 
Third Committee and it is there that the tense negotiations on the wording of 
the Resolution took place. A text was adopted on 26 November in the Third 
Committee and on 18 December 2013 it was adopted without vote in the General 
Assembly of the UN (Carrera, Guild and Parkin 2014).
The Resolution is based on the right to respect for privacy in the Universal 
Declaration and the ICCPR with specific reference to the prohibition on arbitrary 
interference. It ties the right to privacy to the right to freedom of expression – if 
people are subject to mass surveillance, they are no longer able to express them-
selves freely. The preamble to the Resolution insists on the negative impact that 
surveillance and interception of communications, including extraterritorial sur-
veillance and interception, on a mass scale has on the exercise and enjoyment of 
human rights. The Resolution calls upon states to respect the right to privacy and 
prevent violations; to review their procedures, practices and legislation regarding 
surveillance of communications, their interception and collection of personal data, 
including mass surveillance, interception and collection with a view to uphold-
ing the right to privacy and ensuring the full and effective implementation of all 
their obligations under international human rights law and to establish or maintain 
independent, effective domestic oversight mechanisms capable of ensuring trans-
parency and accountability of state’s actions.
The UN Human Rights Council (composed of 47 states elected by the General 
Assembly) has also already engaged with the issue. The High Commissioner noted 
at that meeting that the threat that mass surveillance poses to human rights is among 
the most pressing global human rights situations today. Many state representatives 
present at that session had regard to the report of UN Special Rapporteur on the 
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promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. La 
Rue (2011) had already outlined many dangers of state surveillance and its impact 
of free speech. What is perhaps surprising is that the September 2013 meeting of 
the Human Rights Council received so little press coverage. The meeting was 
well attended by state representatives. The discussions were incendiary as many 
state representatives attended the meeting with statements of condemnation of 
mass surveillance and interception of communications already prepared and agreed 
with neighbouring states on whose behalf they were mandated to speak. While 
one might well expect the German representative to present a text on behalf of 
Austria, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland it is perhaps less obvi-
ous that Pakistan, speaking on behalf of Cuba, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Uganda, 
Ecuador, Russia, Indonesia, Bolivia, Iran and China would also present an agreed 
text condemning the practices. While the counter move particularly in respect of 
this second set of countries is usually to attack them on the basis of their internal 
practices of surveillance and suggest, if not accuse them of, hypocrisy, the fact 
of the intervention nonetheless must be noted and the possibility that a group 
of states with serious disagreements among themselves would choose common 
ground on this subject.
What the debate in 2013 and 2014 reveals is that the division of privacy rights 
along the lines of citizens/foreigners is increasingly challenged on the basis of uni-
versality of human rights. The categorisation of privacy as an issue exclusively 
determined on the basis of constitutional relationships of citizens with their states 
has now been fundamentally challenged by data rights as human rights. The UN 
General Assembly has rejected the citizen-foreigner distinction, arguing that pri-
vacy is an international human right guaranteed by international instruments that 
must be respected by all signatory states. The attempt by the US authorities to 
frame the protection of the privacy of foreigners as an act of generosity by the US 
authorities unrelated to US state human rights obligations has been rejected by the 
UN General Assembly. Further, those states that carried the debate in the General 
Assembly were in no doubt that the right to privacy of all people, whether citizens 
or foreigners, vis-a-vis the state collecting the private data has extraterritorial effect. 
Where a state exercises its jurisdiction by collecting personal data anywhere in the 
world, that exercise of jurisdiction, implied or explicit, carries with it the human 
right prohibition on arbitrary interference with privacy.
The immediate outcome has been the creation of a new post at the UN level 
of Special Rapporteur on Privacy, and the appointment of Professor Joseph 
Cannataci of Malta in July 2015. The mandate (Resolution 28/16) given to the 
Special Rapporteur by the Human Rights Council is:
(a) To gather relevant information, including on international and national frame-
works, national practices and experience, to study trends, developments and 
challenges in relation to the right to privacy and to make recommendations to 
ensure its promotion and protection, including in connection with the chal-
lenges arising from new technologies;
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(b) To seek, receive and respond to information, while avoiding duplication, from 
States, the United Nations and its agencies, programmes and funds, regional 
human rights mechanisms, national human rights institutions, civil society or-
ganizations, the private sector, including business enterprises, and any other 
relevant stakeholders or parties;
(c) To identify possible obstacles to the promotion and protection of the right to 
privacy, to identify, exchange and promote principles and best practices at the 
national, regional and international levels, and to submit proposals and recom-
mendations to the Human Rights Council in that regard, including with a 
view to particular challenges arising in the digital age;
(d) To participate in and contribute to relevant international conferences and 
events with the aim of promoting a systematic and coherent approach on 
issues pertaining to the mandate;
(e) To raise awareness concerning the importance of promoting and protecting 
the right to privacy, including with a view to particular challenges arising in 
the digital age, as well as concerning the importance of providing individuals 
whose right to privacy has been violated with access to effective remedy, con-
sistent with international human rights obligations;
(f) To integrate a gender perspective throughout the work of the mandate;
(g) To report on alleged violations, wherever they may occur, of the right to pri-
vacy, as set out in article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
including in connection with the challenges arising from new technologies, 
and to draw the attention of the Council and the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Human Rights to situations of particularly serious concern;
(h) To submit an annual report to the Human Rights Council and to the Gen-
eral Assembly, starting at the thirty-first session and the seventy-first session 
respectively.
The Special Rapporteur presented his report (A/HRC/34/60) to the Human 
Rights Council in February 2017 calling for privacy-friendly oversight of govern-
ment surveillance.
Personal data sharing among states – hastening the 
emergence of the data citizen?
As people move between countries, they find themselves straddling between the 
status of citizen and foreigner. This is a moment of particular vulnerability when 
people find themselves subject to a variety of state acts that would not be legal 
within a state but are countenanced at the border. The detention of people at the 
border is one of the areas that has received substantial attention over the past dec-
ade. While citizens cannot be prevented from entering their state of nationality, 
foreigners (who only a few hours earlier may have been citizens in their own state) 
have not such guarantee. Thus, to prevent them from making an unauthorised 
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entry onto the territory of a state, wide detention powers have been adopted by 
many liberal democracies (Cornelisse 2011, 207–226; Wilsher 2012). In the con-
text of border and immigration controls, because states have claimed the sovereign 
power to control their external borders, foreigners seeking to cross those borders 
may be required to provide very substantial amounts of personal data in order to 
justify to officials the reason for their admission. This power to require people to 
hand over large amounts of personal data in order to enter a state has been widely 
used liberal democracies including against the citizen of one another. In this con-
text, states increasingly claim the right to require the individual to consent to the 
use of his or her personal data in ways that the state itself will determine after the 
fact. The idea that there is some purpose limitation regarding the use of personal 
data of foreigners who have been required to provide the data in the context of 
immigration procedures has not yet been accepted by many state authorities. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the UK authorities require anyone seeking a visa 
for short or long stay in the UK to “consent” to the UK authorities sharing their 
personal data not only with an unspecified wide range of actors within the state but 
also with the authorities of third countries. The wording of the UK consent does 
not even limit the exchange and use of personal data to immigration related pur-
pose, as it includes providing personal data to foreign authorities to enable them to 
perform their functions, whatever those might be. This is an exceptionally widely 
formulated “consent”. Indeed, it is so wide that it is hard even to categorise it as 
consent as the individual has virtually no idea nor any way of finding out what may 
become of his or her personal data, or with whom it might be shared.
Just when the world’s data-related attention was fixed on the Snowden revela-
tions in 2013, the UK and US authorities entered into an agreement to exchange 
personal data of people provided o them in the context of immigration procedures. 
A year earlier, the US authorities had entered into a similar agreement with their 
Canadian counterparts,11 but for my purposes I will focus on the UK/US agree-
ment not least because of the European considerations that arise.
The US/UK agreement is important as it permits the exchange of substantial 
amounts of personal data collected in the context of visa and immigration proce-
dures between the two countries. As everyone who works in the immigration field 
is well aware, people must divulge enormous amounts of sensitive personal data in 
immigration procedures. This agreement establishes a framework for a new level of 
exchange of personal data between states, which is purported to be lawful.
The agreement was signed on 18 April 2013 in New Zealand.12 There 
are four aspects of the Agreement that bear attention: (1) the definition of 
Information; (2) the scope and purpose of the agreement; (3) disclosure and use 
of data; (4) protections for the data subject.
Information
The definition of Information is a key part of the agreement as everything else 
depends on it. Information means data that a person provides to either of the 
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authorities (US or UK) for the purposes of: (1) authorisation for transit; (2) travel 
(e.g. visas, ESTAs etc.); (3) work (all categories); (4) residence (all categories); (5) 
citizenship applications (all types).
This includes personal data on admissibility, immigration or nationality com-
pliance actions and or decisions. All this personal data is Information that may be 
shared between the parties. This covers just about everything that a person pro-
vides to the immigration authorities on either side of the Atlantic. For instance, 
in the context of family reunification applications, people frequently need to pro-
vide photographs of their marriages and lists of those who were present in order 
to satisfy the authorities that the marriage is genuine. This personal data, including 
personal data of third parties, would constitute Information for the purposes of 
the Agreement.
Scope and purpose
Personal data categorised as Information can be shared between the UK and US 
authorities for the following purposes: to enforce or administer immigration and 
nationality laws of either party; to facilitate decision-making on applications for transit, 
visas, admission, extension of stay, other immigration benefit, nationality or removal; 
to prevent, investigate or punish acts that would constitute a crime that would make 
the individual inadmissible or removable under the laws of either party. As commis-
sion of even fairly minor crimes can be a mandatory refusal ground for entry onto the 
territory of the UK (and the US) this is a rather wide catch-all provision.
This personal data can be provided either on a systemic search or a case-by-case 
one. So, the US authorities could ask for all personal data on, for instance, anyone 
who has received a specific kind of permission to remain in the UK leave and vice-
versa in a systemic search (or all asylum seekers), or could ask for all personal data 
on a named individual.
The scope of the agreement is limited to personal data on non-British or US 
citizens, though the temporal element in respect of information on citizenship 
applications is entirely unclear. The UK authorities have also signalled that “The 
UK will hold limited, if any, Information about European Economic Area nation-
als and their family members due to their free movement rights under European 
Union (EU) law.” This is rather weak limitation as there is no UK commitment 
not to share Information on EU citizens and their family members with their US 
counterparts. It is only a warning to the US authorities that the UK may not have 
very much on these people. Also, there is no limitation on the UK authorities seek-
ing information on EU citizens and their family members from the US authorities.
Disclosure and use of data
The UK and US authorities agree to provide one another with Information so long 
as it is for one of the purposes set out earlier. They may disclose all the personal data 
to any of their domestic authorities, which can make out an argument that they 
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have a role in carrying out one of the purposes. This could include criminal justice 
authorities, intelligence and police. The parties agree not to disclose this personal 
data to any private party, the public, a foreign government, international organiza-
tion or court without express consent of the other party. However, if the other party 
consents then they can share further the data with courts and other governments. 
The only limitation is that when the authorities are sharing personal data, they make 
their best efforts to ensure that the data is not disclosed to home authorities of refu-
gees or persons with protection under the UN Convention against Torture (that is 
to say, disclose to the persecutors). If the person has not yet been granted refugee 
status or CAT protection then the parties should not share his or her personal data 
with the home state if it is “reasonably foreseeable” that the person will be granted 
international protection. The same goes for the asylum seeker’s family members.
What is particularly interesting here is that it is clearly foreseen that personal 
data may be shared with the country of origin of the individual. While British and 
US citizens are excluded from the scope of the Agreement, data for instance on 
Canadian citizens can be shared between the two parties and with consent, to the 
Canadian authorities as well. A similar provision in the US-Canada Agreement 
would allow for instance for information on British citizens who have provided 
information to the Canadian authorities to be passed to the US authorities. With 
the consent of the Canadian authorities, the US authorities could then share that 
personal data with the UK authorities so long as there was no question of the indi-
vidual being a refugee from the UK. In this way, the restriction on the sharing of 
personal data to that of foreigners can be undermined. Provided that states have 
agreements with a sufficient number of countries then the treatment of personal 
data of foreigners according to one set of rules that is particularly lax and become 
the norm even for the collection of personal data about the state’s own citizens.
Thus, the principle implicit in the Agreement that personal data of citizens 
of the state parties must be subject to different rules than that of foreigners may 
become meaningless.
Where is the data controller to protect the rights of  
the data citizen?
There is not much regarding the data subject him or herself. The UK and US 
authorities confirm to one another in the agreement that they have systems 
whereby people can request access to their personal data and its correction or nota-
tion. They further assure one another that where their authorities refuse to give 
access to data or to correct it, the data subject can seek redress. The UK and US 
authorities permit themselves to retain all the personal data they have exchanged 
for as long as they think it necessary. They are only obliged to destroy personal 
data if it is not relevant to a purpose or erroneously provided. The wording of the 
Agreement makes it clear that no rights are conferred on the data subject as a result 
of it. Enforcement, for instance of the rights of the data subject is only available to 
one of the parties to the Agreement, not to those affected.
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This type of agreement evidences the fragility of people when they are within 
the power of immigration and border authorities and are not citizens of the state. 
It also highlights the assumption that the privacy of citizens of states parties to such 
agreements should not be covered by its provisions because their privacy is entitled 
to a higher standard of protection than that of the foreigner. What happens in this 
context is that the personal data and privacy of the individual who has become 
a foreigner by travelling is available for use without the same strict protections, 
which would be applicable if the individual was a citizen in his or her own state. 
In the context of these Agreements, the only international commitment that is 
directly referred to is the Refugee Convention.13 While that convention is incor-
porated into the Agreement, other human rights conventions are ignored.
However, it became clear to both parties to the agreement that the data citizen 
escapes the categorisation of foreigner or citizen because the data citizen is an incip-
ient legal subject whose authority and legitimacy derives from international rather 
than national law. This change of perspective was incorporated into an exchange of 
notes to the agreement which by implementing arrangements permits the extension 
of its scope to nationals of the parties.14 So, the data citizen comes into being. He or 
she is the citizen of a state, but for the purposes of the collection, storage, processing 
and sharing of his or her personal data, he or she is now a data citizen and will have 
to rely on supranational sources of law to protection his or her data rights.
Conclusion
The transformation of the way personal data moves around the world is heralding 
the emergence of a data citizen – everyone, in the language of international human 
rights law – who is entitled to privacy and as a consequence the right to consent 
to (or refuse) the use of his or her personal data by pubic and private actors. It is 
evident that a number of liberal democratic states consider that the privacy and 
personal data of foreigners does not deserve the same degree of protection as that 
of citizens. This is evident in the aftermath of the 2013/2014 Snowden revelations 
not only from the practices revealed but more importantly from the reaction by the 
US authorities. The issue of mass surveillance of personal data was framed as one 
in which the citizen foreigner distinction was of substantial importance. While the 
US authorities accepted their duty to respect the privacy of their own citizens and 
the legitimacy of concerns by their own citizens regarding surveillance practices 
on themselves, they refused to acknowledge the same right to foreigners. To the 
extent that foreigners enjoy privacy or protection of their personal data, this is by 
reason of the generosity of the US authorities.
This approach to the citizen/foreigner divide was challenged by a number of 
countries that sought to express the right to privacy as an essential element of the 
prohibition on arbitrary interference with privacy contained in the ICCPR. Thus, 
the venue for the struggle was UN human rights obligations and their capacity to 
efface the difference regarding privacy and protection of personal data between 
foreigners and citizens.
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The second case study that I have examined to throw light on how the citizen/
foreigner differentiation works in the area of privacy, is the treatment of personal 
data provided to national authorities in the context of immigration and border 
procedures. Here I analysed an agreement between the USA and the UK regarding 
the sharing of such personal data in order to understand how this personal data is 
perceived and treated. It is evident that the countries entering into the agreement 
considered that the privacy of their citizens was such that even where their citizens 
are foreigners within the territory of the other contracting party, their privacy 
should be respected and their data not made subject to the data sharing rules. On 
the other hand, virtually all personal data provided by foreigners to the authorities 
of the parties is eligible for sharing. That sharing can be with a rather wide range 
of state actors and can extend to third countries on the basis of state consent. It 
is evident from the agreements that the states entering into them do not consider 
themselves constrained by the same rules about privacy and personal data protec-
tion that apply to citizens when they are dealing with the data of foreigners. But in 
recognition of the difficulty of separating the citizen and the foreigner in the data 
world, the agreement was extended to include all persons – the new data citizen as 
the object of state surveillance.
The data citizen will need to emerge from international human rights obliga-
tions of states. This requires the active participation of international organisations 
and civil society bodies in promoting the existence of this new citizen. Effective 
rights that characterise citizenship will only emerge in this field with the effective 
contestation of the claimed legitimacy of certain states to a monopoly over their 
entitlement to use everyone’s personal data as they wish.
Notes
 1 Australia, Canada, Japan, the European Union, the USA.
 2 There are exceptions of course such as the Turkish visa system where foreigners buy the visa 
at the border when they arrive and thus provide very little information about themselves.
 3 Article 17(1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 “No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or cor-
respondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.”
 4 Article 8 European Convention on Human Rights.
 5 cf. The Lives of Others (Sony Pictures Home Entertainment 2007); Deletant 1995; Dennis 
and Laporte 2003.
 6 This doctrine has been much developed by the organs of the Council of Europe in the 
context of the ECHR (cf. Council of Europe 2014).
 7 For an excellent analysis see Hosein and Palow 2013. For some of the counter arguments 
see Wright et al 2009.
 8 Article 12: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has 
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
 9 Article 17(1) ICCPR.
 10 As in Klass & ors v Germany, 6 September 1978; S & Marper v UK, 4 December 2008.
 11 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United 
States of America for the Sharing of Visa and Immigration Information 13 December 
2012; Canadian Treaty E105246.
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 12 Why there, one might wonder?
 13 UN Convention relating to the status of refugees 1951 and its 1967 Protocol.
 14 Exchange of Notes to amend the Agreement between the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States 
of America for the Sharing of Visa, Immigration, and Nationality Information, done at 
Queensland on 18 April 2013 signed 29-Sep-2016; published: Treaty Series 035/2016: 
CM9279 (554KB).
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